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2005 DIGILAW 615 (MAD)

M. R. Natarajan v. State by CBI SPE/EOW, Chennai

2005-04-08

M.THANIKACHALAM

body2005
Judgment :- The accused in C.C.No.5/1997 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, CBI Cases, Chennai, unable to resist the case successfully, received a conviction, followed by sentence and the result is this appeal. 2. The facts leading to the final report ending in conviction are in brief as follows: (a) The appellant/accused was functioning as Officer in Foreign Exchange Department, Bank of India, Main Branch, during the period January to March 1981 at Madras. (b) M/s. Chunder and Sons, Madras was having official dealings as Foreign Exchange Broker with the above said bank. Thiru Venkatesh (P.W.1) was working as Agent in M/s. Chunder and Sons, Madras, in which P.W.7 was also working as Assistant along with P.W.2. P.W.8, Anantha Krishnan is the brother of P.W.7. In M/s. Chunder & Sons, in 1981, P.W.9 Rajendran was working as a Part-time Accountant. P.W.5 is the son of the accused. P.W.4 is the General Manager of Bank of India, under whom the accused was working as said above. (c) On the basis of the complaint given by one C.S. Santhanam, Zonal Manager, Bank of India against the accused appellant and another, P.W.11 registered a case under Ex.P.11 for the alleged offences under Section 120-B r/w 420, 420, 467, 468 and 477-A I.P.C. The investigation in this case revealed that an Godrej Almirah (Seconds) Storewell Model-II worth Rs.1656/- was obtained by the accused, for which the payment was made by M/s.Chunder & Sons, for promoting their business. Further investigation, search of the house of the accused, recovery of the said Almirah, revealed that the accused/appellant had received illegal gratification by way of the above said material, abusing his official position, probably to help M/s. Chunder & Sons in their business and in this way, it was decided by the investigating officer, P.W.11 that the accused had committed an offence, as far as this case is concerned, under Section 5(2) r/w 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act'), for which collecting the required materials, examining the witnesses etc., he laid the final report before the Court concerned. (d) The learned trial Judge, after framing the charge against the accused under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act punishable under Section 5(2) of the Act, questioned the accused, for which the accused refused to plead guilty. (d) The learned trial Judge, after framing the charge against the accused under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act punishable under Section 5(2) of the Act, questioned the accused, for which the accused refused to plead guilty. (e) The prosecution, in order to substantiate the charge against the accused, had examined as many as 11 witnesses, seeking aid from 12 documents, supported by two material objects, which are sought to be nullified by the accused by the examination of one witness as D.W.1, seeking strength from Ex.D.1 (f) The learned trial Judge, weighing the evidence and analysing the case, applying the principles of law, came to the conclusion, that the accused/appellant, who was a public servant, on demand, obtained the Godrej Bureau from M/s. Chunder & Sons, in order to help them in the promotion of their business and the said act would attract 'abuse of official position' as contemplated under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act and that the attempt of the accused to prove that he had paid the cash for the purchase of Almirah, by producing Ex.D1 was an after thought, since it was established that the said document was prepared at later point of time, in order to escape from the offences committed by him. Thus taking the view, concluding that the prosecution had established the case, whereas the accused failed to explain the possession of the almirah, which was purchased in the name of M/s. Chunder & Sons, slapped the conviction against the accused/appellant and punished him to undergo imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, which are sought to be assailed in this appeal. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.S. Vijayakumar and the learned Special Public Prosecutor, Mr. N. Chandrasekaran for the respondent. 4. Section 5(1)(d) of the Act defining 'criminal misconduct', mandates, if any public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, he shall be punished with the imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 5. 5. It is the case of the prosecution, that the accused/appellant being a public servant, abused his position as public servant and in this way, obtained for himself a Godrej Almirah from M/s. Chunder and Sons, which act should come within in the ambit of the above said Section, warranting conviction, which was accepted by the trial Court. