Judgment Rajesh Tandon, J. Present appeal has been flied against the judgment and order dated 23-6-1989, passed by the Sessions Judge, Pithoragarh convicting the accused appellant for the offence punishable under section 302, 394 and 201 I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life under section 302 I.P.C., four years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- under section 394 I.P.C. and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence punishable under section 201 I.P.C. In default of payment of fine under section 394 I.P.C., the accused was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and in default of payment of fine imposed under section 201 I.P.C., accused was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that on 31-8-1988 at morning Smt. Kituri Devi had gone, to the forest for cutting fuel wood but she did not return till next day. Her husband contacted the villagers and hectic search was made. In the search, dead body of Smt. Kituri was found lying in a Naia in the jungle of Ban Panchayat. Her body was covered by leaves and branches of the tree. Her ornaments were also found missing. 3. P.W. 2, Harl Ram lodged F.I.R. of the incident at Patwari Chauki, Samour at 5.00 PM on the same day. In the written report he expressed suspicion on accused Khim Ram. A case under section 302, 201 and 392 I.P.C. was registered against the accused Khim Ram. 4. The Investigating Officer Dinesh Chand Pant held inquest on the dead body and prepared inquest report Ex. Ka-l. He also seized samples of blood stained and plain earth. He prepared site plan EX.ka4. 5. Accused Khim Ram was arrested and on his pointing out Guloband Ex.8, Bariath Ex.7, blood stained Baniyan Ex.9, Shirt EX.10 and Pant EX.11 were recovered from his house. One Munara (Ex. 12) was sold by the accused to co-accused Ratan Ram, which was recovered from his possession. Another Munara was deposited by the accused with Johar Singh (P.WA). He also prepared recovery memo of Guloband EX.Ka-6, memo of recovery of clothes of the accused EX.Ka7, recovery memo of Munara EX.ka-9 and Ka-12. After completing the investigation he submitted charge sheet EX.Ka-18 against accused Khim Ram, Ratan Ram and Chandra Ram. 6. Another Munara was deposited by the accused with Johar Singh (P.WA). He also prepared recovery memo of Guloband EX.Ka-6, memo of recovery of clothes of the accused EX.Ka7, recovery memo of Munara EX.ka-9 and Ka-12. After completing the investigation he submitted charge sheet EX.Ka-18 against accused Khim Ram, Ratan Ram and Chandra Ram. 6. Accused Khim Ram was charged for the offences punishable under section 302, 394 and 201 read with sec. 34 I.P.C. Charges under section 302/34, 394/34 and 201/34 I.P.C. were framed against accused Chander Ram and charge under section 411 I.P.C. was framed against the accused Ratan Ram. All the accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. To prove its case the prosecution has examined P. W .1, Harish Chandra Pathak, P.W.2 Hari Ram, P.W.3 Diwan Singh P.WA Johar Singh, P.W.5 Dr. P.S. Quarabi, P.W.6 Shivraj Singh and P.W.7, Dinesh Chandra Pant. The learned Sessions Judge after considering the evidence on record held that there was no evidence against accused Chandar Ram and Ratan Ram and both of them were acquitted. However accused Khem Ram was held guilty of the offence punishable under section 302, 394 and 201 I.P.C. and convicted and sentence him as stated above. Feeling aggrieved the present appeal has been filed. 8. We have heard Sri R.S. Sammal, Advocate learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Addl. Government Advocate and have gone though the evidence on record. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant argued two points firstly the conviction of the accused is against the evidence on record and secondly the trial of the accused as illegal as the accused was juvenile at the time of alleged occurrence. 10. The post mortem report Ext.ka-13 shows that deceased was brutally chopped by the accused and as much as nine lacerated and incised wounds were found on the dead body. Dr. P.S. Quarabi (P.W.5) conducted post mortem examination on the dead body and found the following ante mortem injuries : 1. Lacerated wound size 8 cm x 4 cm. over forehead transversely placed, bone deep and margins irregular. 2. Incised wound size 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. bone deep, transversely placed over left cheek 2.5 cm. below left eye and 2 cm. lateral to nose. Direction was transverse. 3. Incised wound 5 cm. x 1 cm. Lacerated wound size 8 cm x 4 cm. over forehead transversely placed, bone deep and margins irregular. 2. Incised wound size 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. bone deep, transversely placed over left cheek 2.5 cm. below left eye and 2 cm. lateral to nose. Direction was transverse. 3. Incised wound 5 cm. x 1 cm. transversely placed over upper and lateral part of right side of neck, muscle deep 2 cm. and situated 4 cm. below right ear. Direction transverse. 4. Incised wound 6 cm. x 1.5 cm. bone deep situated over chin and right mandible. Direction obliquely upwards to right side over line of mandible. Right mandible fractured. 5. Dislocation of left temporal mandible joint with swelling of surrounding area of joint. 