JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioners in this batch of writ petitions which are either associations of parallel colleges or persons owning and running individual parallel colleges in Kerala, are questioning the constitutional validity of levy of service tax treating parallel college as 'commercial training or coaching centre 'within the meaning of Section 65(27) of the Finance Act, 1994, hereinafter called the 'Act'. Individual notices issued to parallel colleges by the Central Excise Department demanding registration under Section 69 of the Act and payment of service-tax under Section 66 read with Section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act are also under challenge on the ground that the same are unauthorised, discriminatory, and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. I have heard Sri M.K. Damodaran, senior counsel and other counsel appearing for the petitioners, and Sri John Varghese, Addl. Solicitor General of India, appearing for the respondents. There is no need to go into the facts of every individual case or the details of notices issued, because the services rendered by the petitioners are the same and notices issued are of the same pattern either demanding registration or payment of service-tax on the charges received by the parallel colleges for the services rendered by them. The Supreme Court vide judgment in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Association v. Union of India and Ors., ([2004] 267 ITR 9 (SC)) and Division Bench of this Court in All Kerala Chartered Accountants Association v. Union of India and Ors. (ILR (2002) 1 Ker 547) upheld the constitutional validity of some other charging provisions of the Act. Though the authority for legislation on service-tax was first derived by Parliament from the residuary Entry 97 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, by a later constitutional amendment, specific source of authority is conferred on it vide Entry 97A. Therefore, there is no scope for considering the constitutional validity of the Act generally and the petitioners rightly did not canvass any such general proposition. However, petitioners raised a general contention that the provision for taxing education in any form is against the Constitution. Therefore, there is no scope for considering the constitutional validity of the Act generally and the petitioners rightly did not canvass any such general proposition. However, petitioners raised a general contention that the provision for taxing education in any form is against the Constitution. They have referred to new Article 21A introduced by Constitution (86th Amendment) Act, 2002, which provides for free and compulsory education to children of the age of 6 to 14 years and the substituted Article 45 which requires the State to endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six years. Of course Article 41 also provides that the State shall within its economic capacity and development make effective provision for securing the right to work to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, etc. There is certainly force in the contention of the petitioners that even if the State is not able to finance higher education as required under the Directive Principles of State Policy under Article 41 of the Constitution, it should not deny and discourage opportunities for education by adding cost to it in the form of tax on education which will certainly disable the economically weaker sections from pursuing higher studies. Addl. Solicitor General of India appearing for the respondents submitted that so many educational institutions are mushrooming and education is carried on as business. Therefore according to him, there is no illegality or even impropriety in levying tax on such educational institutions. I am unable to appreciate this apprehension of the Government because this malady has to be corrected only by levying income-tax on the institutions and not by licensing the institutions to collect service-tax from students. In fact Section 10(22) of the IT Act which granted blanket income-tax exemption for educational institutions is now deleted and exemption is provided with moderation in Section 10(23C) of the said Act. Of course, Section 11 of the IT Act which provides cover to large number of tax evaders under the guise of charity will continue to protect educational institutions as charity includes education also. If education is run on business lines, then solution is to amend Section 11 and other relevant provisions of the IT Act withdrawing the exemptions to institutions and Government can simultaneously provide financial aid to beneficiaries which will put an end to misuse of income-tax provisions. If education is run on business lines, then solution is to amend Section 11 and other relevant provisions of the IT Act withdrawing the exemptions to institutions and Government can simultaneously provide financial aid to beneficiaries which will put an end to misuse of income-tax provisions. Therefore I do not think the levy of service-tax on students will serve the purpose of disciplining those who make business out of education. Tax on education, particularly when the incidence of tax is passed on to the beneficiaries, that is, the students, is a regressive legislation and has to be condemned, more so, when large number of poor people seek salvation through education and employment. However, the question is whether this Court is free to interfere with legislative policy and strike down the taxing provision supported by a specific constitutional entry on the ground that it is against the spirit of the Constitution laid down in the Directive Principles mentioned above. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Courts while examining constitutional validity should not substitute judicial wisdom in the place of the legislature. So long as there is no constitutional bar against levy of service-tax on education, and statute stands the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, then the levy has to be fully upheld, no matter whether the Court considers the levy unwise, improper or even a regressive measure which is a policy matter to be left to the wisdom of the legislature. Therefore, the argument of the petitioners that levy of tax on education is against the spirit of Constitution and against the directive principles is only to be rejected and I do so. 2. The limited question, therefore, to be considered is the challenge against abovereferred charging section, which provides for service-tax on services rendered by commercial training or coaching centres on grounds of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the first place, the petitioners raised a contention that parallel colleges do not come within the definition clause contained in Section 65(27) of the Act. Alternatively, they contended that if the parallel colleges are covered by the definition clause, and consequently the charging provision, then the same is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as regular colleges affiliated to universities whether aided or self-financed rendering the same services are outside the scope of levy. 3. Alternatively, they contended that if the parallel colleges are covered by the definition clause, and consequently the charging provision, then the same is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as regular colleges affiliated to universities whether aided or self-financed rendering the same services are outside the scope of levy. 3. The Central excise authorities have issued the impugned notices to petitioners demanding registration and payment of service-tax on their finding that the service rendered by parallel colleges attracts service-tax under the charging section read with definition clause and since petitioners are denying the same, this Court has to examine this as a preliminary issue and the challenge against constitutional validity particularly on the ground of discrimination under Article 14 need be gone into only if the parallel colleges answer the description of 'commercial training or coaching centre' defined under Section 65(27) of the Act, which is subject to tax under Section 66 read with Section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act. In order to appreciate the arguments of the petitioners, the relevant definition clauses have to be gone into and for easy reference Sub-clauses (26) and (27) of Section 65 are extracted hereunder : 65. Definitions: (26) 'commercial training or coaching' means any training or coaching provided by a commercial training or coaching centre; (27) 'commercial training or coaching centre' means any institute or establishment providing commercial or coaching for imparting skill or knowledge or lessons on any subject or field other than the sports, with or without issuance of a certificate and includes coaching or tutorial classes but does not include pre-school coaching and training centre or any institute or establishment which issues any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognised by law for the time being in force. Even though petitioners have referred to the dictionary meaning of 'commercial training' and contended that imparting of coaching by them to students to write various university degree' examinations such as B.A., B. Com., M.A., M. Com., etc., do not come within the meaning of 'commercial training'. I do not think the said argument can be accepted because, on going through Sub-clause (27) of Section 65 it is clear that coaching in any form for imparting knowledge or skill or lessons on any subject or field, except the subjects specifically excluded by the said definition clause are covered by it. I do not think the said argument can be accepted because, on going through Sub-clause (27) of Section 65 it is clear that coaching in any form for imparting knowledge or skill or lessons on any subject or field, except the subjects specifically excluded by the said definition clause are covered by it. In fact, the institutions excluded are those imparting coaching or training in sports, pre-school coaching -and training centres and institutes or establishments which issue any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognised by law for the time being in force. In other words, except those covered by the above said exclusion clause, all other educational institutions or training centres imparting any education or training in any form are covered by the definition clause. The claim of the petitioners is that they are imparting coaching and training to students to appear for university degree examinations in B.A., B. Com., M.A., M. Com., etc. as private students and the said students write the same examinations and get the same degrees as students of regular colleges affiliated to regular universities. According to the petitioners, the regular colleges, whether aided or self-financed affiliated to universities, are also rendering the same service to students and though they are not awarding any degrees or diplomas, they are not subjected to levy of service-tax by the Department and so much so, if such colleges are not liable for payment of service-tax, then there is no reason why the petitioners who are rendering same service; should be treated differently and subjected to tax. Alternatively they contended that the regular colleges, whether aided or self-financed affiliated to universities, which are not awarding any degree or diploma also are liable to service-tax as they also do not come under the exclusion clause. In other words, according to the petitioners, the respondents are not justified in exempting regular colleges, whether aided or self-financed affiliated to universities from service-tax as no exemption is provided to them in the definition clause. I am unable to accept this argument of the petitioners because the category of institutions excluded from the definition clauses includes not only institutes or establishments issuing certificates or diplomas or degrees, but will cover any institution issuing any other 'educational qualification' recognised by law for the time being in