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2005 DIGILAW 567 (GAU)

Umadutt Jhunjhunwala v. Suraj Kr. Longani

2005-08-08

B.K.SHARMA

body2005
1. This revision application is directed against the judgment and order dated 13.11.2000 passed by the appellate court, i.e., the learned District Judge, Shillong reversing the judgment and decree dated 24.7.1998 passed by the learned Munsiff decreeing the suit in question in favour of the plaintiff who is the appellant in this appeal. The plaintiff/ appellant filed Title Suit No. 9(SH)/88 for ejectment of the defendant/ respondent from the suit premises and for delivery of the vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff by evicting the defendant, his family members, employees, workmen and all others found living in the suit premises, with the defendant. 2. As per the statement made in the plaint, the plaintiff-appellant is the owner of holding No. 34 at Police Bazar, Shillong and the defendant/ respondent has been in occupation of the first floor of the two storied building within the same holding as monthly tenant of the plaintiff at a rental of Rs. 500 per month payable in advance within the first week of each current month. 3. The defendant entered into a tenancy agreement with the plaintiff on 16.12.1972 for a period often (10) years from 01.01.1973 subject to the renewal for another term of 10 years on expiry of the original lease on 31.12.1983. The defendant told the plaintiff that he was not interested in renewal of the tenancy and requested the plaintiff to allow him six months time only for shifting to another place. On such a request, the plaintiff allowed the defendant to stay in the suit premises for a period of six months. However, even after expiry of six (6) months, the defendant did not vacate the suit premises and he continued to occupy the same on some pretext without renewing the tenancy. According to the plaintiff, the defendant has been occupying the suit premises without any valid tenancy agreement. 4. It is the case of the plaintiff that the premises under the occupation of the defendant is very old and is in a dilapidated condition and almost unsafe for human habitation. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he wants to construct a RCC building by demolishing the present structure and for the purpose, he requested the defendant repeatedly to vacate the suit premises, but the defendant failed to do so without assigning any reason. 5. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he wants to construct a RCC building by demolishing the present structure and for the purpose, he requested the defendant repeatedly to vacate the suit premises, but the defendant failed to do so without assigning any reason. 5. The plaintiff has constructed a RCC building in the other part of the holding which also covers the back side of the premises under occupation of the defendant. Moreover, the ground floor of the premises which was under occupation of the Shillong Branch of Bijoya Bank has been vacated by the Bank as per the request made by the plaintiff enabling him to carry out the construction and presently the said ground floor is lying vacant. However, refusal on the part of the defendant to vacate the first floor has resulted in failure on the part of the plaintiff to carry out the construction. The plaintiff has been residing just behind the suit premise along with his family members and it has become difficult for him to stay there. 6. Further statement made in the plaint is that the defendant apart from refusal to vacate the suit premises on bona fide requirement of the plaintiff is also very much irregular in paying monthly rent. At times the defendant used to pay the rent for two months. While accepting the rent for two (2) months, i.e., February and March 1987, the plaintiff protested against irregular payment of rent and asked the defendant to vacate the suit premises which the defendant refused. From April 1987 the defendant did not pay rent and, thus, he became a defaulter at the time of the filing of the suit. The plaintiff issued quit notice to the defendant on 16.5.1988 through his advocate asking the defendant to vacate the suit premises-by the end of June 1988 and also for payment of all arrears of rent, but the defendant failed to comply with the demand made in the notice and continued to occupy the suit premise illegally. 7. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement questioning the maintainability of the suit. Apart from the common grounds of their being no cause of action, the suit being barred by the principles of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence, he also contended that the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties. 7. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement questioning the maintainability of the suit. Apart from the common grounds of their being no cause of action, the suit being barred by the principles of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence, he also contended that the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties. The defendant denied the allegations made in the plaint. He denied that the suit premises is required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation after reconstruction. According to the defendant, the plaintiff has extensive landed properties. The defendant pleaded for dismissal of the suit. 8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed. (1) Whether there is any cause of action for the suit ? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form ? (3) What was the system and mode of payment of rent agreed to by the parties ? (4) Whether the defendant is regular in the payment of rent and if not whether any late payment of rent is being accepted by the plaintiff thereby giving effect to the renewal of agreement dated 16.12.1972 when the rent for two months, was accepted subsequent to expiry of the lease ? (5) Whether defendants case be termed a defaulter and liable for ejectment ? (6) Whether the deposits of rent in the court by the defendant is a valid deposit or not ? (7) Whether the suit premises is very old, in a dilapidated condition and not habitable and, therefore, required for reconstruction and also for bona fide use and occupation of the plaintiff? (8) Whether the half portion of the suit premises has been vacated by other co-tenant and is lying vacant for more than a year ? (9) Whether the defendant has got any right to use and occupy the suit premises after expiry of the lease on 31.12.1982 and whether any relationship of landlord and tenant is still existing between the parties ? (10) To what relief/reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to? 9. The plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and three other witnesses as PWs 2, 3 and 4. The defendant also examined himself as DW-1 and four other witnesses as D.Ws. 