JUDGMENT S.M.M. ALAM, J 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 19.2.2003 and order dated 21.2.2003 passed by Sri Narendra Prasad Singh, 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram in Sessions Trial No. 647 of 2000 whereby he has been pleased to convict appellants Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary for the offence under Sections 304-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section 201 of the I.P.C. He has further been pleased to direct that both the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case, as per the written report (Ext. 1) of the informant Sriniwas Choudhary filed on 22.3.2000, in brief, is that his sister Punchratana was married with appellant Harendra Choudhary on 12.12.1999 according to the Hindu religion. After the said marriage she went to her Sasural and stayed there for three months. Thereafter her Roksadi took place and she was brought to her Naihar. Further case is that the brother-in-law of appellant Harendra Choudhary came to the house of the informant and asked the informant to fix 12.3.2000 as the date of Donga (Roksadi) which was objected to by the informant and his father. The informant as well as his father requested Hiralal Choudhary to fix some other date in the month of Baishakh on the pretext to arrange money for Roksadi but even then they did not agree and on 12.2.2000 appellants Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary along with some other persons of their village came to the house of the informant on a Tempo and demanded Roksadi of his sister. They also demanded T.V. and one she-calf but the informant and his father expressed their inability to give T.V. and she-calf at that time and promised them to give both the articles later on. This caused annoyance to Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary and so they did not take meals in the night. Further case is that on 13.3.2000 Roksadi of the informant's sister took place and on that date Hiralal Choudhary and Harendra Choudhary told that since T.V. and she-calf were not given, as such he (informant) would not be able to see her sister again. Further case is that on 13.3.2000 Roksadi of the informant's sister took place and on that date Hiralal Choudhary and Harendra Choudhary told that since T.V. and she-calf were not given, as such he (informant) would not be able to see her sister again. Further case is that on 21.3.2000 Ram Narayan Singh, who had worked as the mediator in the marriage of the informant's sister with appellant Harendra Choudhary, came to his house and told him that his sister had been burnt to death by her in-laws. On getting this information, the informant along with his parents went to village Udaipur (Sasural of his sister) where they were informed by the villagers that the appellants along with others had killed his sister by strangulating her neck and thereafter they had cremated the dead body on 17.3.2000. Further case is that appellants Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary and other villagers of village Udaipur forced the informant and others to board on a jeep and to return back to their home. They also threatened that if they lodged any case they would be killed. Further case is that the informant's father became unconscious but the informant anyhow came to the Police Station and submitted the written report on the basis of which Sanjhauli P.S. Case No. 17/2000 was instituted. 3. After investigation of the case, the Investigating Officer submitted chargesheet against five accused persons and on the basis of chargesheet, cognizance was taken and all the five accused persons were committed to the Court of Session for facing trial. After commitment the charge under Sections 304-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against all the five accused persons on 5.7.2001. The accused persons denied the charge and claimed to be tried and thus, they were put on trial and by the impugned judgment and order, the appellants Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary were convicted but Jagmato Kuer, Mina Devi and Sabita Devi were not found guilty and they were acquitted. 4. The accused persons denied the charge and claimed to be tried and thus, they were put on trial and by the impugned judgment and order, the appellants Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary were convicted but Jagmato Kuer, Mina Devi and Sabita Devi were not found guilty and they were acquitted. 4. The defence case, as it appears from the trend of cross-examination and the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is that the appellants have been falsely implicated in this case and the fact is that the deceased filed away from the house of the informant and during the relevant time she was not at the house of the appellants but because of the fact that the appellants refused to return back the gift, the informant has falsely implicated the appellants. 