Judgment :- K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. The question that is posed for consideration in this case is whether Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) is justified in rejecting an appeal on the ground that the appeal was not maintainable since it was filed out of time. 2. Appeal 8/2003 dated 16-4-2003 was filed by the appellant against the order-in­ original No. 1/2002 dated 23-9-2002 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise Divisional Office, Palakkad. Application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was also filed. Commissioner (Appeals) noticed that the impugned order was received by the appellant on 2-10-2002. However, the appeal was filed only on 16-4­2003. Commissioner noticed that the appeal was filed not only beyond the period of limitation but also beyond the condonable period. Commissioner (Appeals) has no power to admit such belated appeal and consequently the appeal was rejected. Aggrieved by the same the matter was taken up in appeal before the Tribunal. Tribunal rejected the appeal holding that the Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in rejecting it since he has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the period that was permitted by the statute. Aggrieved by the same this appeal has been preferred under S.130-A of the Customs Act, 1962. 3. For a proper appreciation of the question posed, it is relevant to refer to the appeal provisions which are extracted hereunder. 128. Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by an officer of customs lower in rank than a Commissioner of, Customs may appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order: Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to 'be presented within a further period of thirty days. (1A) The Appellate Tribunal may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of hearing of an appeal, grant time to the parties or any of them and adjourn the hearing of the appeal for reasons to be recorded in writing. Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the appeal. Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the appeal. (2) Every appeal under this section shall be in such form and shall be verified in such manner as may be specified by rules made in this behalf. 4. Special statute when prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing an application and provides on clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown may be extended in the maximum only up to a specified time limit and no further, the appellate authority has, no jurisdiction to treat within the limitation an application filed before it beyond such maximum time limit specified in the statute. 5. We may in this connection refer to the decision of the apex court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, UP. v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur (1975) 35 S.T.C. 413). Reference may also be made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in N.B. Golangada v. Union of India (1978 E.L.T. (J. 61 A) wherein plea was raised for condonation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act. Repelling the contention of the court held as follows: “Then the question arises as to whether the appellate authority is competent in law to condone the delay in preferring the appeal. Here again, neither in S.35 nor in any other provision of the Act or rules framed there under, there is any provision which empowers the appellate authority to condone the delay in preferring appeals. In the absence of such a provision, the Collector of Central Excise would have no power to condone the delay. Reference was made to S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and it was urged that the Collector could have condoned the delay by calling for an explanation from the petitioner, and on being satisfied that there was reasonable cause for preferring the appeal beyond time. We are afraid, the provisions of S.5 will not be applicable to appeals provided in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which is a Special Act which provides for appeals and prescribed a special period of limitation for appeals. The authority exercising power of appellate authority under S.35 is not a court and, therefore, the provisions of S.5 could not be invoked. The authority exercising power of appellate authority under S.35 is not a court and, therefore, the provisions of S.5 could not be invoked. Moreover, in view of the prevision of S.29 also it cannot be said that the provisions of S.4 and 5 are attracted to appeal provided under S.35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944. In view of this legal position, rejecting the appeal on the ground, of limitation. The revisional authority has merely confirmed the order of the Collector of Central Excise, and we do not think that there is any justification for interfering in this petition.” We are of the View, when statute has prescribed a time limit for condonation of delay and when the appeal is filed beyond that appeal cannot be entertained by a statutory authority or the Tribunal unless power is conferred on those authorities. Reference may also be made to the decisions of the Apex Court in Sakuru v. Tenali (AIR 1985 SC 1279) and I.S. Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Finance Services Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 456) wherein the Apex Court held that in construing a special statute providing for limitation consideration of hardship is irrelevant. 6. In such circumstances, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal. The appeal lacks merits and the same would stand dismissed.