This is to dispose of R.S.A No. 2 of 2004 and R.S.A. No. 3 of 2004. Both the appeals have been filed challenging the common judgment and decree dated 02.12.2003 passed by the first appellate Court of Addl. District Judge, Manipur West disposing Civil Appeal No. 13/96/6/96/4/03 and Civil Appeal No. 14/96/7/96/1/03 and thereby confirming the judgment and decree which had been passed by the trial court in respect of O.S. No. 21/87/9/91/54/91 and O.S. No. 43/90/47/91/60/91. 2. Heard Mr. N. Kerani Singh, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Kh. Chonjohn, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. I have also perused the materials. 3. The brief fact leading to these two Second Appeals are as follows: the appellants in both the present Second Appeals as plaintiffs instituted O.S. No. 21/87/9/91/54/91 in the Court of Munsiff, Thoubal praying mainly for decree of their rights and title over the suit land, for permanent injunction restraining the present respondents, who were defendants in the suit, from entering into the suit land and for cancellation or removal of the names of the present No. 1, who was the defendant No. 1 in the suit, her deceased husband, Angou, from the land records of the suit land. According to the plaintiffs in the suit, the original owner of the suit land namely, Angou Singh, orally gifted the suit land in 1963 to his eldest daughter, Smt. Mani Devi, who is the plaintiff No. 1 in the suit and the appellant No. 1 in the present Second Appeals, and she possessed the suit continuously in 1983 after recording her name in respect of it. Further, according to the plaintiffs, the plaintiff No. 1 gifted the suit land to her daughter, plaintiff No. 2, in 1983 and since then the plaintiff No. 2 has been in possession of the land as its absolute owner. It is said that the said suit was filed when the present respondents started to make hostile claim in respect of the suit land and when they also admitted to tress pass to it in 1986 and 1987. The defendants, who are the present respondents, denied the allegations of the plaintiffs. It is said that the said suit was filed when the present respondents started to make hostile claim in respect of the suit land and when they also admitted to tress pass to it in 1986 and 1987. The defendants, who are the present respondents, denied the allegations of the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, after the death of the original owner of the suit land in 1984, it devolved upon the class I legal heir of the deceased land owner, i.e. the plaintiff No. 1 and the defendants. Further, as per the pleadings of the defendants, the plaintiff No. 1 was entitled only to 1/3 of the suit land. 4. The present respondents in the two Second Appeals, who were defendants in the O.S.No.21/87/9/91/54/91, also filed another suit being O.S.No.43/90/47/91/60/91 to the Court of Sub Judge I, Manipur against the present two appellants praying mainly for a decree and partition declaring 2/3 of the same suit land as their shares. The said subsequent suit was contested by the present appellants. 5. The two suits were proceeded in the Court of Sub Judge I, Manipur in pursuance of the order of the learned District Judge, Manipur passed in Judicial Misc. Case No. 12 of 1991 on 30.5.1991. The learned Sub Judge proceeded with the trial of the two suits jointly. Out of 11 issues framed, the trial Court took up issue No. 11, i.e., “whether the present suit is barred by section 51-B read with section 139 of the MLR & LR Act,1960 ? “ as the preliminary issue as it involves question of jurisdiction of the Court. The trial Court held on 9.9.92 that in view of the provisions of Section 51-B read with Section 159 of the MLR & LR, 1960 the suit bearing O.S.No.60 of 1991 was barred, but the other suit being O.S.No.21 of 1987 was not barred. A revision being Civil Revision No. 1 of 1993 was filed by the present respondents in this Court and this Court, vide order passed on 23.6.93 allowed the revision and the impugned order of the trial Court was set aside. A revision being Civil Revision No. 1 of 1993 was filed by the present respondents in this Court and this Court, vide order passed on 23.6.93 allowed the revision and the impugned order of the trial Court was set aside. On direction of this Court in the said revision Case No. 1 of 1993, the two suits were proceeded analogously and on the basis of the materials produced by the parties, the trial Court, vide common judgment and decree dated 31.5.96, decreed the suit filed by the present respondents by holding that they were entitled to 2/3 of the suit land and dismissed the suit filed by the present appellants. 6. Aggrieved by the said common judgment and decree dated 31.5.96, present appellants filed two appeals in the Court of the District Judge, Manipur West and the learned Addl. District Judge, vide common judgment and decree passed on 30.6.97 in First Civil Appeal No. 13/96/6/96 and First Civil Appeal No. 14/96/7/96 remanded the two suits to the trial court for de novo proceeding by framing additional issue with regard to the question of adverse possession raised by the present appellants in their suits. Second Appeals Nos.5 of 1997 and 6 of 1997 were filed by the present respondents to this Court questioning the legality of the said order of the first appellate Court. This Court, vide order passed on 28.1.03, allowed the two second appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate court dated 30.6.97 and directed the first appellate court to dispose of the said two first appeals on the basis of the materials already on the records. Thereafter, the learned Addl. District Judge, Manipur West, disposed of the said two first appeals vide the impugned common judgment and decree dated 2.12.93. As per the impugned decree, the two first appeals were dismissed, the present appellant No. 1, was held entitled to 1/3 share of the suit land and the present respondents were in effect held entitled to 2/3 share of the suit land. It was also ordered that partition of the suit land was to be effected by the Collector concerned or any Gazetted Officer subordinate to the Collector and deputed by him in this behalf in accordance with the provisions of section 54 read with Order 20 Rule 18 of the CPC. It was also ordered that partition of the suit land was to be effected by the Collector concerned or any Gazetted Officer subordinate to the Collector and deputed by him in this behalf in accordance with the provisions of section 54 read with Order 20 Rule 18 of the CPC. Structures and standings belonging to the present appellants on the 2/3 share of the respondents were ordered to be demolished. Aggrieved by the said common judgment and decree dated 2.12.03 passed by the first appellate court, these two Second Appeals have been filed. 