5. In support of the prosecution case, the prosecution has examined altogether five witnesses, namely, P.W. 1 Sitalwaso Devi, P.W. 2 Hiralal Rawani, P.W. 3 Sriniwas Choudhary, P.W. 4 Ram Narayan Singh and P.W. 5 Ramagya Rai. Out of the said witnesses, P.W. 1 is the mother of the victim, P.W. 2 is a co-villager of the informant, P.W. 3 is the informant himself, P.W. 4 is the father-in-law of the informant and P.W. 5 is the Investigating Officer of this case. In addition to the oral evidence, some papers have been brought on record which have been marked exhibits. Ext. 1 is the written report of the informant. Ext.2 is the signature of the informant on the written report. Ext. 2/1 is the signature of S.I. Sanjhauli P.S. on the formal F.I.R. Ext. 3 is endorsement of S.I. Sanjhauli P.S. on the written report and Ext. 4 is the formal F.I.R. On behalf of the defence, not a single witness was examined. 6. From perusal of the judgment of the lower Court it appears that on scrutinising the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the learned Judge believed the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and 5 and believing their evidence, the learned trial Judge held that the prosecution has been able to prove that deceased Panchratna, who was married to appellant Harendra Choudhary on 12.12.1999 died within seven years of the marriage in her Sasural otherwise than under normal circumstance. The learned trial Judge also held. 1 to 3 and 5 and believing their evidence, the learned trial Judge held that the prosecution has been able to prove that deceased Panchratna, who was married to appellant Harendra Choudhary on 12.12.1999 died within seven years of the marriage in her Sasural otherwise than under normal circumstance. The learned trial Judge also held. that the prosecution has succeeded in proving that soon before her death, deceased Panchratna was subjected to cruelty and harassment by appellants Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary as the deceased's parents failed to fulfil the demand of T.V. and she-calf made by the appellants in dowry. On the basis of the above findings, the learned trial Judge held both the appellants guilty under Sections 304-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. The contention of the learned defence counsel is that the impugned judgment and order is bad in law as well as on facts. His further contention is that the learned Trial Court has wrongly placed reliance upon the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 who are all interested witnesses and without any cogent reason he discarded the evidence of P.W. 4, who is definitely an independent witness. His further contention is that there is no eye-witness of the occurrence of killing of Panchratna and in this regard, the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 that deceased Panchratna was killed by the appellants in her Sasural by strangulation is merely based on conjectures and surmises and the same is not admissible in the eye of law. His further contention is that it is the specific defence of the appellants that deceased Panchratna was mentally derailed and she fled away from her Naihar but the learned trial Judge did not consider this aspect of the case and without any basis he held that the death of Panchratna had taken place in her Sasural otherwise than under normal circumstance within seven years of her marriage and so, the learned defence counsel submitted to set aside the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court. 8. 8. On the other hand, the State Counsel argued that for proving an offence under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution has to prove three points i.e. (i) the death of the deceased was caused by burn or bodily injury otherwise than under normal circumstance; (ii) the death must occur within seven years of the marriage of the deceased and (iii) soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for demand of dowry. The learned State counsel while supporting the judgment submitted that the prosecution has fully been able to prove all the above points so far as this case is concerned and as such, the impugned judgment and order should be confirmed. 9. In view of the rival contentions of both the lawyers, the question which arises for determination in this case is whether from the materials available on record it can be held that deceased Panchratna died in her Sasural within seven years of her marriage otherwise than under normal circumstance and that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellants in connection with non-fulfilment of demand of dowry. In this regard the date of marriage of the deceased Panchratna with Harendra Choudhary, the date of Donga (Roksadi) of the deceased Panchratna and the date of death of the deceased Panchratna are relevant. So far as date of marriage of the deceased Panchratna with appellant Harendra Choudhary is concerned, it appears that the same is not disputed although it seems that in the written report (Ext. 1) the prosecution has not given the correct date of marriage of deceased Panchratna with Harendra Choudhary but so far as Donga (Roksadi) of deceased Panchratna which is said to have taken place on 13.3.2000 and the death of deceased Panchratna taking place in her Sasural are concerned, the same have been denied by the defence. In my view, Donga of deceased Panchratna which is said to have taken place on 13.3.2000 is a deciding factor in this case and if it is believed that on 13.3.2000 