JUDGMENT B.K. Roy, J. 1. This appeal under Section 19 of the Family Court is directed against the judgment and Order dismissing the Appellant's suit filed for dissolution of his marriage with the Respondent chiefly on the ground that his wife has deserted him since June 4, 1993 by grant of a decree under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 2. The portrayal of relevant facts is in a narrow compass: 2.1. The Appellant's case was to this effect: (i) The Appellant, a Lower Division Assistant in the Department of Parliamentary Affairs, Civil Secretariat, Assam, Dispur, married the Respondent as per the Hindu Vedic rites on February 5, 1992, who deserted him on June 4, 1993 and is living separately with her parents at Chandmari. (ii) The Respondent serves as Junior Architect and earns not less than Rs.5000.00 per month. She is capable to maintain herself. (iii) She not allowed him to live peacefully. She always behaved in a very cruel manner. Sometimes she did not cooked food. Sometimes she picked up quarrel on imaginary ground and abused him with filthy language. He had to bear all sorts of tortures. He tolerated all these in the hope that time will heal every hurt inflicted on him and age will mellow her down. (iv) She was provoked and inspired by her eldest brother-in-law Dandi Kakati. He came to know that Dandi Kakati used to meet her in his absence in her office or on some abandoned places on way to or back to her office to residence. He has seen some secret conversations going between them in a hush hush manner. Earlier he did not suspect anything and when be began to hear from his friends and well-wishers he made queries from his wife. (v) In the meantime she became pregnant and developed complications. She had to be hospitalized on May 22, 1992 and given necessary treatments. After her recovery she went to her mother's house on June 4, 1993 straightway from the hospital without any intimation to him. He was told by her in laws that as she is in advance stage of pregnancy she should be allowed to take rest for sometime in their house for full recovery. (vi) A son, Master Ankurjyoti Kalita, was born to them on August 10, 1993 at Red Cross Hospital, Chandmari, who is now aged about 4 years. He was told by her in laws that as she is in advance stage of pregnancy she should be allowed to take rest for sometime in their house for full recovery. (vi) A son, Master Ankurjyoti Kalita, was born to them on August 10, 1993 at Red Cross Hospital, Chandmari, who is now aged about 4 years. The son is with his mother. (vii) He was not informed about her hospitalization at the time of delivery nor his consent was obtained for her Caesarian operation after which the son was delivered. Despite all these he went to the hospital with some articles of baby use in his hands but he was not allowed to see her by entering the operation theatre. He was even misbehaved by his father-in-law in presence of one of his friends Rabin Talukdar and asked him to leave the place immediately as they cannot bear his presence. On August 18, 1993 his bother Janardan Kalita and Tarak Das came to Guwahati to enquire about his wife and the baby and have brought some essential goods viz. Baby towel, Baby power, Baby oil etc. for both of them. Those articles were kept by her. On August 1993 all of them went to enquire but were ill-treated. (viii) A notice was served on him by the Women Legal Aid Cell, Guwahati on 8.10.1993 for settling the matter amicably. (ix) Attempts were made to compromise the dispute but it failed. He implored her to return to him with the baby promising that he will not ill-treat her, if she agrees to live with him. She did not return. (x) She has lived more than 2 years separately at her own vagary without caring for the conjugal life of the Petitioner. There is no hope at all that she would ever return and reconcile. The marriage has irretrievably failed and there is no scope for reunion in future. (xi) He maybe allowed to maintain the son by keeping him with him as she is a careerist woman and there is no other reliable person to look after him. He is anxious to look after the welfare of his son. 2.2. The Respondent, in her written statement, had asserted, inter alia, to this effect: (i) The petition is vexatious, malafide and contains false allegations. She had not deserted her husband on June 4, 1993. He is anxious to look after the welfare of his son. 2.2. The Respondent, in her written statement, had asserted, inter alia, to this effect: (i) The petition is vexatious, malafide and contains false allegations. She had not deserted her husband on June 4, 1993. (ii) Her husband has performed a second marriage prior to filing of this case. (iii) His motive is to malign her and cast a stigma in her character and integrity. She has been a victim of extreme physical and mental tortures at the hands of her husband and other members of the family for which her married life has turned into a nightmare and misery, which compelled her to leave the matrimonial house and take shelter with her parents. (iv) He has even refused to see her and/or new born baby during the period of her hospitalization and delivery. (v) He has concocted a story, which is devoid of any truth. (vi) He is highly suspicious. (vii) She had to file Panbazar Police Station Case No. 18/97 under Sections 498(A)/494 IPC. (viii) The petition be dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000.00 3. An attempt was made by the learned Judge, Family Court for conciliation, which failed. 