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Gauhati High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 622 (GAU)

Jyostna Chakraborty v. Sujit Banerjee

2005-08-25

AMITAVA ROY

body2005
JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The judgment and order dated 5.6.2004 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 3, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Title Appeal No. 8/2004 affirming the judgment and order dated 14.1.2004 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 2, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Title Suit No. 194/99 is under challenge. The learned Trial Court had decreed the suit for eviction of the Petitioners from the suit premises and the same was upheld in the appeal as above. 2. I have heard Mr. S. Sharma, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. B. K. Goswami, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mrs. T. Goswami, Advocate for the opposite party. The proforma opposite party were unrepresented. 3. The facts in brief leading to the instant petition are essential to be noted. The opposite party instituted the aforementioned suit praying for a decree for the ejectment of Shri Promode Chakrabarty (since deceased), the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners from the suit premises and also for arrear rent of Rs. 420/-. The pleaded case of the opposite party/Plaintiffs is that the suit house originally belonged to the proforma opposite party and the Defendant (predecessor in interest of the Petitioners) was a tenant under them at monthly rent of Rs. 120/- payment whereof was due on the first day of the month itself. The tenancy was according to the English calendar. The proforma opposite party by registered sale deed No. 6355/98 dated 23.11.98 sold the suit premises to the opposite party-Plaintiffs. Thereafter the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners was verbally informed by the opposite party about the sale and they were asked to attorn to them and pay the rent. The opposite party also sent a notice on 12.5.99 by registered post with AD to the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners informing him about the sale and that with effect therefrom, the opposite party had become the landlord vis-a-vis the suit premises. According to the opposite party, the notice was received by the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners on 15.5.1999. The proforma opposite party also issued a notice to the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners by registered post with AD on 18.6.1999 informing him about the transfer of the property in favour of the opposite party by sale deed dated 23.1.1988. The proforma opposite party also issued a notice to the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners by registered post with AD on 18.6.1999 informing him about the transfer of the property in favour of the opposite party by sale deed dated 23.1.1988. The opposite party contented that in spite of the above information/limitation, the predecessor in interest of the Petitioner did neither approach them nor offered rent for the period thereafter. On such failure, therefore, the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners became a defaulter. In addition, the opposite party pleaded that the present accommodation in which they were residing was inadequate and that they required the suit premises bonafide for their own use and occupation by making constructions. 4. The predecessor in interest of the Petitioners filed his written statement inter alia expressing ignorance about the transaction of the sale of the suit premises by the proforma opposite party in favour of the Plaintiff/opposite party and asserted that neither he was verbally informed about the same nor was served with any notice in connection therewith. It was contended that there was no fixed date for payment of rent and that the landlord used to collect the same intermittently and not at regular intervals. The proforma opposite party on being offered rent for the suit premises for the month of July, 1998 refused to accept the same and as all efforts for payment failed, he was compelled to deposit the rent for July, 1998 onwards in Court. It was pleaded that for several days at a stretch, he approached the proforma opposite party tendering rent but on continuous refusal to accept the same, he had no other alternative but to deposit the rent favouring the proforma opposite party in Court regularly. It was, therefore, contended that he was not a defaulter as alleged. The claim on bonafide requirement was also resisted inter alia contending that the same did not have any factual basis. 5. On the death of the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners on 27.8.2002, the Petitioners were substituted in his place. They thereafter filed an application for amendment of the written statement filed by the original Defendant, which was allowed overruling the objection of the opposite party Plaintiff. 6. 5. On the death of the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners on 27.8.2002, the Petitioners were substituted in his place. They thereafter filed an application for amendment of the written statement filed by the original Defendant, which was allowed overruling the objection of the opposite party Plaintiff. 6. In their amended written statement, the Petitioners-while reiterating that there was no fixed date for payment of rent and that the landlord(s) used to collect the same at their desire-asserted in particular that they had no knowledge about transaction of sale between the proforma opposite party and the opposite party Plaintiff and also denied to have been served with any notice about the same. According to them, the rent for the month of July, 1998, was offered to the opposite party Plaintiff but as they refused to accept the same and as all appeals failed, the Petitioners under the compelling circumstances had to deposit the rent for the month of July 1998 onwards in Court, the corresponding rent deposit case for the said month being Misc. N. (J) 2847/98. According to them, they approached the opposite party Plaintiff regularly tendering the rent and requesting them to accept the same and on being refused kept on depositing the same in Court. They, therefore, maintained that they could not be branded as defaulters. They reiterated the stand of their predecessor in interest that the suit premises was not bonafide required by the Plaintiffs opposite party. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed several issues of which issues Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 being relevant are extracted herein below. Issue No. 4 : Whether the principal Defendant is a tenant of the Plaintiff? Issue No. 5 : Whether the Defendant is a defaulter in payment of monthly rent?. Issue No 6: Whether the Defendant has deposited the monthly rent in Court and if so whether such deposit is valid? Issue No. 7: Whether the suit premises is bonafide required by the Plaintiffs? 8. Both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. Whereas the opposite party Plaintiff examined Sujit Banerjee (Plaintiff No. 1), and Subroto Banerjee (Plaintiff No. 2) as their witnesses, the Petitioners' examined Pradip Chakraborty, Sudip Chakraborty and Subhas Banerjee as their witnesses. Issue No. 7: Whether the suit premises is bonafide required by the Plaintiffs? 8. Both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. Whereas the opposite party Plaintiff examined Sujit Banerjee (Plaintiff No. 1), and Subroto Banerjee (Plaintiff No. 2) as their witnesses, the Petitioners' examined Pradip Chakraborty, Sudip Chakraborty and Subhas Banerjee as their witnesses. They inter alia also proved rent paying receipts from the year 1953, challans evidencing deposit of rent in the name of opposite party/Plaintiff as well as the rent deposit cases for the months of July, September, November, December, 1998 and April, 2001. 9. The learned Trial Court answered Issue No. 4 holding the principal Defendant (predecessor in interest of the Petitioner) as the tenant under the opposite party. While deciding issue No. 5 and 6, the learned Trial Court took note of the sate deed, Exhibit 1, the notice Exhibit 2, informing the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners about the sale transaction and Exhibit 4, the certificate issued by the Postal Department confirming delivery of notice, Exhibit 2 to the Principal Defendant i.e. Promod Chakraborty on 15.5.1999. It held that as by dint of the sale, the opposite party had become the owners of the suit premises only on 23.11.1988, the tender of rent prior thereto to them was invalid. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court concluded that the Petitioners/Defendants having failed to discharge their burden in establishing that they had tendered rent for the months of May, June, July, August, 1999 to the opposite party Plaintiffs prior to depositing the rent for the said months in Court, the deposit was not a valid one and that therefore they were defaulters in payment of rent. The learned Trial Court, however, rejected the plea of bonafide requirement and decreed the suit only on the ground of defaulter. 10. Being aggrieved, the Petitioners took the matter in appeal and by the impugned judgment and order, the learned lower Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the learned Trial Court. 11. The learned Trial Court, however, rejected the plea of bonafide requirement and decreed the suit only on the ground of defaulter. 10. Being aggrieved, the Petitioners took the matter in appeal and by the impugned judgment and order, the learned lower Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the learned Trial Court. 11. The learned lower Appellate Court while deciding the issue of defaulter took note of the extracts of the assessment register of the Corporation (Exhibit 9) and held that the proforma opposite party as the owners of the suit premises, by Exhibit 1 the sale deed had conveyed the same to the opposite party Plaintiffs on 23.11.1988 whereafter the latter became the owner thereof. On a consideration of the rent receipts, Exhibit C, D and E (series) evidencing receipt of rent by Sujit Banerjee and Subroto Kumar Banerjee opposite party/Plaintiff No. 1 and opposite party Plaintiff No. 2 respectively from the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners, the learned lower Appellate Court on the basis of definition of "landlord" in Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (hereafter referred to as the Act) held that the tender of rent, if made by the Defendant to the Plaintiff opposite party on 23.11.98 was valid. The learned Court below, however, on a consideration of the evidence of DW1 and DW3 conjointly on the aspect of offering of rent to the opposite party Plaintiff found the same to be contradictory and declined to accept the factum of tender for the month of July, 98. It also noticed the admission of DW1 about the issuance of notices Exhibit 2 and 5 to the original Defendant and also accepted the service of notice Exhibit 2 on him on 15.5.1999 in terms of the certificate issued by the Postal Department, Exhibit 4. On a discussion of the evidence on record, the learned Court below concluded that in absence of any evidence that after the knowledge of the sale, the Petitioners Defendants had tendered rent to the opposite party Plaintiff, the deposit of rent in Court was not valid and thus they were defaulters in payment of rent. The trial court's findings on the issue of bonafide requirement was, however, upheld. 12. Mr. The trial court's findings on the issue of bonafide requirement was, however, upheld. 