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 10. (10) To what relief/reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to? 9. The plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and three other witnesses as PWs 2, 3 and 4. The defendant also examined himself as DW-1 and four other witnesses as D.Ws. 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 10. The learned Munsiff decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff answering all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and granting the reliefs prayed for in the suit. 11. Being aggrieved, the defendant approached the first appellate court, i.e., the District Judge, Shillong by filing Title. Civil Appeal No. l(SH)/ 1998. By the impugned judgment dated 10/13.11.2000 the appeal has been answered in the affirmative in favour of the defendant by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the second appeal (since converted to revision petition). While admitting the appeal by order dated 1.2.2001, the following questions of law were framed: (1) Whether the learned trial court has the jurisdiction to try the instant suit and whether the question of jurisdiction can be raised at the subsequent stage after trial of the suit ? (2) Whether rent was deposited in terms of the provisions of section 5 of the Meghalaya Urban Areas Rent Control Act and if not, whether the rent deposited by the defendant/tenant is in contravention of the said provisions of the Act ? (3) Whether the impugned judgment is in contravention of section 21, CPC and also of section 5 of the Meghalaya Urban Areas Rent Control Act? 12. By order dated 3.4.2003 another issue was framed which reads as follows: "Whether the first appellate court acted beyond the provisions of section 5(C) of the Meghalaya Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, in not effectively deciding the vital issue of bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the appellant, specially the subsequent development of the issue ?" 13.1 have heard Mr. G.S. Massar, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr, A.S. Siddique for the appellant, I have also heard Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel along with Mr. B.K. Deb Roy, learned counsel for the respondent. I have also gone through the entire records of the case and have given my anxious consideration to the same. 14. Learned counsel for the parties in their lengthy and elaborate argument took me to every piece of evidence on record. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel along with Mr. B.K. Deb Roy, learned counsel for the respondent. I have also gone through the entire records of the case and have given my anxious consideration to the same. 14. Learned counsel for the parties in their lengthy and elaborate argument took me to every piece of evidence on record. They have also cited number of decisions in support of their respective cases. By order dated 21.4.2005 passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 127(SH)/04, the instant appeal was registered as Civil Revision Petition and, thus, the appeal stood converted to revision petition. 15. As regards the question of jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff to try the suit which was strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the parties, it is on record that in absence of the Presiding Officer of the court of the Assistant District Judgfe, Shillong for a long time, Miscellaneous Case No. 62(SH)/1996 was filed under section 24, CPC before this court for transfer of the suit from the said court to any other court of competent jurisdiction. The application was filed by the present appellant and the same was disposed of by order dated 9.10.1996, as per the agreement arrived at by the parties, made known to the court through their respective counsel. As per the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, this court passed the said order for trial of the suit by the learned Munsin7Shillong. Thereafter the case records were transmitted to the court of the learned MunisfF. The suit proceeded in the court of the learned Munsiff without any objection from the defendant/respondent. After framing of issues, etc., the learned Munsiff recorded the evidence of both the parties and thereafter upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, decreed the suit by judgment and decree aforementioned. 16. Before the appellate court, the defendant/respondent for the first time raised the question of jurisdiction of the learned Munisff in deciding the suit. The appellate court has held that the suit having been valued Rs. 6,000 and the court of Munsiff having had pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs. 3,000, the learned Munsiff lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. 17. 16. Before the appellate court, the defendant/respondent for the first time raised the question of jurisdiction of the learned Munisff in deciding the suit. The appellate court has held that the suit having been valued Rs. 6,000 and the court of Munsiff having had pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs. 3,000, the learned Munsiff lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. 17. Being confronted with the argument that the question of jurisdiction was never raised before the learned Munsiff and that the defendant with his full knowledge and consent participated in the suit proceeding before the learned Munsiff, the appellate court has held that the question of jurisdiction can be raised and entertained at any stage of the proceeding and that a jurisdiction not vested in the court cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. According to the appellate court, since the learned Munsiff did not have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, the judgment and decree passed by him was a nullity and its validity could be set up whenever and wherever it is enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in co-lateral proceeding. While arriving at such a finding, the appellate court has placed reliance on the decisions as reported in P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Mohan Mor Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001 ; Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P.) Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 1240 and State of Maharashtra v. Admane Anita Moti, AIR 1995 SC 350 . 