( 1 ) THE unsuccessful tenant, being aggrieved of the reversing orders, filed these C. R. Ps. C. R. P. No. 3095/2001 is filed by Akkala Durga rao and no doubt, it is stated that Akkala durga Rao in his individual capacity cannot pray for permission to deposit rents inasmuch as M/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel Traders, rep. by its managing partner Sri Akkala Durga Rao is the tenant. The other 2 C. R. Ps. , are filed by m/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel Traders, rep. by its managing partner Sri Akkala Durga Rao. Akkala Durga Rao in his individual capacity filed R. C. C. No. 111/93 on the file of Rent controller, Vijayawada, praying for permission to deposit rents from March, 1993 onwards into Court and before the learned rent Controller none of the parties were examined but however the learned Rent controller allowed the petition granting permission to the petitioner to deposit rents @ Rs. 300/- per month without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and also directed the parties to bear their own costs. Respondent in the said R. C. C. , the landlord, carried the matter by way of appeal r. C. C. M. A. NO. 27/95 on the file of Principal senior Civil Judge-cum-Appellate Authority under A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, Vijayawada, and before the Appellate Authority Ex. A-1 and Exs. B-1 to B-7 were marked and the appeal was allowed on the ground that Akkala Durga rao is not the tenant and hence, he cannot file a petition under Section 8 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act (here-in-after referred to as the Act , in short, for the purpose of convenience ). Aggrieved by the same, C. R. P. No. 3095/2001 was filed by Akkala Durga Rao in his individual capacity. ( 2 ) THE landlord filed old R. C. C. No. 74/93 renumbered as R. C. C. No. 173/96, on the file of Rent Controller, Vijayawada. praying for eviction of the tenant M/s. Suvarna Iron and steel Traders, rep. Aggrieved by the same, C. R. P. No. 3095/2001 was filed by Akkala Durga Rao in his individual capacity. ( 2 ) THE landlord filed old R. C. C. No. 74/93 renumbered as R. C. C. No. 173/96, on the file of Rent Controller, Vijayawada. praying for eviction of the tenant M/s. Suvarna Iron and steel Traders, rep. by its managing partner sri Akkala Durga Rao on the ground of wilful default and likewise, the landlord filed old r. C. C. No. 128/94, renumbered as R. C. C. No. 249/96 on the file of Rent Controller, vijayawada, praying for eviction on the ground of wilful default for subsequent period as against the tenant M/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel traders, rep. by its managing partner sri Akkala durga Rao. The landlord was unsuccessful before the learned Rent controller and aggrieved by the same, he had carried the matter by way of appeals r. C. C. M. A. N0. 5/98 and R. C. C. M. A. No. 135/97 on the file of Principal Senior Civil judge-cum-Appellate Authority underthe Act at Vijayawada, and the aforesaid orders made in the R. C. Cs. , had been reversed and aggrieved by the same, M/s. Suvarna Iron and steel Traders, rep. by its managing partner sri Akkala Durga Rao preferred C. R. P. No. 2321/2002 and C. R. P. No. 2322/2002, respectively. ( 3 ) SRI Ramakrishna, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner in all the c. R. Ps. , had taken this court through the reasons recorded by the learned Rant controller and would contend that in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no default much less wilful default since the tenant has been prompt in payment of rents and the landlord had avoided the receipt of rents so as to make it a ground of eviction and the tenant had invoked the jurisdiction of the learned Rent Controller under Section 8 (5) of the Act and has been depositing the rents and, hence, there is no wilful default, at all. The learned counsel also explained about the issuance of bearer cheques and the evidence available on record and also the conduct of the parties. The learned counsel also explained about the issuance of bearer cheques and the evidence available on record and also the conduct of the parties. The learned Counsel also pointed out to the periods of default wherein the tenant is said to have committed default and had explained the facts and circumstances and would contend that even if there was some delay, the same was due to conduct of the landlord and hence, the same cannot be styled as wilful default. The learned Counsel also pointed out to certain portions of the evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1 as well. ( 4 ) PER contra, Sri Anjaneyulu, the learned counsel representing the landlord would contend that Durga Rao is not the tenant but the firm is the tenant and hence, the said durga Rao invoking the jurisdiction of the rent Controller under Section 8 (5) of the Act is not tenable in Law. The learned Counsel also pointed out to the conduct of the parties and had drawn the attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the Appellate authority in relation to bearer Cheques. The learned Counsel also explained the periods of default on the strength of which the R. C. Cs. , were filed and how the matter had been dealt with by the learned Rent Controller and the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority while reversing the said findings. The Counsel would maintain that in the facts and circumstances, the default committed can be said to be only wilful default and nothing else and hence, insasmuch as the orders made by the Appellate Authority are well-reasoned orders and there is no perversity involved in the reasoning while recording the findings by the Appellate Authority, the C. R. Ps. , are liable to be dismissed. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions in this regard. ( 5 ) HEARD the Counsel. ( 6 ) C. R. P. NO. 3095 of 2001:- As already referred to supra, the application under section 8 (5) of the Act was filed by Akkala durga Rao. Before the Appellate Authority ex. A-1, dated 11-12-1996, deposition of r. W. 1 in R. C. C. No. 173/96 (old R. C. C. No. 74/93) was marked. Exs. B-1 to B-3 the letters, Ex. B-4 the postal cover, Ex. Before the Appellate Authority ex. A-1, dated 11-12-1996, deposition of r. W. 1 in R. C. C. No. 173/96 (old R. C. C. No. 74/93) was marked. Exs. B-1 to B-3 the letters, Ex. B-4 the postal cover, Ex. B-5- legal notice issued by the Advocate for m/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel Traders had been marked. The specific case of the landlord is that M/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel Traders, is the tenant and this is clear from R. C. C. No. 173/96 (old R. C. C. No. 74/93) before the rent Controller and Ex. A. 1 is the certified copy of the deposition. Exs. B-1, B-2, B-4, b-5, B-7 also establish the same. Akkala durga Rao may be the managing partner of m/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel Traders, and at the best, he can represent the firm but definitely not in his individual capacity. Ex. B-5 discloses that notice was issued on behalf of the firm. In the light of the documentary evidence available on record, the Appellate Authority recorded a finding that inasmuch as the firm is the tenant, in the individual capacity this application under Section 8 (5) of the Act cannot be maintained and on that ground the appeal was allowed. Apart from this aspect of the matter, in the light of the tenant as shown in the other 2 Rent Control proceedings, there cannot be any serious controversy that the firm is the tenant, may be represented by the managing partner, and, hence, in view of the same, the order made by the Appellate Authority in this regard cannot be found fault and accordingly, the same is hereby confirmed. ( 7 ) C. R. P. NOS. 2321 and 2322 of 2002:- as already referred to supra these 2 C. R. Ps. , are filed by the tenant M/s. Suvarna Iron and steel Traders, rep. by its managing partner sri Akkala Durga Rao, being aggrieved of the common reversing order made in r. C. C. M. A. NOS. 5/98 and 135/97. Both the r. C. Cs. were filed by the landlord on the ground of wilful default. It is the case of the landlord that the tenant was paying rent at rs. 100/- per month and by the date of the filing of the petition, the tenant was paying rs. 900/- per month, but however, the landlord was issuing receipts for Rs. 300/- only. were filed by the landlord on the ground of wilful default. It is the case of the landlord that the tenant was paying rent at rs. 100/- per month and by the date of the filing of the petition, the tenant was paying rs. 900/- per month, but however, the landlord was issuing receipts for Rs. 300/- only. The tenant committed default in payment of rents from October, 1991, but however, tenant sent a cheque for Rs. 600/- urging monthly rent as Rs. 300/- claiming to be the rent for the months of March and April, 1993 and the same was denied by the landlord. It is the specific stand by the landlord that rs. 900/- per month, the tenant is in arrears of rs. 19. 800/- and thus, committed willful default. The tenant had taken a specific stand that monthly rent is only Rs. 300/- since december, 1985 and he has been regular in payment of rents on landlord visiting his shop till November, 1991, and from December, 1991 onwards he has been paying the rents monthly by way of cheques drawn on Punjab national Bank up to February, 1993 and the landlord enacted those cheques and the landlord did not turn up to collect the rents for the month of March, 1993 and he waited till the end of April, 1993 and sent two cheques for Rs. 300/- each representing rent for the months of march and April, 1993, by registered letter, dated 1-5-1993, and the same was received by the landlord but reply was sent with false allegations and a rejoinder was also issued. Further stand was taken that the tenant filed R. C. C. No. 111/93 to permit him to deposit rents since the landlord was evading to receive the rents. The landlord agreed to sell the petition scheduled property in favour of Smt. Akkala Kumar, W/o Durga rao for a consideration of Rs. Further stand was taken that the tenant filed R. C. C. No. 111/93 to permit him to deposit rents since the landlord was evading to receive the rents. The landlord agreed to sell the petition scheduled property in favour of Smt. Akkala Kumar, W/o Durga rao for a consideration of Rs. 4,00,000/- in presence of elders on 30-6-1991 and received some advance on different dates and the landlord failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement and hence, his wife got issued a notice dated 26-7-1993, demanding the landlord to receive the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed and his wife filed O. S. No. 898/93 for specific performance and only with a view to evict his from the premises with a mala fide intention, the eviction petition is filed. Yet another R. C. C. was filed on the ground that the tenant committed default in payment of rents for the subsequent period. The same was also resisted. There is nothing on record to show that the rent payable is Rs. 900/- per month and the case of the tenant is that the rent is only Rs. 300/- per month. In R. C. C. No. 173/96, P. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined and R. W. 1 was examined, Exs. A-1 to A-11 and Exs. B-1 to B-48 were marked. In r. C. C. No. 249/96 (old R. C. C. No. 128/94) p. W. 1 and R. W. 1, the landlord and the managing part of the firm-the tenant, alone were examined, Ex. A-1 and Exs. B-1 to B-4 were marked. The Appellate Authority had disposed of both the appeals by common order. P. W. 1 categorically deposed about the default committed by the tenant in payment of rents from September, 1991. Even after September, 1991, the rents were not sent regularly by cheques. P. W. 1 also deposed that since he has been running a work shop and he has been maintaining accounts and whenever he receives rents, he will be entering the same in the accounts book. No doubt, on the strength of the rent receipts Exs. B-1 to B-35, a finding had been recorded that the rent is only Rs. 300/- per month. As per Ex. B-6, marked through R. W. 1, rent of Rs. 300/- is shown to have been paid on 4-1-1980. No doubt, on the strength of the rent receipts Exs. B-1 to B-35, a finding had been recorded that the rent is only Rs. 300/- per month. As per Ex. B-6, marked through R. W. 1, rent of Rs. 300/- is shown to have been paid on 4-1-1980. The learned judge also discussed at length the practice of issuance of cheques by R. W. 1 for the default period. The evidence of R. W. 1 is that these all are bearer cheques and having issued cheques to P. W. 1 for 22 months, he had not obtained receipts from P. W. 1 But, however, the evidence of R. W. 1 is that he had received the receipts from the part-time accountant of p. W. 1, who was also accountant of the tenant for sometime. Further finding had been recorded relating to Ex. B-41, marked in r. C. C. No. 173/96 and the relevant Pass book relating to Punjab National Bank also had not been filed. A further finding had been recorded in relation to Exs. B-1 to B-32 which do not disclose any exhibit seal of R. C. C. No. 111/93. It is also in the evidence of R. W. 1 that though R. C. C. No. 111/93 was filed paying permission to deposit rents into Court, he could not deposit rents from the day he filed petition on the ground that he was not permitted to do so in view of the fact that an order granting permission had not been specifically made by the Court. A further finding had been recorded in relation to ex. B-48, the Ledger Extract in R. C. C. No. 111/93, relating to deposit of Rs. 5,400/- and a further finding had been recorded in relation to Ex. A-6 the certified copy of the challan relating to R. C. C. No. 74/93. The contradictory document and the non- explanation relating thereto also had been taken note of. It is also pertinent to note that the landlord had taken the specific stand that the counter-foil of the cheques filed before the Court are only created for the purpose of resisting the eviction petitions and in fact, the cheques were not encashed. The burden could have been discharged by the tenant, by adducing the relevant evidence. The evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1, and Exs. A-1 to A-11 and Exs. The burden could have been discharged by the tenant, by adducing the relevant evidence. The evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1, and Exs. A-1 to A-11 and Exs. B-1 to B-48 in R. C. C. No. 173/96, and also the evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1 and Ex. A-1 and Exs. B-1 to B-4 in r. C. C. No. 249/96 (old R. C. C. No. 128/94) had been taken into consideration and ultimately, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the tenant failed to discharge the burden relating to the payment of rents in time. It is, no doubt, true that whether in individual capacity or otherwise, an attempt was made on the part of the tenant to deposit rents before the Court by invoking the provisions of section 8 (5) of the Act. ( 8 ) IN Hari Prasad Badruka v. Tellukunta laxmi and others it was held:-" Deposit of rent by a tenant into Court, as per the provisions of Section 8 of the act, is for the benefit of the landlord, so that the landlord can withdraw the amount immediately after it is deposited. If the tenant who makes a deposit does not file the challans evidencing the deposit into the Bank into Court, the landlord cannot have the benefit of amount deposited by the tenant, and therefore it is as good as the tenant not paying the money to the landlord. Though Rule 5 of the Rules does not stipulate any time within which the tenant should file the challans evidencing the deposit of money in the Bank into the court, by necessary implication it should be taken that he should file the challans into the Court within a reasonable time from the date of deposit. It is well known that