JUDGMENT B. P. DAS, J. — This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C’) with a prayer to quash the proceeding in I.C.C. No.237 of 2003 pending in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Panposh at Uditnagar as well as the order passed therein taking cogni¬zance against the petitioner of the offence under Sections 294/423/506/323/34 of the Indian Penal Code (‘I.P.C.’ in short). 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present application, as have been stated in the complaint petition, are as follows : O.P. No.2-Prafulla Kumar Mishra, an advocate of Rourkela Bar, filed the aforesaid complaint case impleading the present petitioner-Mukesh Dhirubhai Ambani, the Chairman of Reliance Infocomm, as accused No.1, and two others, namely, Rajesh Hirwe, the Manager of Reliance Infocomm Ltd., Rourkela, and V.K. Gupta, the owner of M/s. Balajee Agencies (Telecom Division), Rourkela, as accused Nos.2 and 3 respectively who are not parties to this case. O.P. No.2 in the aforesaid complaint petition stated that during August, 2003 he had taken a mobile phone under a scheme launched by Reliance Infocomm, in the name and style, “Reliance India Mobile Kar Lo Duniya Mutthi Mein” by submitting application in the prescribed form along with a demand draft of Rs.501/- and an undertaking to pay Rs.449/- per month. The said application form along with the demand draft was submitted to accused No.3-V.K. Gupta, owner of M/s. Balaji Agencies (Telecom Division), Rourkela, an authorized agent of Reliance Infocomm, and a hand-set was provided to the complainant with Mobile telephone No.3100611. After getting the hand-set, the complainant started operating the same but found that local mobile service was not available in the hand-set for which the complainant brought the same to the notice of accused Nos.2 and 3, who assured that the local call service would be available very soon. When the hand-set started giving further mechanical trouble and the same could not be operated, on 10.9.2003 the complainant handed over the hand-set to accused No.3 for repair at his counter where accused No.2 said that the hand-set was to be sent to Bhubaneswar for repair. After about 12 days, the hand-set was given back to complainant but on the next day of receipt the hand-set stopped functioning. After about 12 days, the hand-set was given back to complainant but on the next day of receipt the hand-set stopped functioning. The complainant went to the counter of the authorized agent of the Reliance Infocomm and after lodging a complaint handed over the defective hand-set. Accused Nos.2 and 3, who were present at the counter, assured the complainant that the hand-set would be repaired and returned at the earliest. As to the query of the complainant regarding accessibility of local calls, accused Nos.2 and 3 said that the same would be provided to the complainant as well as all other customers. On 24.9.2003 when the complainant went again to the counter of accused No. 3, accused No.2 returned the hand-set to the complainant with the assurance that the hand-set would henceforth function properly. On the next day, i.e., 25.9.2003, the hand-set again stopped functioning for which the complainant immediately rushed to the counter of accused Nos.2 and 3 and handed over the defective hand-set to them, requesting them to replace the hand-set which was bluntly refused. On 29.10.2003 at about 3.15 P.M. accused No.2 came to Rourkela Bar Association premises and requested the complainant to come to his counter for a discussion regarding the hand-set. Accordingly, at about 3.30 P.M. of that day the complainant along with one Balabhadra Nayak, Advocate, went to the business counter of accused Nos.2 and 3. The accused persons asked the complainant to take back his hand-set which had already been repaired. As the hand-set was giving frequent trouble, the complainant requested accused Nos.2 and 3 to replace the same as per the warranty. At this accused No.2 turned violent and abused the complainant in filthy language by saying “SALA MADORCHOD, OKILATI DIKHATA HAIN HAMCO, TUMKO TO YEHI PHONE MACHINE LENA PADEGA, NAHI TO TUM YEHAN SE BHAGO”. When the complainant objected to the aforesaid offend¬ing behaviour of accused No.2, the latter gave a push to the complainant as a result of which the complainant fell down on the ground and injured. When the complainant was coming back from the counter, accused No.2 threatened by saying “ABE OKIL AGAR TUM ISKE BARE ME JADA HALLA KAREGA AUR NAYA PHONE DEMAND KAREGA TO TUMKO JANSE MAR DENGA” and forced the complainant to take back the repaired hand-set. The complainant hurriedly left the counter without taking back the hand-set from the accused persons. When the complainant was coming back from the counter, accused No.2 threatened by saying “ABE OKIL AGAR TUM ISKE BARE ME JADA HALLA KAREGA AUR NAYA PHONE DEMAND KAREGA TO TUMKO JANSE MAR DENGA” and forced the complainant to take back the repaired hand-set. The complainant hurriedly left the counter without taking back the hand-set from the accused persons. During the incident, accused No.3, who was present at the counter, en¬couraged and instigated accused No.2 to commit such untoward incident. The complainant also stated that when the aforesaid incident took place Balabhadra Nayak, Advocate, who had accompa¬nied him to the counter of the accused persons, and one Jugal Prasad Parida were present and they had wit¬nessed the occurrence. Immediately after the aforesaid incident, the complainant along with Balabhadra Nayak, Advocate, went to Raghunathpalli Police Station and reported the matter orally to the police authority, who assured the complainant to take appropriate action in the matter. When the police did not take any action, the complainant was forced to file the aforesaid complaint case in the Court of the S.D.J.M., Panposh at Uditnagar, against accused No.1, namely, Mukesh Ambani describing him as the Managing Direc¬tor of Reliance Infocomm, as well as against accused Nos.2 and 3, namely, Rajesh Hirwe, Manager, Reliance Infocomm Ltd., Rourkela, and V. K. Gupta, owner of M/s. Balajee Agencies, Rourkela, i.e., the authorized agent of Reliance Infocomm, respectively, who are not parties in this proceeding. 