JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. I have heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. K.K. Batra, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4. I have also heard Mr. M. Bhuyan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1. 2. The material facts, which are not in dispute, may, in a narrow compass, be set as follows : - The petitioner No. 1, which is a limited company registered under the Companies Act with the petitioner No. 2, as one of its shareholders, availed credit facilities from the respondent No. 3, namely, Union Bank of India (in short 'the UBI') for construction of a project known as "Hotel Kuber". On failure of the petitioner No. 1 to keep its commitment to the UBI, the account of the petitioner No. 1 became 'Non-performing Asset' (hereinafter referred to as-'NPA') as far back as in the year 1991. The UBI, thereafter, initiated a recovery proceeding, which was registered as OA 135/97, in the Debts Recovery Tribunal (in short 'the DRT'), Guwahati. The petitioners, as defendants, participated in the said proceeding, which was eventually disposed of by judgment and order, dated 20.6.2002, whereby the learned Tribunal held the UBI entitled to recover the amounts claimed by them with interest and the cost holding the defendant-petitioners herein jointly and severally liable for making payment of the same. A certificate was accordingly issued in favour of the UBI for recovery of Rs. 81,88,778.57 with interest at the rate of 12.5 per cent from the date of institution of the suit till realization thereof. On 29.1.2003, the Reserve Bank of India (in short, "the RBI') issued some guidelines for compromise/settlement of the NPA of public sector banks. On 24.3.2003, the petitioner No. 1 wrote a letter to the respondent No. 4, namely, General Manager, Union Bank of India, Eastern Region, Kolkata, expressing its willingness to compromise its outstanding balance in terms of the RBI's said guidelines. As the UBI did not accede to the request made by the petitioners, the petitioners have approached this Court, with the help of their present writ petition, seeking issuance of appropriate writ(s) commending the UBI to settle their claims against the petitioners by taking resort to the said guidelines, dated 29.1.2003, aforementioned. 3. Presenting the case on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. 3. Presenting the case on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, has submitted that the guidelines, dated 29.1.2003, aforementioned clearly show that these guidelines apply to the cases, which are pending in the DRT. It has also been submitted by Mr. K.N. Choudhury that since the certificate of recovery issued by the learned Tribunal is, now, pending for execution/recovery with the respondent No. 5, namely, Recovery Officer, DRT, Guwahati, and since the guidelines issued by the RBI are binding on all the public sector banks, such as, the UBI, these guidelines ought to have been resorted to by the UBI, for, the guidelines squarely apply to the facts of the present case. 4. Controverting to the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. K.K. Batra, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, has contended that the said guidelines apply to only pending proceedings and not to such proceedings, which stand concluded with decrees passed or recovery certificates issued. Once a decree is passed or a recovery certificate is issued, these guidelines, in the light of the contents of the guidelines, cannot, according to Mr. Batra, be applied. It has been pointed out by Mr. K.K. Batra that the question as to whether the guidelines apply to such suits or recovery proceedings, where the decrees have been granted or the recovery certificates have been issued, has been considered in two cases by the Bombay High Court and it has been held therein that the guidelines aforementioned do not apply to the cases, wherein decrees have already been passed. Reference, in this regard, is made by Mr. Batra to the decision, dated 3.7.2003, passed in WP(C) No. 973/03 (Chemosyn Ltd. and Anr. v. Union Bank of India and Anr.) and (Sathe Biscuits & Chocolates Co. Ltd. v. Bank of Maharashtra). 5. In fact, in the two cases, which Mr. Batra has relied upon, the RBI had appeared and contended that the said guidelines would not apply to the suits or proceedings, which stand decreed. Mr. M. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the RBI, submits that the stand of the UBI is consistent and that there is no change in their stand that the guidelines, dated 29.1.2003, aforementioned do not apply to the recovery proceedings, which stand concluded with the passing of the decree or issuance of recovery certificates. 6. Mr. M. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the RBI, submits that the stand of the UBI is consistent and that there is no change in their stand that the guidelines, dated 29.1.2003, aforementioned do not apply to the recovery proceedings, which stand concluded with the passing of the decree or issuance of recovery certificates. 6. The moot question, which falls for determination in the present case, is this: Whether the guidelines, dated 29.1.2003, aforementioned issued by the RBI apply to the cases in which decrees have been passed and/or recovery certificates have been issued ? 7. Before answering the question posed above, what needs to be noted is that in the present case, at the initial stage, a feeble attempt was made to project, on behalf of the UBI, that the guidelines aforementioned were not binding on the UBI. Though this stand was quickly abandoned, it needs to be pointed out in order to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding that while considering, in B.I.O. Finance Ltd. v. The Custodian, [1997] 3 SCR 51, the ambit and scope of Section 36 read with Section 46 of Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Apex Court made it clear that the directives issued by the Reserve Bank of India are of binding nature, the banks must follow them and if there is violation or breach of these directives, the bank would be liable to punitive action. Emphasising the binding nature of the guidelines issued by the RBI the Apex Court, in Bank of India v. Ravindra, AIR 2001 SC 3095 , observed that once directives are issued by the Reserve Bank of India, all banks are bound by such directives and they have to implement them and that such a practice shall be resorted to in the larger interest of justice, which would narrow down the controversy in suits filed by Banking Institutions and would enable expeditious disposal of such suits. 