18. It will be appropriate to refer to the provision of section 27 of the Civil Procedure Code at this stage and the legal position relating to the assumption of jurisdiction by a court without any objection from either of the parties relating to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads follows : "21. Objection to jurisdiction. - (1) No Objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. - (1) No Objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (2) No objection as to the competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the executing court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 19. As per the provision of section 21(2), CPC, no objection as to the competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. In the instant case, admittedly the suit was filed in the court of the Assistant District Judge, Shillong on being valued at Rs. 6,000 and at the point of time the court of Munsiff had pecuniary jurisdiction upto Rs. 3,000. However, since the Presiding Officer in the court of the Assistant District Judge, Shillong and not available occasioning delay in disposal of the suit, aforesaid application under section 24, CPC was filled before this court to transfer the suit to any other Court of competent jurisdiction. Both the parties agreed for trial of the suit by the learned Munsiff and the suit proceeded on that basis by way of framing of issues, taking evidence, hearing the learned counsel for the parties and consequent delivery of the judgment and preparation of decree. Both the parties agreed for trial of the suit by the learned Munsiff and the suit proceeded on that basis by way of framing of issues, taking evidence, hearing the learned counsel for the parties and consequent delivery of the judgment and preparation of decree. At no stage of the proceeding, any objection was raised on behalf of the defendant/respondent relating to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction on the part of the learned Munsiff. 20. As per the aforesaid provision of section 21(2), CPC such objection if any has to be raised in the court of first instance at the earliest and before settlement of issues. If no such objection is raised at the stages mentioned in the aforesaid provision, such objection cannot be allowed by any appellate or revisional court, unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 21. In the instant case, there is no dispute that no such objection was raised before the l6arned Munsiff before settlement of issues and/or at the earliest opportunity. In fact no objection at all was raised throughout the trial before the learned Munsiff. In fact, as noticed above rather the defendant/respondent consented for trial of the suit by the learned Munsiff. 22. It is in the above context the decision on which the learned appellate court placed reliance will have to be understood. The cases on which the appellate court placed reliance so as to conclude that the learned Munsiff having had no pecuniary jurisdiction, could not have passed the judgment and decree are on the question of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the civil court. The provisions of section 9, CPC have been referred to. It was in that context, the Apex Court in the said decisions has held that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is equally true that if a court inherently lacks jurisdiction, the superior court cannot confer jurisdiction on that court. Same is not a case in hand. It is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction, but is a case of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The appellate court failed to appreciate that section 21(2), CPC is attracted in the instant case and that the defendant/respondent was estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction. 23. Same is not a case in hand. It is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction, but is a case of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The appellate court failed to appreciate that section 21(2), CPC is attracted in the instant case and that the defendant/respondent was estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction. 23. It has been held in number of cases that in absence of any failure of justice no objection should be entertained by appellate or revisional court without there being objection raised in the court of the first instance. The Legislature has given a statutory recognition to the principle of waiver to the jurisdiction of the court. The provisions of section 21(2) CPC have given recognition to the principle of waiver with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction. Such incorporation has been made by bringing amendment in 1976 to ensure that the time, knowledge and labour spent by the court in adjudicating the issues do not go in vain if the parties concerned participated in the adjudication process, joined the issues and allowed the court to try the suit on merit without raising objections to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court at the earliest opportunity. Thus, the provisions of the statute are made fool proof by providing adequate provisions for curing any irregularity. 24. The provisions of section 21 prohibited the appellate court from entertaining any objection to jurisdiction on the ground of pecuniary limit. It is only when failure of justice has occasioned, the appellate or revisional courts may in rarest of the rare cases entertain the appeal or revision. When a case has been tried by the court on merits and judgment rendered, in the clear circumstances, should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it has resulted in failure of justice. The provisions of section 21(2), CPC have been consciously made by the Legislature in terms of wliich objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary being technical in nature is not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been prejudices on merit. 25. The above principles relating to raising of objection of pecuniary jurisdiction finds Support from the following decisions : (a) Kiran Singhi v. Charan Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 . (b) Heralal Patri v. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 . (c) Bahrain Retro Co. Ltd. v. P.S. Papu, AIR 1966 SC 634 . (d) Musstt. 25. The above principles relating to raising of objection of pecuniary jurisdiction finds Support from the following decisions : (a) Kiran Singhi v. Charan Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 . (b) Heralal Patri v. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 . (c) Bahrain Retro Co. Ltd. v. P.S. Papu, AIR 1966 SC 634 . (d) Musstt. M. Begum v. Lakshman Ravi Das, AIR 1992 Guw. 91. (e) R.S. and DV Finance Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Vallast Glass Works Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 2094 . (f) Phatahuma and Others v. Kdopil Das Kutti, AIR 1981 SC 1683 . (g) Sashi Kanta Sarma v. Hemkanta Sarmah, 1988 (1) GLJ 34. (h) Monoranjan Sutradhar v. Subhasini Shil, 1999 (1) GLT518. 