appellants Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary had taken Roksadi (Donga) of the deceased then natural inference will be that at the time of alleged occurrence the deceased Panchratna was definitely in her Sasural. But if the story of Donga of deceased Panchratna is disbelieved, the entire prosecution case will fail. But if the story of Donga of deceased Panchratna is disbelieved, the entire prosecution case will fail. Regarding Donga the prosecution case is that in the month of Kartik brother-in-law of appellant Harendra Choudhary, namelly Hiralal Choudhary had come to the house of the informant and had fixed 12.3.2000 as the date of Donga (Roksadi) against the wishes of the informant and as per programme, the said Hiralal Choudhary and Harendra Choudhary along with others had come to the house of the informant on 12.3.2000 and took Roksadi of the informant's sister on 13.3.2000. To support this part of the story, the prosecution has examined P.W. 1 Shitalwasa Devi, P.W. 2 Hiralal Rawani and P.W.3 Sriniwas. 10. P.W.1 Shritalwasa Devi, who is the mother of the deceased, has deposed that about three years ago her daughter Panchratna was married to appellant Harendra Choudhary and after marriage she went to her Sasural and stayed there for three months. Thereafter she came to her Naihar. She has further deposed that in the same year after Chhat festival Hiralal Choudhary (brother-in-law of Harendra Choudhary) came to her house along with two other persons and demanded Roksadi (Donga) of her daughter in the month of Fagun. She has further deposed that Hiralal Choudhary forcibly fixed the date of Donga of her daughter in the month of Fagun. She has further deposed that in the month of Fagun both the appellants came to her house for taking Gouna (Donga) of her daughter and on the next day they took (Donga) of her daughter. 11. Corroborating the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 Hiralal Rawani has also deposed that for taking Donga (Roksadi) of informant's sister Panchratna, appellants Harendra Choudhary and Hiralal Choudhary had come to the house of the informant and forcibly fixed the date of Donga of Panchratna in the month of Fagun for which the father of Panchratna was not ready. He has further deposed that as per programme both the appellants came to the house of the informant in the month of Fagun and took Donga of the informant's sister. 12. P.W.3 Sriniwas, who is the own brother of the deceased, Panchratna, has also deposed that for fixing the date of Donga of his sister, appellant Hiralal Choudhary had come to his house and forcibly fixed the date of Donga in the year, 2000 for which his father was not ready. 12. P.W.3 Sriniwas, who is the own brother of the deceased, Panchratna, has also deposed that for fixing the date of Donga of his sister, appellant Hiralal Choudhary had come to his house and forcibly fixed the date of Donga in the year, 2000 for which his father was not ready. He has further deposed that according to the date fixed by appellant Hiralal Choudhary, appellant Harendra along with Hiralal Choudhary and two to four others came to his house and took Donga of his sister. 13. From perusal of Paras 7 and 8 of the cross-examination of P.W. 1, it appears that in her cross-examination also she has supported this fact that appellant Hiralal Choudhary had come to her house for fixing the date of Donga and thereafter both the appellants along with others had come to her house and had taken Donga of her daughter. Likewise, Para 7 of cross-examination of P.W. 2 shows that he again reiterated that both the appellants had come to the house of the informant for taking Donga of her sister Panchratna and they stayed in the house of the informant in the night. He has further deposed that he was present at the house of the informant in the night at the time of serving dinner to them and also at the time of Donga of Panchratna. Thus it appears that in cross-examination also P.W. 2 has supported the prosecution case regarding 'Donga' of deceased Panchratan. The cross-examination of P.W. 3 para-6 also corroborates that he also supported the factum of Donga of his sister taking place and that both the appellants had come to his house for taking 'Donga' (Rokhsadi) of his sister. Thus, it appears that P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 all have supported this fact that the appellants had taken Roksadi (Donga) of the informant's sister. It is true that there is some discrepancy in the evidence of P.W.2 on this point as he has deposed that for fixing the date of Donga both the appellants had come to the house of the informant but P.Ws. 1 and 3 have not supported this fact and this is also not the case of the prosecution. In my view, this is not a very vital contradiction which can falsify the entire case of the prosecution. Thus, I find that from the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 have not supported this fact and this is also not the case of the prosecution. In my view, this is not a very vital contradiction which can falsify the entire case of the prosecution. Thus, I find that from the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3, this fact is well established that the informant's sister Panchratna was married to appellant Harendra Choudhary and both these appellants had taken Rokhsadi (Donga) of the deceased in the month of March, 2000 just about one week before the alleged date of occurrence. 