JUDGMENT B. Lamare, J. 1. Heard Mr. V.K. Jindal, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. L. Lyngdoh, learned Counsel for the Petitioners. Also heard Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned Sr. G.A. for the State Respondents, Mr. M.F. Qureshi, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 4 and Mr. B.N. Dutta, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. K.R. Bhattachaijee, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 5. 2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was filed before this Court on behalf of the Rai Bahadur Anup Chand Hindi High School, Keating Road, Shillong, through the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school and also by the Petitioner No. 2, the Secretary of the School, who claims that he has an interest in the Board Management of the School besides being Secretary of the Managing Committee. 3. According to the Petitioners, Rai Bahadur Anup Chand Hindi High School, Keating Road, Shillong, (for short the School) was established in the year 1926 by one Shri Rai Bahadur Anup Chand. Initially the school was running on a private fund, but afterwards the school was brought as a Government Aided School under the Deficit system. The School is a Hindi Medium School and the Managing Committee of the School used to be constituted by the Inspector of Schools and it is governed by the Meghalaya School Education Act, 1981 and the Rules framed thereunder. 4. It is also the case of the Petitioners that the Respondent No. 4 who claims himself to be the Secretary of Marwari Panchayat has no right whatsoever to claim the school is a 'Minority' School and that the said Marwari Panchayat has no right whatsoever on the School. According to the Petitioners, the Managing Committee of the School is to be constituted on the proposal to be given by the outgoing Managing Committee which is to be submitted to the Inspector of Schools, Shillong. The case of the Petitioners is also that the said Marwari Panchayat has nothing to do with the management of the school and therefore, the Managing Committee proposed by the said Marwari Panchayat to the Inspector of Schools is totally without jurisdiction or authority and that the Inspector of Schools was wrong in forwarding the proposal of the Marwari Panchayat to the Director of Higher and Technical Education. The Petitioners therefore have prayed for a direction not to give effect the proposal dated 30.1.2002 submitted by the Secretary of the Marwari Panchayat to the Inspector of Schools and to approve the proposal submitted by the outgoing Managing Committee sometime in the month of February and March, 2002. 5. Resisting the case of the Petitioners, the Inspector of Schools has filed an affidavit on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as stated in paragraph 7 of the affidavit that the proposal made by the Petitioner No. 2 to the Inspector of Schools was not complete. Moreover the Petitioner No. 2 has ignored the resolution of the Managing Committee meeting held on 14.7.2001 and submitted his own proposal to the Respondent No. 3-Inspector of Schools. It is also stated that the Marwari Panchayat by their letter dated 30.1.2002 has claimed for constitution of Managing Committee as they are the sponsoring body of the School. As there was a dispute regarding the claims for constitution of Managing Committee of the School, the proposal made by the Petitioners could not be approved by the Respondent No. 3-Inspector of Schools. 6. The Respondent No. 3-Inspector of Schools, in the affidavit, has also stated that due consideration could not be made to the proposal of the Petitioners for re-constitution of the Managing Committee due to complaint, claim and counter-claims as apparent from records. However, from the documentary evidence, it appears that the Marwari Panchayat is the sponsoring body of the school as the patta for a land issued by the Deputy Commissioner on 6.10.1969 was in the name of the Secretary of the Panchayat. The lease agreement was also executed and signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong in favour of the Secretary of the Marwari Panchayat. Taxes and revenue were also paid by the Panchayat for the land in which the school is situated. 7. The Respondent No. 4 also resisted the claim of the Petitioners and stated that the school is a minority institution belonging to the Marwari Community who are the linguistic and religious minority of Hindu group in the State of Meghalaya, as Hindus constituted only 14.37% of the population of the State. 7. The Respondent No. 4 also resisted the claim of the Petitioners and stated that the school is a minority institution belonging to the Marwari Community who are the linguistic and religious minority of Hindu group in the State of Meghalaya, as Hindus constituted only 14.37% of the population of the State. He also supported the contention made by the Respondent No. 3 in his affidavit that the land where the school is situated stands in the name of Marwari Panchayat and all taxes and revenues were also paid by the Marwari Panchayat. The Respondents also contended that the Managing Committee constituted on 26.10.1998 and expired on 25.10.2001. However, the Managing Committee continued to exist by virtue of the interim order passed by the learned Asst. District Judge in Misc. Case 8(H) 2002 arising out of a Title Suit No. 7(H) 2002. However, the said interim order passed by the learned Assistant District Judge has ended on 2.9.2002, therefore, after this date, the Managing Committee constituted on 26.10.1998 has ceased to function. The Petitioners therefore, have no right to claim as the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School which term has already expired. 