S. R. NAYAK, J. ,, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the order of the Central Administrative tribunal, Bangalore Bench, Bangalore (for short, 'the Tribunal'), dated 31st March, 1995 passed in Original Application No. 2100 of 1995. In o. A. No. 2100 of 1995 filed by the petitioner herein, he sought for the following reliefs:" (i) to issue a writ of certiorari or order or direction or any other writ, quashing the order F. No. 222 (14)/1995-96/ccit/vol. VIII, dated 26-5-1995 (Annexure-C) of the Board and order dated 31-3-1998 in O. A. No. 2100 of 1995 (Annexure-D) of the Central Administrative Tribunal rejecting the claim of the petitioner as illegal and unjust; (ii) to direct the respondents to step up the pay of the petitioner on par with that of his junior with effect from the date the junior got the higher pay i. e. , 16-8-1979; (iii) to grant him all consequential benefits including upward revision of retiral benefits; (iv) to award exemplary costs of the petition; (v) to pass such orders as the Hon'ble Court deems fit and expedient in the facts and circumstances of the case". The Tribunal has dismissed the O. A. and while doing so, it has observed that the petitioner has not made out that he is entitled to the stepping up of his pay under any of the Government orders or statutory provisions. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as follows.- the petitioner after due selection joined the services of the income-tax Department as Second Division Clerk with effect from 22-2-1956 in the then scale of pay of Rs. 60-130. Thereafter, he was promoted as Upper Division Clerk on 8-7-1963 in the scale of Rs. 130-300, as Head Clerk with effect from 5-2-1971, as Income-tax inspector with effect from 19-4-1971 and as Income-tax Officer with effect from 28-6-1982 and retired on superannuation with effect from 30-4-1988. The petitioner had a junior, K. S. Sathyadharma by name, who was an Upper Division Clerk with effect from 1-6-1965 and became a Stenographer (OG) on 18-3-1964. K. S. Sathyadharma was further promoted as Tax Assistant with effect from 15-5-1978, as Head Clerk with effect from 22-6-1979 and as Inspector with effect from 16-8-1979. The petitioner had a junior, K. S. Sathyadharma by name, who was an Upper Division Clerk with effect from 1-6-1965 and became a Stenographer (OG) on 18-3-1964. K. S. Sathyadharma was further promoted as Tax Assistant with effect from 15-5-1978, as Head Clerk with effect from 22-6-1979 and as Inspector with effect from 16-8-1979. The petitioner was promoted to the cadre of Inspector from the post of head Clerk while his Junior K. S. Sathyadharma passed through the intermediary cadre of Tax Assistant from which cadre he was promoted as Head Clerk and then as Tax Inspector in due course. It is the case of petitioner that he could not pass through the intermediary cadre as he was already promoted to the cadre of Head Clerk and as a result, the pay of the junior became more than his pay. On 21-6-1979, the pay of the petitioner was Rs. 620/- while that of the junior K. S. Sathyadharma was rs. 600/ -. But, on 16-8-1979 when his junior was promoted as Inspector, the junior's pay was Rs. 680/- while that of the petitioner who was already promoted as Inspector was only Rs. 620/ -. This reduced pay was subsequently reflected at the time of revision of pay scales from 1-1-1986 and that disparity continued to be reflected throughout. According to the petitioner, certain members of the cadre moved this Court challenging the unintended benefit accruing under the rules to the juniors and sought for similar benefit to them also and, eventually, on the judgment handed down by this Court in those writ petitions, the CBDT itself issued orders in letter No. F. B. 12014/5/92ad. X, dated 13-5-1992 directing the authorities to remove the anomaly and to step up the pay of the seniors on par with that of the juniors. After the issuance of the above letter dated 13-5-1992 containing instructions, the petitioner applied for the benefit of stepping up his pay. He was informed vide communication F. No. 222 (14) 1995-96/ccit/vol. VIII, dated 26-5-1995 that in view of the Zonal Accounts Officer's observation, the claim of the petitioner was rejected. Being aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner instituted O. A. No. 2100 of 1995 in the Tribunal. He was informed vide communication F. No. 222 (14) 1995-96/ccit/vol. VIII, dated 26-5-1995 that in view of the Zonal Accounts Officer's observation, the claim of the petitioner was rejected. Being aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner instituted O. A. No. 2100 of 1995 in the Tribunal. Before the