7. Mr. N.Kerani Singh, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf for the appellants submits that while considering the issue No. 4 involving the question of oral gift, one made by the original owner, Angou Singh in favour of the present appellant No. 1 and another made by the appellant No. 1 in favour of the appellant No. 2, the learned Addl.District Judge, Manipur West dwelt on section 123 of the TP Act and section 17 of the Indian Registration Act and held to the effect that the alleged oral gift would not have created right and title in favour of the present appellantNo.1 as well as in favour of the present appellant No. 2. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, under pure Hindu law a gift need not be in writing, but it must be accompanied by delivery of possession. The learned counsel, further, submits that one of the substantial questions of law required to be decided is; “ whether under the pure Hindi Law an oral gift can be made without any writing ?” and that if an oral gift is permissible under the pure Hindu Law, the appellant No. 1 would have acquired right and title over the suit land and as such her possession of it should have been held an adverse as against the co-owner contrary to the decision of the first appellate court in respect of the issue No. 5. 8. 8. It is also submitted by the learned counsel of the appellants that divorce is permissible and recognized by customary law prevalent among Manipuri Meeteis and as such the first appellate Court has made a wrong decision in respect of the issue No. 3 by relying wrongly on the provisions of section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 and to consider the provisions of section 29(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act under which divorce is permissible and recognized under custom. The said issue No. 3 is, “whether the defendant No. 8, Smt. Komolini Devi, was divorced by late Angou during his life time?” 9. The third point submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant is to the effect that while deciding issue No. 11, the first appellate court has misread the provisions of section 159 and section 59 of the MLR &LR Act and decided the said issue wrongly. The said issue No. 11 is, “whether the present suit is barred by section 51-B read with Section 159 of the MLR & LR Act,1960 or not ?” 10. In respect of the first and the second points urged by the appellants, the substantial question of law which is found to have been framed is,” whether oral gift and divorce by Meitei custom is permissible in view of the fact that transfer of property Act and the Hindu Marriage Act are in force in the State of Manipur.” As regards the 3rd point urged by the appellants, the substantial question of law which is found to have been framed is, “ whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to try partition suit in view of the provisions of Section 51-B and section 159 of the MLR & LR Act,1960?” As regards the above said substantial question of law, Mr. Chonjohn,learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that there is no pleadings on the side of the appellants to support the said substantial question of law raised in these two second appeals for the first time. Chonjohn,learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that there is no pleadings on the side of the appellants to support the said substantial question of law raised in these two second appeals for the first time. The learned counsel of the respondents draws this Court's attention to the decision of the Hon'ble Suprme Court in Panchu Gopal Barua & Ors -Vs-Umesh Chandra Goswami AIR 1997 SC 1041 wherein wherein it was held at para 9 as follows: “9.Generally speaking, an appellant is not to be allowed to set up a new case in second appeal or raise a new issue (otherwise than a jurisdictional one), not supported by the pleadings or evidence on the record and unless the appeal involves a substantial question of law, a second appeal shall not lie to the High Court under the amended provisions. In the present case, no such question of law was formulated in the memorandum of appeal in the High Court and grounds (6) and (7) in the memorandum of the second appeal on which reliance is placed did not formulate any substantial question of law. The learned Single Judge of the High Court also, as it transpires from a perusal of the judgment and under appeal, did not formulate any substantial question of law in the appeal and dealt with the second appeal, not on any substantial question of law, but treating it as if it was a first appeal, as of right, against the judgment and decree of the subordinate Court. The intendment of the legislature in amending section 100 CPC was, thus, respected in its breach. Both the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court had decided the case only on questions of fact, on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties before the trial Court. No pure question of law nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the trial Court or the First Appellate Court by the respondent. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in entertaining the second appeal on an altogether new point, neither pleaded nor canvassed in the subordinate Courts and that too by overlooking the changes brought about in Section 100 CPC by the Amendment Act of 1976 without even indicating that a substantial question of law was required to be resolved in the second appeal. To say the least, the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same.” 11. It is also ascertained that Hon'ble Supreme Court in SANTOSH HAZARI -V-PURUSHOTTAM TIWARI(DECEASED) BY LRS. (2001)3 SCC 179 held at para 14 as follows: “14. A point of law which admits of no two opinion may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be “substantial ” a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law, “involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and question should emerge from the sustainable finding of facts arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case; or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. 