F.M.Ibrahim Kalifulla,J.: The challenge in these writ appeals is to the order of the learned single Judge, dated 14.12.2000 in W.P.Nos.3556 of 1998, 5685 of 1998 to 5690 of 1998 and 5711 of 1998 to 5722 of 1998. 2. The challenge in the above said writ petitions was to the two common awards passed by the first respondent-Labour Court in I.D.Nos.195 of 1990 to 200 of 1990, 240 of 1990, 241 of 1990 and 701 of 1990 to 713 of 1990, dated 31.3.1997 respectively. Under the said awards, the first respondent-Labour Court directed the appellant to reinstate the concerned workmen with continuity of service, with full back wages and other attendant benefits less the amount already paid by way of compensation. 3. The brief facts which led to the raising of the above disputes are required to be stated. The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of PVC pipes. The respective second respondents in these appeals were all employed under the appellant. It is stated that after the expiry of long term settlement dated 28.2.1986, a fresh settlement came to be entered into between the appellant and its workmen represented by their Union on 14.1.1988. It appears that not satisfied with the benefits extended to the workmen, agitations were resorted to, which according to the appellant, resulted in loss of production which ultimately forced the appellant to close its factory with effect from 17.12.1988. According to the appellant, the closure notice dated 17.11.1988 as contemplated under Sec.25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’) was also sent to the appropriate State Government. It is further stated that there was also a charter of demand on behalf of the workmen, which the State Government declined to refer as per its order dated 17.7.1989 on the ground that the factory itself had been closed with effect from 17.12.1988. It is not in dispute that the said order of the State Government was not challenged. It is further claimed by the appellant that the total number of workmen at the time of closure was 52 apart from the Management Assistants numbering 26. It is on record that all the workmen and the Management Assistants were offered closure compensation as provided under Sec.25-FFF read with 25-F of the Act and that the compensation was also accepted by all of them. 4. It is on record that all the workmen and the Management Assistants were offered closure compensation as provided under Sec.25-FFF read with 25-F of the Act and that the compensation was also accepted by all of them. 4. According to the appellant, while the rest of the workmen and Management Assistants accepted the closure and left their services, the present second respondents in each of the above said writ petitions numbering 18 alone raised disputes under Sec.2-A of the Act and on failure of conciliation, approached the first respondent-Labour Court, challenging their non-employment. 5. Be that as it may, it is stated that the appellant-management approached the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (in short, “BIFR”) and that a rehabilitation scheme was sanctioned by BIFR on 22.3.1994. In the disputes raised by the second respondents herein, a common award came to be passed by the first respondent Labour Court on 31.3.1997, directing reinstatement with continuity of service, full back wages and other attendant benefits less the amount already paid by way of compensation. 6. Aggrieved against the said award, the appellant preferred the above said writ petitions in W.P.Nos.3556 of 1998 etc., wherein, the learned single Judge was of the view that the first respondent-Labour Court failed to consider the evidence available on record, while its ultimate conclusion was contrary to the said evidence. The learned Judge, therefore, felt that the award suffered from an infirmity of error of law apparent on the face of record and it also failed to exercise in jurisdiction vested in it in a proper manner. After so holding and while remitting the matter back to the first respondent-Labour Court for fresh consideration, the learned Judge gave liberty to both parties to let in further evidence if they choose, while directing the first respondent-Labour Court to pass a fresh award on merits. The learned Judge did not stop with that, but directed the appellant-management to pay a sum of Rs.10,000 to each of the second respondents as an ad hoc payment, holding that the same was warranted in the special circumstances of the case. The said direction was made by the learned Judge by way of an interim award, as according to the learned Judge, there was prima facie case for the workmen. Hence, the writ appeals. 7. The said direction was made by the learned Judge by way of an interim award, as according to the learned Judge, there was prima facie case for the workmen. Hence, the writ appeals. 