Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. This writ petition by a retired employee of the Bihar State Electricity Board hereinafter referred to as the Board) is directed against the resolution bearing Memo No. 2106, dated 4.9.2000 (Annexure-9), passed by the Board, whereby the petitioners pension has been reduced by 10 per cent. 2. According to the writ petition, the petitioner was an employee of the respondent Board and was posted as an Electrical Executive Engineer Electric Supply Division, Dehri-on-Sone, district Rohtas, during the period 26.1.1992 to August 1995. By letter dated 18.10.1996 (Annexure-2/1), the Board had served a show cause notice on the petitioner to explain as to why the request of Rohtas Rerolling Mills, Dehri-on-Sone, to enhance its load from 187 KVA to 235 KVA was not granted indicating inaction and negligence. The petitioner did not reply to the same and the Board sent its second letter dated 26.2.1997 (Annexure-2), enclosing thereto copy o,f the said show-cause notice dated 18.10.1996 (Annexure-2/1), and calling upon the petitioner to show cause. The petitioner had shown cause by his communication dated 12.3.1997 (Annexure-3). On a consideration of the cause shown by the petitioner and other relevant materials, the respondent authorities in substance came to the conclusion that the petitioner had not purposely enhanced the supply load of the said Mill. In the mean time, the petitioner was heading towards his superannuation. His post-retirement benefits were finally fixed by order dated 30.12.1997 (Annexure-1), and he superannuated with effect from 31.12.1997. This was followed by the Boards second show-cause notice dated 8.9.1999 (Annexure-4), whereby he was informed that he had been found guilty of causing loss of rupees 2.49 lacs to the Board, thereby calling upon the petitioner to show-cause as to why his pension to the extent of the 10 per cent be not reduced in terms of Rule 139 of the Bihar Pension Rules 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The petitioner had shown cause by his communication dated 24.3.2000 (Annexure-8), which was followed by the impugned order whereby the petitioners pension has been reduced to the extent of 10 per cent in terms of Rule 139 of the Rules. Hence this writ petition. 3. The petitioner had shown cause by his communication dated 24.3.2000 (Annexure-8), which was followed by the impugned order whereby the petitioners pension has been reduced to the extent of 10 per cent in terms of Rule 139 of the Rules. Hence this writ petition. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits tht action under Rule 139 of the Rules predicates the detailed procedure which was not followed in the present case, and the proceeding was instead disposed of on the basis of show-cause notice. He relies on the following two reported judgments : (i) 2000(2) PLJR 845 Rajnity Jha V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors.; (ii) 2000 (4) PLJR 83 Ram Awadhesh Sharmav. The State of Bihar and Ors. He next submits that the impugned action is hit by the bar of four years engrafted in Rule 43 (b) of the Rules. He relies on Judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ram Awadhesh Sharma (supra). He lastly submits that the principles of natural justice were not duly observed. The documents called for by him were not supplied to him. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned action. He submits that the principles of natural justice and fair-play were, fully observed. The documents asked for by the petitioner to enable him to submit his show-cause was supplied to him. He next submits that the impugned action is under Rule 139 of the Rules and, therefore, the distinction between the same and Rule 43(b) has to be kept in mind which provides for different situations and different procedure. He relies on the following reported judgments : (i) 1998 (3) PLJR 28, Serajuddin Ahmad V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors.; (ii) 2000 (4) PLJR 459 , The State of Bihar and Ors. V/s. Bipin Bihari Prasad and Anr., (iii) -, para 5 M. Narasimhacharv. The State of Mysore; 5. I have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It appears to me that by communication dated 18.10.1996 (Annexure-2/1), read with the Boards communication dated 26.2.1997 (Annexure-2), the petitioner was called upon to explain the allegations stated therein. The petitioner had filed detailed show-cause on 12.3.1987 (Annexure-3), disowning his liability and responsibility in the matter. It appears to me that by communication dated 18.10.1996 (Annexure-2/1), read with the Boards communication dated 26.2.1997 (Annexure-2), the petitioner was called upon to explain the allegations stated therein. The petitioner had filed detailed show-cause on 12.3.1987 (Annexure-3), disowning his liability and responsibility in the matter. No contemporaneous material or document has been brought to my notice to show that the petitioner had called for any document at this stage to enable him to file his show-cause, and was not supplied to him. This led to a detailed consideration of the matter which led to the Boards decision rejecting the petitioners show cause and also indicating therein the proposed punishment, both rolled into one, vide communication dated 8.9.1999 (Annexure-4). 