3. The S.D.J.M. recorded the statements of the complainant and two witnesses to the occurrence under Section 202, Cr.P.C. and found a prima facie case under Sections 294/423/506/323/34, I.P.C. against the accused persons. Accordingly by order dated 5.2.2004 the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence u/ss. 294/423/506/323/34, I.P.C. against the accused persons and issued processes against them. The present application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. has been filed by accused No.1.- Mukesh Ambani on the ground that the offences of which cognizance has been taken are not made out against him, with a prayer for quashing the entire proceeding. 4. The undisputed facts are that Mukesh Dhirubhai Ambani is the Chairman of Reliance Infocomm; accused No.2 is the Manager of Reliance Infocomm at Rourkela in the district of Sundargarh and accused No.3-V.K. Gupta, the owner of M/s. Balajee Agencies, Rourkela, is the authorized agent of Reliance Infocomm at Rourke¬la. 5. 4. The undisputed facts are that Mukesh Dhirubhai Ambani is the Chairman of Reliance Infocomm; accused No.2 is the Manager of Reliance Infocomm at Rourkela in the district of Sundargarh and accused No.3-V.K. Gupta, the owner of M/s. Balajee Agencies, Rourkela, is the authorized agent of Reliance Infocomm at Rourke¬la. 5. In this proceeding it is to be examined whether on the allegations made by the complainant in the complaint petition and the statements made on oath during the inquiry u/s.202, Cr.P.C. any offence is made out against the petitioner of which cog¬nizance has been taken and whether it is a fit case where the inherent power of this Court as provided u/s. 482, Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the order taking cognizance of the offences alleged against the petitioner. 6. Sections 294, 423, 506, and 323 of the I.P.C. under which cognizance has been taken against the petitioner are ex¬tracted hereunder. “294. Obscene acts and songs - Whoever, to the annoyance of others, (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or (b) signs, recites or utters any obscene songs, balled or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.” “423. Dishonest or fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration - Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently signs, executes or becomes a party to any deed or instrument which purports to transfer or subject to any charge, any property, or any interest therein, and which contains any false statement relating to the consideration for such transfer or charge, or relating to the person or persons for whose use or benefit it is really intended to operate, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both.” “506. Punishment for criminal intimidation - Whoever, com¬mits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc., - and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprison¬ment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” Under the Orissa Amendment, if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, it is cognizable and non-bailable. “323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt-Whoever, except in the case provided for any Section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either de¬scription for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.” So far as the offence under Section 294, I.P.C. is concerned, there is nothing in the complaint petition to show that the petitioner had ever come to Rourkela nor is there any allegation in the complaint petition itself that the petitioner had committed any obscene act in a public place, or recited or uttered any obscene words. Likewise, as to the cognizance of offence under Section 506, I.P.C. taken against the petitioner the complaint petition, taken as it is, does not reveal any allegation against the petitioner his having committed any crimi¬nal intimidation. So far as cognizance of offence under Section 323, I.P.C. is concerned, there is no allegation of commission of such offence against the petitioner. As regards the offence under Section 423, I.P.C., there is nothing in the complaint petition to implicate the petitioner. 7. But Smt. Bharati Dash, learned counsel for the O.P.-complainant, however, vehemently argued that the present peti¬tioner while floating the scheme “Reliance India Mobile Kar Lo Duniya Mutthi Mein” agreed to provide certain services to the customers. The learned counsel for the complainant relied upon Sub-clauses (i) and (iii) of Clause 2 of the Terms and Conditions of the Customer Application Form, which read as follows : “2. The learned counsel for the complainant relied upon Sub-clauses (i) and (iii) of Clause 2 of the Terms and Conditions of the Customer Application Form, which read as follows : “2. Provision of Services (i) Services shall be available to the subscriber, within the Short Distance Charging Area (SDCA) where he has registered for the service, at all times subject to Force Majeure conditions including but not limited to act of God, fires, strikes, embar¬goes, war, insurrection, riots and other causes beyond the reaso¬nable control of the Company including atmospheric/topographical hindrances. (ii) .... .... .... (iii) These terms and conditions shall become effective upon the Company, at its sole discretion, accepting after due verification the application of the Subscriber attached herewith, and shall continue to remain in force until terminated. xxx xxx xxx” The learned counsel in her written note of submission made on behalf of the O.P.-complainant stated that an offence under Section 423, I.P.C. was well made out against the petitioner as he being the head of the company floated a scheme, lured the general public to enter into agreement and thereafter violated the terms of the agreement. According to her, as per the agreement, no service was provided under the said scheme, as there was no local call facility although the petitioner’s company was col¬lecting charges for their services illegally and fraudulently. As per the written notes of submission of Smt. Dash, and as per her argument, the petitioner violated the terms and conditions incor¬porated in the application form. Alternatively it was argued by the learned counsel for the complainant that the recitals in the said agreement were false. The aforesaid argument advanced by the learned counsel for the complainant is totally misconceived because the allegations made do not come within the mischief of Section 423, I.P.C. The scope of Section 423, I.P.C. deals with two specific frauds in the execution of deeds or instruments of transfer or charge, namely (i) false recital as to consideration and (ii) false recital as to the name of beneficiary. These two ingredients are totally absent in the complaint petition and in the statements made on oath by the complainant and his witnesses under Section 202, Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the O.P.