7. Assailing the order of the learned Judge, Mr.A.R.Gokulnath, learned counsel appearing for appellant contended that the various questions formulated by the learned Judge in the impugned order would not arise for consideration to bedecided afresh by the first respondent-Labour Court and therefore, no remand was called for. According to the learned counsel, in the light of Secs.25-H and 25-FFF of the Act read along with Rule 63 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Dispute Rules, there was no scope for granting any relief to the respective second respondents and therefore, the learned Judge ought not to have remitted the matter back to the first respondent-Labour Court. It was also contended that in any event, the direction for payment of an ad hoc sum of Rs.10,000 to each of the second respondents, was totally un-called for. According to the learned counsel, the learned Judge ought to have stopped with the quashing of award and ought not to have resorted to remittal for fresh consideration. 8. As against the above submissions, Mr.S.N. Kirubanandam, learned counsel appearing for the contesting second respondents, would contend that since the first respondent-Labour Court has passed the impugned award based on an analysis of the evidence placed before it, the same did not call for any interference. According to the learned counsel, even Rule 63 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Dispute Rules, is not applicable and in any case, the same was never raised at the instance of the appellant. The learned counsel would therefore, contend that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and on a perusal of the award of the first respondent-Labour Court as well as the order of the learned single Judge, we find that the various facts set out above in the earlier part of our order, were not in controversy, especially the fact relating to closure of the factory of the appellant and payment of closure compensation to the respective workmen including the second respondents herein. It is also not in dispute that whatever compensation paid by the appellant was duly received by the second respondents and that they also encashed the same. It is also not in dispute that whatever compensation paid by the appellant was duly received by the second respondents and that they also encashed the same. In fact, nowhere, in the impugned award, any evidence as to whether the receipt of such compensation was without prejudice to their rights. On the other hand, the closure of the appellant’s factory on and after 17.12.1988 was tacitly admitted before the first respondent-Labour Court. Exs.M-1 to M-20 and M-29 to M-52 were stated to be the concerned closure notices sent to the workmen as well as the appropriate Government. It was also admitted by W.W.1 before the first respondent-Labour Court that the establishment was closed on 17.12.1988 W.W.1 also admitted that notice of closure was served on each of the worker along with the closure compensation.The acceptance of the closure compensation is also not in dispute. In such a situation, the only other question for consideration was whether reopening of the factory, the sanctioning of rehabilitation scheme by BIFR, the present second respondents are entitled as a matter of right to claim for re-employment by virtue of operation of Sec.25-H of the Act. 10. The said question being purely a legal question, in our view, the same does not call for a remittance to the first respondent-Labour Court for determination. If the closure resorted to by the appellant-management as on 17.12.1988 was not under challenge and it had become final and conclusive as on that date, at best, the only other question would be, ‘whether the compensation payable under Sec.25-FFF of the Act was duly paid by the appellant management’. At the risk of repetition, it will have to be stated that the same was duly complied with by the appellant. Therefore, proceeding on the basis that pursuant to the rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by the BIFR, the manufacturing operations were revived after 1991, would it be obligatory on the appellant to offer re-employment to the second respondents herein by virtue of Sec.25-H of the Act. 11. Therefore, proceeding on the basis that pursuant to the rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by the BIFR, the manufacturing operations were revived after 1991, would it be obligatory on the appellant to offer re-employment to the second respondents herein by virtue of Sec.25-H of the Act. 11. Though on behalf of the appellant, it was contended that by virtue of the proviso as contained in Rule 63 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, there was no necessity for the appellant to offer re-employment to the second respondents, on a detailed scrutiny of the relevant provisions under the Act, namely, 25-H vis-a-vis 25-FFF of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that even such a contention may not be necessary in this case. The claim for such re-employment which was also awarded by the first respondent-Labour Court is apparently based on 25-H of theAct. Unfortunately, the legal position as regards the application of 25-H in the case of employees covered under Sec.25-FFF of the Act seemed to have been not properly appreciated nor made known to the first respondent-Labour Court.The question is no longer res integra. The issue has been squarely dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Constitutional Bench judgment reported in Punjam Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited, Chandigarh etc. and seven others v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh etc. and several others, (1990)2 L.L.J. 70 which has now been followed and reaffirmed in the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Maruti Udyog Limited v. Ram Lal and others, (2005)1 L.L.J. 853 . 