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted, that there is no acceptable and unassailable evidence to show, that the accused appellant abused his position as public servant, demanded and obtained any valuable thing from P.W.1, and in the absence of such material, the conviction slapped upon the accused appellant is not sustainable legally, that the accused appellant had paid a sum of Rs.1600/- for the purchase of Almirah through M/s. Chunder & Sons, since they had connection with the Godrej Bureau Company, which may not amount to abuse of his position as public servant, which is also supported by Ex.D1, not properly considered by the trial Court and that in order to sustain a conviction, there must be proper, and valid sanction as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act, which is absent in this case, not properly considered by the learned trial Judge. On the above points, elaborating the same, seeking aid from the evidence, as well as from the legal precedents, a strenuous argument was made for the release of the accused from the clutches of Section 5(1)(d) r/w 5(2) of the Act. 7. The learned Special Public Prosecutor, while opposing the above said submission would contend, that in this case, it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt, that the petitioner had obtained a valuable thing from P.W.1 viz., Godrej Bureau, for which the amount also emanated only from M/s. Chunder and Sons, for which the accused cannot claim as if he had paid the amount since Ex.D1 was prepared at a later point of time, which will not shadow the materials collected by the prosecution, that the sanction issued by P.W.4, who is the competent authority, to remove the accused from the service is perfectly valid, since while sanctioning, he had applied his mind, as disclosed in the sanction order itself. In this view, according to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the reasonings assigned by the trial Court, for slapping the conviction, are well sustainable and the interference of this Court is not at all necessary. 8. In this view, according to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the reasonings assigned by the trial Court, for slapping the conviction, are well sustainable and the interference of this Court is not at all necessary. 8. From the submissions of either counsel and by going through the materials, the points that arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the accused/appellant had abused his position as public servant and obtained the Godrej Bureau (M.O.1) from M/s. Chunder and Sons. If so, whether it amounts to criminal misconduct. (ii) Whether the sanction issued by P.W.4 is proper and valid. 9. The accused appellant was working as officer in Foreign Exchange Department of Bank of India Main Branch between January and March 1981 at Madras. One M/s. Chunder and Sons, Madras was having official dealings as Foreign Exchange Broker with the Bank of India, Madras Main Branch. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused appellant demanded a Godrej Almirah from M/s. Chunder and Sons and in pursuance of that demand, M/s. Chunder & Sons had purchased a Godrej Bureau for Rs.1656/- and the same was delivered to the accused at his residence, which was acknowledged by his son Suresh (P.W.5) on 14.3.1981. The acceptance of Godrej Bureau, on demand by the accused, according to the prosecution, amounts to criminal misconduct, attracting Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In this way, by filing a final report, proving the offence, the prosecution obtained a conviction, which is challenged in this appeal, as aforementioned. 10. It is an admitted position that the appellant was a public servant as defined under the Act. In this case, it is also proved by the examination of P.Ws.1,2,5,7 & 9 that a Godrej Bureau (M.O.1) was handed over to P.W.5 by P.W.2 on 14.3.1981, as disclosed by Exs.P4 & P5 also. P.W.11 had recovered M.O.1 from the house of the accused is also an admitted fact. For the purchase of M.O.1, Godrej Bureau, it is also an admitted fact, as disclosed by Exs.P1 to P5, that M/s. Chunder & Sons had placed orders for the purchase of Godrej Bureau costing Rs.1656/-. Thus, it is proved by satisfactory evidence, that Godrej Bureau, M.O.1 was purchased by M/s. Chunder & Sons, and the same was handed over to the accused/appellant, where from it was also recovered. Thus, it is proved by satisfactory evidence, that Godrej Bureau, M.O.1 was purchased by M/s. Chunder & Sons, and the same was handed over to the accused/appellant, where from it was also recovered. In view of the above admitted position, as well as the proved fact, in order to attract the offence under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, it must be shown that the accused/appellant, being the public servant, on demand, by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise by abusing his position as public servant, obtained M.O.1, which could be described as valuable thing, as said in Section 5(1)(d) of the Act. Only on the basis of the admitted fact that M.O.1 was recovered from the house of the accused, as well as taking into account that this bureau was purchased in the name of M/s. Chunder and Sons, no presumption could be drawn that the accused/appellant had obtained the said bureau abusing his position as public servant or by corrupt or illegal means, which requires evidence also. In this context, before going into evidence available on record, the legal principles declared by the courts, while interpreting Section 5(1)(d) of the Act has to be remembered. 