where no time is stipulated for performing an obligation the person who has to perform the obligation has to perform it within a reasonable time. The tenant who deposits money into Bank, as per the order of the Court under sections 8, 9 and 11 is under and obligation to file the challans evidencing deposit of money in Bank, into the Court as per Rule 5 (3) of the Rules. Rule 5 (4) of the Rules contemplates notice of deposit being given to the person (s) concerned within seven days of delivery of the challan by the tenant. Rule 5 (4) of the Rules contemplates notice of deposit being given to the person (s) concerned within seven days of delivery of the challan by the tenant. If the tenant himself gives a notice to the landlord, or if the landlord is appearing through a counsel to the Counsel for the landlord, there is no further need for the Rent controller to serve notice of deposit on the landlord. If no such notice is given, the tenant has to deposit process fee for the Court to serve the notice of deposit on the person (s) concerned. If process fee is not deposited, the Court cannot serve notice of deposit on the landlord. In this case, admittedly notice of deposit was not given to the landlord or his Counsel and it is not even the case of the tenant that process fee was deposited, as per Rule 16 for sending notice of deposit to the landlord. Thus it is clear that the tenant has not complied with the provisions of Rule 5 (4) read with Rule 16 of the Rules, for the Rent controller taking steps for service of notice of deposit on the landlord, because without the tenant depositing the process fee for service on notice, court cannot cause service of notice of deposit on the landlord. When a tenant takes recourse to section 8 of the Act for deposit of rents into the Court, he has to follow the procedure prescribed therein. If he fails to deposit challans into Court and give notice of deposit or fails to deposit process fee to enable the Court to cause service of notice of deposit on landlord for a considerably long time, it cannot, but be held that he becomes a wilful defaulter, thereby creating a right in the landlord seeking his eviction from the demises premises on the ground of wilful default. "in C. Hanumantha Rao and anotherv. M. Prem sudhakar Rao it was held:-"i have gone through the record and also through the orders passed by the principal Subordinate Judge. It is not the case of the tenant that he had paid the rents. His case, however, is that landlord refused to receive the rent for number of years and he deposited the rent in a Bank account opened by him in his won name. It is not the case of the tenant that he had paid the rents. His case, however, is that landlord refused to receive the rent for number of years and he deposited the rent in a Bank account opened by him in his won name. It is nowhere shown that the Landlord was ever communicated that a Bank account had been opened in which the rent was being deposited. The Andhra Pradesh building (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act (XV of 1960) is a complete code governing he relationship of landlord and tenants. The tenants have been given protection against eviction. A Landlord can only be able to evict a tenant if any of the grounds laid down in Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Act become available to such a Landlord. Therefore, I am of the view that the provisions of the A. P. Rent control Act need to be interpreted in such a way that whenever a right accrues to a Landlord for evicting the tenant the eviction should follow. It has been stated that the Landlord in this case very cleverly carved out a ground for eviction of the tenant by refusing to accept the rent. One would have believed this argument bur for Section 8 of the A. P. Rent Control Act. The legislature was conscious of such situations and therefore a detailed mechanism has been laid down in section 8 which is supposed to be followed by tenants in case there is refusal of acceptance of rent by a landlord. After all what was the impediment for the tenant for number of years to go to the Rent Controller and deposit the rent. It is admitted fact that for number of years the Landlord did not receive the rent. It was received by him only after the suit was instituted and there was nothing on record to show that the tenant ever went to the Rent controller. On this question the finding of both the Courts below is concurrent and in the revisional jurisdiction this court would not like to re-appreciate the evidence, but the legal aspect of the issue involved has been considered and in my view of a tenant fails to deposit the rent for number of years in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of the A. P. Rent Control Act he is clearly a willful defaulter. In the present case the petitioner had deposited the rent in a Bank Account in his own name and therefore there was nothing which could stop the tenant from withdrawing this amount. It was only a plan created to defeat the rights of landlord. Had the tenant been really interested in paying the rents he would have followed the mandate of Section 8 of the Act. Since Section 8 of the Act has not been followed by the petitioner, there is no way out but to hold that the tenant in this case was a wilful defaulter. "in Bansilal