( 1 ) LEARNED Standing Counsel Sri B. G. Sridharan accepts notice for respondent 2. Learned Additional Government Advocate accepts notice for respondent 1. Third respondent is represented by the Caveator. Sri g. Balakrishna Shastry, learned Counsel accepts notice for respondents 4 to 10. Though this matter is posted for preliminary hearing, with the consent of learned Counsels appearing for all the parties, the matter is taken up for hearing. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS 1 and 2 are elected as Chairman and Vice-Chainnan respectively to the second respondent APMC, Bikampady, Mangalore. The petitioners assailing the correctness of the order passed on LA. No. II, dated 20-8-2005 in Misc. Case No. 56 of 2005 by the learned Principal district Judge, Mangalore, have presented this writ petition. The first respondent issued the calendar of events dated 30-8-2005 vide annexure-C under Section 41 (2) of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 (hereinafter called 'apmc Act') read with Rule 44 of the Karnataka Agricultural Prodiice Marketing (Regulation) Rules, 1968 (hereinafter called 'rules'), convening the meeting of all the members for the purpose of election to the posts of president and Vice-President. The election was fixed at 11. 00 a. m. on 9-8-2005. On 9-8-2005, when the proceedings were commenced at 11. 00 a. m. for electing the President and Vice-President, one Sri Ramachandra (respondent 10 herein) has produced the notification dated 8-8-2005 bearing No. NE/272/mre/2005 (2) and submitted that he has been nominated as one of the Committee Member of the second respondent in place of Sri Alwin Qudrose who had been earlier nominated as per the notification dated 24-6-2005 which was gazetted on 18-7-2005, annexure-B. The first respondent upon considering the said fact, has stated that Sri Ramachandra cannot be allowed to participate in the election and he wanted to make clarification from the higher officer and thereafter, appropriate decision will be taken for conducting the election. Respondents 3 to 6, 8 and 9 respectively gave a representation vide annexure-E to the first respondent praying to postpone the election until the controversy is decided. The said request was rejected and the first respondent proceeded to hold the election. At that stage, out of 16 members, six members who had given the representation, left the meeting hall. Thereafter, there were 8 members and they have signed the register. The said request was rejected and the first respondent proceeded to hold the election. At that stage, out of 16 members, six members who had given the representation, left the meeting hall. Thereafter, there were 8 members and they have signed the register. As there was quorum, proceedings were continued and recorded that except petitioners 1 and 2, none of the members have filed nominations for the post of President and Vice-President and accordingly, petitioners 1 and 2 were declared as elected as President and Vice-President respectively without contest vide Annexure-F. Be that as it may. It is the case of the petitioners that they have taken charge vide Annexure-G. ( 3 ) WHEN the things stood thus, respondents 3 to 10 herein have filed an election petition under Section 41 (4) of the APMC Act read with Rule 45 of the Rules. Along with the election petition, they have filed I. A. No. II praying to stay the operation of the proceedings of the first respondent dated 9-8-2005. The Trial Court, after hearing, has granted an ex parte interim order on 16-8-2005. In pursuance of the notice, respondents therein appeared and filed their objections to I. A. No. II. The Trial court, after hearing the parties, has made the ex parte interim order dated 16-8-2005 absolute by order dated 20-8-2005 vide Annexure-H. Assailing the correctness of the said order, petitioners have preferred this writ petition. ( 4 ) PRINCIPAL submission canvassed by learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is one without jurisdiction, contrary to the mandatory provisions of APMC Act and the Rules and the entire approach of the Trial Court/election tribunal is erroneous. Further, he submitted that the Election Tribunal is not functioning as a Civil Court and do not have the powers of the civil Court and therefore, it cannot pass the interim order, particularly an interim order which amounts to restraining the elected members from functioning as Chairman and Vice-Chairman. He also submitted that assumption of jurisdiction under Rule 45 (3) of the Rules is totally a wrong assumption inasmuch as the power to pass interim order is a substantial power granted by the statute and therefore reasons given by the Trial Court that it has got power to pass the interim order cannot be sustained. He also submitted that assumption of jurisdiction under Rule 45 (3) of the Rules is totally a wrong assumption inasmuch as the power to pass interim order is a substantial power granted by the statute and therefore reasons given by the Trial Court that it has got power to pass the interim order cannot be sustained. He relies on the decision of this Court in Malleshappa v revanasiddappa and Others, 1979 (2) Kar. L. J. 171 wherein it is held that the Munsiff functioning under the Act is not a Court but is a 'persona designate' and as such, he does not enjoy all the powers of the Civil Court. Rule 18 relates to the trial of the election petition and does not relate to the passing of an interim order of the nature in question. The ratio laid down by this Court in the said decision directly applies to the facts and circumstances of the case. Further, placing reliance on another judgment of this Court in S. Nagangoud v Y. Basi Reddy,ilr 1969 Mys. 734 submitted that this Court held that the Trial Court has committed an error in issuing injunction against an elected candidate and that the Civil Judge was right in vacating the injunction. Normally in election matters, the verdict of the electorate has to be respected and given effect to until it is set aside on any one of the grounds on which the law permits it to be set aside. Therefore, he submitted that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is liable to be rejected on the threshold. ( 5 ) PER contra, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 3 to 10, inter alia, contended that under Rule 45 (3) of the APMC Rules, the Trial court being an Appellate Authority, has inherent power to grant an interim order of stay and therefore the impugned order passed by the trial Court is just and proper. He further submitted that when the first respondent has recorded in his proceedings that he will consult the higher officers regarding the notification dated 8-8-2005 nominating the 10th respondent as one of the committee member, first respondent could not have conducted the election and declared that the petitioners have been elected unopposed as President and Vice-President respectively and the Trial Court has rightly considered this aspect and granted an interim order. He fairly submitted that the matter may be disposed of directing the Trial Court to dispose of the election petition as expeditiously as possible. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent 2, on instructions, submitted that in pursuance of the declaration of result, petitioners 1 and 2 have assumed the charge as President and Vice-President vide Annexure-G and they are discharging their duties. ( 7 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels appearing for all the parties at considerable length of time and after careful perusal of the impugned order and after considering the rival contentions of the parties, the only question that arises for consideration is:"whether the impugned order passed by the Trial court/election Tribunal is sustainable in law?" ( 8 ) AFTER careful perusal of the impugned order, it emerges on the face of the order that the Trial Court has committed an error in granting interim order of stay. It is well-settled principles of law laid down by the supreme Court in several decisions that in election matters, interim order should be granted in rarest of rare cases. In the present case, the trial Court has failed to read the entire proceedings conducted by the first respondent for electing President and Vice-President of the second respondent. If the entire proceedings are read in toto, it is clear that the total members participated in the meeting on 9-8-2005 are 16, out of which, 6 members have not signed the register for participating in the meeting. As per the mandatory provisions of the APMC Act, l/3rd members who were present in the meeting form the quorum and as there was quorum, the first respondent proceeded to hold election and recorded a finding that only petitioners have filed nominations for the post of President and Vice-President and therefore they have declared as elected unopposed. They have assumed charge as per Annexure-G. Therefore, the Trial Court ought not to have granted ex parte interim order. In the decision of Malleshappa relied on by the petitioners, this court, in similar matter arising out of interim order granted under Rule 18 of the Karnataka Village Panchayats (Election of Chairman and vice-Chairman) Rules, 1959, has held that the Trial Court has committed an error in granting interim order. In the decision of Malleshappa relied on by the petitioners, this court, in similar matter arising out of interim order granted under Rule 18 of the Karnataka Village Panchayats (Election of Chairman and vice-Chairman) Rules, 1959, has held that the Trial Court has committed an error in granting interim order. It is worthy to extract the relevant portion of the law laid down by this Court which reads thus: "the Munsiff functioning under the Act is not a Court but is a 'persona designate,' and as such, he does not enjoy all the powers of the Civil Court. Rule 18 relates to the trial of the election petition and does not relate to the passing of an interim order of the nature in question as such an order cannot be said to form part of the trial of the election petition inasmuch as such an order is not necessary for conducting the trial of the election petition. That being so, the contention of the first respondent that by reason of the provisions contained in Rule 18 of the Rules, the Munsiff had the jurisdiction to pass the order of temporary injunction, cannot be accepted. Consequently the order passed by the Munsiff cannot at all be sustained, and the same is hereby quashed". Further, this Court in the case of S. Nagangoud, held thus: "without going into the question of jurisdiction, what appears to me to be decisive in the matter of exercising the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908, is that the Munsiff committed a clear error in issuing an injunction against an elected candidate and that the civil Judge was right in vacating the injunction. Normally in election matters, the verdict of the electorate has to be respected and given effect to until it is set aside on any one of the grounds on which the law permits it to be set aside". After careful perusal of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that the Trial Court is not justified in passing the interim order in the election petition and the same may not be sustainable. After careful perusal of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that the Trial Court is not justified in passing the interim order in the election petition and the same may not be sustainable. Further, it is pertinent to note here itself that sub-clause (3) of Rule 45 reads as under:" (3) The procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in regard to suits shall be followed by the District Judge as far as it can be made applicable in the trial and disposal of an election petition". Therefore, the finding recorded by the Trial Court that as per Rule 45 (3) it has got power to consider the application for interim order may not be justifiable. Rule 45 (3) of the Rules stipulates the procedure followed in regard to suits shall be followed and made applicable by the District judge for the disposal of the election petition. The Trial Court has gone beyond the scope of the statute and assumed the power, entertained the application and granted the interim order and such action is not at all justifiable. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court on LA. No. II in Misc. Case No. 56 of 2005 cannot be sustained. ( 9 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case stated above, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 20-8- 2005 on LA. No. II passed by the Trial Court in Misc. Case No. 56 of 2005 is set aside. The Trial Court is directed to dispose of the Misc. Case no. 56 of 2005 as expeditiously as possible. ( 10 ) THE learned Additional Government Advocate is permitted to file memo of appearance in two weeks. Sri B. G. Sridharan, learned Counsel is permitted to file vakalath for respondent 2 in two weeks. Sri G. Balakrishna Shastry, learned Counsel is permitted to file memo of appearance for respondents 4 to 10 in two weeks. --- *** --- .