11. The Apex Court, while construing the words "corrupt" or "illegal means" as well as the word "abuse" occurring in Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, has declared in M. Narayanan v. State of Kerala AIR 1963 SC 1116 as follows: "On a plain reading of the express words used in the clause, we have no doubt that every benefit obtained by a public servant for himself or for any other person by abusing his position as a public servant falls within the mischief of the said clause.", thereby indicating that in order to attract this offence, the main criterion should be, that the public servant should have abused his position as such. Otherwise, the conduct of the accused would not attract Section 5 of the Act. 12. In the State of Gujarat vs. M.P. Dwivedi ( 1972 2 SCC 392 ), the Apex Court reiterating and affirming the decision in Narayanan Nambiyar's case referred supra, has held, that the abuse of position would be the necessary ingredients of the offence; the abuse being either by corrupt or illegal means or by other means of the nature mentioned. 13. 13. In R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala ( 2003 (9) SCC 700 ), the apex Court while considering Section 5 of the Act, has held, the ingredients of the offence are: (i) abuse of position as a public servant; (ii) obtaining for himself or for another any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; and (iii) by corrupt or illegal means. Keeping the above ingredients in mind, it should be found out whether the accused obtained the Godrej Bureau by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise, abusing his possession as public servant. 14. The Apex Court had taken the view in State by Special Police Establishment v. D. Krishnamurthy (1995 Supp (3) SCC 702) that if abuse of position as a public servant is lacking in the prosecution case, then conviction cannot be sustained. In the above ruling, it is observed as follows: "The language of Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is clear and unambiguous in the sense that if a public servant by whatever means, be they corrupt or illegal, obtains for himself or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage must, in any event, for doing so, abuse his position as a public servant. (emphasis supplied) If such abuse of his position as a public servant is lacking in the prosecution case, and there is evidence barely to the effect, that he has by some means, be they illegal or corrupt, obtained for himself or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, that by itself would not be enough." Therefore, in our case, if the accused, who was a public servant had obtained M.O.1 without abusing his position as public servant, independently, not connected with his position, then penal provision under Section 5(1)(d) may not have any enforceability against the accused appellant. 15. In the light of the above principles, the case on hand should be seen, to sustain the conviction. The accused appellant admitting that he had purchased M.O.1 through M/s. Chunder and Sons, took the responsibility on his shoulder, to explain the same, as if he had purchased the bureau utilising the service of P.W.1, who had some connection with the company, having knowledge about the availability of the bureau (seconds) by paying cash. In support of this contention also, Ex.D1 was put into service. 16. In support of this contention also, Ex.D1 was put into service. 16. Ex.D1 is sought to be explained by the prosecution, as if the said document was obtained by the accused from P.W.1, after the search was conducted in the house of the accused and after the recovery of the bureau, probably to escape from the legal punishment. To prove the above aspects, some of the witnesses have also been examined, who had no connection with the documents, being party, in the sense signing therein, though they claim that the documents were prepared in their presence, which I will discuss infra, after assessing the evidence of P.W.1. 