26. Before the appellate court, it was not a pleaded case of the defendant-respondent that there has been failure of justice in deciding the suit by the learned Munsiff. As noticed above, the defendant-respondent all throughout participated in the proceeding before the learned Munsiff and even gave consent before this court for trial of the suit by the learned Munisff. The finding of the appellate court is also not based on any failure of justice occasioned by trial of the suit by the learned Munsiff. The only ground on which the plea of lack of jurisdiction has been allowed is that the valuation of the suit being Rs. 6,000 and the court of Munsiff being vested with pecuniary jurisdiction to the extent of Rs. 3,000, the learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The appellate court has decided the issue of jurisdiction as if the court of Munsiff lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the suit unmindful of the provisions of section 21(1), CPC introduced by amendment in 1976. From the materials on record there is nothing to show and not even a whisper on the part of the defendant-respondent on the basis of which it can be said that there has been failure of justice. This being the position, I have no hesitation to hold that the appeal could not have been allowed on the technical ground of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The appellate court failed to distinguish the position relating to inherent lack of jurisdiction and the kind of jurisdiction involved in this proceeding in reference to section 21(2), CPC. 27. This being the position, I have no hesitation to hold that the appeal could not have been allowed on the technical ground of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The appellate court failed to distinguish the position relating to inherent lack of jurisdiction and the kind of jurisdiction involved in this proceeding in reference to section 21(2), CPC. 27. The appellate court although has held that the court of Munsiff lacked jurisdiction to try the suit and could have allowed the appeal on that basis, has also tried the other issues deAded by the learned Munsiff. Thus, after answering the first issue relating to jurisdiction in the above manner, I now proceed to deal with the other issues involved in this proceeding answered in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, but negatived by the appellate court. 28. Issue No. 9, i.e., whether the defendant has got any right to use and occupy the suit premises after expiry of the lease on 31.12.1982 and whether any relationship of the landlord and the tenant is still existing between the parties, has been answered in favour of the plaintiff-respondents, but the same has been reversed by the appellate court. Considering the fact that the main issues like bona fide requirement of the suit premises and default on the part of the defendant-respondent towards payment of monthly rent, etc., this issue need not detain us. Suffice is to say that while the trial court has held that in absence of any renewal of the tenancy agreement after expiry of the lease on 31.12.1982, the defendant-respondent has no right to use and occupy the suit premises in absence of extension or renewal of the lease, the appellate court has reversed the findings holding that even in absence of any tenancy agreement the defendant-respondent cannot be treated as stranger. Be that as it may, this issue will have to be considered in reference to the main issues. 29. Other issues as were formulated by the trial court can be broadly categorized into two areas, namely, the bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff-appellant and whether the defendant-respondent is a defaulter in payment of rent. Be that as it may, this issue will have to be considered in reference to the main issues. 29. Other issues as were formulated by the trial court can be broadly categorized into two areas, namely, the bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff-appellant and whether the defendant-respondent is a defaulter in payment of rent. In answering this two issues on the basis of the materials on record, the other issues such as whether the suit premises is very old and in a dilapidated condition not fit for human habitation and whether there was any occasion for the defendant-respondent to deposit the rent in the court, etc., will automatically come for consideration. 30. As regards the irregular payment of monthly rent as alleged by the plaintiff-appellant, the court on the basis of the evidences on record found that as per the terms of the tenancy agreement, the defendant-respondent was required to pay monthly rent of Rs. 500 in advance within the first week of every English calendar month. The trial court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the none other than the defendant (DW1) found that although the defendant was regular in payment of monthly rent at the beginning, subsequently he became irregular in payment of rent. In that context, the trial court also noticed the expiry of the tenancy agreement and non-renewal of the same by the defendant-respondent with the plea that within six months time he would shift to another place by vacating the suit premises. 31. The appellate court while reversing tfoe aforesaid findings misdirected itself to the evidences on record and its appreciation. The dispute relating to payment of monthly rent with irregularity will have to be understood in the context of depositing the rent by the defendant-respondent in the court. It is the definite case of the plaintiff-appellant that the rent was deposited by the defendant-respondent in the court without tendering the same, to the landlord-appellant and without there being any refusal to accept the monthly rent by the appellant. In the cross-examination, the defendant himself stated that he had no proof of tendering the monthly rent to the plaintiff-appellant before depositing the same in the court. In the cross-examination, the defendant himself stated that he had no proof of tendering the monthly rent to the plaintiff-appellant before depositing the same in the court. As per the procedure envisaged under the Meghalaya Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, when the landlord refuses to accept the lawful rent tendered by his tenant, the tenant has to deposit the same in the court within 30 days of its becoming due together with process fees for service of notice on the landlord. Atenant who has made such deposits shall not be treated as a defaulter. In the instant case the defendant-respondent was to deposit the rent for April 1987 in the last part of April or in the 1st week of May, but exhibit-B shows that the rent for April and May 1987 was deposited in the court by the defendant-respondent on 28.05.87. This will go to show that the rent for April was not deposited within 30 days of its becoming due. This aspect of the matter has been noticed by the trial court, but the appellate court ignored the same. 32. With regard to the procedure of depositing the rent in the court as per the provisions of the aforesaid Act, the appellate court has held