12. In SKHAHARI PARWATRAO KARAHALE AND ANR. -V- BHIMASHANKAR PARWATRAO KARAHALE (2002)9SCC 608 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that finding contrary to current finding of lower court and having no basis either any pleading, issues framed or in the questions actually adjudicated upon by any of the lower courts could not be sustained. 13. On careful perusal of the records of the lower court, I do not find any pleadings on the side of the present appellants to the effect that the said Angou Singh orally gifted the suit land to his eldest daughter under pure Hindu Law. 13. On careful perusal of the records of the lower court, I do not find any pleadings on the side of the present appellants to the effect that the said Angou Singh orally gifted the suit land to his eldest daughter under pure Hindu Law. In the absence of any such pleadings, no issue involving the said substantial question of law is found to have been framed. Apart from that the Indian Registration Act came into force in Manipur from 16.4.1950 under the provisions of part se laws Act,1950. Accordingly, the Indian Registration Act with effect from the said date became a law of the State and in the absence of any saving clause in the said Act in respect of any custom, even assuming that oral gift of immovable property was permissible in Manipur under the then prevailing custom before enforcement of the Indian Registration Act, that custom will be considered to have ceased, to have any effect in this State in far as it is in conflict with the provisions of the said Act requiring registration in respect of instrument of gift of an immovable property. At the same time, there is no any dispute that transfer of property Act was in force in the State at the time when the said gifts were made. It is well settled that no gift inter vivos of any immovable property can validly be made by a Hindu excepting by a registered document as contemplated by section 123 of the transfer of property Act read with section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. There is no saving clause in the transfer of property Act in favour of any gift made by a Hindu under any custom. There is neither any pleading nor proof of the alleged existence of any custom in this State permitting making of gift of immovable property orally. The point raised by the appellant in the second appeals has no basis either in the pleadings, issues framed or in the questions actually adjudicated upon by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court and as such no substantial question of law regarding validity or otherwise of an oral gift of immovable property under any custom governing Manipuri Hindu is involved in the case. No decision is required to be made in this connection in these second appeals. No decision is required to be made in this connection in these second appeals. I find that the concurrent finding made by the lower courts in respect of issue No. 4 were made for sufficient and cogent reason. Accordingly, the decision of the first appellate court in respect of issue No. 4 is not interfered with. 14. Regarding permissibility of divorce under customary law prevalent among Manipuri Meeteis also, I find that there is no pleadings in this regard on the side of the present appellants. No issue is also found to have been farmed in the suits in this regard. This substantial question of law regarding permissibility of divorce under customary law prevalent among Manipuri Meeteis apart from under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was never adjudicated by any of the lower courts. It is a new plea which has been raised in these second appeals for the first time. Such a new plea or new case having no support from pleadings or evidence on record cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in the second appeals. On perusal of the records, I find that the finding of the first appellate court in respect of issue No. 3 was based on cogent and sufficient ground. No illegality was caused by not considering the provision of section 29(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Accordingly, no interference is warranted in respect of the said decision of the lower court as regards issue No. 3. 15. In respect of the 3rd point submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants regarding barring or otherwise of the partition suit by virtue of the provisions of section 51-B of the MLR & LR Act read with section 159 of the said Act, the learned counsel for the respondents draws my attention to this court's decision in Civil Revision No. 1 of 1 of 1993 on 23.6.93 and submits that in view of the decision of this Court, the said substantial question of law is no longer bound for decision in this appeals. In the said Civil Revision 1 of 1993, this Court set aside the decision of the trial court in respect of issue No. 11 which was taken up as a preliminary issue. In the said Civil Revision 1 of 1993, this Court set aside the decision of the trial court in respect of issue No. 11 which was taken up as a preliminary issue. I have also perused the decision of the first appellate court in connection with the said issue No. 11 and I find that the decision is acceptable inasmuch as it was passed in consonance with the decision of this Court. In view of this finding, no interference is warranted in respect of the said decision of the appellate court in respect of issue No. 11. The said second substantial question of law framed by this Court is considered and I do not find sufficient ground for interfering with the decision of the appellate court. 16. In view of the above findings, I do not find merit in these second appeals. Both the Second appeals are hereby rejected. The impugned judgments and decrees are not interfered with.