-complainant relied upon a decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1990 SC 494 (Dhana¬lakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar), wherein it was held that when there are specific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredients of the offence taken cognizance of, quashing of the proceeding by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. by the High Court is illegal. The learned counsel then relied upon another decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 1 , (State of Bihar v. Murad) and specifically attention of this Court was drawn to the following observations made in paragraph 6 thereof : “xxx xxx xxx It is trite that jurisdiction under S.482, Cr.P.C. which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdic¬tion the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not... ... ” Learned counsel for the O.P.-complainant also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Raj Laxmi Mills V. Shakti Bhakoo, 95 (2003) CLT 401 (SC). That was a case under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act wherein it was held that - “3. The High Court invoked the provisions of Section 11 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and came to the conclusion that as the respondent was not in charge of or responsible for the con¬duct of the business, therefore the order summoning her was bad in law. 4. We are of the opinion that at the stage of summoning when evidence was yet to be led by the parties, the High Court could not on assumption of facts come to a finding of fact that the respondent was not responsible for the conduct of the busi¬ness.” The ratio of the aforesaid decisions is not at all applica¬ble to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. 8. In view of the discussions above now the question to be decided is whether it is a fit case to quash the cognizance of the offence taken against the petitioner. 9. In this regard it is profitable to refer the judgments of the Apex Court in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , and State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 , relied upon by Shri G. Rath, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. In R. P. Kapur’s case (supra) the Supreme Court indicated some categories of cases where the inherent powers of the High Court can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings, and the same are : (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra), the Apex Court held that the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated in that cases are as follows : “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie consti¬tute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a congnizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and con¬tinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” In this regard it is profitable to rely upon the decision in the case of K. Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 S.C.C. 547 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows : “3. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised to quash proceedings, in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily the criminal proceedings which are instituted against the accused must be tried and taken to logical conclusions under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with the proceedings at an interlocutory stage. However, there may be cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised. Where there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the crimi¬nal proceeding in respect of the alleged offence, the High Court should not be reluctant to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. However, there may be cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised. Where there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the crimi¬nal proceeding in respect of the alleged offence, the High Court should not be reluctant to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. Similarly where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value do not constitute the offence alleged, or without appreciating the evidence but only merely by looking at the complaint or the FIR or the accompanying documents, the offence alleged is not disclosed, the person proceeded against in such a frivolous criminal litigation has to be saved.” On the same line is a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Md. Sharaful Haque, 2004 (8) Supreme 31 , wherein it was held thus : “In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.........” 10. In view of the foregoing discussion of facts and law and considering the circumstances in which the complaint petition was filed against the petitioner disclosing therein that the complainant orally reported the incident to the local police is shrouded with doubts and is not believable as the complainant was a practising advocate of Rourkela Bar. The allegations made in the complaint petition and the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken in their face value do not make out any offence against the petitioner of which cognizance has been taken. The allegations made in the complaint petition and the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken in their face value do not make out any offence against the petitioner of which cognizance has been taken. In my considered opinion, pendency of the pro¬ceedings against the petitioner is an abuse of the process of the Court and, therefore, it is a fit case where the inherent power of this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should be exercised to quash the impugned order taking cognizance against the petitioner. Resul¬tantly the order dated 5.2.2004 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Panposh at Uditnagar in I.C.C. No.237 of 2003 taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 294/423/506/323/34, I.P.C. against the petitioner is quashed as the same is totally an outcome of non-application of judicial mind. The Criminal Misc. Case is disposed of with the above order. Crl. Misc. Case disposed of.