12. For better understanding of the issue involved, Secs.25-FFF and 25-H of the Act require extraction, which read as under: "25-FFF. Compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings: (1) Where an undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-sec.(2), be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Sec.25-F, as if the workman has been retrenched: Provided that where the undertaking is closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to the workman under Clause (b) of Sec.25-F, shall not exceed his average pay of three months. (2) Where any undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams, or other construction work is closed down on account of the completion of the work within two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set up, no workman employed therein shall be entitled to any compensation under Clause (b) of Sec.25-F, but if the construction work is not so completed within two years, he shall be entitled to notice and compensation under that section for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months." "25-H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen: Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment, and such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for re-employment shall have preference over other persons. 13. Punjam Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited, Chandigarh etc. and seven others v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh etc. and several others 1990(2) L.L.J. 70 at 76, after elaborately analysing Secs.2(oo), 25-F, 25-G, 25-H, 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has stated the legal position as under: "In our view, the principle of harmonious construction implies that in a case where there is a genuine transfer of an undertaking or genuine closure of an undertaking as contemplated in the aforesaid sections, it would be inconsistent to read into the provisions of a right given to workman "deemed to be retrenched" a right to claim re-employment as provided in Sec.25-H. In such cases, as specifically provided in the relevant sections the workmen concerned would only be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with Sec.25-F. It is significant that in a case of transfer of an undertaking or closure of an undertaking in accordance with the aforesaid provisions, the benefit specifically given to the workmen is "as if the workmen had been retrenched" and this benefit is restricted to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Sec.25-F. [Italics added] 14. Maruti Udyog Limited v. Ram Lal and others , (2005)1 L.L.J. 853 at 859, para.6 reads as under: "26. Maruti Udyog Limited v. Ram Lal and others , (2005)1 L.L.J. 853 at 859, para.6 reads as under: "26. The aforementioned provisions clearly carve out a distinction that although identical amount of compensation would be required to be paid in all situations but the consequence following retrenchment under Sec.25-F of the 1947 Act would not extend further so as to envisage the benefit conferred upon a worman in a case falling under Secs.25-FF or 25-FFF thereof. The distinction is obvious inasmuch as whereas in the case of retrenchment simpliciter a person loses his job as he became surplus and, thus, in the case of revival of chance of employment, is given the preference in case new persons are proposed to be employed by the said undertaking; but in a case of transfer or closure of the undertaking the workman concerned is entitled to receive compensation only. It does not postulate a situation where a workman despite having received the amount of compensation would again have to be offered a job by a person reviving the industry." [Italics added] 15. Again in paras.34, 35, and 38, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has succinctly set out the legal position in the following words: “34. The submission of Mr. Das to the effect that the Parliament having used the words ‘every workman’ in Sec.25-FFF, which would include dismissed workmen in view of its definition contained in Sec.2(s) of the 1947 Act, should be widely interpreted so as to hold that even those workmen who had received compensation would be entitled to the benefit of Sec.25-H of the 1947 Act, cannot be accepted. Such a construction is not possible keeping in view the statutory scheme of the 1947 Act, Sec.25-F vis-a-vis Sec.25-B read with Sec.2(oo) of the 1947 Act, contemplates a situation where a workman is retrenched from services who had worked for a period of not less than one year on the one hand and those workmen who are covered by Sec.25-FF and Sec.25-FFF on the other keeping in view the fact that whereas in the case of the former, a retrenchment