ORDER 1. This appeal has been filed by the Jharkhand State Electricity Board against the judgment and order dated 15th October, 2003 passed by the learned single Judge on the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 herein being W.P. (S) No. 5727 of 2002. By the said order, the learned single Judge allowed the writ application, quashed the order impugned in the writ petition and directed that the writ petitioner would be entitled to remain in service till he attains the age of 60 years on the basis of the age recorded in the Service Book. 2. As will appear from the materials on record, the writ petitioner was appointed by the appellants and his Service Book was opened on 21st June, 1975 in which his date of birth is recorded as 12th October, 1945. After 25 years of service i.e. on 14th December, 2000, the writ petitioner was made to undergo medical examination by a Medical Board which determined his age as 60-62 years and, thereafter by memo dated 24th January, 2001, the petitioner was made to superannuate with effect from 31 st December, 1999. 3. Challenging he said order of superannuation, the petitioner contended in the writ petition that once his date of birth had been recorded in his Service Book as 12th October, 1945, there was no further need for his examination by a Medical Board after 25 years. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioner that although the date of birth recorded in the Service Book was sought to be disputed, no enquiry was ever conducted with regard to such dispute and, in any event, the date of birth, once recorded in the Service Book, should not have been altered without any opportunity of hearing being given to the petitioner. 4. Accepting the submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioner, the learned single Judge allowed the writ application and quashed the order by which the petitioner had been superannuated and also directed that he should continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years on the basis of the age recorded in the Service Book. 5. 4. Accepting the submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioner, the learned single Judge allowed the writ application and quashed the order by which the petitioner had been superannuated and also directed that he should continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years on the basis of the age recorded in the Service Book. 5. Challenging the said order in the instant appeal, the Jharkhand State Electricity Boars has contended that although the writ petitioners date of birth was recorded in the Service Book as 12th October, 1945, the same appeared to have been tampered with and having regard to the same, the petitioner along with others, who were similarly situated, were referred to the Medical Board for correct assessment of their age. It is in that situation that, as a result of such dispute, the writ petitioner was examined by the Medical Board which found his age between 60 to 62 years on the date of examination, namely, 1st December, 2000, which prompted the appellant and its authorities to superannuate the writ petitioner from service with effect from 31st December, 1999, when in terms of the report of the Medical Board, he attained the age of 60 years. 6. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Ajit Kumar submitted that the entire procedure had been conducted in a manner which was above any suspicion and the writ petitioners case was not the only case referred to the Medical Board since similar cases were there, where there was discrepancy in the Service Book, which were sent to the Medical Board for examination. Mr. Kumar submitted that having accepted the verdict of the Medical Board, the writ petitioner also put in his pension papers and 90 per cent of such pension had already been sanctioned by the authorities. An affidavit to that effect has been filed on behalf of the Jharkhand State Electricity Board today. Mr. Kumar submitted that once the writ petitioner had accepted his date of birth in terms of the report of the Medical Board and had also submitted his pension papers. it was no longer open to him to contend that his date of birth should not have been corrected on the basis of such report. 7. Opposing the appeal, Mr. Mr. Kumar submitted that once the writ petitioner had accepted his date of birth in terms of the report of the Medical Board and had also submitted his pension papers. it was no longer open to him to contend that his date of birth should not have been corrected on the basis of such report. 7. Opposing the appeal, Mr. A.K. Jha reiterated the submissions made before the learned single Judge and also relied on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India and Ors., . Mr. Jha submitted that mere submission of pension papers did not preclude the writ petitioner from filing, the writ petition contending that he could have been allowed to superannuate on the basis of the entry regarding his date of birth in his Service Book. Mr. Jha laid especial emphasis on paragraph 13 of the judgment wherein the Honble Supreme Court held that even after receiving retrenchment compensation, the appellant was not estopped from exercising his fundamental rights under the Constitution, particularly when his termination from service was punitive in nature and was in violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Jha also referred to a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Lever Limited v. S.M. Jadhav and Anr, , in support of his proposition that neither the employer nor the employee is entitled to raise a dispute regarding date of birth at the fag end of the employees service career. On the basis of the said judgments, Mr. Jha submitted that the impugned order does not warrant interference and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and considering the materials on record, we are unable to sustain the order passed by the learned single Judge since, in our view, the appellants herein did not commit any error in directing the writ petitioner to be examined by the Medical Board. 8. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and considering the materials on record, we are unable to sustain the order passed by the learned single Judge since, in our view, the appellants herein did not commit any error in directing the writ petitioner to be examined by the Medical Board. There is no denial of the fact that although in the Service Book of the writ petitioner, his date of birth had been recorded as 12th October, 1945, the same appeared to have been written in a different ink from the other entries in the Service Book which prompted the appellants-authorities to refer the matter regarding the petitioners age to the Medical Board along with several other employees. The petitioner did not raise any objection at the time of examination by the Medical Board and even accepted the verdict of the Board by submitting his pension papers. While it has been held in the case of Nar Singh Pal (supra), that constitutional rights cannot be waived, we also cannot overlook the fact that in the said case, the termination of the appellants service did not appear to be punitive, whereas, in the instant case, that is not so. Even as far as the other decision cited by Mr. Jha is concerned, the same, in our view, is with regard to the employee and not the employer. It is the employee who raised the dispute which caused the Honble Supreme Court to observe that the appellant, at the fag end of his career, could not raise a dispute regarding age. 9. The learned single Judge appears to have been swayed by the fact that the writ petitioner had competed 25 years of service during which period the question of date of birth had not been raised. No doubt, there is some force in the said proposition but, at the same time, it cannot be said that the employer was precluded from looking into the writ petitioners service record for the purpose of finding out his date of birth. Having looked into the service records and having noticed the discrepancy, the appellants took the step of referring the petitioners case to the Medical Board. We see no impropriety in such action. 10. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the order of the learned single Judge is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Having looked into the service records and having noticed the discrepancy, the appellants took the step of referring the petitioners case to the Medical Board. We see no impropriety in such action. 10. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the order of the learned single Judge is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. All retiral benefits, which appear to have been sanctioned, must be paid to the writ petitioner within fifteen days from date.