6. Lacerated wound 3 cm. x 2 cm. muscle deep over fight forearm on dorsal aspect 3 cm. upwards from wrist joint (right). Direction longitudinal. 7. Incised wound 3 cm. x 2 cm. muscle deep over left palm 1 cm. below metacarpophalangial joint of left thumb. Direction oblique . 8. Incised wound 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. muscle deep over dorsal surface of left thumb. Direction longitudinal. 9. Incised wound size 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. muscle deep over tip of left middle finger. Direction transverse. 11. The doctor has opined that the death was caused due to shock and hemorrhaege due to ante mortem injuries. Dr. P.S. Quarabi has deposed that these injuries could be sustained by Bariath EX.7. 12. In this case there is no direct evidence against the accused. The case of the prosecution rests on the circumstantial evidence. 13. It is well settled principle of law that in case where the evidence is purely circumstantial in nature, the facts and circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is sought to be drawn must be fully established beyond any reasonable doubt and such circumstances must be consistent and unerringly point out the guilt of the accused and the chain of circumstances must be complete. 14. The first circumstance which unerringly points out to the guilt of the accused is the discovery of Bariath Ex.l, (the weapon used in the murder) on the pointing out of the accused. To prove this circumstance the prosecution has examined P.W.2, Harish Chandra Pathak who is Pradhan of village Kerala Mehar and P.W.3 Diwan Singh, Sabhapati of village Siyoli. Both these witnesses are independent witnesses. To prove this circumstance the prosecution has examined P.W.2, Harish Chandra Pathak who is Pradhan of village Kerala Mehar and P.W.3 Diwan Singh, Sabhapati of village Siyoli. Both these witnesses are independent witnesses. They deposed that accused Khim Ram made disclosure about the Bariath and brought the Investigating Officer and the witnesses to his home where he got recovered Bariath EX.-7 from Bharpati of his house. He also got recovered clothes, which he was wearing at the time of incident. He also got recovered a Guloband EX.-8. The accused said that he had thrown the belt of the cloth on which the Guloband was affixed in the forest. Witness Diwan Singh P.W.3 stated as under ;- HINDI TYPING 15. Accused told to the Investigating Officer and the witnesses that he sold a Munra to Ratan Ram for Rs. 600/- but Ratan Ram only paid him Rs. 100/and remaining Rs. 500/- are outstanding to him. Thereafter accused along with witnesses had gone to the house of co-accused Ratan Ram. Ratan Ram handed over a Gold Munara to the Investigating Officer. 16. P.W.4, Johar Singh has stated that accused Khim Ram came to his shop at Kameri on 31-8-1988 and tried to sold him a Munra and told that the Munra belonged to his mother who is blind. Johar Singh told the accused to come on next day with his mother or some other person. This witness kept the Munara with him and gave receipt of it to the accused. He proved Munra Ex-13. This witness has stated that the accused told his name as Bishan Ram son of Lachham Ram. He stated that the receipt was scribed by Rajendra Singh on which accused had affixed his thumb impression. He proved receipt as EX.ka-11. This witness also proved Fard of the recovery of Munara as EX.ka-12. 17. The Sessions Judge also relied upon the circumstance in which P.W.6, Shivraj Singh has deposed that he saw accused Khim Singh coming from his home on 31-8-88 at about 11.00 AM and he had a Bariat in his hand. This witness stated that Ex-7 is the same Bariat. He stated that later on he came to know about the murder of Smt. Kiyura Devi. 18. This witness stated that Ex-7 is the same Bariat. He stated that later on he came to know about the murder of Smt. Kiyura Devi. 18. Thus on the basis of the circumstances narrated above, i.e. discovery of weapon used in the offence and biood stained clothes under section 27 of the Evidence Act, recovery of Gold Munra on the pointing out of accused from co accused Ratan Ram and another Munra from witness P.W.4 Johar Singh and from the evidence of P.W.6 Shivraj Singh regarding seeing the accused going towards the jungle with the weapon of assault in his hand, it is fully established that on 31-8-1988, deceased Smt. Kituri left her house for cutting fuel wood in the forest. She was brutally murdered and her ornaments were looted. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly held the accused guilty for the offences punishable under Section 302, 394 and 201 I.P.C. the conviction of the accused under section 302, 394 and 201 I.P.C. is therefore, upheld. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the order of sentence against accused Khim Ram cannot be sustained, as he was minor at the time of incident. The learned counsel argued that he was 16 years of age at the time of alleged incident but the trial Court has not considered this aspect of the case and in view of the provisions made under the Juvenile Justice Act, the trial of the accused by the Sessions Judge is bad and illegal. 20. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as its Preamble speaks, is An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to juveniles in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection, by providing for proper care, protection and treatment by catering to their development needs, and by adopting a child friendly approach in the adjudication and disposition of matters in the best interest of children and for their ultimate rehabilitation through various institutions established under this enactment. 21. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, it will be useful to reproduce : A review of the working of the Juvenile Act, 1986 (53 of 1986) would indicate that much greater attention is required to be given to children in conflict with law or those in need of care and protection. 21. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, it will be useful to reproduce : A review of the working of the Juvenile Act, 1986 (53 of 1986) would indicate that much greater attention is required to be given to children in conflict with law or those in need of care and protection. The justice system as available for adults is not considered suitable for being applied to a juvenile or the child or anyone on their behalf including the police, voluntary organizations, social workers, or parents and guardians, throughout the country. There is also an urgent need for creating adequate infrastructure necessary for the implementation of the proposed legislation with a larger involvement of informal systems specially the family, the voluntary organizations and the community. 22. A perusal of the objects of the Act shows that by virtue of clause (f) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India, protection has been given to the children. It reads as under: (f) that the children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. 23. The learned counsel has pointed out that in his ball application dated 13-3-1989 in paragraph 6, it has been clearly mentioned that the accused was minor at the time of alleged offence. Hindi Typing 24. Further in his statement under section 313, accused Khim Ram has stated his age to be 16 years, which was written by the Sessions Judge himself. Further in the memo of appeal before this Court the appellant has mentioned this plea very clearly. 25. Sub section (2) of Section 69 of the Act, provides as under: (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. 26. Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 which is similar to the corresponding section 64 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 reads as under :- 3. 26. Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 which is similar to the corresponding section 64 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 reads as under :- 3. Continuation of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile- Where an inquiry has been initiated against a juvenile in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection and during the course of such inquiry the juvenile or the child ceases to be such, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the' inquiry may be continued and orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person had continued to be a juvenile or a child. 27. Section 20 of the Act deals with the pending cases. Pending cases covers appeal also. Section 20 reads as under : Special Provision in respect of pending cases: Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence. 28. From a reading of a provisions it is clear that proceedings contemplated under section 20 mean proceedings either at the stage of trial or appeal. Thus the aim and object of the provisions is not only to avoid de novo trial of the juvenile but also to cover him under the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000, even after his conviction and during the period he is undergoing sentence. The relevant date to determine the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act (Act No. 56 of 2000) would be the date of occurrence i.e. the age of the accused as on the date when the crime was committed. The relevant date to determine the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act (Act No. 56 of 2000) would be the date of occurrence i.e. the age of the accused as on the date when the crime was committed. If he was below 18 years of age at that time, then he would be juvenile under Act No. 56 of 2000, and the provisions would be applicable, once it is found that the case is covered by Section 20 or Section 64 of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children)Act, 2000. 29. In AIR 1989 Patna 217 Krishna Bhagwan v. State of Bihar, a Full Bench after following the judgments of Apex Court, has held that the Juvenile Act protects the interest of the children and if the plea that accused was, child and his trial by ordinary criminal Court is barred, taken for first time at appellate stage, can be entertained. 