Judgment :- M. Karpagavinayagam, J. The detention order dated 17.1.2005 branding the detenu as a 'Bootlegger' is sought to be challenged in this habeas corpus petition filed by the brother of the detenu. 2. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the detention order was passed by the detaining authority on 17.1.2005 detaining the detenu in pursuance of the powers conferred to him in G.O.(D).No.274, Prohibition and Excise (XVI) Department, dated 18.10.2004, issued by the Government under Section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 and since the said Government Order conferring the powers to the detaining authority to pass orders under Section 3(2) of the Act would expire on the ninetieth day i.e., 16.1.2005, the detention order in this case, dated 17.1.2005, is not valid and consequently the detention order is liable to be quashed. 3. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that this ground is not a valid one in view of the fact that G.O.(D).No.274, Prohibition and Excise (XVI) Department, dated 18.10.2004 has conferred the power to the detaining authority under Section 3(2) of the Act to exercise the power for a period of three months from 18.10.2004 and as such, the three months' time would expire only on 17.1.2005 and thereafter, the new Government Order in G.O.(D).No.33 Prohibition & Excise (XVI) Department, dated 18.1.2005 conferring the similar powers to the detaining authority had come into force and as such, the detention order passed on 17.1.2005, by virtue of the powers conferred under G.O.(D).No.274, Prohibition and Excise (XVI) Department, dated 18.10.2004, is perfectly valid as the same was passed within a period of three months. 4. Several Judgments have been cited by both the parties to substantiate their pleas. However, it is to be noted that three months period has to be calculated on month wise and not on days wise. The term 'one month' is defined under General Clauses Act. As per Section 3(35), a 'month' is defined as 'a month shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar'. Therefore, the term 'month' as contained in the relevant G.O. dated 18.10.2004 would be a calendar month. The term 'one month' is defined under General Clauses Act. As per Section 3(35), a 'month' is defined as 'a month shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar'. Therefore, the term 'month' as contained in the relevant G.O. dated 18.10.2004 would be a calendar month. As per Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, the number of days in a month reckoned according to the British Calendar under which some months have 31 days and others have 30 days, while one month as 28, in the leap year 29 days. This point is dealt with in the decision in K.K.C.Textiles Mills rep. by its Partner C.Rathnasamy and Anr. v. Maize Products, Ahmedabad rep. by the Zonal Manager (1998 (2) MWN (Crl) 179). 5. So, in the light of the definition of a 'month' as per Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that 'three months' being the calendar months cannot be restricted to the meaning of "90 days". If the calendar month is reckoned, it goes without saying that the period of three months would expire as on 17.1.2005 and not on 16.1.2005 as claimed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. At the end, the learned counsel for the petitioner would request this Court to consider the point that there is delay in considering the representation. However, from the chart produced by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it is seen that the representation of the detenu dated 29.1.2005 was received by the Government on 2.2.2005 and after collecting the remarks from the sponsoring authority on 10.2.2005, the report was sent to the Government on the same day and the final order has been passed by the Minister concerned on 17.2.2005 and the rejection letter was prepared on 23.2.2005 and ultimately the same was served on the detenu on 26.2.2005. Hence, we are of the view that there is no delay in considering the representation. Therefore, this ground is also liable to be rejected. 7. The Habeas Corpus Petition is dismissed.