Judgment :- (1.) This is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the petitioner praying for condonation of delay of 39 days in filing the appeal being CRA No. 306 of 2001. (2.) Mr. Ranjan Roy, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that in Special Case No. 6/1990 arising out of RC 12/85 dated 20.2.1987 of C. B.I./ S.P.E./Cal, the Learned Judge, First Special Court, Alipore by judgment and order dated 25.1.2001 acquitted the accused opposite parties. The petitioner challenging the said judgment and order of acquittal has filed the appeal. There was 39 days delay in filing the appeal and grounds of delay has been explained in paragraph 11 of the application. The grounds mentioned in the said paragraph 11 would reveal that as it was an appeal by organisation of Government and the matter passed through different tables and officers, delay was inevitable and beyond the control of petitioner. In matter of State when it passes through different departments and machinery some delay is expected. In the instant matter the petitioner has been able to make out sufficient cause for the delay which prevented it in filing the appeal in time. (3.) Mr. Roy further submitted the expression "sufficient cause" should be contrued liberally with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than technical considerations. The factors which are peculiar too and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions require adoption of pragmatic approach and Court decide the matter on merit, and the delay should be condoned. In support of his contention Mr. Roy referred to the decisions reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , AIR 2000 SC 2306 , AIR 1996 SC 2750 , AIR 1996 SC 1623 and AIR SC 897. (4.) Mr. Subir Banerjee learned Advocate for the accused opposite parties submitted that delay has not been explained properly. No explanation of delay between the dates as disclosed in Clauses (d), (e) and (f) in paragraph 11 has been explained. The said Clauses of paragraph 11 do not at all explain properly the cause of delay. The Clauses (g) and (h) of paragraph 11 also do not explain properly the delay between the dates as mentioned in those clauses. There is no material at all in the appeal itself. The said Clauses of paragraph 11 do not at all explain properly the cause of delay. The Clauses (g) and (h) of paragraph 11 also do not explain properly the delay between the dates as mentioned in those clauses. There is no material at all in the appeal itself. The petitioner failed to produce sufficient and some important witnesses before the concerned Court as a result of which there was order of acquittal. The accused opposite parties have retired in the meantime and they should not be called again in the appeal. There is no merit at all in the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The Court must be impartial and should not favour the petitioner as it is one of the wings of Government. Being a Government concern, the petitioner is not entitled to have any extra advantage. When the petitioner has failed to explain the causes of delay in filing the appeal, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be dismissed. In support of his condonation Mr. Banerjee cited a decision reported in (1993)1 Cal LT (Cal) 132. (5.) I have duly considered the submissions of the learned Advocates of the parties. It appears that petitioner, that is, Central Bureau of Investigation wants to prefer appeal being CRA No. 306 of 2001 assailant the order of acquittal dated 25.1.2001 passed by the Learned Judge, First Special Court, Alipore. The application for condonation of delay reveals that the petitioner filed the application for obtaining certified copy of the judgment on 31.1.2001 and petitioner received certified copy of the order on 30.3.2001. On 4.4.2001 the Public Prosecutor, C.B.I., Anti Corruption Branch submitted opinion to the Senior Public Prosecutor of C.B.I. Anti Corruption Branch Calcutta and on 10.4.2001 the senior Public Prosecutor submitted his comments. Thereafter on 30.5.2001, the Deputy Legal Adviser C.B.I. held discussion with the Public Prosecutor and gave his opinion, and thereafter, on 8.6.2001 the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.B.I., went through the file and after his opinion forwarded the file to the Additional Director, C.B.I. Calcutta. On 19.6.2001, the Additional Director, C.B.I. forwarded the file with his note of approval to the Deputy Inspector General, C.B.I. and on some date the said file was received by the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. Anti Corruption Branch Calcutta. On 19.6.2001, the Additional Director, C.B.I. forwarded the file with his note of approval to the Deputy Inspector General, C.B.I. and on some date the said file was received by the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. Anti Corruption Branch Calcutta. The Inspector, C.B.I. High Court at Calcutta on 19.6.2001 was instructed to approach the Special Public Prosecutor, C.B.I. for consultation. On 20.6.2001 the papers were forwarded to Mr. Ranjan Kumar Roy, the Special Public Prosecutor C.B.I. High Court at Calcutta for preparation of the draft copy for approval and he instructed the Inspector B. K. Mitra to collect and forward certain documents. On 28.6.2001 the documents were handed over to Mr. Ranjan Kumar Roy, the Special Public Prosecutor for taking necessary steps. On 4.7.2001 the draft copy of the revisional application and application for condonation of delay were forwarded to the petitioner through Inspector. On 24.4.2001 the appeal, application for stay and application for condonation of delay were returned to Mr. Ranjan Kumar Roy, the Special Public Prosecutor of C.B.I, for correction and approval. On 27.4.2001 the appeal, application for stay and application for condonation of delay were finally engrossed and typed and on 30.7.2001 the appeal, stay application and the