30. Aforesaid Full Bench decision has been relied upon by the Apex Court in (2000) 5 SCC 488 Arnit Das VS. State of Bihar and held as under: 16. The term ''juvenile justice" before the onset of delinquency may refer to social justice; after the onset of delinquency, it refers to justice in its normal juridical sense. (See - ''Juvenile Justice: Before and After the Onset of Delinquency", working paper prepared by the Secretariat for 6th U. N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, quoted at p. 4 of the Treatise, Ved Kumari, ibid.) The Juvenile Justice Act provides for justice after the onset of delinquency. The societal factors leading to the birth of delinquency and the preventive measures which would check juvenile delinquency legitimately fall within the scope of social justice. Once a boy or a girl has assumed delinquency, his or her treatment and trial at the hands of the justice delivery system' is taken care of by the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act. The view so ,taken finds support from the Preamble to the Act and the Statement of Objects and Reasons. The Preamble speaks for the Act making provisions for the things post delinquency. Several expressions employed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons vocally support this view. The view so ,taken finds support from the Preamble to the Act and the Statement of Objects and Reasons. The Preamble speaks for the Act making provisions for the things post delinquency. Several expressions employed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons vocally support this view. The Act aims at laying down a uniform juvenile justice system in the country avoiding lodging in jail or police lock-up of the child; and providing for prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency, for care, protection, etc. post-juvenility. In short the field sought to be covered by the Act is not the one which had led to juvenile delinquency but the filed when a juvenile having committed a delinquency is placed for being taken care of post-delinquency. ..................... ..................... 9. Shri U. R. Lalit, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant invited our attention to Santenu Mitra v. State of W.B. i993 Supp. (1) SCC 409, Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar 1984 (Supp.) SCC 228 and Gopinath Ghosh v. State of W.B. (1989) 3 SCC 1 and to a number of other decisions which we do not propose to catalogue separately for most of them have been referred to in paras 14 and 15 of the decision in Bhola Bhagat. What has been emphasized by Shri Lalit is that in all these cases the question whether the person, arrayed as the accused-appellant before the Court, was a juvenile or not was decided by taking into consideration the age of the accused on the date of the occurrence or the date of the commission of the offence. We have carefully perused all these decisions. In all these cases the counsel for the contesting parties before the Court have made their submissions by assuming that the date of the offence was the relevant date for determining the age of the juvenile. Accordingly this Court, having examined the facts of each case, recorded a finding as to the age of the accused on the date of the occurrence of the offence. Accordingly this Court, having examined the facts of each case, recorded a finding as to the age of the accused on the date of the occurrence of the offence. Generally speaking these cases are authorities for the propositions that : (I) the technicality of the accused having not claimed the benefit of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act at the earliest opportunity or before any of the courts below should not, keeping in- view the intendment of the legislation, come in the way of the benefit being extended to the accused-appellant even if the plea was raised for the first. time before this Court; (ii) a hyper technical approach should not be adopted while appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile and if two views may be possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases; and (iii) the provisions of the Act are mandatory and while implementing the provisions of the Act, those charged with responsibilities of implementation should show sensitivity and concern for a juvenile. However, in none of the cases the specific issue -by reference to while date (the date of the offence or the date of production of the person before the competent authority), the court shall determine whether' the person was a juvenile or hot, was neither raised nor decided. 21. The Full Bench decision of the High Court of Calcutta in Dilip Saha v. State of W.B. AIR 1978 Cal 529 and the Full Bench decision in Krishna Bhagwan v. State of Bihar AIR 1989 Pat 217, were strongly relied on by the learned Senior Counsel, Shri Lalit submitting that the question specifically arising for consideration before this Court was also before the two High Courts. We have examined the two decisions. In Dilip Saha the Calcutta High Court, interpreting the provisions of the W. B. Children Act, 1959 which is a pari material enactment, has taken the view that the age of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence is the relevant age for attracting the provisions of the W.B. Children Act, 1959 and not his age at the time of trial. Vide paras 22 to 24 the Full Bench has assigned two reasons for taking the view which it has done which in our opinion are both erroneous. One reason is that according to Section 24 of that Act a child cannot be sentenced to death or ordinarily to imprisonment then denying the benefit of the provisions of the Act to a person who was a child on the date of the offence but had ceased to be so on the date of commencement of the inquiry or trial, may result in the child being sentenced to death or imprisonment for life consequent