8. The Respondent No. 5 also resisted the claim of the Petitioners and filed an affidavit, and stated in paragraph 3 of the affidavit that the instant writ petition was filed on 24.9.2002 and the last Managing Committee of which The Petitioner No. 2 was the Secretary has expired on 26.10.2001. The interim order granted by the learned Assistant District Judge on 2.4.2002 was vacated on 12.9.2002, therefore, the Petitioners have no more right to file the instant writ petition. The Respondent No. 5 also stated in affidavit-in-opposition that there was no resolution whatsoever authorizing the Petitioner No. 2 to file this writ petition on behalf of the Managing Committee of the School, as the petition has been filed without the authority of the Managing Committee which has already become defunct. The Respondent No. 5 also alleged that the Petitioner No. 2 had committed financial irregularities in managing the school as the Petitioner No. 2 removed all the records from the school complex to his personal custody which is not known to the Respondent No. 5 and thereby also misused the funds of the school as indicated in paragraph 5 of the affidavit filed by the Respondent No. 5. 9. 9. From the claims and counter-claims made by the parties as narrated above, the first point that emerged to be seen is whether the Petitioner No. 2 has any authority or locus standi to file the instant writ petition on behalf of the Managing Committee of the School. The undisputed fact is that last Managing Committee of the School was constituted by the Inspectors of School by the order dated 26.10.1998 and its term was to expire on 25.10.2001, in that last constituted Managing Committee, the Petitioner No. 2 was the Secretary. However, on expiry of the term of the Managing Committee, the Petitioner No. 2 has approached the Court of the Asst. District Judge, Shillong in Title Suit No. 7(H) 2002. Along with the said suit, a Misc. Case No. 8(H) 2002 was also filed by the Petitioner No. 2. In the said Misc. case, the Assistant District Judge has passed an interim order. However, the interim order was vacated by the learned Assistant District Judge by his order dated 12.9.2002 passed in the said Misc. case. As a result of this order, vacating the interim order, the Petitioner No. 2 has ceased to be the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School with effect from 12.9.2002, the Managing Committee constituted on 26.10.1998 has also ceased to exist. A perusal of the records shows that there is no resolution whatsoever authorizing the Petitioner No. 2 to file the present writ petition on behalf of the Managing Committee and the same was filed without any authority from the Managing Committee. Needless to say that the petition was filed on 24.9.2002 after the Managing Committee has become defunct. As regards the claim of the Petitioner No. 2 that he has an interest in the management of the School, it is seen in the paragraph 2 of the writ petition that there is no statement in what manner the Petitioner No. 2 has an interest in the management of the school, his interest is only as a Secretary of the Managing Committee which has already expired. No fundamental or legal rights of the Petitioners existed after the terms of the Managing Committee has expired. No fundamental or legal rights of the Petitioners existed after the terms of the Managing Committee has expired. The Petitioners therefore have approached this Court by this petition without authority of the new Managing Committee and without any fundamental or legal rights being affected and therefore have no right or locus standi to approach this Court by this petition. 10. The next point to be seen is that whether the School is a minority School or not. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and other reported in AIR 1983 SC 1 , in paragraph 143 of the judgment has interpreted the provisions of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India as follows: On an analysis of the two articles, Article 29 and Article 30 and the three cases referred to above, it is evident that the impugned Act does not seek to curtail the right of any section of citizens to conserve its own language, script or culture conferred by Article 29. The benefit of Article 30(1) can be claimed by the community only on proving that it is a religious or linguistic minority and that the institution was established by it. In the view that we have taken that Auroville or the Society is not a religious denomination, Articles 29 and 30would not be attracted and, therefore, the impugned Act cannot be held to be violative of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. 