14. It has been submitted on behalf of the defence counsel that there is absolutely no evidence on record to establish that death of the deceased Panchratna had taken place in her Sasural. It is true that there is no eye-witness of this part of occurrence in this case and the case is based on circumstantial evidence and it is well settled that where a case is based squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. It is also settled law that before conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence, the following circumstances must be fully established (i) the circumstance from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstance concerned must or 'should' and not 'may' be established. (ii) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (iii) The circumstance should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (iv) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and (v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In the following Paras, I would like to see whether conditions as mentioned above have been fulfilled in this case or not. 15. In the following Paras, I would like to see whether conditions as mentioned above have been fulfilled in this case or not. 15. I have found above that the prosecution has been able to prove that the appellants had taken Roksadi (Donga) of deceased Panchratna just before one week of the alleged occurrence. This goes to establish that after Gouna and before her death Panchratna was definitely in her Sasural. The evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 is that after getting information that Panchratna had been killed by strangulation, they immediately rushed to her Sasural and on reaching there they did not find Panchratna in her Sasural. They have further deposed that on enquiry the appellants did not give any satisfactory reply and they forcibly them sent back to village Dhawani on a tractor which was being driven by the Mama of appellant Harendra Choudhary. Thus, the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 establishes this fact that when on getting the information about the death of Panchratna they went to her Sasural and they did not see her alive. It is true that P.W. 4 Ram Narain Singh has denied this fact that he had informed the informant about the death of his sister but this does not make any difference as P.W. 4 has also admitted that informant's sister Panchratna was already dead, when this evidence of the prosecution witnesses is believed that after Donga the informant's sister Panchratna was taken to her Sasural by the appellants the natural inference is that she died in her Sasural. An inference can also be drawn from the suggestion put forward by the defence to the prosecution witnesses that as the appellants refused to return back the articles which were given to appellant Harendra Choudhary at the time of marriage of Panchratna with him, so in order to take back those articles, the informant has falsely implicated the appellants. This suggestion itself shows that Panchratna was not alive and that is why the question of return of articles given to appellant Harendra Choudhary at the time of his marriage with Panchratna arose. Had she been alive, such question would have arisen only when there was dissolution of marriage or on separation but there is no such case of either party of separation or dissolution of marriage of the deceased Panchratna with appellant Harendra Choudhary. Had she been alive, such question would have arisen only when there was dissolution of marriage or on separation but there is no such case of either party of separation or dissolution of marriage of the deceased Panchratna with appellant Harendra Choudhary. Therefore, the presumption will be that when the demand was put it was in the minds of both the appellants that Panchratna was already dead and since it has been established from the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 that just one week before both the appellants had taken Rukhsati (Donga) of Panchratna then it is also established that at the time of her death deceased Panchratna was at her Sasural and she died in her Sasural. Accordingly, I hold that there is enough evidence on record that at the time of death, deceased Panchratan was at her sasural. 16. From perusal of the statements of appellants made under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it appears that the specific question has been put to the appellants that on 17.3.2000 they killed the deceased Panchratna for non-fulfilment of demand of T.V. and Pari in dowry. To this question, they simply said that it is not correct. Likewise, specific question was put to them that after killing Panchratna they disposed of her dead body. In reply to this question, the appellants again did not utter a single sentence that Panchratna did not die in her Sasural or that she had fled away from her Maika as she was mentally unsound. Not only this but the defence has not adduced any oral or documentary evidence that Panchratna was mentally unsound and she had fled away from her Naihar. All these facts establish that the suggestion put to the prosecution witnesses that Panchratan had fled away from her Naihar is without any basis and without any substance. Thus, from the materials available on record it is established that after Rukhsati (Donga) Panchratna had gone to her Sasural but just after one week of the alleged Rukhsati, she was not found alive at her Sasural which fact is sufficient to hold that the death of Panchratna had taken place in her Sasural. 