17. If a person is said to have committed criminal misconduct by receiving bribe, either in cash or in kind, generally in turn he should have helped the person, who paid the cash or kind. Ordinarily, no person would pay money or any valuable thing to a public servant, when he was discharging his official duty, according to rules and regulations. In order to over come certain provisions, which may be stringent or in order to avoid the delay, or to have easy or quick order, saving time, generally, people are greasing the hands of the Government Official i.e. to say for consideration. Only in this way, the accused is also stand charged, as if he had demanded bribe from P.W.1, in order to help him in the foreign exchange business. If that is so, at least some incident should have been disclosed. But, as seen from the oral evidence of P.W.1, I am unable to find any material, to label the conduct of the accused, as criminal misconduct, that he demanded the bureau in this case, in order to help M/s. Chunder & Sons in their foreign exchange dealings. P.W.1 would state, that the accused demanded a bureau as gift and obliging the same, a Godrej Bureau was given to the accused. It is not the case of P.W.1 or any other witness, including the investigating officer, that by obtaining the bureau, the accused did any favour to M/s. Chunder and Sons, violating the rules and regulations or by-passing the regular procedure, avoiding the delay etc. It is not the case of P.W.1 or any other witness, including the investigating officer, that by obtaining the bureau, the accused did any favour to M/s. Chunder and Sons, violating the rules and regulations or by-passing the regular procedure, avoiding the delay etc. If we look this case from this angle, a doubt should arise, whether by abusing his position as public servant, the accused would have obtained the Godrej Bureau, thereby bringing that conduct within the definition of criminal misconduct. Assuming that the accused requested P.W.1 for a bureau, it is only as a gift, not as illegal gratification or by corrupt or illegal means or abusing his position as public servant. If it is to be held, that the accused/appellant had abused his position as public servant, then as said supra, he should have helped M/s. Chunder & Sons in someway in the sales and purchase of foreign currencies, which is not the case, as seen from the evidence. Therefore, in the absence of materials, that the accused abused his official position, by doing any favour, then obtaining the valuable thing, it is hard and difficult to rope in the accused under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, as rightly claimed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance upon the decisions quoted above. 18. On behalf of the prosecution, to prove that the amount for the purchase of Godrej Bureau emanated from M/s. Chunder & Sons, much reliance is placed upon Ex.P.2 as well as the oral evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.9. Ex.P2 is the entry in a note book said to have been maintained by M/s. Chunder & Sons, for the disbursement of petty cash. Ex.P.2 says: under the heading "business promotion" - cost of one Almirah to clients - Rs.1656. This account is written on 10.3.1981. As seen from Ex.P.1, only on 10.3.1981, an order was placed for the purchase of Godrej Bureau to be delivered to the accused, since his address is also given therein. Thus, connecting Exs.P.1 & P.2 coupled with the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 & 9, it was urged that the amount should have emanated from M/s. Chunder & sons and the beneficiary being the accused, since the bureau was delivered in his house, it should be presumed or assumed that only by abusing his official position, the accused had obtained this bureau. If Ex.P.2 is the entry written, during the usual course of day-to-day business, that too being the petty cash book, as and when amounts were paid, then taking the same as authenticated one, unquestionably, a conclusion could be drawn, as if for the purchase of the bureau, M/s. Chunder & Sons had paid the amount. In this case, though there are some evidence, leading to some probabilities, in my consideration, the evidence is not with certainty, warranting to say, that the accused abused his position and in that course, M/s. Chunder & Sons were compelled to part away with Rs.1656/- for the purchase of Godrej Bureau. 19. In order to disbelieve Ex.P.2 entry and to spread a cloud of shadow, the learned counsel for the accused drew my attention to the oral evidence of P.W.1, who said that from 8.1.1981 alone, M/s.Chunder and Sons Branch Office was opened at Madras, thereby showing prior to that, there was no branch office at Madras. This being the admitted position, if Ex.P.2 has to be accepted, it should have the entries only on and from 8.1.1981. But unfortunately, in the book, which contains Ex.P.2, there are entries, starting from 29.11.1980, thereby showing, this petty cash book may not be the cash book maintained by M/s. Chunder & Sons in the ordinary course of business, which could be further inferred from the manner it was written, coupled with the oral evidence of P.W.9. 