tribunal, on behalf of the petitioner, it was urged that if the petitioner senior were to receive less salary than the compared junior, his pay has to be stepped up. The Tribunal, both on the ground of limitation and on merit, dismissed the application. ( 3 ) WE have heard Sri T. R. Sridhar, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri M. S. Padmarajaiah, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. Sri Sridhar would contend that the question of limitation does not arise in the present case because fixation of pay is a perpetual recurring cause of action and no limitation would be applicable to determine the claim. According to the learned Counsel, the limitation would apply only for payment of arrears which should be restricted to three years prior to the date of approaching the Tribunal. Attacking the impugned judgment of the Tribunal with regard to merit, Sri Sridhar would contend that when a junior passes through the intermediary cadre or gets benefit of special pay for having worked in the special pay post which benefit has been denied to the seniors for no fault on their part and as a result the junior in subsequent promotion gets higher pay, the pay of the senior should be stepped up on par with that of the junior and that is exactly the intendment of the instructions contained in the O. M. dated 13-5-1992. ( 4 ) SRI M. S. Padmarajaiah, learned Senior Standing Counsel, per contra, while supporting the impugned judgment of the Tribunal would maintain that the instructions/guidelines contained in O. M. dated 13-5- 1992 have no application to the facts of the case because, the compared junior, namely, K. S. Sathyadharma, could not have drawn higher pay than the petitioner but for the merger of two kinds of special pay. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels for the parties the only thing to be seen by us is whether the impugned order of the Tribunal could be faulted with on any permissible ground? ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels for the parties the only thing to be seen by us is whether the impugned order of the Tribunal could be faulted with on any permissible ground? The facts disclosed in the case would show that the petitioner passed through the posts of Lower division Clerk, Upper Division Clerk, Head Clerk, Income-tax Inspector and Income-tax Officer, whereas the compared junior, namely, K. S. Sathyadharma had passed through the posts of Lower Division Clerk with Special pay of Rs. 20/-; Stenographer (OG), Upper Division Clerk, tax Assistant, Head Clerk, Income-tax Inspector and Income-tax officer. The petitioner had joined the service as Lower Division Clerk, whereas the compared junior joined service as Lower Division Clerk with special pay of Rs. 20/- and was later promoted as Stenographer (OG) on 18-3-1964. Subsequently, the compared Junior opted for Upper division Clerk grade on 21-6-1965. The pay of the petitioner and that of the compared junior as on that date was Rs. 154/- and Rs. 155/- respectively. In other words, the compared junior was drawing more pay in the lower cadre of Upper Division Clerk itself. It needs to be noticed that the lower posts held by the petitioner and that of the compared junior were separate and not identical. The anomaly in the pay between the two was for the reason that the compared junior got the merger pay of Rs. 20/- and Rs. 35/- on his promotion as Stenographer (OG) on 18-3-1964 and Tax Assistant on 15-5-1978 respectively, in addition to availing of the benefit of FR 22-C in pay fixation on promotion as Tax assistant. As such, the petitioner does not satisfy the conditions laid down in the O. M. dated 4-2-1966 of the Ministry of Finance, government of India. ( 6 ) BY O. M. dated 13-5-1992, the department has given guidelines as to how the anomaly in fixation of pay resulting in junior drawing higher pay than his senior or promotion as Income-tax Inspector should be set right. The relevant portion of the said O. M. reads as follows.-". . . . ( 6 ) BY O. M. dated 13-5-1992, the department has given guidelines as to how the anomaly in fixation of pay resulting in junior drawing higher pay than his senior or promotion as Income-tax Inspector should be set right. The relevant portion of the said O. M. reads as follows.