6. It is equally manifest that the action against the petitioner had been initiated while he was in service and is ex facie covered by Rule 49 (iv) of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the CCA Rules) which is applicable to the category of employees to which the petitioner belongs. The same provides for imposition of penalty of recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders for good and sufficient reason. Rule 55-A of the CCA Rules provides that no order imposing the penalty specified in Clauses (i), (ii) or (iv) of Rule 49 on any Government servant to whom these rule are applicable shall be passed unless he has been given an adequate opportunity of making any representation that he may desire to make and such representation, if any, has been taken into consideration before the order is passed. It is thus manifest that action was initiated against the petitioner in terms of Rule 49 (iv) and Rule 55-A of the CCA Rules while the petitioner was in service. It is settled, law that such an action can be concluded by. allowing the employee to file a representation, detailed procedure need not be followed, and charge-sheet is not required to be served, law is equally well settled that if the employee retired before such a proceeding could be concluded, then the same by automatic operation of law will be deemed to have been converted into one under Rule 138 of the Rules. I, therefore, reject the petitioners contention that the detailed proceeding was not followed. 7. I, therefore, reject the petitioners contention that the detailed proceeding was not followed. 7. The petitioners next contention is equally the result of over-sight of the distinction between the scope and ambit of Rule 43(b) of the Rules which has to be seen in contra-distinction to Rule 135 of the Rules whereas action under Rule 43(b) can be taken on the basis of a duly constituted departmental proceeding or a judicial proceeding, such a protection is not available to a retired employee if action is intended under Rule 139 of the Rules and action can be taken on the basis of representation. This position is manifest from a plain reading of the provisions of Rule 55-A of CCA Rules read with Rule 139(c) of the Rules, the contention is, therefore, rejected. 8. I must at this stage deal with the reported judgments relied on by learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner has first of all relied on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Rajnity Jha (supra). The judgment is not relevant in the present context pre-eminently for two reasons the employee therein had retired and the departmental action was initiated after the employee had retired and, secondly, action was taken under Rule 43 of the Rules. As stated hereinabove, the scope of Rule 43, on the one hand, and Rule 139 on the other are quite different. The judgment, therefore, is of no assistance to the petitioner. 8.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner next relies on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ram Awadhesh Sharma (supra). The learned Single Judge had formulated the following two issues for adjudication in paragraph No. 3 of the judgment and is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: 3. In this case, the questions to be determined are: (i) Whether a departmental proceeding initiated against a Government employee, while in service, on retirement can be deemed to be a proceeding under Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules or not? (ii) Whether a departmental proceeding initiated against a Government employee, while in service, on retirement, if converted/treated as a proceeding under Rule 43(b), the State of Bihar can pass any penal order withholding/withdrawing pension and gratuity in respect of an allegation prior to four years of institution of such proceeding? (ii) Whether a departmental proceeding initiated against a Government employee, while in service, on retirement, if converted/treated as a proceeding under Rule 43(b), the State of Bihar can pass any penal order withholding/withdrawing pension and gratuity in respect of an allegation prior to four years of institution of such proceeding? It is thus manifest that the issues pre-eminently touching Rule 43(b) were under consideration and, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioner in the present case. 9 Learned counsel for the respondents has rightly relied on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Serajuddin Ahmad (supra) which fully supports his case. Action was taken while the petitioner was still in service and was taken to be a proceeding u/s. 55-A of the CCA Rules. Orders were obviously passed after the employee had superannuated. There was reduction of pension on the ground that the service record was found unsatisfactory and such exercise of power was under Rule 139(a) and (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. A Division Bench of this Court in its judgment in The State of Bihar V/s. Bipin Bihari Prasad, (supra) has, in substance, taken the same view. It was found by the Division Bench that show-cause notice against the employee was issued when he was in service, was held to be in terms of Rule 55-A of the CCA Rules and, therefore, summary proceeding indicated therein read with Rule 139(C) was adequate. In such a situation, no specific charge was required to be framed and proved in a departmental proceeding. It has further been held that if the proceeding has not been concluded before the employee superannuated, then the same shall by automatic operation of law be deemed to have been converted into one Rule 139 of the Rules. Law is thus well settled that in a situation like the present one, where action had been initiated while the petitioner was still in service, which was in substance under Rule 55-A of the CCA Rules, then a detailed procedure is not required to be followed and can be concluded after superannuation on the basis of the representation contemplated by Rule 139(c). 10. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondents on paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Narasimhachar (supra) is not quite relevant in the present context. 10. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondents on paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Narasimhachar (supra) is not quite relevant in the present context. The same dealt with the contention that such a reduction in pension was tantamount to reduction in rank and, therefore, the procedure under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution must be followed. The contention was repelled on the ground that reduction of pension is not covered by the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution for the reason that it deals with three situations (i) dismissal, (ii) removal, and (iii) reduction in rank. Reduction in rank applies to the public servant who is expected to serve after reduction which is not the case in hand. Furthermore the petitioner has not based his case on Art. 311 of the Constitution. 11. I must also deal with the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that copies of all the documents were not supplied to him to enable him to meet the allegation effectively. It appears to me that show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner by communication dated 18.10.1996 (Annexure-2/1), read with the communication dated 26.2.1997 (Annexure-2), and the petitioner has submitted his exhaustive show-cause by communication dated 12.3.1997 (Annexure-3). Neither has it been contended before me, nor do I find, that the petitioner had called for the documents before this stage. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the petitioner was not handicapped in submitting his show- cause/representation until this stage. This was followed by the second show-cause notice dated 8.9.1999 (Annexure-4), whereby the petitioner was informed of the reasons for holding that the allegation had been found true, and also informing him of the proposed punishment. This was obviously in the nature of a second show-cause notice. The materials on record suggest that the petitioner for the first time asked for documents before submitting his reply to the second show-cause notice. By his communication dated 29.9.1999 (Annexure-5), the petitioner had requested the Boards Secretary to supply the information/documents indicated therein. It is manifest from the inter-departmental communication dated 21.1.2000 (Annexure-6), which followed that the petitioners request to supply to him informations/documents was acceded to, the entire text of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference. By his communication dated 29.9.1999 (Annexure-5), the petitioner had requested the Boards Secretary to supply the information/documents indicated therein. It is manifest from the inter-departmental communication dated 21.1.2000 (Annexure-6), which followed that the petitioners request to supply to him informations/documents was acceded to, the entire text of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference. ^^funsZkkuqlkj] vi;qZqä fo"k;d cksMZ ds i=kad 2400 fnukad 8-9-99 ,oa vkids vf/k;kpuk i= fnukad 29-9-1999 ds izlax esa egkizca/kd≶&eq[; vfHk;ark] daUnzh; fcgkj {ks=h; fo|qr cksMZ] iVuk ls izkIr izfrosnu i= la[;k 144 fnukad 8-1-96 dh Nk;k izfr vuqyXud lfgr layXulfgr layXu djrs gq, vuqjks/k gS fd oakfNr Li"Vhdj.k 15 fnukaas ds vUnj vo; lefiZr djus dk d"V djsa A lkFk gh dguk gS fd tokc rS;kj djus ds fy, layXu vfHkys[kksa ds vfrfjä dksbZ vU; vfHkys[k ns[kuk pkgrs gSa rc vius O;; ls fo|qr vapy] lklkjkr ,oa fo|qr ize.My] Msgjh&vksu&lksu dk;kZy; tkdj ,rn~ lEcU/kh vfHkys[k voyksdu djus dk d"V djsa A fo|qr v/kh{k.k vfHk;ark] lklkjke ,oa fo|qr dk;Zikyd vfHk;ark] Msgjh&vksu&lksu ls vkidks lg;ksx djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k tk jgk gS A** It further appears from the inter-departmental communication bearing letter No. 539, dated 2.3.2000 (Annexure-7), that the documents mentioned therein were made available to be supplied to the petitioner. 11.1. The two-fold conclusion which automatically follows from the discussion hereinabove that the petitioner had not asked for any information/documents till he had furnished his show-cause. Secondly, the petitioner had asked for certain informations/documents to enable him to represent against the second show-cause notice, which were supplied to him, apart from the Boards clear offer (vide Annexure-6) that he was entitled to inspect the entire documents. I am thus convinced that the documents/ informations called for by the petitioner were supplied to him and the principles of natural justice and fair play were fully observed in the present case. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed.