ORDER S.K. Seth, J. This second appeal is at the instance of defendants against the judgment and decree dated 2-2-2005 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Rajgarh (Biaora), in Regular Civil Appeal No. 2-A/2004. By the impugned judgment and decree, judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was affirmed. For deciding the appeal, following are the relevant facts. Father of the respondent No. 1 (Late Vinay Singh) and the appellants No. 1 and 2 were the half-blood brothers. Their common ancestor was Nonandsingh. It seems that the said Nonand Singh owned various agricultural holdings. He, during his lifetime, by way of registered sale-deed, distributed various agricultural holdings between his three sons viz. Vinay Singh (father of respondent No. 1) and appellant No. 1 and 2 (Narayansingh and Jagdish) respectively. The agricultural suit land bearing Khasra No. 386, 387 and 351 are the subject-matter of the dispute. According to the plaintiffs, in view of the oral partition which took place in the year 1953, the suit land was given to Vinay Singh and he was in the exclusive possession of the suit land and carried out agricultural operations. When Nonandsingh executed the registered sale-deed in the year 1973 and showed that Khasra Nos. 386 and 387 had gone to the share of Jagdish, therefore, Vinay Singh instituted a suit in the year 1974 for declaration and permanent injunction against Nonandsingh and the appellant Nos. 1 and 2. Vinay Singh also sought temporary injunction. The prayer of temporary injunction was allowed and the matter was unsuccessfully challenged in appeal before the Additional District Judge, Biaora. Ultimately, the said suit was compromised and it was agreed that Vinay Singh shall be the owner of land bearing Khasra Nos. 386, 387 and 351 situated in Village Sawasada. The compromise was signed by Nonandsingh. Although it was agreed that the registered sale-deed executed in favour of Jagdish would be suitably amended, however, that could not be done and Nonandsingh expired and Vinay Singh continued to remain in possession of the suit land and continued to cultivate the same in his own right as a owner thereof. After the death of Nonandsingh and Vinay Singh, in order to grab the suit land, appellants threatened to interfere with the possession 'of the respondents. Hence, respondents instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming that they are in possession of the suit land. After the death of Nonandsingh and Vinay Singh, in order to grab the suit land, appellants threatened to interfere with the possession 'of the respondents. Hence, respondents instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming that they are in possession of the suit land. The matter was resisted by the appellants and it was contended that they are the owners of the suit land by virtue of registered sale-deed executed by their father, Nonandsingh in the year 1973. With these pleadings, parties went to the trial and adduced their evidence both documentary as well as oral. Appreciating the evidence in the light of pleadings made by the parties, learned trial Court found that the previous compromise decision in the civil suit does not constitute res judicata so far as subsequent suit is concerned. It was also held that Vinay Singh remained in possession of the suit land in his own right as a owner thereof and continued to cultivate the same as long as he remained alive and after his death, respondents herein are in possession and cultivating the suit land. Thus, the suit was partly allowed and the respondents were declared owner of the suit land. However, learned trial Court refused to grant them mesne profit as claimed by them in the plaint. The matter was challenged in the appeal by the appellants and by the impugned judgment and decree, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed. I have heard Shri Vinay Zelawat, learned counsel appearing for appellants at length and also perused the records of the courts below. Learned counsel appearing for appellants vehemently argued that the suit land was not given to Vinay Singh by registered sale-deed, therefore, neither the Vinay Singh nor his legal representatives can claim any interest in the suit land. There was no amendment in the registered sale-deed, therefore, the appellants continued to be the owner of the suit land. It was also contended by the learned counsel for appellants that the subsequent suit was barred on the principles of res judicata. Lastly, it was contended that the courts below have erred in believing the story of oral partition alleged to have taken place in the year 1953. Thus, the judgments of courts below are unsustainable in law. It was also contended by the learned counsel for appellants that the subsequent suit was barred on the principles of res judicata. Lastly, it was contended that the courts below have erred in believing the story of oral partition alleged to have taken place in the year 1953. Thus, the judgments of courts below are unsustainable in law. After having heard learned counsel for the appellants at length, I find no merit and substance in the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants. The courts below have rightly appreciated the evidence in the proper perspective and recorded the finding of fact that Vinay Singh continued to remain in possession and cultivated the suit land during his life time. It was also rightly held that the principles of res judicata are not attracted in the present case. The finding of fact that Vinay Singh continued to remain in possession of the suit land during his life time and during the life time of his father, Nonandsingh, goes to show that Nonandsingh had given the possession of suit land to his son, Vinay Singh through his first wife. This fact has been found duly proved by the courts below on the basis of appreciation of evidence and as such, it is not open to this Court to interfere with the finding of fact which is not perverse. As regards the plea of res judicata, the courts below have rightly held that the earlier decree based upon compromise could not operate as res judicata because nothing was decided by the court. It is well settled that the compromise decree is not a decision by the court. It is the acceptance by the court of something to which the parties had agreed. A compromise decree merely sets the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties. The Court does not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the Court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the Court can be res judicata, whether statutory u/s 11 of the CPC or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter which was heard and finally decided and cannot operate as res judicata. Such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties, but such an estoppel must be specifically pleaded. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter which was heard and finally decided and cannot operate as res judicata. Such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties, but such an estoppel must be specifically pleaded. See Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and Others Vs. Valluri Jagannadha Rao and Others, . Similar view was taken by subsequent decision reported in Ram Gobinda Dawan and Others Vs. Smt. Bhaktabala, . In view of the aforesaid position of law, I find that the contention that the earlier compromise decree would operate res judicata has no force. Consequently, I find that the appeal does not involve any merit and question of law much less substantial question of law. In view of the aforesaid, I find no merit and substances in the present second appeal. The findings of fact given by the courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence are binding on this Court and are not open to challenge. Material evidence has been considered to come to such findings and as such there is no scope of interference with such findings of fact. The factual finding recorded by the courts below is based upon proper appreciation of evidence and cannot be interfered with in this second appeal. It is not a case of misreading of evidence leading to miscarriage of justice. Neither a case of no evidence and thus, the findings are not perverse to invite the ratio of Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) By Lrs., , hence such findings being unassailable is confirmed in this second appeal. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit and substance in the appeal. Same is accordingly rejected summarily. No order as to costs.