present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay were affirmed and filed. The different stages mentioned above for preparation of the appeal and the application have been stated in several clauses namely (a to q) of paragraph 11 of the present application. (6.) It is admitted that the petitioner is Central Bureau of Investigation, a wing of the Central Government. Petitioner itself is abstract object and not a private individual and living human and, naturally the office of the petitioner is being looked into and run by different persons. It is well-known that in a matter concerning Government a single individual on his own cannot take any decision. The learned Public Prosecutor who was conducting the case in the Trial Court would give his opinion to the Special Public Prosecutor and the Special Public Prosecutor in his turn will communicate the matter to the legal adviser of C.B.I. The legal adviser of C.B.I. will then move the matter to the higher rank official namely Superintendent of Police and he will bring it to the notice of next higher rank of Police Officer namely. Deputy Inspector General of Police for his opinion and approval, and finally matter would be placed to the Additional Director or Director of C.B.I. for final approval as to whether opinion of preferring appeal has to be acceded to or not. In that process the concerned file passes through different departments, different officers and, it is well-known that it takes time to move a file from one Government Department to another Government Department. In that process considerable length of period is consumed in taking the final decision. Accordingly in a matter of Government, certain amount of latitude is permissible, The words or the expression "sufficient cause" should not be considered with pedantic approach and in a matter concerning Government, pragmatic approach requires to be taken for the ends of justice. (7.) The Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji reported in AlR 1987 SC 1353 observed that, "Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that the cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties". In the same decision the Apex Court further held that, "When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay". The Supreme Court further held that, "It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical ground but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so". The Supreme Court also observed that Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, and every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner". (8.) In Radha Krishna Rai v. Allahabad Bank reported in (2000)9 SCC 733 the Supreme Court condoned delay of 1418 days in preferring the appeal. In M. K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam reported in (2001)6 SCC 176 Supreme Court condoned delay of 554 days in filing application for setting aside ex parte decree. (8.) In Radha Krishna Rai v. Allahabad Bank reported in (2000)9 SCC 733 the Supreme Court condoned delay of 1418 days in preferring the appeal. In M. K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam reported in (2001)6 SCC 176 Supreme Court condoned delay of 554 days in filing application for setting aside ex parte decree. (9.) In the decisions cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner namely State of Bihar v. Kameswar Prasad Singh reported in AIR 2000 SC 2306 ; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma reported in AIR 1996 SC 2750 ; State of Haryana v. Chandra Man; reported in AIR 1996 SC 1623 and G. Ramegowda v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 1988 SC 897 the Supreme Court explained the similar views. In Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala (Supra) the Supreme Court observed that in matter of transaction of business of Government being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. In such a matter insistence upon explaining every days delay by Court would be improper. In State of Haryana v. Chand Mani (Supra) the same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court by observing that, in view of the fact that Government is an impersonal machinery and decisions are taken at slow pace certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. (10.) The legal position is clear in view of the aforesaid decisions. The principle pronounced by this Court in (1993)1 Cal LT 132 is accordingly not properly applicable in the instant matter. I am satisfied that petitioner has been able to explain properly the delay which prevented it in preferring the appeal in time and paragraph 11 of the application is sufficient to explain causes of delay. The vehement objection raised by the accused opposite parties are not acceptable and their contention that delay was not explained, is not acceptable to this Court and their objection is accordingly rejected. Since the petitioner has been able to explain the delay, of 39 days or 71 days as stated in the application which prevented it from preferring appeal in time, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. (11.) The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act being CRAN No. 772 of 2001 is accordingly allowed and disposed of. Since the petitioner has been able to explain the delay, of 39 days or 71 days as stated in the application which prevented it from preferring appeal in time, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. (11.) The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act being CRAN No. 772 of 2001 is accordingly allowed and disposed of. (12.) Let the matter now appear under the heading admission of appeal along with leave of the Court to prefer appeal. Later : (13.) After delivery of Judgment, learned Advocate for the petitioner prayed for certified copy of this order. (14.) Accordingly, Criminal Section is directed to supply the certified copy of this order, if applied for to the learned Advocate for the petitioner expeditiously.