takes place, in the latter it does not. The Parliament amended the provisions of the 1947 Act by inserting Sec.25-FF and Sec.25-FFF therein by reason of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment Act), 1957 with effect from November 28, 1956, as it was found that having regard to the helpless condition to which workman would be thrown if his services are terminated without payment of compensation and presumably on the ground that if a reasonable compensation is awarded, he may be able to find out an alternative employment within a resonable time. In the case of closure of an Industrial undertaking the Act contemplates payment of compensation alone. ”35. In construing a legal fiction the purpose for which it is created should be kept in mind and should not be extended beyond the scope thereof or beyond the language by which it is created. Furthermore, it is well-known that a deeming provision cannot be pushed too far so as to result in an anomalous or absurd position. The Court must remind itself that the expressions like “as if” is adopted in law for a limited purpose and there cannot be any jurisdiction to extend the same beyond the purpose for which the legislature adopted it. “36. ..... ....... ............. ”37. ..... ....... .............. “38. The statutory scheme does not envisage that even in the case of closure of an undertaking, a workman who although had not been retrenched would be re-employed in case of revival thereof by another company. If the submission of Mr.Das is accepted, the same would not only run contrary to the statutory scheme but would make the definition of retrenchment contained in Sec.2(oo) of the 1947 Act otiose.” [Italics added] 16. In the light of the above said settled legal position, we are of the firm view that there is no question of application of Sec.25-H to the case on hand in order to consider the scope of re-employment of the second respondents herein. In the said circumstances, the only other question would be ‘whether there is any scope for granting any other relief to the second respondents herein other than the payment of closure compensation as provided under Sec.25-FFF of the Act’. 17. As stated earlier, the closure resorted to by the appellant on and from 17.12.1988 was not under challenge. In other words, neither the Union representing the workmen nor the workmen themselves have questioned the justifiability of the closure. 17. As stated earlier, the closure resorted to by the appellant on and from 17.12.1988 was not under challenge. In other words, neither the Union representing the workmen nor the workmen themselves have questioned the justifiability of the closure. In the claim statement filed before thefirst respondent-Labour Court, while admitting the declaration of closure on and from 17.12.1988, the second respondents would only contend that such a closure was in violation of Secs.25-F and 25-N of the Act. It was also contended that the non-employment was not for any mis-conduct committed by the second respondents. Significantly in the claim statement itself, it was admitted that the compensation pursuant to the closure was offered to the workmen which was received by them under protest and without prejudice to their rights. Further, none of the exhibits filed on behalf of the second respondents had anything to do with the validity of the closure effected by the appellant. One of the second respondents was examined as W.W.1. before the first respondent-Labour Court. As regards the said oral evidence, the first respondent-Labour Court has only referred to the admission made by the said witness about the factum of closure on 16.12.1988 and the receipt of the compensation. The only other statement, that was worth mentioning, was, the ‘re-starting of the factory’ from the year 1991. Nothing was pointed out before us even in the written submissions as to any invalidating factor challenging the closure effected by the appellant on 17.12.1988. 18. Therefore, going by the pleadings, evidence as well as the conclusion of the first respondent- Labour Court, the validity of the closure was never challenged while the receipt of closure compensation was tacitly admitted. It was for this reason, we are obliged to state that the scope for consideration in the writ petition and the writ appeals was only relating to the application of Sec.25-H vis-a-vis 25-FFF of the Act and nothing more. Inasmuch as we have reached a conclusion that the second respondents are not entitled to invoke 25-H for re-employment in respect of the non-employment which came to be made by virtue of the closure of the appellant’s factory on and from 17.12.1988, we are unable to sustain the award of the first respondent and the consequential order of the learned single Judge in directing the first respondent-Labour Court to re-examine the issue. Therefore, the awards as well as the order of the learned single Judge are liable to be set aside. 19. In the result, the writ appeals stand allowed and the impugned Awards as well as the order of the learned single Judge, dated 14.12.2000 are set aside.No costs. Consequently, connected W.A.M.Ps. are closed.