that the defendant-respondent was not a defaulter in payment of rent and placing reliance on the certain decisions drew the presumption in favour of the defendant-respondent without any reference to the evidences on record. The appellate court avoided to go in the issue as per the provisions of section 5(4) of the Act which was crucial and relevant to the issue. There is nothing in the evidence to prove that the defendant-respondent had complied with the aforesaid provisions. The onus towards compliance of the same was on the defendant-respondent to prove that the rent was deposited in the court as provided in section 5(4) of the Act. As per the said provision, there must be evidence that there was refusal by the landlord. The tendering of rent and refusal to accept the same are the preconditions towards depositing the rent in the court. Any deposit made in contravention of such preconditions cannot be said to be a deposit of rent in the eye of law. 33. As per the said provision, there must be evidence that there was refusal by the landlord. The tendering of rent and refusal to accept the same are the preconditions towards depositing the rent in the court. Any deposit made in contravention of such preconditions cannot be said to be a deposit of rent in the eye of law. 33. In this connection I may also gainfully refer two decisions of this court as reported in 2005 (1) GLT532 (Parul Bala Debnath v. Umatara Roy) and 2005 (1) GLT 543 (Ray and Co. v. Basanti Devi Somani). In both the decisions, referring to the provisions* of section 5(4) of the Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, it has been held that the deposit of rent contrary to the procedure envisaged will not save the tenant from being a defaulter. 34. The appellate court while reversing the findings of the trial court simply relied on various decisions of the Apex Court and this court without referring to the facts and circumstances involved in the case and unmindful of the fact that the ratio of a decision will have to be understood in the background of the fact situation involved in that case. As has been held by the Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Prushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , while writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of the based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. The appellate court failed to discharge its obligation on these sound and well settled principles. 35. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show that the respondent/ tenant tendered the rent to the appellant/landlord and there was refusal of his part to accept the same. As has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Rameswarlal Choudhury v. Ram Niranjan Mour (1995) Supp. 35. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show that the respondent/ tenant tendered the rent to the appellant/landlord and there was refusal of his part to accept the same. As has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Rameswarlal Choudhury v. Ram Niranjan Mour (1995) Supp. (3) SCC 44, without resorting to such tender there could not have been any deposit of rent in the court and such a procedure adopted by the tenant was not in compliance with section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (Adopted by the State of Meghalaya). 36. Similarly in the case of Abdul Matin Choudhury v. Nitananda Dutta Banik, (1997) 2 GLR 468, this court held that as per the provision of section 5(4) of the Act, there must be evidence that there was refusal by the landlord to accept the rent before depositing the rent in the court. Same view has been expressed in the case of Niranjan Sarah v, Sapna Dam, (2000) 3 GLT 503. 37. As regards the bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord-appellant, the trial court has answered the issue in favour of the appellant which has been negatived by the appellate court. This issue is taken up together with the issue as to whether the house in question is in a dilapidated condition and unfit for human habitation. Referring to the evidences on record, the trial court has answered both the issues in favour of the plaintiff. The suit property is a Assam Type house and the same is under the occupation of thl defendant-respondent since 1955 and the same is more than half a century old. The plaintiff-appellant in such circumstances wanted to reconstruct the same so as to be replaced by a RCC building demolishing the present structure. The plaintiff-appellant in his evidence clearly stated about the unhygienic condition in which he had to live with present suit house adjacent to his living house. The trial court upon examination of the exhibit Nos. 3,4,5 and 6 and also on the basis of local inspection carried out, held that the house is a very old one and in a bad shape and not fit for human habitation. The trial court upon examination of the exhibit Nos. 3,4,5 and 6 and also on the basis of local inspection carried out, held that the house is a very old one and in a bad shape and not fit for human habitation. The trial court held that in such circumstances the proposed reconstruction of the RCC building in place of the old Assam Type House was the requirement of the landlord-appellant. However, the appellate court on this issue also without referring to the evidences on record, reversed the finding only on the basis of the certain decisions without first deciding the applicability of those cases to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 38. The appellate court has also misread the deposition made by the plaintiff-appellant in terms of which as per the family agreement, his son was required to reside in the said suit premises. However, in view of the occupation of the same by the defendant-respondent he was compelled to reside in some other house. The appellate court found such evidence to be in deviation from the stand in the plaint. The appellate court has even gone to the extent of holding that in absence of ajiy evidence on record to show the bona fide requirement of the landlord-appellant by way of production of municipal permission and sanctioned plan for construction, etc., the plea of the landlord-appellant was not acceptable. Like that of the other issues, the appellate court answered the issue against the plaintiff-appellant placing reliance on certain decisions without first ascertaining the applicability of those decisions to the facts .and circumstances of the present case. 39. It is on record that during the pendency of the suit, as per the family arrangement made in 1990 the suit premises was given to PW 2 (appellant). The family arrangement was reduced to writing and registered on 1.7.1995 (exhibit 2). It is also on record that vide exhibit 3, the same was approved by the income-tax authority. All these developments are subsequent to the filing of the suit. It is on record and not rebutted by the defendant-respondent that PW 2 is living with is family in his brother's house. In his cross-examination, PW 2 clearly stated that he has no other accommodation other than the suit premises. All these developments are subsequent to the filing of the suit. It is on record and not rebutted by the defendant-respondent that PW 2 is living with is family in his brother's house. In his cross-examination, PW 2 clearly stated that he has no other accommodation other than the suit premises. All these aspects of the matter having a clear bearing to the issues involved, escaped the notice of the appellate court while reversing the findings recorded by the trial court. 