20. A cursory look of this Petty Cash Book would indicate, that all the entries were made or written on the same day. The Part-time Accountant, who claims so, viz., P.W.9, would state that he had written the day book, bank account, ledger, etc. on the basis of the receipts handed over to him by P.Ws.1 and 7. Though P.W.9 had stated, that only on seeing the receipt for the purchase of Almirah for Rs.1656/-, he had written Ex.P.2 entry, P.W.9 did not identify any receipt, and none was shown to him. Further, Ex.P.2 also fails to indicate that the purchase of bureau by paying this cash, relates to the bureau recovered from the house of the accused, though it is admitted by the accused, that he had purchased a bureau through P.W.1. Further, Ex.P.2 also fails to indicate that the purchase of bureau by paying this cash, relates to the bureau recovered from the house of the accused, though it is admitted by the accused, that he had purchased a bureau through P.W.1. According to the accused, he had paid the amount and P.W.1 misusing his position, misappropriated that amount and made an entry, as if the company alone had paid the amount, which cannot be so easily eclipsed, since there are materials in support of the same, the further fact being, the oral evidence of P.W.1 itself is not trustworthy. 21. Ex.D1 reads: "Received from M.R.Natarajan of Bank of India, Madras 600001 cash Rs.1600/- for purchasing one Steel Cupboard (Godrej-Seconds)." It is admitted at least at later point of time that P.W.1 had acknowledged the amount by signing. If P.W.1 is a trustworthy witness, when Ex.D1 was shown to him, he should have accepted the same, then ought to have explained, if it had come into existence, after the search made by P.W.11. But as seen from the deposition of P.W.1, when Ex.D1 was shown to him, he had totally denied, saying that receipt was not written by him, in which he had also not signed and the signature found therein, is not his signature. It is an admitted fact, that the son of the accused, who has been examined as P.W.5 alone had received the bureau acknowledging the receipts. When P.W.5 was cross examined, Ex.D1 was shown to him and marked through him, not objected also. P.W.5 had stated that on the information furnished by his father, he came to know that his father has paid a sum of Rs.1600/- for the purchase of Godrej bureau. If really, Ex.D1 was not the receipt issued by P.W.1, the prosecution ought to have objected the same, at least while marking, which is not the case as seen from the deposition. After the examination of P.W.5, it appears, in order to explain the receipt, P.W.1 was recalled on 25.2.1997. Only at that time, P.W.1 had explained as if the accused and P.W.5 came to him, requested a receipt, since police have searched the house of the accused, and seized the bureau. It is also admitted by him, that he had signed in the said receipt, though no amount has been paid. Only at that time, P.W.1 had explained as if the accused and P.W.5 came to him, requested a receipt, since police have searched the house of the accused, and seized the bureau. It is also admitted by him, that he had signed in the said receipt, though no amount has been paid. During the cross examination, when it was questioned as to why he had denied at the first instance, he had stated that without properly verifying the document viz., Ex.D1, he had stated so. The learned trial Judge had observed in the deposition at the time of giving evidence so also. P.W.2 has not seen the receipt viz., Ex.D.1, thereby showing P.W.2 was not speaking the truth regarding Ex.D1, receipt. Therefore, accepting the oral evidence of P.W.1, as if on demand by the accused, by utilising the fund of M/s. Chunder & Sons, he had purchased the bureau and delivered the same to the accused, in my considered opinion, appears to be unsafe, though the delivery is an admitted one. 22. After the examination of P.W.1 and explaining Ex.D1, as if it came into existence after the search and recovery of bureau, to support the said explanation, P.W.7 and P.W.8 have been examined. As per the evidence given by P.W.1, Ex.D1 was prepared on 26.4.1982 in a Hotel called 'Rex Hotel' in the presence of P.Ws.7 & 8. On the other hand, P.W.7 would state that the receipt was prepared on 22.4.1982, whereas P.W.8 would state as if the receipt was prepared, not even identifying Ex.D1, on 26.8.1982. Admittedly, neither P.W.7 nor P.W.8 had signed in Ex.D1, in order to say that they are competent to speak about the preparation of Ex.D1 on the subsequent date. In view of the inconsistent evidence given by these three witnesses, as said supra, it is highly unbelievable that Ex.D1 should have come into existence only after the search and seizure of the bureau by the respondent, in order to escape from the offence committed by the appellant. As adverted already, if Ex.D1 had come into existence as claimed by the prosecution, nothing would have prevented P.W.1 from giving evidence so, while he was examined at the first instance, that too when he was confronted with Ex.D1, during the cross examination. As adverted already, if Ex.D1 had come into existence as claimed by the prosecution, nothing would have prevented P.W.1 from giving evidence