17. The next point for consideration will be whether the deceased Panchratna died in her Sasural within seven years of her marriage and her death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. 17. The next point for consideration will be whether the deceased Panchratna died in her Sasural within seven years of her marriage and her death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. In this regard the specific case of the prosecution is that the deceased Panchratan was married to appellant Harendra Choudhary on 12.12.1999 but there appears no similarity in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on this point. According to the informant P.W.3, the marriage of his sister Panchratan had taken place in the year, 1999 but according to the evidence of P.W.1, who is the mother of Panchratna, her marriage had taken place about three years back from the date of her deposition (her deposition was recorded on 3rd December, 2001) meaning thereby that in the year 1998 the marriage of Panchratna with appellant Harendra Choudhary had taken place. In my view, this date appears to be correct date in view of the other facts available on record. I am further of the view that the difference in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 regarding the date of marriage of Panchratna is immaterial as the same has not been challenged by the defence. So, on the basis of the materials available on record it can be held that in the year, 1998 Panchratna was married to appellant Harendra Choudhary. According to the written report (Ext. 1) of the informant P.W. 3, he got information about the death of his sister for the first time on 21.3.2000 through P.W. 4 and then he along with his parents went to the house of appellant Harendra Choudhary situated in village Udaypur and came to know that on 17.3.2000 the husband and in-laws of Panchratna had killed her by strangulating her neck and thereafter they had cremated her dead body. In support of this case P.W. 1 at para-1 of her deposition has deposed that 6-7 days after Bidagari (Donga) she came to know that the in-laws of her daughter had killed her. She has further deposed that her Samadhi Ram Narayan Choudhary P.W. 4 had informed her about the incident. She has further deposed that on getting the above information, she went to the Sasural of her daughter along with her husband and her son Sriniwas (P.W. 3) and made enquiry about her daughter from her in-laws but they remained mum. She has further deposed that her Samadhi Ram Narayan Choudhary P.W. 4 had informed her about the incident. She has further deposed that on getting the above information, she went to the Sasural of her daughter along with her husband and her son Sriniwas (P.W. 3) and made enquiry about her daughter from her in-laws but they remained mum. She has further deposed that on the next day she along with her sons, Sriniwas and Hiralal Rawani went to Sanjhauli Police Station and gave written report to the police. Corroborating the evidence of P.W. 1, Hiralal Rawani (P.W. 2) has deposed that on getting information about the murder of Panchratna by her inlaws from Ram Narayan Choudhary (P.W. 4), P.W. 3 along with his father and mother (P.W. 1) proceeded to the Sasural of Panchratna where they got information that Panchratna had been killed by strangulation by her in-laws. He has also corroborated this fact that on the next day he along with Sriniwas (P.W. 3) and his mother P.W. 1 went to Sanjhauli P.S. where Sriniwas gave written report drafted by him. P.W. 3, who is the own brother of the deceased as well as the informant of this case, has deposed in paragraph 2 of his deposition that after 56 days of Bidagari of his sister, Ram Narayan Singh P.W. 4 informed him that Panchratna had died. He has further deposed that on getting the above information he along with his father and mother went to the Sasural of his sister situated in village Udaypur and made enquiry from Hiralal, Harendra Choudhary, mother of Harendra and sister of Harendra about the death of Panchratna but they all remained mum, and somehow he came to know that Panchratna had been killed by strangulation. He has also corroborated the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that on the next day all the three persons went to Sanjhauli Police Station and gave written report (Ext. 1) in the P.S. Thus, the above evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 fully supports the prosecution case that Panchratna died in her Sasural within two years of her marriage what to say, within seven years of her marriage. 18. 1) in the P.S. Thus, the above evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 fully supports the prosecution case that Panchratna died in her Sasural within two years of her marriage what to say, within seven years of her marriage. 18. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that they got information that Panchratna had been killed in her Sasural is inadmissible in the eye of law as P.W. 4 Ram Narayan Singh in his evidence has denied to have sent any such information to P.Ws. 1 and 3 regarding the murder of Panchratna. He Submitted that if this evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 is held to be inadmissible in the eye of law then there remains no legal evidence on record to hold that Panchratna had been killed by her husband and in-laws in her Sasural. It is true that P.WA has not supported this fact in his evidence that he had informed P.Ws. 1 and 3 that Panchratan had been killed in her Sasural by her in-laws, as such, I find no difficulty in holding that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 that they received information from P.WA that Panchratna had been killed by her husband and her in-laws is definitely inadmissible in the eye of law. But on this ground alone, the entire evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 regarding death of Panchratna in her Sasural cannot be thrown out as both the witnesses have deposed that after getting the above information they themselves went to the Sasural of Panchratna and made enquiry about the death of Panchratan from both the appellants as well as from other in-laws of Panchratna but they all remained mum. I have no hesitation in holding that the above evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 which is based on their personal knowledge about the death of Panchratna is admissible in the eye of law and from that evidence it can be easily inferred that the death of Panchratna had occurred in her Sasural otherwise than under normal circumstances inspite of the fact that there is no direct evidence that Panchratna had been killed by her in-laws. Accordingly, I hold that from the above evidence it is established beyond doubt that Panchratna had died in her Sasural within seven years of her marriage and her death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. Accordingly, I hold that from the above evidence it is established beyond doubt that Panchratna had died in her Sasural within seven years of her marriage and her death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. 19. The next point to be considered in this case is that soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty/hearassment in connection with the demand of dowry by her husband and her inlaws. In this regard, once again I would like to refer the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3. P.W. 1, who is the mother of the deceased, has deposed that when after three months of her marriage Pancharatna came to her Naihar she told her that in-laws used to torture her as they were demanding Pari and T.V. She has also deposed that Panchratna had also stated that they (her husband and in-laws) had given threat that if Pari and T.V. were not given in dowry, they would kill her. She has again deposed that when appellants Harendra and Hiralal Choudhary both came to her house for Bidagari (Donga) they had made demand of T.V. and Pari in dowry and on refusal by the deceased's father, they had not taken dinner in the night. This evidence of P.W. 1 was corroborated by P.W. 2 who has deposed that at the time of Bidagari appellants Hiralal Choudhary and Harendra had put up demand of T.V. and Pari and since the demand was not fulfilled they refused to take dinner in the night. P.W.3, who is the informant, has also supported this fact in his evidence and has deposed that the appellants had refused to take meal in his house as demand of T.V. and Pari was not fulfilled. He has further deposed that when at the time of Rukhsadi his sister was weeping appellant Hiralal threatened her that she would not be allowed to come to village Dhauni again. The above evidence of the prosecution witnesses fully establishes that soon before the death of Panchratna the appellants had raised the demand of Pari and T.V. by way of dowry and appellant Hiralal had given threat to the deceased that she would not be allowed to come to village Dhauni (her Naihar) again. This evidence itself establishes that Panchratna was subjected to cruelty/harassment on account of non-fulfilment of demand of Pari and T.V. in dowry. This evidence itself establishes that Panchratna was subjected to cruelty/harassment on account of non-fulfilment of demand of Pari and T.V. in dowry. Cruelty has been explained under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code in the following words "Cruelty means-any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman." In my view, the threat given by the appellants at the time of Donga that in case of non-fulfilment of demand of T.V. and Pari, Panchratna would not be allowed to come to her Naihar again amounts to cruelty as it is a wilful conduct on the part of the appellants to keep her under mental and physical torture. Thus, from the evidence and the materials available on record it is established beyond doubt that soon before the death of Panchratna the appellants had raised the demand of Pari and T.V. by way of dowry and due to non-fulfilment of demand of