40. In the case referred to by Mr. Msissar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant as reported in AIR 1988 SC 1422 (Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander), the Apex Court while holding that High Court in exercise of its revisional power in appropriate case re-appreciate the evidences if findings of the appellate court are found to be infirm in law, also held that the court can take cognizance of subsequent events to mould the relief. 41. Another case on which Mr. Massar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant placed reliance is that of Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Ranadhir Ch. Dutta, AIR 1988 SC 396 in which the Apex Court found fault with the appellate court in interfering with the finding of the trial court about bona fide requirement of the landlord of the suit premises. In the instant case also the clear finding recorded by the trial court on the basis of the evidences on record could not have been interfered with by the appellate court merely on surmises, conjectures and simply by referring to certain case laws without discussion anything as to the applicability of the same to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 42. In the case of Lay a Prasad v. Pradeep Shrinivastava, AIR 2001 SCW 598 , the Apex Court dealing with a case of eviction under the provisions of U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) held that subsequent developments occurred pendente lite can be taken into account. 43. Same view has been expressed in the case of Rajudas v. Rambabu, AIR 2001 SCW 2298 . In that case also, as in the instant case, the Apex Court held that the High Court rightly considered the fresh need which was after passage of seven long years. 43. Same view has been expressed in the case of Rajudas v. Rambabu, AIR 2001 SCW 2298 . In that case also, as in the instant case, the Apex Court held that the High Court rightly considered the fresh need which was after passage of seven long years. The Apex Court noticed that by passage of time the need was changed and the minor son had become major for whose need there was specific evidence in the proceeding. In the case of N.R. Niranjan Swami v. B. Francis Jagan, AIR 2001 SCW 2765 , the Apex Court held that successive suits can be filed by the landlord on ground of bona fide requirement or non-payment of rent. This case was pressed into service to bring home the point of argument that the subsequent evenjts brought on evidence by the landlord-appellant could not have been brushed aside by the appellate court. 44. In the case of Abdul Gaffar v. H.R. Srinivas Setty, (2000) 9 SCC 367 , the Apex Court held that the revisional court can test the bona fide need of landlord on the basis of the subsequent events. As in the instant case in that case also the trial court allowed the eviction petition of the landlord. However, the District Judge reversed the findings and held that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and answered the hardship in favour of the tenant. The High Court allowed the revision application filed by the landlord under section 115 of the CPC on both counts, i.e., bona fide need and comparative hardship. It was held by the Apex Court that the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can examine the significance of subsequent events. 45. Another case on which Mr. Masar, learned senior counsel appearing for the landlord-appellant placed reliance is that of Dwarka Prasad v. Niranjan, (2003) 4 SCO 549. In that case, the Apex Court held that the bona fide requirement of the landlord includes the requirement of the family members, i.e., his son, brothers, sisters, etc. 46. From the discussions made above and on the basis of the evidences on record, the appellate court could not have reversed the findings of the trial court so as to hold that there was variation of facts in respect of the bona fide requirement of the suit premises. 46. From the discussions made above and on the basis of the evidences on record, the appellate court could not have reversed the findings of the trial court so as to hold that there was variation of facts in respect of the bona fide requirement of the suit premises. The appellate court lost sight of the fact that the suit was instituted way back in 1988 and the plaintiff-appellant duly brought on record the bona fide requirement of the suit premises. 47. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant-respondent extensively referring to the evidences on record, supported the impugned judgment of the appellate court. He placed reliance on the decision of this court reported in (1991) 1 GLR 255 (Horen Baruah v. Lalit Bhuyari). He also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court as reported in AIR 1974 SC1596 (Mattulal v. Radhelal) in support of his argument. Both the decisions were pressed into service to bring home his point of argument that there was no bona fide requirement of the suit premises. 48. The above cases are of no help to the case of the defendant-respondent. While in the case of Haren Baruah (supra) this court held that bona fide requirement has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, in the second case the Apex Court pointed out that the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord and the finding thereof is a finding of fact and that the High Court in second appeal cannot interfere with such finding of fact unless it is shown that there is a mistake of law committed by the subordinate court or that the finding of the subordinate court is based on no evidence or is such as no reasonable man can reach. 49. In the instant case, the bona fide requirement of the suit premises is well established as has been discussed by the trial court and has been brought on record by adducing evidence by the plaintiff-appellant There being no appreciation of such evidences even remotely, the findings arrived at by the appellate court is perverse finding requiring interference of this court in exercise of*its revisional power. 50. Mr. 50. Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel for the defendant-respondent also placed reliance on two decisions of this court as reported in (1989) 1 GLR 286 (Khadi Village Industries Commissioner v. State of Nagaland) and (1988) 1 GLR 330 (On the death of Rashik Roy his heir Smt. Renu Roy v. Shri Boloram Kalita). In the case of Boloram (supra), this court reiterated the well established principle of law that if two views are reasonably possible on the question under examination, one favouring the tenant has to be adopted. In the case ofKhadi Village Industries (supra) the Division Bench of this court held that a tenant who continues to occupy the premises even after the lease period is over, is called a tenant by sufferance. Both the decisions were pressed into service so as to submit that the materials available on record tilt in favour of the tenant-respondent and, thus, the finding recorded by the appellate court should not be interfered with in exercise of revisional power. I am afraid that both the decisions are misplaced, when the evidences are overwhelming towards establishment of the bona fide requirement of the landlord-appellant and the default on the part of the defendant-respondent. 51. Another case on which Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant-respondent placed reliance is that of Rashiklal v. Shah Gokul Das, AIR 1989 SC 920 . In that case the landlord accepted the accumulated rent without any objection and on that ground the Apex Court held that the eviction of tenant on ground of default in payment of rent was not permissible. Same is not the case in hand. Apart from the default on the part of the defendant-respondent in payment of monthly rent, he deposited the rent in clear contravention of the aforesaid provisions of the Act. As discussed above, he deposited the rent without first tendering the same to the landlord-appellant and without there being any refusal on the part of the landlord-appellant to accept the rent. The procedure envisaged as per the provisions of the Act having been flouted, the trial court rightly answered the issue in favour of the plaintiff-appellant which could not have been reversed by the appellate court without referring to the evidences on record. 52. Mr. The procedure envisaged as per the provisions of the Act having been flouted, the trial court rightly answered the issue in favour of the plaintiff-appellant which could not have been reversed by the appellate court without referring to the evidences on record. 52. Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel placing reliance on the following decisions also reminded this court of the scope of interference with the findings arrived at by the appellate court in exercise of revisional power of this court. (a) Madhurilata Devi v. Shri Gaurapada Basak, (1984) 1 GLR 392. (b) Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Risen Chamria?AIR 1950 SC 23. (c) Shaik Jaffar Shaik Mahmud v. Md. Pasha, (1975) 1 SCO 25. (d) Anil Kr. Saha v.Adhir Kr. Dev,2001 (3) GLT402. 53. In all the cases the scope, ambit and limitation towards exercising the revisional power has been disused. However, as noticed above, when the appellate court committed manifest error of law and fact in appreciating the evidences on record, and simply brushed aside the findings recorded by the trial court on the basis of certain decisions without first ascertaining as to the applicability of the same in the given facts and circumstances of the case, there is no escape from exercising the revisional power. 54. While it is true that the revisional power is required to be exercised sparingly in matters relating to the finding of fact, but at the same time there is no gainsaying that such power is required to be exercised when the finding recorded by the subordinate court is perverse and contrary to the evidences on record. In the instant case, the appellate court failed to consider the material evidences on record and proceeded in the matter in a wrong direction. The failure of the appellate court to consider the jurisdictional facts regarding non-compliance of the provisions of Assam Urban Rent Control Act, bona fide requirement of the suit premises and default on the part of the defendant-respondent in its true perspective on the basis of the established facts has resulted in failure of justice requiring interference of this court in exercise of its revisional power. 55. 55. In the case of Ram Karan Das Agarwala v. Radheshyam Agarwala, 1989 GHC 80, the Division Bench of this court held that a finding relating to a tenant being a defaulter or the premises being required bona fide by the landlord can be interfered by the High Court on a revision petition, if it is palpably wrong being based on surmises and conjectures or in disregard of relevant piece of evidence, which have not been controverted. In the instant case the findings recorded by the trial court on the basis of the evidence on record cannot be said to be palpably wrong being based on surmises and conjectures or in disregard of relevant piece of evidence. 56. This court in the case of K. Ibohal Sing v. Ch. Iboyaima Sing, (1993) 1 GLR 325 reiterated that it is incumbent on the part of the appellate court to discuss all the evidences on record and to give its findings. This court also held that while reversing the decisions, the appellate court must give reasons and in fact, the sources of the reasons. Even on concurring the judgment oral evidence should be summarized for accepting or rejecting the appeal. It haVbeen held in that case that a judgment which does not discuss the reasons and also the oral evidences on record is vitiated by error of procedure. In the instant case as has been noticed above, the appellate court passed its judgment merely on certain principles laid down by various courts without referring to the facts and circumstances of the instant case and ascertaining as to the applicability of the said decisions. It could not have reversed the findings of the trial court on that basis. 57. It is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and he has got complete freedom in the matter. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. P.P. Machinery, (2000) 1 SCC 679 , the Apex Court held that the High Court erred in allowing the tenant's second appeal by incorrectly assuming that the landlord, had admitted that there were number of alternative properties in his possession and, thus, framing questions mandatory under section 100 of the CPC, contrary to clear the findings of the lower courts. 58. 58. In the case of Sarala Ahuja v. United India Insurance Corporation, (1998) 8 SCC 119 , the Apex Court observed that when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. It went on to observe that it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. It observed that while deciding the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. 