so, while he was examined at the first instance, that too when he was confronted with Ex.D1, during the cross examination. In view of the conduct of P.W.1 disowning Ex.D1 totally, at the first instance and after recalling, giving explanation, which is also not supported by P.Ws.7 & 8 to the entire extent, regarding the dates, I am unable to accept the explanation, whereas considering the subsequent admission of P.W.1 regarding the execution and the signature in Ex.D1, I am constrained to hold that P.W.1 should have received the amount from the accused appellant for the purchase of second hand almirah from Godrej Company. P.W.1 though had stated that he has informed about the preparation of Ex.D1, at later point of time, to the investigating officer, it is not so, as seen from the evidence given by the investigating officer, which also would indicate that the explanation offered by P.W.1 must be an after thought. The suggestion thrown on behalf of the accused that P.W.1 misappropriated the amount from the company and in order to escape, he made an entry in Ex.P.2, as if the amount was spent for the purchase of Godrej Bureau, may be true to certain extent or at least the above said conduct of P.W.1 undoubtedly created an indelible doubt in the minds of the Court about the demand, obtaining the bureau by the appellant, abusing his position as public servant, which were not properly considered by the trial Court. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the accused appellant had not obtained M.O.1 from P.W.1 by abusing his official position as public servant, whereas it was obtained through P.W.1 only by paying cash, as evidenced by Ex.D1, though it is not dated. In this view, the criminal misconduct reported against the petitioner is not at all proved beyond all reasonable doubt, warranting any conviction and the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. 23. The learned counsel for the appellant questioned the sanction, labeling the same as invalid, thereby urging that taking cognizance of the offence, itself is bad and in this way, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. 23. The learned counsel for the appellant questioned the sanction, labeling the same as invalid, thereby urging that taking cognizance of the offence, itself is bad and in this way, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. Section 6 of the Act is a bar to take cognizance of an offence punishable under sub-section (2) or sub-section 3(a) of Section 5 of this Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction from the competent person. The competent persons, who are empowered to grant sanction are catalogued in Section 6(1)(a)(b)(c) of the Act. The petitioner should come under the category 6(1)(c), which reads: "In the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his service." No doubt has been raised regarding the status of the accused appellant as public servant and in order to prosecute him, sanction is a must. Only in this way, as spoken by P.W.4, sanction was obtained under Ex.P.7 24. The learned Special Public Prosecutor, while supporting the sanction order viz., Ex.P.7 relied on a decision of the Apex Court in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991 (3) SCC 655), wherein it is observed by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court as follows: "In our opinion, it is not necessary that the authority competent to give sanction for prosecution or the authority competent to remove the public servant should be vertically superior in the hierarchy in which the office of the public servant exists. There is no such requirement under Section 6. The power to give sanction for prosecution can be conferred on any authority. Such authority may be of the department in which the public servant is working or an outside authority. All that is required is that the authority must be in a position to appreciate the material collected against the public servant to judge whether the prosecution contemplated is frivolous or speculative" On the strength of the above observation, it was urged that since the General Manager of the Bank of India viz., P.W.4 had granted sanction to prosecute the appellant under Ex.P7, after applying his mind, the same cannot be challenged as one issued by an incompetent authority. 25. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant attacked Ex.P7 on two grounds viz., that while issuing sanction order or granting sanction, the authority concerned has not applied his mind, since the order does not disclose what are the materials considered by the authority. By going through Ex.P7, I am unable to subscribe my view to the above said contention, since a reading of Ex.P7 shows that P.W.4 perused the files as well as applied his mind also, which is also spoken by the person concerned viz., P.W.4. On this ground, I am unable to invalidate, Ex.P.7, thereby finding fault, in taking cognizance of the offence, concluding Section 6 of the Act is not complied with. The second ground taken to invalidate Ex.P.7 is that though P.W.4 was the General Manager of Bank of India, he has no authority to issue sanction order or in other words, he is incompetent to sanction the prosecution. 