v. Mohmood Ahmed it was held:-" Sub-section (5) of Section 8 does not contemplate that any specific order has to be passed by the Rent Controller before the tenant deposits the rent. The right of the tenant under sub-section (5) is subject to the fulfillment of the condition that the landlord has refused to receive the rent sent to him by money order under sub-section (4 ). A reading of the entire provisions of section 8 of the Act would disclose that after the landlord refused to receive the rent sent by way of money order, the tenant while exercising the right under sub-section (5) has to deposit the rent refused by the landlord before the Rent controller along with the application therefor and shall continue to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due. As noticed hereinbefore, a finding a fact has been arrived at by the learned appellate Judge to the effect that although such application was filed in 1985 subsequent to the refusal of the landlord to receive the rent sent by money order in September, 1985, the tenant actually deposited the rent only in February, 1986. In view of the admitted fact that the petitioner has failed to deposit the rent even after filing of the petition to deposit the rent, it cannot be said that the learned appellate Court has committed any jurisdictional error in setting aside the order the learned rent Controllerand ordering foreviction of the petitioner. "in Adapa Santharam and another v. Sait nathmal Manik Chand it was held:-"this part of the case has been specifically considered by both the courts below. Both the Courts below rejected the contention of the tenant regarding his case that he sent Money orders under Exs. B-2 and B-3 to the land-lord and Exs. "in Adapa Santharam and another v. Sait nathmal Manik Chand it was held:-"this part of the case has been specifically considered by both the courts below. Both the Courts below rejected the contention of the tenant regarding his case that he sent Money orders under Exs. B-2 and B-3 to the land-lord and Exs. B-4 and B-5 are the money order coupons showing the refusal. I have also verified Exs. B-2, b-3, B-4 and B-5 from the original records. Money Order coupons dated 8-11-1982 show the name of S. Nathmal manik Chand, but the name of the landlord is Sait Nathmal Manik Chand. Apart from that, from Exs. B-2 and B-3, it is clear that the full address of the landlord is not shown. Moreover, the alleged M. O. coupons said to have been refused do not bear any postal endorsement or postal seal. The lower appellate Court specifically noted that if the correct address were to be given in exs. B-2 and B-3, the same should have reached the landlord. After all the landlord resides in the upstairs of the same building. Exs. B-4 and B-5 did not contain any endorsement of the postal authority nor seal of the postal department in order to hold that they were refused and returned by the landlord and in this view of the matter, reliance was not placed on these documents, having regard to this evidence on record on the part of the tenant, both the courts below held that the tenant did not tender the rent to the landlord as contended by him in the months of September, October and november, 1982, either in person or through the alleged money orders. It was open to the tenant to tender the rent to the landlord immediately after he received Ex. A-2 reply notice, dated 29-11-1982 sent by the landlord to his telegraphic notice vide Ex. A-1. In ex. A-2, the landlord specifically stated that he never refused to receive the rent from the tenant. On receipt of Ex. A-2 at least the tenant should have sent the rent either by Demand draftor by cheque at least through the counsel of the land-lord, who issued Ex. A-2. Instead of that, he filed R. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 before the rent Controller, under Section 8 (5) of the Act seeking the permission of the court to deposit the rent into the Court. A-2. Instead of that, he filed R. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 before the rent Controller, under Section 8 (5) of the Act seeking the permission of the court to deposit the rent into the Court. Moreover, as noticed by both the Courts below, the said petition in R. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 was filed on 30-12-1983. It was returned to the tenant by the office with certain objection on 31-12-1982. The tenant has presented the same after complying with the office objections on 25-1-1983 and it has been taken on file on 21-2-1983. Thereafter, the tenant has deposited a total amount of rs. 4,550/- vide challan No. 1363 on 30-3-1983 towards the rent from september, 1982 to March, 1983 for a period of seven months, from this material on record, it is clear that even after filing R. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 on 31-12-1982 under Section 8 (5) of the act, he was not diligent in prosecuting the said petition and depositing the rent immediately. Mere filing an application under Section 8 (5) of the Act could not by itself be sufficient, but he must deposit the rent immediately on that application seeking the permission of the court. Moreover, the said application in r. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 has been filed without complying the other requirements of Section 8 of the Act. As per Section 8 (2) of the Rent Control Act, if the landlord refuses to receive or accept the rent, then the tenant may by notice require the landlord to specify within 10 days from the date of receipt of the notice the Bank into which the rent may be deposited. Under clause (4) of the Act, if the landlord does not specify such a bank for depositing the rent, the tenant should sent the rent to the landlord by money order and if the landlord refused to receive the rent remitted by money order under sub-section (4), then the tenant may deposit the rent before the authority. From these provisions, it is clear that in order in invoke the jurisdiction of the court seeking permission to deposit the rent, the tenant must fulfil these other conditions of that section. As noted above, the money orders alleged to have been sent vide Exs. B-2 and B-3 were not sent on the correct address of the landlord. From these provisions, it is clear that in order in invoke the jurisdiction of the court seeking permission to deposit the rent, the tenant must fulfil these other conditions of that section. As noted above, the money orders alleged to have been sent vide Exs. B-2 and B-3 were not sent on the correct address of the landlord. The alleged money order coupons Exs. B-4 and B-5 do not bear any endorsement of the postal authority noting refusal nor bear the seal of the postal department. On the other hand, there is illegal statement on those coupons Ex. B-5 "no such Addressee". In those circumstance, as held by both the Courts below, there was no tender of rent by the tenant to the landlord by money order, not here was any refusal of the money order by the landlords. From these circumstances, it is clear that by filing an application in r. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 of the Act seeking permission of the Court to deposit the arrears of rent, the tenant cannot plead that there was no default on his part. As held by this Court in (1) 1985 (2) alt. 169, Section 8 of the Act is only directory and not mandatory. From this, it follows that the tenant may resort to Section 8 and may not resort to Section 8. After the arrears of rent have fallen due, without following the mandatory provisions of that Section, if he invokes Section 8 (5), such application cannot come to the aid of the tenant to show his bona fides in not paying the rent in time. Moreover, even after filing of that petition on 30-12-1982, actually the rent was not deposited till 30th march, 1983. From these circumstances, it is clear that the tenant was a wilful defaulter right from the month of September 1982 till march, 1983. Nevertheless, in this case, it is an admitted fact by the tenant himself in his evidence as R. W. 1 that the rent was payable at the end of every month with grace period of 10 days thereafter. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that both the Courts below rightly held that the tenant was wilful defaulter in the payment of rent to the landlord. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that both the Courts below rightly held that the tenant was wilful defaulter in the payment of rent to the landlord. "however, the learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in view of the admissions made by the landlord s P. W. 1 that the tenant deposited rs. 3,000/- with him, the landlord should have adjusted the same towards arrears of rent, even this aspect of the case has been specifically considered by the lower Appellate Court in paragraph 15 of its judgment. As per the provisions of section 7 of the Act, the landlord shall not claim, receive or stipulate for the payment of any premium, an amount not exceeding one month s rent by way of advance. On that basis, it is calculated that after deducing one month s rent as advance out of Rs. 3,000/- the amount that would be in excess of that one month s rent come to Rs. 2,350/ -. Even if this amount is adjusted towards arrears of rent for the period of five months from september, 1982 to January, 1983, even then, there would be default on the part of the tenant, because, the arrears would be more than the amount in deposit. In view of the rejection of the case of the tenant, regarding Exs. B-2 to b-5 there cannot be any explanation on the part of the tenant for not tendering the arrears of rent. However, the learned counsel for the landlord contended that if the tenant had requested the landlord, the landlord should have adjusted the arrears of rent out of the amount in deposit. It is only on the basis of evidence for the first time it appears an argument was developed in the lower appellate court in this behalf and the lower appellate Court has rejected the same, holding that even after such adjustment, still the tenant would be in arrears. The learned counsel for the landlord further contended that such an adjustment, the tenant shod necessarily plead in the case and it is not an automatic adjustment. He further contended that there is no agreement for such adjustment towards the rent between the parties. In support of his contention, he relied upon the ruling the Supreme court reported in (2) AIR 1993 Supreme court 1948. He further contended that there is no agreement for such adjustment towards the rent between the parties. In support of his contention, he relied