59. Similarly, in the case ofPrativa Devi v.T.V. Krishna, (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the Apex Court once again reiterated that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and that he has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. Reversing the findings reached by the High Court and restoring the order of the Rent Controller in which it was established that the landlord required the premises in question for his personal use and occupation, the Apex Court observed that there is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. 60. In a recent decision, the Apex Court reported in (2005) 5 SCC 375 (Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass), dealing with a similar question as in the instant case held that bona fide requirement of the landlord may continue to subsists or the circumstances might change to a different state. In that case the Apex Court was involved with the provisions of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 and the provisions of section 14. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Apex Court has made the following observations: '13. Life is not static and so the law cannot afford to be static. The third proviso cannot be so interpreted as to restrict the right conferred by sub-section (3)(a)(i) on the landlord to be exercisable only "once in a lifetime". The proviso has to be read as providing a statutory expression of a situation which would otherwise have been held to be mala fides of a requirement. The third proviso cannot be so interpreted as to restrict the right conferred by sub-section (3)(a)(i) on the landlord to be exercisable only "once in a lifetime". The proviso has to be read as providing a statutory expression of a situation which would otherwise have been held to be mala fides of a requirement. A landlord, having obtained possession of any building to satisfy a requirement, cannot again and again plead the same set of circumstances or similar circumstances for evicting tenants one after the other. That is what the third proviso aims at providing. The proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that in spite of the requirement having undergone a change or a new requirement unrelated to the proviso one having come into existence, the landlord would yet be denied relief under sub-section (3)(a)(i) merely because at some point of time in the past he had resorted to this provision for seeking an eviction. Such an interpretation is too rigid an interpretation and would cause such hardship to the landlord as the Legislature cannot be said to have intended. The examples are available in decided cases and two such are : Jagir Singh v. Jagdish Pal Sagar and Brij Lal Puri v. Muni Tandon.' 61. As in the instant case in that case also the landlords were earlier litigating for eviction of the tenant from the upper floor. In the first round of litigation, they succeeded and yet the fruits of the decree were denied to them on account of pendency of the appeal. They thought it proper to shift the tenant from the first floor to the ground floor so as to satisfy their own requirement as it existed on that date. The tenant also agreed to occupy the ground floor for residence as he was in dire need of some space to live though the premises were not fit for human residence and could not be termed "residential". The Apex Court has held that this is "sufficient cause" within the meaning of the second proviso. It noticed that circumstances changed. Subsequent events took place. The family of appellant 1 enlarged. A new requirement came into existence which did not exist earlier. Thus, the bona fide of such requirement of the landlords held, cannot be doubted. 62. The aforesaid judgment the Apex Court made the following observation in paragraph 25. "25. It noticed that circumstances changed. Subsequent events took place. The family of appellant 1 enlarged. A new requirement came into existence which did not exist earlier. Thus, the bona fide of such requirement of the landlords held, cannot be doubted. 62. The aforesaid judgment the Apex Court made the following observation in paragraph 25. "25. Undoubtedly, the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 has been enacted for the purpose of providing for the control of rents and evictions because of paucity of accommodation in urban areas. The rent control legislations generally aim at preventing rack-renting and resorting to evictions by unscrupulous and greedy landlords, who take advantage of the shortage in availability of accommodations in cities and dictate their terms to the tenants and if they do not follow the dictates, subject them to eviction. Thl rent control legislations are generally heavily loaded in favour of the tenants and the provision dealing with which the courts at times lean in favour of the landlords is the one which permits the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for his own occupation, residential or non-residential. There are weak amongst the tenants as also amongst the landlords. (See Joginder Pal case, SCC paras 9 and 32.) Take the case of a landlord knocking the doors of the court seeking its assistance for a roof over his head or for a reasonably comfortable living, when he is himself either in a rented accommodation or squeezing himself and his family members in a limited space, while the tenant protected by the rent control law is comfortably occupying the premises of the landlord or a part thereof. Provisions like section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Act should be so interpreted as to advance the cause of justice instructed by the realities of life and practical wisdom. While the tenant needs to be protected, the courts would not ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bona fide requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of his family, unless they feel convinced that the so-called requirement of the landlord was a ruse forgetting rid of an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise mala fide and did not fall within the four corners of the ground for eviction provided by the law. 63. 63. From the above discussions and on the basis of the materials available on record, I have no hesitation to set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 13.11.2000 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Title Civil Appeal No. 1(H)/1988 by which the judgment and decree passed by learned Munsiff, Shillong dated 24.7.1988 in Title Suit No. 9(H)/1988 has been reversed. Consequently, the impugned appellate judgment dated 10.11.2000 passed by the learned District Judge in title Civil Appeal No. 1(H)/1988 stands set aside and quashed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in Title Suit No. 9(H)/19888 stands restored. 64. The revision application stands allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The Registry shall transmit the case records to the court below after observing the due formalities.