dowry, Panchratna was subjected to cruelty by her husband and her in-laws. 20. During the course of argument, the defence counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court given in the case of Ranjeet Singh Vs. The State of Bihar reported in 2004 (3) PLJR 100, Relying upon the decision, the learned defence counsel has submitted that in a case under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, there should be nexus between the death of the deceased and dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her and if interval between dowry related time and death happens to be wide enough, that would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that demand was the immediate cause of death. I am of the view that the decision cited above will not apply in this case because in that case it was found that interval between the demand of dowry and death of the deceased was wide enough and the same was not covering the words "soon before her death". I am of the view that the decision cited above will not apply in this case because in that case it was found that interval between the demand of dowry and death of the deceased was wide enough and the same was not covering the words "soon before her death". But here in this case there is close proximity between the demand of dowry and death of the deceased, Panchratna as only about a week back at the time of Donga both the appellants had put forward the demand of Pari and T.V. which could not be met by the parents of the deceased and so, I hold that the decision referred by the learned defence counsel does not apply in this case. 21. It has been argued on behalf of the defence that there is specific case of the prosecution that the deceased Panchratna had been burnt to death by her in-laws in her Sasural but the prosecution has entirely failed to prove this part of the story that the deceased had been burnt to death in her Sasural by her in-laws and not a single eye-witness has come forward to depose that he had seen the occurrence. Even the Investigating Officer (P.W. 5) has not deposed that he had found any evidence of causing death of Panchratna by setting her on fire at the place of occurrence. The learned defence counsel submitted that since the prosecution has failed to prove the murder of Panchratna by setting her on fire, as such, the appellants conviction under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code is bad in law. In reply to this argument of the learned defence counsel, I would like to say that in a case under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, it is not necessary to prove in what manner and how the victim was killed. The only thing which the prosecution has to establish is that the death of the victim had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The only thing which the prosecution has to establish is that the death of the victim had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. Here, in this case the prosecution has been able to establish that deceased Panchratna died in her Sasural otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years (within two years) of her marriage and soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty as the demand of T.V. and Pari in dowry was not fulfilled. In such view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the above argument of the learned defence counsel has got no merit so far as this case is concerned and I hold that the prosecution has been able to prove all the three ingredients necessary to prove the charge under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code against both the appellants. 22. Both the appellants also stand charged under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code for causing disappearance of the dead body of the deceased Panchratna in order to screen themselves from legal punishment but in this regard again there is no direct evidence on record. However, there is circumstantial evidence that when P.Ws. 1 and 3 went to the house of appellant Harendra Choudhary they did not find Panchratna there alive and on query about her death, the appellants did not give any reply. This circumstance fully establishes that after committing the offence of dowry death, the appellants had caused disappearance of the dead body of Panchratna in order to screen themselves from legal punishment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code against both the appellants. 23. On the basis of the above discussions and on careful scrutiny of the materials available on record, I have come to the conclusion that both the appellants have rightly been convicted under Sections 304B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and there is no need of any interference in the judgment of the learned Trial Court. 24. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and hence, the same is hereby dismissed. 24. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and hence, the same is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed against both the appellants are hereby confirmed and upheld. Appellant No. 2 Hiralal Choudhary is on bail, as such his bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the Trial Court to serve out the remaining period of sentence.