upon the ruling the Supreme court reported in (2) AIR 1993 Supreme court 1948. In para 20 of the judgment, the Hon ble supreme Court has held as under:-" We are in broad agreement with the view of the Full Bench of the Patna high Court and the Madras High court on the question of automatic adjustment and hold that a tenant cannot save himself from the consequences of eviction under the act on the ground of default in the payment of rent by claiming automatic adjustment of any excess rent paid consequent upon mutual enhancement of rent, even if illegal unless there is an agreement between the parties for such an adjustment. The tenant may also in a given case seek adjustment of the excess rent in the hands of the landlord against the arrears by specifically asking the landlord for such an adjustment before filing of the suit or in response to the notice to quit and even in the written statement by way of set off within the period of limitation and by following the procedure for claiming such a set off, while resisting the claim for eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent but he cannot claim automatic adjustment . "on the other hand, the learned counsel forthe petitioner- tenant relied upon the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in (3) AIR 1989 SC 1510 . That was a case in which their Lordships of the Supreme court were interpreting Section 7 of the a. P. (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act. In that case, it was argued that the landlord had an amount of Rs. 6,500/- as advance and after deduction one month s rent from out of the advance amount, the balance amount of rs. 5,000/- was with him in deposit and section 7 (2) (a) prohibited payment of any sum exceeding one month s rent by way of advance further sub-section (3) declared the stipulation for payment of rent in advance beyond that of one month as null and void. From the facts of that case, it is revealed that the payment in deposit with the landlord was more than the alleged arrears of rent payable by the tenant. From the facts of that case, it is revealed that the payment in deposit with the landlord was more than the alleged arrears of rent payable by the tenant. Considering a similar contention the Honourable supreme Court held as under:"in M/s. Sarwan Kumar Onkar Nath v. Subhas Kumar Agarwalla (1987) 4 SCC 546 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2302 ), salimuddin s case came for consideration. This was also dispute under the Bihar Act where tow month s rent had been paid in advance by the tenant to the landlord on the stipulation that the advance amount would be liable be adjusted towards arrears of rent, whenever necessary or required. The Court held that the tenant could not be evicted on the ground of default in the payment of rent for two months even if the tenant failed to ask the landlord to make adjustment of the advance amount in the absence of any agreement requiring the tenant to inform the landlord as to when such adjustment is to be made. This court said that when the Rent Act prohibited the landlord to claim such advance payment, the tenant couldnot be considered to be a defaulter and the doctrine of paridelic to was not attracted to such a fact-situation. Mr. Rao building upon the ratio of these two decisions rightly contended before us that when the landlord had Rs. 5,000/- on tenant s account with him which he was holding for years without paying interest and against the clear statutory bar, there could be no justificastion for granting a decree of eviction on the plea of arrears of rent. In view of the fact that the stipulation that the amount would be refundable at the end of the tenancy is null and void under Section 7 (3) of the Act, the amount became payable to the tenant immediately and the landlord with Rs. 5, 000/- of the tenant with him could not contend that the tenant was in default for a small amount by not paying the rent for some months. 5, 000/- of the tenant with him could not contend that the tenant was in default for a small amount by not paying the rent for some months. "in the light of the latter decision, the learned counsel forthe tenant-petitioner contended that the landlord should have adjusted the arrears of rent from out of the amount in deposit with the landlord whether the tenant requests for such adjustment or not or whether there is an agreement to that effect or not and such adjustment should necessarily be automatic. In Kama/a Bai and others v. E. Rajeswan it was held:-"to sum up, when landlord refuses to receive rent for any month, it is open to tenant to opt for Section 8 which is not mandatory but only directory. But having opted for section, by issuing notice under Section 8 (2), the tenant has to follow diligently the steps stated in section 8 (3) to Section 8 (5) namely, if landlord refused to nominate the Bank, he has to sent the rent by M. O. deducing the M. O. commission and continue remit in the same manner till landlord expresses his willingness to accept the rent or specifies the Bank. If the landlord refuses to receive rent so sent by M. O. , the tenant has to deposit it in Court by filing application under Section 8 (5 ). But mere filing of application does not absolve the tenant from obligation to remit the rent before the due date. He has to