force. I am unable to accept this argument of the petitioners because the category of institutions excluded from the definition clauses includes not only institutes or establishments issuing certificates or diplomas or degrees, but will cover any institution issuing any other 'educational qualification' recognised by law for the time being in force. Petitioners are right in their contention that affiliated aided or self-financed colleges are not awarding any degree or diploma but the universities to which those colleges are affiliated only are issuing degrees or diplomas. However, under the university education regulations, certain degree or diploma examinations can be written only after the students undergo a 'course-study', which requires minimum attendance in lecture classes and practical training in an affiliated college or institution. The distinction between the petitioners and the affiliated colleges is that only affiliated colleges and institutions can conduct course-study wherever required to qualify the students to write the university examination. Students studying in the parallel colleges are private students who are taking private coaching in subjects where course-study is not required under the examination regulations of the university to write the examinations. Such courses are in subjects in humanities, language, commerce, etc., where students attending parallel colleges are free to write examination as private students without the need to complete any course-study. In other words, students trained by the petitioners in the parallel colleges are otherwise eligible to write examinations just by registration with the university without any need to undergo any course-study anywhere. Of course, regular affiliated colleges are also imparting education in same subjects where course-study is not required to write the university examinations. However, those colleges are conducting courses in science subjects also where course-study with required attendance and practical training are compulsory under the examination regulations of the university to which those colleges are affiliated. Therefore the completion of course-study with practical training in the subject in an affiliated college is a requirement for the student to write university examination, irrespective of whether examination is written immediately on completion of course-study in the same college or not. Even though the colleges are not issuing any diploma or degree certificates, they are issuing course completion certificate to the students to make them eligible to write the examinations in terms of the university regulations which is certainly an 'educational qualification' prescribed by the university. Even though the colleges are not issuing any diploma or degree certificates, they are issuing course completion certificate to the students to make them eligible to write the examinations in terms of the university regulations which is certainly an 'educational qualification' prescribed by the university. So much so, affiliated colleges whether aided or self-financed are different and come within the description of the exempted category under the definition clause, while petitioners who are engaged in private coaching are not covered by the exemption clause. In the circumstances, the petitioners' contention that students trained by them are getting diploma or degree certificate after writing university or board examinations in the same way as students studying similar subjects in regular aided or self-financed colleges does not make them eligible for exemption under the exemption clause. Therefore the service rendered by the petitioners in coaching and training private students for examinations will attract service-tax while regular aided or self-financed colleges affiliated to universities are outside the tax net. 4. The next question to be considered is whether the definition clause contained in Section 65(27) of the Act which makes the service rendered by the petitioners taxable under Section 65(105)(zzc), is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is a settled position by series of decisions of the Supreme Court that taxing provisions should stand the test of constitutional validity with reference to Article 14 of the Constitution of India [Also : see Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. : ([1989] 178 ITR 97 (SC)) and East India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. State of AP : [1963] 1 SCR 404]. In order to appreciate the challenge against levy of service-tax as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the effect of levy has to be gone into. Counsel for the petitioners rightly contended that there is no provision in the Act prohibiting collection of service-tax and service-provider is, therefore, entitled to collect service-tax which in this case is from the students. Even if prohibition is introduced against collection of service-tax, fee has to be increased without which the heavy burden of 10 per cent tax cannot be paid is the case of the petitioners. In either case, the burden of service-tax on education falls on the student community. Even if prohibition is introduced against collection of service-tax, fee has to be increased without which the heavy burden of 10 per cent tax cannot be paid is the case of the petitioners. In either case, the burden of service-tax on education falls on the student community. It is in this context that the validity of the provision has to be considered with reference to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As already stated, students studying in the parallel colleges are students who are entitled to write the university examinations as private students. The curriculum prescribed for the examination and the degree certificate awarded to private students and students studying in regular colleges, whether aided or self-financed affiliated to university, are the same. Therefore there is no distinction between the two classes of students namely, the students studying in the colleges affiliated to universities and private