upon his being held guilty which would be violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution which prohibits any person on conviction for any offence being subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. The High Court has overlooked that Article 20(1) of the Constitution would be attracted only if the applicability of the Act was determined by reference to the date of the offence but if it was determined by reference to the date of the commencement of the inquiry or trial then Article 20(1) would not apply. The second reason assigned by the High Court is that the investigating officer may by delaying investigation and putting up of the accused for trial deny the accused the benefit of the provisions of the Act and thereby defeat the object and purpose of the Act. Suffice it to say that such an occasion would not arise at all because before the commencement of the trial there would be some point of time when the accused shall have to be brought before the competent authority and that date would be determinative of the fact whether the accused was a juvenile or not. As to Krishna Bhagwan case decided by the Patna High Court, suffice it to observe that the opening part of the judgment itself indicates that the question posed before us was not a question arising before the High Court. The two questions considered and answered by the High Court were different. As to Krishna Bhagwan case decided by the Patna High Court, suffice it to observe that the opening part of the judgment itself indicates that the question posed before us was not a question arising before the High Court. The two questions considered and answered by the High Court were different. The High Court was seized of the issues as to what would be the impact of the event of the child ceasing to be so before the conclusion of the trial and the effect of the plea under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 having not been taken before the trial court, and the trial having proceeded oblivious of the provisions of the Act. During the course of discussion the Full Bench has observed that the juvenile is one who was below a certain age on the date of the commission of the offence but the observation is also based on an assumption and is certainly not a point deliberated upon before the High Court. 31. The Apex Court in 1997 (4) Crimes 123 (SC) Bhola Bhagat etc. VS. State of Bihar has held as under: 10. In Gopinath Ghosh v. State of W.B. an argument was raised on behalf of the appellant therein for the first time in the Supreme Court that on the date of offence the appellant was aged below 18 years and was, therefore, a "child" within the meaning of the expression '''child'' as contained in the West Bengal Children Act. 1959 and therefore the Court had no jurisdiction to sentence him to suffer imprisonment, after holding a trial. In that case, this Court framed an issue as to what was the age of the appellant on the date of an offence for which he had been tried and convicted and remitted the issue to the learned Sessions Judge, Nadia to return a finding on that question. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing both the sides certified his findings that the appellant Gopinath Ghosh was aged between 16-17 years on the date of the offence. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing both the sides certified his findings that the appellant Gopinath Ghosh was aged between 16-17 years on the date of the offence. This Court then after referring to various provisions of the Act opined that Section 24 of the Act takes away the jurisdiction of the Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment, unless the case falls under the proviso and that Section 25 of the Act forbids any trial of a juvenile delinquent and that only an inquiry can be held in his case in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the trial of a summons case. This Court noticed that unfortunately the appellant had never questioned the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court which tried him for the offence. Nor was any such plea raised in the appeal against his conviction and sentence in the High Court. It was for the first time that the contention was raised before the Supreme Court. The Court then observed : (SCC p. 231, para 10) "In view of the underlying intendment and beneficial provisions of the Act read with clause (f) of Article 39 of the Constitution which provides that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment, we consider it proper not to allow a technical condition that this contention is being raised in this Court for the first time to thwart the benefit of the provisions being extended to the appellant, if he was otherwise entitled to it." (emphasis ours) and then went on to direct: (SCC p. 232, para 12) "The next question is what should be the sequel. to our decision ? The appellant has been in prison for some years. But neither his antecedents nor the background of his family are before us. It is difficult for us to gauge how .the juvenile court would have dealt with him. Therefore, we direct that the appellant be released on bail forthwith by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nadia, ... and then proceed in accordance with law, keeping in view the provisions of the Act." 11. It is difficult for us to gauge how .the juvenile court would have dealt with him. Therefore, we direct that the appellant be released on bail forthwith by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nadia, ... and then proceed in accordance with law, keeping in view the provisions of the Act." 11. Again, in the case of Bhoop Ram v. State of V.P. the only question for consideration before a Bench of this Court was whether the appellant who had been convicted and sentenced along with certain adult accused should have been treated as a child within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the V.P. Children Act, 1951 and sent to the approved school for detention therein till he attained the age of 18 years instead of being sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The Court after considering the material on the record opined that the appellant therein could not have completed 16 years of age on the date when the offence was committed and held that the appellant should have been dealt with under the U. P. Children Act instead of being sentenced to imprisonment when he was convicted by the Sessions Judge under various grounds. Since, the appellant had by the time the appeal was heard by the Supreme Court reached the age of more than 28 years, the Court directed: (SCC p. 4, para 8) "Since the appellant is now aged more than 28 years of age, there is no question of the appellant now being sent to an approved school under the V. P. Children Act for being detained there, In a somewhat similar situation, this Court held in Jayendra v. State of V.P. that where an accused had been Wrongly sentenced to imprisonment instead of being treated as a "child" under Section 2(4) of the V.P. Children Act and sent to an approved school and the accused had crossed the maximum age of detention in an approved school viz. 18 years, the course to be followed is to sustain the conviction but however quash the sentence imposed on the accused and direct his release forthwith. Accordingly, in this case also, 'we sustain the conviction of the appellant under all the charges framed against him but however quash the sentence awarded to him and direct his release forthwith." (emphasis ours) 12. Accordingly, in this case also, 'we sustain the conviction of the appellant under all the charges framed against him but however quash the sentence awarded to him and direct his release forthwith." (emphasis ours) 12. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar v. State of V. P. noticed the following observations of the High Court regarding the age of the appellant: (SCC p. 420, para 1) ''At the time of occurrence Pradeep Kumar appellant, aged about 15 years, was resident of Railway Colony, Naini, Krishan Kant and Jagdish appellants, aged about 15 years and 14 years, respectively, were resident of Village Chaka, P. S. Naini." At the time of granting special leave, two appellants therein produced School-leaving certificate and horoscope respectively showing their ages as 15 years and 13 years at the time of the commission of the offence and so far as the third appellant is concerned, this Court asked for his medical examination and on the basis therefore concluded that he was also a child at the relevant time. The Court then held: (SCC p. 420, paras 3 and 4) ''It is, thus, proved to the satisfaction of the Court that on the date of Occurrence, the appellants had not completed 16 years of age and as Such they should have been dealt with under the V.P. Children Act instead of being sentenced to imprisonment on conviction under Sections 302/34 of the Act. Since the appellants are now aged more than 30 years, there is no question of sending them to an approved school under the V. P. Children Act for detention. Accordingly, While Sustaining the Conviction of the appellants under all the charges framed against them, we quash the sentences awarded to them and direct their release forth with. The appeals are partly allowed in the above terms." 32. Here in this case, no inquiry regarding the age of the appellant had ever been made at the trial stage. The accused has not been asked by the Sessions Judge to adduce evidence in respect of his claim being juvenile nor the accused was referred for radiological examination to determine his age. 33. Thus in the light of the above observations, we are of the opinion that a inquiry should be made by the Sessions Judge regarding the age of the accused at the time of offence. 34. 33. Thus in the light of the above observations, we are of the opinion that a inquiry should be made by the Sessions Judge regarding the age of the accused at the time of offence. 34. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed. The conviction of the accused under section 302, 394 and 201 I.P.C. is maintained. 35. The case is remitted to the trial Court for holding an inquiry to verify the age of the accused at the time of occurrence. The Sessions Judge shall thereafter forward the entire record of the proceedings to this Court for further orders. 36. Pending disposal of the inquiry before the Sessions Judge, the sentence passed against the accused shall remain in abeyance. The inquiry be completed within three months. 37. Let a copy of this judgment along with the trial Court's record be sent to the Sessions Judge concerned forthwith for compliance.