obtain order from the Court for immediate deposit or deposit the rent in a separate bank account in order to show his bona fides. The question whether in case the tenant does not opt for Section 8, he is bound to continue to remit rent by M. O. every month or he can stop paying rents subsequently, does not arise in this case. Applying these principles to the facts of the case, ex. B-1 and Ex. B-3 are not proved as true and the tenants have deposited the rents for the period from November, 1991, only on 20-10-1992. Even assuming that Exs. B-1, Ex. B-3 and ex. B-4 are true, the tenants having opted for Section 8 and issued notice contemplated in sub-section (2) failed to remit the rents in accordance with the procedure mentioned in sub- sections (3) to (5 ). Even assuming that Exs. B-1, Ex. B-3 and ex. B-4 are true, the tenants having opted for Section 8 and issued notice contemplated in sub-section (2) failed to remit the rents in accordance with the procedure mentioned in sub- sections (3) to (5 ). Thus, it has to be held that the tenants has committed wilful default in payment of rents for the period from November, 1991 to August, 1992. "in Singumahanthi Jagannadha Rao v. Putchala Surya Prakasa Rao, it was held that the tenant made irregular payment of rents and the Appellate Authority while reversing the decision of the Rent controller found that it constitutes wilful default and when the finding is not a perverse finding, order of the Appellate authority not liable to be interfered with in Revision. In n. D. Thandani (Dead) by Lrs. v. Arnavaz rustom Printer and another the Apex Court held:-"the case at hand projects a picture where in spite of the leaning of the law in favour of the tenant, if anyone deserves sympathy it is the landlord and not the tenant. As already noticed, this is the third round of litigation complaining of default in payment of rent by. the tenant. In the first round of litigation the rate of rent was alleged by the landlord to be Rs. 160/- per month which was denied by the tenant who pleaded the rate of rent to be Rs. 80/- per month only. In the litigation which ended in the apex Court, the rate of rent was finally adjudged to have been rs. 160/- per month and not Rs. 80/- as written statement pleaded by the tenant. Not only does the law itself require the tenant to pay or tender the rent month to month, the order of this Court mandated the tenant to clear all the arrears of rent within two months and thereafter to deposit the rent month by month and strictly observe compliance with the orders of the Supreme Court. The tenant did not even thereafter comply with the provisions of Rule 5. Huge amount of arrears accumulated, which were cleared in one go. Even other deposits were not regularly made. The tenant did not keep the landlords informed of the deposits either directly or by complying with provisions of the Rule. The tenant did not even thereafter comply with the provisions of Rule 5. Huge amount of arrears accumulated, which were cleared in one go. Even other deposits were not regularly made. The tenant did not keep the landlords informed of the deposits either directly or by complying with provisions of the Rule. The obligation of the tenant to pay or tender the rent cannot be said to have been discharged unless and until the landlords were posted with the information along with particulars enabling them to withdraw the amount. The legal notices served by the landlords were not responded to in the desired manner so as to put an end to their grievance. A claim for eviction founded on the simple ground of default in payment remained pending for years, obviously because of the reluctance and the procrastinating tactics of the tenant. If this is not wilful default then what else can it be? we are clearly of the opinion thatthe High Court has rightly held the tenant to be a chronic wilful defaulter. The decree for eviction is fully justified. "reliance was also placed on the decision abdul Raheem by G. P. A. , Mohd. Phirozeali v. M/s. Srinivasa Dyeing Works, Vijayawada, rep. by its Partner, V. V. Subba Rao and others. ( 9 ) ON a careful analysis of the evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority, this Court is of the considered opinion that taking the over-all facts and circumstances and also the conduct of the parties, the Appellate authority is well-justified in recording a finding that the tenant committed wilful default and hence, the said finding recorded by the learned Judge need not be disturbed by this revisional Court since there is no illegality or perversity in arriving at such a conclusion. Hence, the said findings are hereby confirmed. It is needless to say that all the c. R. Ps. , are devoid of merit and accordingly, the same shall stand dismissed. The tenant however is granted three months time to vacate the premises on filing an undertaking before this court within a period of four weeks. In default, the landlord is at liberty to put the eviction orders into execution. It is needless to say that the tenant to pay the rents for this period also. ( 10 ) THE C. R. Ps. In default, the landlord is at liberty to put the eviction orders into execution. It is needless to say that the tenant to pay the rents for this period also. ( 10 ) THE C. R. Ps. , are accordingly dismissed with costs.