students who take coaching in parallel colleges to write the same examinations. While the students studying in affiliated colleges cannot be subjected to service-tax along with tuition fees and other fees levied by the management of those colleges, students who are studying in parallel colleges will have to bear the service-tax as an additional burden along with tuition fees and other charges collected by the management of parallel colleges. The main reason why many students cannot join regular colleges affiliated to universities is economical. Further, on account of limited number of seats available in the affiliated colleges, the less brilliant will have to look for coaching elsewhere and they end up in parallel colleges. It is also a well-known fact that in interior and remote areas of the State, poor students even if eligible for admission in regular colleges cannot afford outstation study and they naturally go to parallel colleges. In fact counsel for the petitioners pointed out that many brilliant students who could not afford to go to regular colleges after study in parallel colleges have secured high ranks in the examinations conducted by the universities. Therefore, in most cases, students landing in parallel colleges are the less fortunate ones who are compelled to join parallel colleges for economic reasons. It is worthwhile to note that the State Government after appreciating these realities have granted the same concession in bus fare granted to regular college students, to students in parallel colleges also. Therefore, in most cases, students landing in parallel colleges are the less fortunate ones who are compelled to join parallel colleges for economic reasons. It is worthwhile to note that the State Government after appreciating these realities have granted the same concession in bus fare granted to regular college students, to students in parallel colleges also. Financial benefits are provided to students from SC and ST community studying in parallel colleges also. Therefore the State Government also treats the students in affiliated colleges and parallel colleges as part of the same class. In any case, there can be no distinction between students undergoing private study in the parallel colleges and those undergoing course-study in the regular colleges, so long as the curriculum, the examinations written and the degrees obtained by them are one and the same. So far as the teaching staff rendering coaching is concerned, it is common knowledge that appointments in private colleges whether aided or self-financed are made at the choice of the managements and not by relative merits of the applicants. In fact, counsel for the petitioners rightly pointed out that those who start parallel colleges are mostly those who by virtue of their weak financial position are not able to secure jobs in regular colleges and they employ equally unfortunate ones as members of teaching staff. In other words, there may not be any qualitative difference in the coaching rendered in parallel colleges and in regular colleges. Even though counsel for the respondents submitted that by virtue of notification fixing the threshold limit of Rs. 4 lakhs turnover for attracting service-tax liability only big institutions are liable, I do not think any distinction can be drawn among parallel colleges based on turnover because, the burden of service-tax on the parallel colleges will have to be borne by the students, and the validity of charging section has to be tested against Article 14 of the Constitution with reference to its effect on the beneficiaries, that is the students. In view of the findings above, I find no distinction between students undergoing private study in parallel colleges and those undergoing study in affiliated colleges whether aided or self-financed in the same subjects for writing the same examinations. In view of the findings above, I find no distinction between students undergoing private study in parallel colleges and those undergoing study in affiliated colleges whether aided or self-financed in the same subjects for writing the same examinations. Therefore levy of service-tax for services rendered by parallel colleges which indirectly falls on the students, but by simultaneously providing exemption to regular affiliated colleges allowing the students therein study free of tax is patently discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Though the service-tax is, in the Union List, since education happens to be in the concurrent list and considering the encouraging policy of the State Government to improve the educational opportunities of the students in the State, wherefrom large number of educated people migrate outside the State and outside the country seeking employment, the view of the State Government was called for by this Court. After referring the matter to the Cabinet, the Under Secretary to Government has filed an affidavit in Court wherein he has stated that though the State is helpless in regard to levy of service-tax, the Government decided to bring to the notice of the Central Government the difficulties experienced by parallel colleges in the matter of service-tax. In the circumstances, it has to be assumed that the State Government is also in favour of exemption to the parallel colleges in the same way granted to regular colleges under the exemption in the definition clause. In view of the above findings, I hold that the impugned provisions of the Act authorising levy of service-tax on parallel colleges are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, I make it clear that the judgment is rendered on the peculiar facts applicable to parallel colleges in Kerala and this is not to be treated as declaring the section unconstitutional, insofar as any other category of educational institution or training centre is concerned. The impugned proceedings in all the writ petition cases are quashed and respondents are prohibited from demanding registration or service-tax for the services rendered by petitioners, their members and other parallel colleges in Kerala.