4. Following three issues were framed for adjudication: (1) Whether the Defendant deserted the Plaintiff? (2) Whether the Defendant treated the Petitioner with cruelty? (3) To what relief, or reliefs the parties are entitled? 5. The parties adduced evidence and materials to support their respective cases. 6. The learned Judge, as already stated dismissed the Appellant's suit, after observing/holding to the following effect: (i) The Plaintiff has miserably failed to substantiate his claim of desertion by his wife; (ii) The act of the wife in going to her parents' house was justified and does not amount to desertion; (iii) The Plaintiff has failed to prove cruelty to him by the Defendant; (iv) It is the Plaintiff who had treated the Defendant with cruelty and that the Plaintiff was not treated by the Defendant with cruelty; (v) The Certificate (Ext. Ka) clearly proves the claim of the wife that the Plaintiff has married Smt. Ranju Sarma on February 2, 1997 before filing of this suit; (vi) Irretrievable break down of marriage does not constitute a ground for divorce as held in AIR 1984 SC 1562 and this alone does not warrant dissolution of the marriage; The plaintiff has failed to prove desertion and cruelty. 7. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharyya, learned senior Advocate appearing in support of this appeal took us to the oral evidence adduced by the parties and submitted as follows: (i) On the pleadings set forth by the parties and the evidence adduced there was a desertion by the wife of her husband within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ib). (ii) The findings in relation to second marriage of the Appellant was erroneously recorded as the Certificate was inadmissible in evidence. (iii) In any view of the matter there being no chance of continuation of any matrimonial relationship thereby the marriage is irretrievable and we should grant a decree of divorce. 8. We do not find any substance in any of these three submissions. 9. Section 14 of the Family Court Act, 1984 read as under: 14. Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. A Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) (Emphasis supplied) The Legislature clearly contemplates a liberal approach for adjudication of the matrimonial disputes. 10. Witness No. 2, Abala Rabha, for the wife in her evidence claimed herself to be a member of Dhupdhara Mahila Samiti. She stated that the Petitioner had stayed in a rented house contiguous to her house with his newly married wife whose name is Ranju Sarma and she is having her photograph with her. Mr. Bhattacharyya did not advance any argument why her evidence should not have been accepted by the Court below. 11. The wife, deposing as witness No. 1, has categorically asserted in her evidence that her husband had married for the second time on February 2, 1997 at Turkeswari Temple; that Ext. Mr. Bhattacharyya did not advance any argument why her evidence should not have been accepted by the Court below. 11. The wife, deposing as witness No. 1, has categorically asserted in her evidence that her husband had married for the second time on February 2, 1997 at Turkeswari Temple; that Ext. 'Ka' is the marriage certificate; the on May 12, 1997, when she came to Turkeswari Temple suddenly she met her nephew's daughter and also her sister-in-law and came to know from them about her husband's second marriage; and that she had seen her husband and his second wife. We do not find any cross-examination by the husband in relation to the aforementioned facts, We too rely on her evidence. 12. We do not find the evidence of the Appellant or his witnesses reliable. 13. The learned judge, Family Court has correctly relied upon the Certificate (Ext. 'Ka') filed by wife evidencing the second marriage of her husband. The certificate, ext. "Ka" was issued by the Secretary, Sri Sri Tukreswari devalaya, Tukura, Goalpara, Assam on 28.2.1997 stating that on 2.2.1997 (Sunday) Manju Ram Kalita, son of Late Madhab Chandra Kalita, village Pijupara, P.S. Nagarbera, District Kamrup had married Smt. Ranju Sarma, daughter of Sri Rohini Sarma, village Alibari, Rs.Rangjuli, District Goalpara. It was not the submission of Mr. Bhattacharyya that this document was forged and fabricated. 14. The second marriage of the husband apparently a void marriage. 15. Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act read as under: 13. Divorce-(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party. (ib) has deserted the Petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the Petitioner; or The desertion stated has to be willful or intentional. The categorical case of the Appellant was that the desertion was in June, 1993 cannot be accepted. The oral evidence adduced by him belies his case inasmuch as he has stated that his wife has left in September 1994. Similar is the position with his witnesses. The wife was coerced by the Appellant to leave his house and got shelter in the house of her parents. The Appellant is living with his second wife. The oral evidence adduced by him belies his case inasmuch as he has stated that his wife has left in September 1994. Similar is the position with his witnesses. The wife was coerced by the Appellant to leave his house and got shelter in the house of her parents. The Appellant is living with his second wife. For this act refusal of the wife to live with the Appellant cannot be construed desertion within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ib) of the Act. 16. Thus, it is not possible for us to reverse the findings recorded. 17. Consequently, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.