-". . . . the question of removal of anomaly in the fixation of pay where a junior person on his promotion as Income-tax Inspector gets higher pay than a senior person, because of the application of fr 22 (C) on his promotion at each intermediate level, has been considered in consultation with the Department of Personnel and training. In supersession of all the previous instructions issued on this subject, it has been decided that such anomaly in fixation of pay may be removed by stepping up the pay of a senior person equal to the level of junior person provided: (a) the compared junior should have been qualified fully for the post of Inspector at the time when the senior is promoted directly as Inspector; and (b) the junior should have been promoted in the intermediate grades in the intervening period". The O. M. dated 13-5-1992 speaks of anomaly in fixation of pay because of the application of FR 22-C. In the present case, the compared junior could not have drawn higher pay than the petitioner, but for the merger of two kinds of special pay. In order to apply the instructions contained in O. M. dated 13-5-1992 the anomaly complained of should be directly as a result of the application of FR 22-C. If, in the lower post, the junior officer draws from time to time a higher rate of pay than the senior by virtue of grant of advance increments, the O. M. dated 13-5-1992 cannot be invoked to step up the pay of the senior officer. In taking this opinion, we are fortified by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another v R. Swaminathan. Therefore, we find merit in the contention of Sri M. S. Padmarajaiah that the O. M. dated 13-5-1992 is not applicable to the petitioner's case. It needs to be noticed that the anomaly in pay vis-a-vis the compared junior is an anomaly which had arisen at the time of his promotion as Upper division Clerk itself. Therefore, we find merit in the contention of Sri M. S. Padmarajaiah that the O. M. dated 13-5-1992 is not applicable to the petitioner's case. It needs to be noticed that the anomaly in pay vis-a-vis the compared junior is an anomaly which had arisen at the time of his promotion as Upper division Clerk itself. This position is subsequently reflected in the pay when the petitioner and the compared junior become Income-tax inspectors. It is satisfactorily established that even as Upper Division clerk, the compared junior had received a higher pay. The career profiles noticed above would indicate the differences in the pay of the petitioner and the compared junior. ( 7 ) THE O. M. dated 13-5-1992 only speaks of removal of anomaly arising in pay fixation because of the direct application of FR 22-C and that anomaly arising on account of merger of special pay with basic pay is outside the scope of the O. M. dated 13-5-1992. In the result, we cannot take any exception to the impugned order of the Tribunal refusing to grant the relief to the petitioner. ( 8 ) WE are also of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief on the ground of delay and laches also. The facts stated supra would disclose that the cause of action for the grievance of the petitioner arose as far back as on 21-6-1965 when the compared junior opted for Upper Division Clerk's grade. As on that date, the pay of the petitioner was Rs. 154/- whereas the pay of the compared junior was rs. 155/ -. The petitioner was not given the benefit of stepping up contemplated by FR 22-C read with the instructions issued by the government of India in that regard. The petitioner having been deprived of that benefit with effect from 21-6-1965 ought not to have slept over his alleged right and ought to have agitated grievance within a reasonable time. 155/ -. The petitioner was not given the benefit of stepping up contemplated by FR 22-C read with the instructions issued by the government of India in that regard. The petitioner having been deprived of that benefit with effect from 21-6-1965 ought not to have slept over his alleged right and ought to have agitated grievance within a reasonable time. In this regard, it is relevant to note that in the order dated 31st July, 1998 passed in O. A. No. 870 of 1996 filed by the very petitioner, the Tribunal had observed that the petitioner has not even alleged that he was unaware that the pay drawn by the junior was more than his pay, or specified as to when he came to know about the junior official getting more pay than him, and that the petitioner should have been diligent and approached the Tribunal within a reasonable time. In the above premise, the Tribunal rejected the application of the petitioner by observing that the claims of the petitioner over two decades old could not be entertained by ignoring serious lapses on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the claim put forth by the petitioner at a belated stage is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches also, if not on merit. ( 9 ) IN the result and for the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed, however, with no order as to costs. --- *** --- .