8. In the face of the position of law, which has been made clear in Ravindra (supra) and B.I.O. Finance Ltd. (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that if the contents of the guidelines, dated 29.1.2003, aforementioned show that the same apply to proceedings, where recovery certificates have been issued, there can remain no room for doubt that the guidelines ought to have been resorted to by the UBI. Turning, however, to the material question, namely, as to whether the guidelines aforementioned can be applied to the facts of the present case, it is of utmost importance to note that Clause C of the guidelines, dated 29.1.2003, aforementioned reads as follows - These guidelines will cover cases on which the banks have initiated action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and also cases pending before Courts/DRTs/BIFR, subject to consent decree being obtained from the Courts/DRTs/BIFR. 9. A careful reading of the contents of Clause C shows that this clause consists of two parts. The first part applies to those cases, wherein banks have initiated actions under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Thus, where a bank initiates an action under the said Act, the guidelines would get attracted and the bank concerned has to proceed with the case keeping in view the said guidelines. The second part of Clause C, on the other hand, deals with the "cases pending before Courts/DRTs/BIFR subject to consent decree being obtained from the Courts/DRTs/BIFR", i.e., the cases, which are sub judice and are not finally disposed of. 10. Admittedly, the present case of the petitioners is not covered by the first part of Clause C. The question, therefore, is as to whether the second part of the said guidelines can be applied to the petitioners' case. While considering this aspect of the matter, it is of paramount importance to note that the judgment and order, dated 20.6.2002, passed in OA 135/97 by the DRT, Guwahati, holding the bank entitled to recover the amount aforementioned with interest and cost has not been appealed against and the same has achieved finality. 11. Logically, therefore, the question, which, now, arises for consideration is as to whether Clause C would apply not only to those cases, which are pending in Courts/DRTs/BIFR, but also to the cases, which have been decided and in which decrees have been passed or recovery certificates have been issued and have attained finality either by for not preferring of appeals or appeal, having been preferred, have been decided. 12. A microscopic reading of the contents of the second part of Clause C clearly shows that the guidelines apply to those cases, which are "pending before Courts/DRTs/BIFR, subject to consent decree being obtained from the Courts/DRTs/BIFR". 12. A microscopic reading of the contents of the second part of Clause C clearly shows that the guidelines apply to those cases, which are "pending before Courts/DRTs/BIFR, subject to consent decree being obtained from the Courts/DRTs/BIFR". The language used, in the second part of Clause C, leaves no room for doubt that to attract the guidelines, the case shall be 'pending' before the Courts/DRTs/BIFR, 'wherein consent decrees are being obtained'. The expression "pending before Courts/DRTs/BIFR, subject to consent decree being obtained from the Courts/DRTs/BIFR" clearly indicate that to apply the guidelines, the case must not only be pending, but that the reason for pendency has to be to obtain consent decrees. In other words, the second part of Clause C does not apply to cases, wherein decrees/orders for recovery have already been made and the same have attained finality, for, in the cases, wherein decrees or orders for recovery have already been made and the same have become final, there is no scope of obtaining of consent decree. An interpretation, which would make the expression "subject to the consent decree being obtained" redundant must, therefore, be avoided. 13. Situated thus, it is abundantly clear that the guidelines, as already held in the case of Sathe Biscuits & Chocolates Co. Ltd. (supra) and B.I. O. Finance Ltd. (supra), do not apply to such cases, wherein decrees have been passed and/or recovery certificates have been issued and have attained finality. I may, however, hasten to point out that in Sathe Biscuits & Chocolates Co. Ltd. (supra), the Bombay High Court has expressed the view that there are two classes of cases, which are covered by the second part of the guidelines, namely, (i) those, which are pending before the Courts/DRTs/BIFR, wherein decrees have not been passed or recovery certificates have not been issued and (ii) those, which are pending in the Courts/DRTs/BLFR for obtaining of consent decree. After a great deal of analysis, I am unable to persuade myself to subscribe to this view, for, in my view, the guidelines will apply to the cases, which are pending before Courts/DRTs/BIFR, wherein consent decrees are being obtained or else the expression "subject to consent decree being obtained" will have no meaning. After a great deal of analysis, I am unable to persuade myself to subscribe to this view, for, in my view, the guidelines will apply to the cases, which are pending before Courts/DRTs/BIFR, wherein consent decrees are being obtained or else the expression "subject to consent decree being obtained" will have no meaning. In other words, it is not enough for making the said guidelines applicable that the suit or recovery proceeding is pending in the Courts/DRTs/BIFR; what the concluding part of Clause C further clearly shows is that these guidelines would apply only to those pending cases, wherein consent decrees are being obtained from the Courts/DRTs/BIFR. As a corollary, therefore, these guidelines would not apply if the suit or recovery proceeding is being contested. To put it differently, the expression 'cases pending before Courts/DRTs/BIFR, subject to consent decree being obtained from the Courts/DRTs/BIFR' means that only those pending proceedings in the Courts/DRTs/BIFR would be covered by the guidelines, which are pending for obtaining of consent decrees. 14. At any rate, therefore, there can be no doubt, and I do hold, that the guidelines, dated 29.1.2003, aforementioned do not apply to the cases, wherein decrees for recovery have already been passed and/or recovery, certificates have already been issued and the same have attained finality. Since in the case at hand, the recovery certificate was already issued before the guidelines came into force, the guidelines for the reasons, which I have indicated above, cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. 15. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, I find ho merit in this writ petition and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 16. The parties are, however, left to bear their own respective costs. Petition dismissed