26. As referred in the above decision, the authority to give sanction for prosecution may be of the Department in which the public servant was working or even an outside authority and the requirement is that the authority must be in a position to appreciate the material collected against the public servant, to judge whether the prosecution contemplated is frivolous or not. If that alone is the observation, and the same fits in with the section, then in the sanction granted by P.W.4, I cannot find fault. But the facts are otherwise, compelling this Court to take a different view viz., that Ex.P.7 was not given by the competent authority. In the above ruling itself, it is observed: "Under our enactment, the power has been conferred on the authority competent to remove the public servant." 27. It is ruled by the Apex Court in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (JT 1997 (7) SC 695), reaffirming the previous decision, while construing Section 6 of the Act, as follows: "Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to Government Servants against frivolous prosecutions.", thereby showing sanction is meant to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecutions and at the same time, giving protection and safe guard for the innocent, but not to be a shield for the guilty. Therefore, it should be established that the sanction issued in this case viz., Ex.P.7 had lifted the bar for prosecution, as said in Section 6 of the Act. In this context, we have to see what is the position of the accused appellant, his cadre, who is the competent authority for his removal and who is the appellate authority in case of removal, to question the same, etc. 28. It is the case of the learned counsel for the appellant that the accused appellant was working as an officer in Scale-III in the Bank of India. As disclosed by the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, the competent authority under Regulation 3(f), 12 & 15 for removing the officers coming under Scale-III is Zonal Manager in Scale-V/Joint Zonal Manager/Chief Regional Manager/Assistant General Manager. Section 6(1)(c) also mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sub-section (2) or sub-section 3(a) of Section 5 of this Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction from the competent person, which is also reiterated in K. Veerasamy's case, as referred supra. The accused appellant was dismissed from service, as reported, as per the proceedings dated 12.8.1998 only by the Regional Manager, thereby confirming that Regional Manager alone is the competent authority, as far as the accused appellant is concerned for his removal from service or from the office. The General Manager appears to be the appellate authority for the orders issued by the Regional Manager. Therefore, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the accused appellant, the General Manager is not the authority competent to remove the appellant from service as contemplated under Section 6(1)(c). This being the position, though a person of higher post had granted sanction, since it is not in accordance with Section 6(1)(c) and as ruled by the Apex Court, it should be held that Ex.P.7 is invalid. When P.W.4 had spoken about the issuance of sanction Ex.P.7, it was also suggested to him that he has no power to sanction for prosecuting the officers in the cadre of accused, which is proved by the production of dismissal order issued by the Regional Manager, Chennai Region and Disciplinary authority. When P.W.4 had spoken about the issuance of sanction Ex.P.7, it was also suggested to him that he has no power to sanction for prosecuting the officers in the cadre of accused, which is proved by the production of dismissal order issued by the Regional Manager, Chennai Region and Disciplinary authority. In this view, it should be held that there is no valid sanction in this case, as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act, which should follow, the case taken on file or the Court taking cognizance of the offence itself is bad, thereby vitiating the entire proceedings. Thus for the violation of Section 6 of the Act, it should be held that the conviction is unsustainable in law and in this view, it requires eraser. The trial Court without considering all these facts and applying proper provisions of law, failed in its duty, committed error, thereby slapped a conviction against the law, which is liable to be set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the conviction and sentence in C.C.No.5/1997 on the file of the Principal Special Judge (CBI Cases), Chennai and the accused-appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him, ordering refund of fine, as well as directing to return M.O.1 to the appellant.