11. In another judgment, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of S. Azeez and other v. Union of India reported in AIR 1968 SC 6624 has interpreted the Article 30 of the Constitution in paragraph 25 of the judgment as follows: What does the word established in Article 30(1) mean? In Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Vol. 11. In another judgment, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of S. Azeez and other v. Union of India reported in AIR 1968 SC 6624 has interpreted the Article 30 of the Constitution in paragraph 25 of the judgment as follows: What does the word established in Article 30(1) mean? In Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Vol. I, it has been said that the word "establish" occurs frequently in the Constitution of the United States and it is there used in different meanings; and five such meanings have been given, namely-(1) to settle firmly, to fix unalterably, as to establish justice; (2) to make or form; as, to establish, a uniform rule of naturalization; (3) to found, to create, to regulate: as, Congress shall have power to establish post offices; (4) to found, recognize, confirm or admit: as, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion; (5) to create, to ratify, or confirm, as We the people, etc., do ordain and establish this Constitution. Thus it cannot be said that the only meaning of the word "establish" is to be found in the sense in which an eleemosynari institution is founded and we shall have to see in what sense the work has been used in our Constitution in this Article. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition the word "establish" has a number of meanings i.e., to ratify, confirm, settle, to found, to create. Here again founding is not the only meaning of the word "establish" and it includes creation also. In Webster's Third New International given a number of meanings, namely, to found or base squarely, to make firm or stable, to bring into existence, create, make, start, originate. It will be seen that here also founding is not the only meaning and the word also means to bring into existence. We are of opinion that for the purpose of Article 30(1) the word means "to bring into existence" and so the right given by Article 30(1) to the minority is to bring into existence an educational institution, and if they do so, to administer it. We have therefore to see what happened in 1920 and who brought the Aligarh University into existence. 12. We have therefore to see what happened in 1920 and who brought the Aligarh University into existence. 12. In the case of A.P. Christians Medical Education Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1986) 2 SCC 667 , in paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Apex Court has interpreted Article 30(1) as follows: It was seriously contended before us that, any minority, even a single individual belonging to a minority, could found a minority institution and had the right so to do under the Constitution and neither the Government nor the University could deny the society's right to establish a minority institution, at the very threshold as it were, however, they may impose regulatory measures in the interests of uniformity, efficiency and excellence of education. The fallacy of the argument insofar as the instant case is concerned lies in thinking that neither the Government nor the University has the right to go behind the claim that the institution is a minority institution and to investigate and satisfy itself whether the claim is well founded or ill founded. The Government, the University and ultimately the Court have the undoubted right to pierce the minority veil with due apologies to the corporate lawyers and discover whether there is lurking behind it no minority at all and in any case, no minority institution. The object of Article 30(1) is not to allow bogies to be raised by pretenders but to give the minorities a sense of security and a feeling of confidence not merely by guaranteeing the right to profess, practice and propagate religion to religious minorities and the right to conserve their language, script and culture to linguistic minorities, but also to enable all minorities, religious or linguistic to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. These institutions must be education institutions of the minorities in truth and reality and not mere masked phantoms. They may be institutions intended to give the children of the minorities the best general and professional education, to make them complete men and women of the country and to enable them to go out into the world fully prepared and equipped. They may be institutions where special provision is made to the advantage and for the advancement of the minority children. They may be institutions where special provision is made to the advantage and for the advancement of the minority children. They may be institutions where the parents of the children of the minority community may expect that education in accordance with the basic tenets of their religion would be imparted by or under the guidance of teachers, learned and steeped in the faith. They may be institutions where the parents expect their children to grow in a pervasive atmosphere which is in harmony with their religion or conducive to the pursuit of it. What is important and what is imperative is that there must exist some real positive index to enable the institution to be identified as an educational institution of the minorities. 13. In the case of St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi reported in (1992) 1 SCC 558 , the Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 28 of the judgment has interpreted provisions of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India as follows: There is by now, fairly abundant case law in the questions as to "minority" the minority's right to "establish", and their right to "administer educational institutions. These questions have arisen in regard to a variety of institutions all over the country. They have arisen in regard to Christians, Muslims and in regard to certain cases of Hindus and linguistic groups. The Courts in certain cases have accepted without much scrutiny the version of the claimant that the institution in question was founded by a minority community while in some cases the Courts have examined very minutely the proof of the establishment of the institution. It should be borne in mind that the words "establish" and "administer" used in Article 30(1) are to be read conjunctively. The right claimed by a minority community to administer the educational institution depends upon the proof of establishment of the institution. The proof of establishment of the institutions is thus a condition precedent for claiming the right to administer the institution. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution of India, there was no settled concept of Indian citizenship. This Court, however, did reiterate that the minority competent to claim the protection of Article 30(1) of the Constitution, and on that account the privilege of establishing and maintaining educational institutions of its choice must be a minority of persons residing in India. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution of India, there was no settled concept of Indian citizenship. This Court, however, did reiterate that the minority competent to claim the protection of Article 30(1) of the Constitution, and on that account the privilege of establishing and maintaining educational institutions of its choice must be a minority of persons residing in India. They must have formed a well defined religious or linguistic minority. It does not envisage the rights of the foreign missionary or institution, however, laudable their objects must be. After the Constitution, the minority under Article 30 must necessarily mean those who form a distinct and identifiable group of citizens of India. Whether it is "old stuff' or "new product", the object of the institute should be genuine, and not devious or dubious. There should be nexus between the means employed and the ends desired. As pointed out in A.P. Christian Educational Society case there must exist some positive index to enable the educational institution to be identified with religious or linguistic minorities. Article 30(1) is a protective measure only for the benefit of religious and linguistic minorities and it is essential, to make it absolutely clear that no ill-fit or camouflaged institution should get away with the constitutional protection. 14. The question with regard to the case of minorities in the State of Meghalaya came before this Court in the case of Michael Lyngdoh v. Managing Committee, Sacred Heart Boys, H.S. School, Shillong and other reported in 1999 (2) GLT 1, in that case this Court has taken into consideration the census of the years 1981 and 1991. According to the population structure in the State census, the Christians population in both the censuses of 1981 and 1991 are 52.62% and 64.58% respectively. The population of Muslims in the said two censuses was 25.7% and 16.82% respectively. The Hindus form the third-highest proportion of the population in both 1981 and 1991, having 18.3% and 14.67% respectively. Therefore, this Court came to the conclusion that Christians population is a majority population in the State of Meghalaya. Hindus form third-highest population in the State and therefore, they are the minority in the State of Meghalaya. 15. The Hindus form the third-highest proportion of the population in both 1981 and 1991, having 18.3% and 14.67% respectively. Therefore, this Court came to the conclusion that Christians population is a majority population in the State of Meghalaya. Hindus form third-highest population in the State and therefore, they are the minority in the State of Meghalaya. 15. Taking above view of this Court in the case of Michael Lyngdoh, (supra) and also the interpretation of Article 30(1) the Constitution of India by the Apex Court in those cases referred to herein above, this Court is of the opinion that the school is a minority school. The finding of Respondent No. 3-Inspector of Schools as stated in affidavit-in-opposition that the school maybe classified as minority institution as it was sponsored by Marwari Panchayat which are the minorities in the State of Meghalaya is therefore, found to be corrected. 16. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the parties at bar that after the term of the earlier Managing Committee had expired, the school has been managing and run by the Inspector of Schools and no Managing Committee has been constituted till date. However, from the letter dated 17.9.2002 issued by the Respondent No. 3-Inspector of Schools to the Respondent No. 2-Director of Higher and Technical Education, Shillong, it is seen that proposal for Managing Committee of the School has already been made by the Respondent No. 3 but the Managing Committee would not be constituted due to pendency of this writ petition. The Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, Director of Higher and Technical Education and Inspector of Schools, Shillong are therefore allowed to finalise the proposal made by the Respondent No. 4 for constitution of the Managing Committee of the School in accordance with the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 17. For the aforesaid observations and reasons, this Court is of the opinion that there is no merit in this petition and accordingly it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.