Judgment ( 1. ) BY this petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the pregnability of the order dated 1-8-1991 passed by 1st Civil Judge Class 2 Betul and order dated 26-9-91 passed in revision by IInd Additional District Judge, Betul, dismissing the revision petition of the petitioner and affirming the order of Trial Court. ( 2. ) THE defendants/petitioners submitted an application in the Trial Court raising an objection that since earlier suit of plaintiffs was dismissed, the subsequent suit is not maintainable. The objection has been rejected and it was held by the Trial Court that subsequent suit is maintainable. The revision petition filed by the defendants before IInd Additional District Judge, Betul has been rejected by the impugned order. ( 3. ) THE unfolded facts of the case are that plaintiff- Pandu who is respondent No. 1 herein this petition, filed earlier a suit which was registered as Civil Suit Number 126-A/90, however, on being transferred to the Court of IIIrd Civil Judge Class 2, the number was changed and the suit was registered as Civil Suit Number 35-A/91. The said suit was dismissed on 10-5-91 for want of better particulars under Order 6 Rule 5, CPC. The petitioners have filed copy of the said order. Thereafter plaintiff-Pandu again filed present suit which has been registered as Civil Suit No. 65-A/91. On filing of the second suit, the present petitioners who are defendants in the Trial Court, submitted an application that the present suit, which has been subsequently filed, can not be tried because the matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit between the same parties, was dismissed on 10-5-91 and, therefore, the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata. The earlier suit was dismissed on account of non- furnishing the better particulars regarding sending the notice under Section 80, CPC. ( 4. ) THE application was opposed by plaintiff/respondent No. 1 on the ground that the present suit has been filed after taking permission under Section 80 (2), CPC from the Court and the earlier suit was dismissed only on the ground of non-furnishing of better particulars and thereafter the defendants rapidly started work of construction and, therefore, the present suit has been filed after the permission granted by the Court under Section 80 (2), CPC. The dismissal of the earlier suit will not operate as res judicata. ( 5. ) THE Trial Court dismissed the application of petitioners on 1 -8-91. The defendants/petitioners filed civil revision against the said order before the IInd Additional District Judge, Betul which has also been dismissed. Hence this petition. ( 6. ) THE contention of Shri D. K. Dixit, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that since the earlier suit was dismissed under Order 6 Rule 5, CPC for want of better particulars, it would amount to a decree and the subsequent suit between the same parties in which the subject matter is directly and substantially in issue is same which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit between the same parties and, therefore, the present suit can not be tried since it is hit by the principles of res judicata. ( 7. ) THE contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that Full Bench of this Court in the case of Budhulal v. Chhotelal and Ors. 1976 JLJ 797 has held in Para 13 that dismissal of suit on account of non-furnishing of further and better particulars amounts to the decree. The Full Bench relied earlier decision of this Court Nazir Abbas Sujjat Ali Raza Azamshah Baja Suleman Shah and Ors. AIR 1941 Nagpur 223. In the case of M. P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. , Bhopalvs. J. L. Chouksey ,, AIR1980 MP 204 , the Single Bench of this Court has also placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of Budhulal (supra) and has held that the dismissal of the suit on account of failure on the part of the plaintiff to furnish better particulars, amounts to decree. ( 8. ) IT be seen that Section 11, CPC is based partly on the maxim of Roman jurisprudence, "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" it concerns the State that there be an end to law suits and partly on the maxim Memo debet bis vexaripro una et eadem causa which would mean that no man should be vexed twice over the same cause. ( 9. ( 9. ) THE question is whether in the earlier suit the Court was having jurisdiction to dismiss the suit specially when an application was filed on behalf of plaintiff for withdrawal of the suit and whether in those circumstances, the decision of earlier suit would amount to res judicata or not. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Budhulal (supra) in Para 13 specifically held and decided by placing reliance on the decision of Nazir Abbas Sujjat Ali (supra) that if a previous suit has been dismissed on account of failure to furnish further and better particulars, the second suit on the same cause of action can not be instituted. ( 10. ) THE Court dismissing the earlier suit was having jurisdiction to dismiss it. It can not be said that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Court dismissing the suit for want of better particulars. The question is altogether different whether the order of dismissal of the suit was contrary to the law or erroneous or dismissal of the suit was without jurisdiction. If a decision of a Court is without jurisdiction such a decision will not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. Thus, the test is whether the decision passed in the earlier suit is that whether it is without jurisdiction or non est. It is well settled in law that the order without jurisdiction is non est, it neither confer any right in any party nor takes away any right from it. In the case of State of M. P. v. Mulamchand 1973 JLJ 489 while laying down the various tests in regard to the applicability res judicata it has been held that even an erroneous decision will operate as res judicata. It would be germane to quote the following passage from the book "res judicata" - Spencer Bower and Turner, Chapter IV Clause 97. Competent jurisdiction is an essential condition of every valid res judicata, which means that, in order that a judicial decision relied upon, whether as a bar, or as the foundation of an action, may conclusively bind the parties, or (in the case of in rem decisions) the world, it must appear that the Judicial Tribunal pronouncing the decision had jurisdiction over the cause or matter and over the parties, sufficient to warrant it in so doing. One can not question about the competency of the jurisdiction passed in previous suit. The said decision is not without jurisdiction, it may be an erroneous decision. But, a wrong decision by a Court having competent jurisdiction will also operate as res judicata. A wrong decision by a Court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to Higher Courts or other procedure like review which the law provides. In this context, I may profitably rely State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee and Ors. . , AIR1966 SC 1061 , 1966 Crilj805 , [1963 ]supp2 SCR542. ( 11. ) IT may be observed that there is a clear distinction between "lack of inherent jurisdiction" and "wrong exercise of jurisdiction". If there is inherent lack of jurisdiction then the decision would be a nullity and its validity could be challenged anywhere and everywhere even in collateral proceedings. However, if the Court though having initial jurisdiction or we may say it is not having inherent lack of jurisdiction, gives a wrong decision on merit or wrongly interpreting or misinterpreting some provisions of law, such decision can not be challenged and is binding between the parties unless it is set aside in the mode prescribed under the law. Therefore, even if the Court having jurisdiction in the earlier suit wrongly dismissed the suit on the ground of want of better particulars, the wrong could have been corrected or could have been challenged by challenging it by way of appeal. In this context it will be profitable to place reliance on the ratio decidendi of this Court in the case of Shyam Bihari v. State of M. P. 1973 JLJ 526 . ( 12. ) SINCE the previous decision of the Court dismissing the suit of respondents became final as no appeal was filed against it and, therefore, according to me, the said decision would operate as res judicata. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Budhulal (supra) has already held that a second suit would not lie if the previous suit has been dismissed on account of failure to provide further and better particulars. ( 13. ) WHATEVER estoppel by record is said to arise out of a judgment, it is presumed that the Court which pronounced the judgment had jurisdiction to do so. ( 13. ) WHATEVER estoppel by record is said to arise out of a judgment, it is presumed that the Court which pronounced the judgment had jurisdiction to do so. The lack of jurisdiction deprives the judgment of any effect, whether by estoppel or otherwise. ( 14. ) WE may borrow sufficient light from Sections 40 and 44 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act reads thus : the existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial. Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act runs as under : any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment or order or decree which is relevant under Section 40, 41 or 42 and which has been proved by the adverse party was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. Competence of a Court and its jurisdiction are thus synonymous terms they mean the right of the Court to adjudicate in a given matter. ( 15. ) THE question has been debated in England in connection with the grant of writ or prohibition and the distinction between a latent want of jurisdiction, that is, something becoming manifest in the course of proceedings and a patent want of jurisdiction that is a want of jurisdiction apparent on the face of the proceedings was pointed out by Lopes J. in the case of Farquharson v. Morgan 1 Q. B. D. 552. ( 16. ) THEREFORE, there is a distinction between the inherent want of jurisdiction in a Court and want of jurisdiction on grounds which have to be determined by the Court itself. The first makes a decree- a nullity which can be ignored and need not to set aside (separately ). The second does not make the decree a nullity, but only voidable; such a decree can be set aside by adopting the proper procedure by filing appeal, but can not be impeached and set aside by in the subsequent suit. The first makes a decree- a nullity which can be ignored and need not to set aside (separately ). The second does not make the decree a nullity, but only voidable; such a decree can be set aside by adopting the proper procedure by filing appeal, but can not be impeached and set aside by in the subsequent suit. A Court which is empowered by law to try a suit, has power to try it rightly or wrongly the validity of a decree does not depend on whether it embodies a correct decision. A judgment of a Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties to the suit and having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction, however, erroneous, can not be a mere nullity and can not be challenged in the subsequent suit. ( 17. ) THE boundary between the error of judgment and usurpation of power is this, the former is reversible by an Appellate Court within a certain fixed time and is therefore only voidable the latter is absolute nullity, when the parties are before the Court and present to it a controversy which the Court has authority to decide, a decision not necessarily correct but appropriate to that question is an exercise of judicial power of jurisdiction. So far as the jurisdiction itself is concerned it is wholly immaterial whether the decision upon the particular question be correct or incorrect. The fact of the Court having jurisdiction to decide the question includes the power to decide that question rightly or wrongly. ( 18. ) THE entire endeavour has been made by Revisional Court and the Trial Court is that the decision passed in earlier suit is erroneous and, therefore, in the subsequent suit it would not be having any binding effect. According to me, the approach of the Revisional Court as well as of the Trial Court is ex facie, illegal and contrary to the law, for the reasons I have already assigned herein-above. ( 19. According to me, the approach of the Revisional Court as well as of the Trial Court is ex facie, illegal and contrary to the law, for the reasons I have already assigned herein-above. ( 19. ) IN view of above, the order dated 26-9-91 passed in revision by IInd Additional District Judge (Annexure P-2) as well as order passed by Trial Court dated 1-8-1991 (Annexure P-1) are hereby quashed and set aside and it is held that the order dated 10-5-1991 passed in earlier suit (Civil Suit No. 35-A/91, Pandu v. Missionary Society Stock Home and Ors.) decided by 3rd Civil Judge Class-2, Betul, operates as resjudicata in the present suit. ( 20. ) THE petition is hereby allowed without any orders as to costs.