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2005 DIGILAW 618 (RAJ)

Nitin S/o Narain Das v. State of Rajasthan

2005-02-23

H.R.PANWAR

body2005
Judgment H.R. Panwar, J.-By the instant revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC, the petitioner has challenged the Order dated 11.2004 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 2, Pratapgarh, Camp Nimbahera (for short, "the trial Court") in Sessions Case No. 36/2004 (35/2004), by which the trial Court framed charge for the offence under Sections 109/302 IPC against the petitioner. 2. The facts of the case, relevant and necessary for disposal of this criminal revision, in a nut shell, are that there was an enmity between accused Daud Khan and Javed with deceased Nand Singh. These two accused hatched a criminal conspiracy to commit murder of Nand Singh alias Gogand and included petitioner Nitin Sindhi in the said conspiracy. It is alleged that as per the well-knitted plan, accused-petitioner Nitin, along with one Narendra Kumar, went to the house of deceased Nand Singh alias Gogand, and all the three went to Bothra Telecom & Restaurant. After some time, accused Daud and Javed came there. Accused Javed took out the knife and aiming it towards deceased Nand Singh, told that it was the last day of his life. Thereafter, accused Daud Khan opened fire from 32 Bore country-made pistol, which hit on the right lung of deceased Nand Singh and he died on the spot. After some time, Narendra Singh came and informed complainant Gajendra Singh about the incident. On this, complainant Gajendra Singh lodged an FIR with Police Station, Nimbahera. After investigation, the police filed challan against the accused persons for the offences under Section 302 read with Sections 34 and 120-B, IPC, as also under Sections 3/25 of the Arms Act. The learned trial Court, vide impugned order, framed charges for the offence under Section 302 IPC and 3/25 of the Arms Act against accused Daud Khan; 302/34 and 3/25 of the Arms Act against accused Javed; and under Sections 109/302 IPC against the present petitioner. 3. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as also the record of the trial Court. 4. From the facts available on record, it is prima facie established that accused Daud Khan and Javed were nourishing ill-will against deceased Nand Singh. Present petitioner Nitin Sindhi was the friend of deceased Nand Singh and they used to go to Bothra Telecom and Restaurant. 4. From the facts available on record, it is prima facie established that accused Daud Khan and Javed were nourishing ill-will against deceased Nand Singh. Present petitioner Nitin Sindhi was the friend of deceased Nand Singh and they used to go to Bothra Telecom and Restaurant. It has also come on record that petitioner Nitin Sindhi is also the friend of accused Daud Khan and Javed, who also used to go to the said restaurant where the incident took place. There is statement of one Balwant Singh recorded by the police wherein he has stated that on the fateful day, at about 6:30 PM, he had seen accused Daud Khan and petitioner Nitin talking together. Though he could not hear the talking but later on he came to know that petitioner Nitin, on being asked by accused Daud Khan, called the deceased at the said restaurant and facilitated accused Daud Khan and Javed to commit the murder of deceased Nand Singh. Accused Javed informed the police that as per the plan, petitioner Nitin Singh brought the deceased to the said restaurant and informed accused Daud Khan. Accused Daud Khan disclosed to the police that on the day of occurrence, he, accused Javed and petitioner Nitin Sindhi hatched a conspiracy that Nitin Sindhi would bring deceased Nand Singh at the said restaurant and Nand Singh would be put shot down. The facts on record clearly show that petitioner, alongwith Narendra Kumar, went to the house of the deceased. Petitioner entered inside the house of the deceased whereas Narendra Kumar remained standing out-side the house. Deceased sat on the pillion of the motorcycle driven by petitioner Nitin and Narendra Kumar went on his bike. Making rounds on the motorcycle, crossing the house of accused Daud Khan, the petitioner took the motorcycle at the said restaurant. After a couple of minutes, accused Daud Khan and Javed reached there and Killed Nand Singh. It is also pertinent to mention here that after the murder, it was Narendra Kumar who went to the house of the deceased and let the incident known to the complainant party but the ptitioner did not inform the incident though it was he who had taken the deceased with him. 5. It is also pertinent to mention here that after the murder, it was Narendra Kumar who went to the house of the deceased and let the incident known to the complainant party but the ptitioner did not inform the incident though it was he who had taken the deceased with him. 5. Thus, there is prima facie evidence against the petitioner to the effect that as per the illegal conspiracy hatched between him and other accused, he abetted in the commission of the crime and facilitated the main accused in the commission of the crime. The learned trial Court, after appreciation of the material placed on record, vide impugned order, framed charge against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 109/302 IPC. I see no illegality, irregularity or perversity in the order impugned framing the charge, which may require interference in the limited jurisdiction of revision. 6. So far as quashing the charges is concerned, it is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and the Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. It is also settled proposition of law that the High Courts power to quash the charge should not be exercised except for strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court, the charge needed to be quashed. At the time of framing the charge, evidence cannot be weighed. 7. In Kanti Bhadra Shah & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal, 2000 (1) SCC 722 , the Honble Supreme Court held that framing the charge itself is prima facie order that the trial Judge has formed the opinion, upon considering the police report and other documents and after hearing both the sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. The Apex Court further held that there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write an order showing the reasons for framing the charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The Apex Court further held that there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write an order showing the reasons for framing the charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. Almost same view has been reiterated by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 ; Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau,1999 Cr. L.R. SC 499; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad vs. Dilip Nathumal Chordia & Anr., 1989 (1) SCC 715 ; Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 52 ; State of Maharashtra vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj, AIR 1977 SC 2041 ; and State of Delhi vs. Gyan Devi & Ors. JT 2000 (Suppl.2) SC 635. 8. In view of the above settled legal principles, it is clear that at the stage of framing the charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima-facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the state of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material. In the instant case, there is prima-facie evidence against the accused-petitioner for framing the charge for the offences under Sections 109/302 IPC. 9. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the revision petition and it is dismissed accordingly.