( 1 ) AN extent of 1180 square yards of land belonging to the respondents situated in Visakhapatnam Town was acquired by the petitioner-Visakhapatnam urban Development Authority, for the purpose of widening of an existing road. The possession of the land was taken on 5-6-1975 and notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act ) was issued on 18-4-1980. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 16-5-1980. An award was passed on 15-5-1985 fixing the market value at the rate of Rs. 66/- per square yard. The respondents were not satisfied about it. They received the compensation under protest and sought for reference under Section 18 of the Act. ( 2 ) ACCEDING to the request of the respondents, the petitioner referred the matter to the Court of III Additional District judge, Visakhapatnam. It was taken up as o. P. No. 757 of 1996. The Trial Court took the view that the award passed by the petitioner after a lapse of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act is invalid in law, in view of section 11-A of the Act and thereby, refused to answer the reference. On the other hand, it directed the petitioner to issue a fresh notification and thereafter, pass an award fixing the market value. The petitioner challenges the same. ( 3 ) SMT. Preeti Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the order under revision is totally outside the scope of reference under Section 18 of the act and cannot be sustained in law. According to her, the subject-matter of reference under Section 18 of the Act is confined to the adequacy of the compensation and it cannot take in its fold, the legality of the award, particularly with reference to the provisions of Sections 4 (1) and 6 of the Act. She further contends that even otherwise, Section 11 of the Act has no application to the facts of the case, inasmuch as the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued much before the section 11-A of the Act came into force and the award was passed within two weeks from such date. She further contends that even otherwise, Section 11 of the Act has no application to the facts of the case, inasmuch as the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued much before the section 11-A of the Act came into force and the award was passed within two weeks from such date. ( 4 ) SRI Rama Gopal, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that there is nothing in the Act, which precludes the Court from dealing with reference under Section 18 of the act, to go into the very validity of the award. He contends that mere acquiescence by the parties in an otherwise illegal notification does not attach legality to the award. He submits that the very object of enacting Section 11-A of the Act was to ensure that the parties are not denied the contemporaneous compensation and that no exception can be taken to the order under revision. ( 5 ) THIS revision arises out of a reference under Section 18 of the Act. It is a matter of record that the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act was issued on 18-4-1980 and it was followed by a declaration under Section 6 or the Act on 16-5-1980. The petitioner passed an award, dated 15-5-1985. Not being satisfied with the market value fixed by the petitioner, the respondents sought for reference. The petitioner acceded to the same and referred the matter to the Trial Court. The parameters of adjudication by a Civil Court in a reference under Section 18 of the act are very limited. The reference can be only for determination of the objections as to the measurement of land, the amount of compensation payable for it, or the apportionment of compensation among the various persons, interested in the land. Beyond that, the Civil Court cannot address itself to the question of the very validity of notification. The reason is that the award came to be passed after the stage of notifications and with the active participation of the owners of the land. In a way, it can be said that even where the notifications under Section 4 (1) of the Act and Section 6 are defective, the landowners are deemed to have waived their objections by participating in the award enquiry. In a way, it can be said that even where the notifications under Section 4 (1) of the Act and Section 6 are defective, the landowners are deemed to have waived their objections by participating in the award enquiry. Therefore, even where an objection is raised touching on the legality and validity of the notifications, while participating in reference under Section 18 of the Act, the court cannot deal with the same. Such matters are clearly outside the scope of reference. ( 6 ) THE Trial Court referred to certain judgments rendered by the Supreme Court as well as this Court, while taking the view that the award passed by the petitioner was contrary to Section 11-A of the Act. Those, however, are the cases, where the very notifications were challenged by the aggrieved parties. They are not the ones in which the landowners participated in the award enquiry, and received the amount of compensation, or sought for reference thereafter. ( 7 ) THE order under revision cannot be sustained on facts also. Assuming that it is competent for a Court dealing with a reference under Section 18 of the Act to examine the validity of the notifications, with reference to Section 11-A of the Act, the present case does not suffer from any such irregularity. Section 11-A of the Act mandates that the Collector shall make award under Section 11 of the Act within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and that if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land, shall lapse. The proviso to that section directs that if the declaration under section 6 of the Act was published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from the date on which the amendment came into force. The amendment became effective from 24-9-1984. The notification under section 6 of the Act was issued much earlier to that. The petitioner had two years time from 24-9-1984 to pass the award according to the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act. The award was passed on 15-5-1985, which is within the stipulated time. Therefore, the order of the Trial Court cannot be sustained. The notification under section 6 of the Act was issued much earlier to that. The petitioner had two years time from 24-9-1984 to pass the award according to the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act. The award was passed on 15-5-1985, which is within the stipulated time. Therefore, the order of the Trial Court cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) THE Trial Court did not examine the correctness or adequacy of the market value fixed by the petitioner, obviously, because it took the view that the reference itself was vitiated. Since it emerges that the award does not suffer from such legal infirmity, the matter needs to be remanded to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication. ( 9 ) HENCE, the civil revision petition is allowed and the order under revision is set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial Court for consideration and disposal, according to law. It shall, however, be open to the parties to lead evidence in support of their contentions. Since the acquisition took place more than two decades ago, the Trial Court is directed to dispose of the O. P. within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.