12. Mr. Sharma has argued that it being evident on the face of the records that the opposite party Plaintiffs had been the landlord vis-a-vis the suit premises from before 23.11.98 and that they had been receiving the rent paid by the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners by issuing due receipts therefore and it being amply established that the opposite party Plaintiffs having refused to accept the rent when tendered for the month of July, 98, the same was deposited in Court, the finding that the Petitioners were defaulters in payment of rent is perverse. There being sufficient evidence on record that the Petitioners/Defendants had tendered rent to the opposite party Plaintiffs on all occasions before depositing the same in Court, the learned lower Appellate Court acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction in holding otherwise and returning a finding that the Petitioners were defaulters. According to Mr. Sharma, the learned lower Appellate Court having held that the opposite party Plaintiffs were the landlord in terms of Section 2(c) of the Act vis-a-vis Petitioners, it ought to have taken note of the secondary evidence of deposit of rent from the month of May, 1999 in the form of treasury challans, as available on records and in not doing so it failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in law. The Petitioners having taken due steps in the related miscellaneous cases rend deposit cases as required under Section 5(4) of the Act, the learned lower Appellate Court ought to have held that the Petitioners were not defaulters as alleged. The records of the misc. cases relating to the deposit of rent for the months amongst Ors. of May 1999 onwards not having been produced by the office inspite of an application made therefor, the Petitioners could not have been made responsible therefore and the finding of the learned lower Appellate Court in the above premises that the Petitioners were defaulters being patently illegal is liable to be interfered with by this Court. 13. In support of his submissions, Mr. Sharma has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court. Dutta Cycle Stores and Ors. v. Gita Devi Sultania and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 586 , Vasudha Srivastava and Ors. v. Smt. Kamla Chauhan and Anr. (1992) 1 SCC 645 , Ms. Grewal and Anr. 13. In support of his submissions, Mr. Sharma has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court. Dutta Cycle Stores and Ors. v. Gita Devi Sultania and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 586 , Vasudha Srivastava and Ors. v. Smt. Kamla Chauhan and Anr. (1992) 1 SCC 645 , Ms. Grewal and Anr. v. Deep Chand Sood and Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 151 , Smt. Renu Roy and Ors. (On the death of Rashik Roy his heirs) v. Shri Bolo Ram Kalita 1988 (1) GLR 330, Nabajyoti Mahanta v. Smt. Prabini Majumdar(1996) 2 GLT 459, Ms. Lumbini Baruah v. Cotton College, Guwahati and Ors. 1997 (1) GLT 67. 14. In reply Mr. Goswami has argued that the determinations by the Courts below on default being concurrent findings of fact, this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would not interfere therewith. No re-appreciation of evidence is permissible and this Court would not sit over in appeal over such conclusions based on an exhaustive analysis of the materials on record. According to him, the opposite party Plaintiff having proved the purchase of suit property by the sale deed exhibit 1, intimation thereof to the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners vide Exhibit 2 and the receipt of the notice vide exhibit 4, they became the landlord only w.e.f. 23.11.1988 therefore, plea of payment of rent prior thereto was wholly irrelevant. Mr. Goswami has argued that the Petitioners having failed to prove the tender of rent to the opposite party Plaintiff after 15.5.1999, the deposit thereafter in Court, if any, not being in terms of the requirements of Section 5(4) of the Act, is nonest in law and therefore, the learned Court below was perfectly justified in holding that they were defaulters in payment of rent. The opposite party Plaintiffs having become the owners of the suit premises and, therefore, the landlord w.e.f. 23.11.1998 and entitled to receive rent from 15.5.1999, the date on which the transfer of the ownership was known to the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners, it was their burden to establish that they had duly tendered the rent for the period thereafter to them before depositing the same in Court. There being no evidence on record to the said effect, the finding of default recorded by the learned Court below cannot be faulted with, he urged. There being no evidence on record to the said effect, the finding of default recorded by the learned Court below cannot be faulted with, he urged. The challans of payment of rent per se being not suggestive of the compliance of requirements of Section 5(4) of the Act in absence of better evidence the learned Senior Counsel contended that the learned Court below rightly held the Petitioners to be defaulters. 15. I have extended my thoughtful consideration to the rival contention of the parties. As the finding with regard to the bonafide requirement has not been questioned the scrutiny has to be essentially confined only to the plea of default. Whereas the Petitioners/Defendants have taken a consistent plea that from the very beginning the opposite party Plaintiffs had been the landlord receiving rent from them for the suit premises till the Month of July, 1998, whereafter the rent had to be deposited in Court after unsuccessful tendering, the specific case of the opposite party Plaintiffs is that they had become the owners of the suit premises only w.e.f. 23.11.1998 and entitled to rent from 15.5.1999 the date on which they claim, the notice of the sale transaction was served on the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners. 16. The categorical assertion of the opposite party Plaintiffs being that the Petitioners Defendants had become defaulter in payment of rent having failed to pay the rent for the period after 15.5.1999, in my view the point to be examine is whether having regard to the stand taken by the Petitioners-Defendants they have been able to discharge their burden to prove that the rent had been deposited by them in Court after that date in conformity with the requirements of Section 5(4) of the Act. This is because having regard to the pleaded case of the Plaintiffs in the plaint, the tender of rent and the deposit thereof for the period before 15.5.1999 is inconsequential. 17. In his evidence, PW1 inter alia proved the sale deed, Exhibit 1. He deposed that they informed the Petitioners about the transaction and that the certificate issued by the postal department, Exhibit 4 established that the notice Exhibit 2 was received by the addressee. 17. In his evidence, PW1 inter alia proved the sale deed, Exhibit 1. He deposed that they informed the Petitioners about the transaction and that the certificate issued by the postal department, Exhibit 4 established that the notice Exhibit 2 was received by the addressee. He also asserted that the proforma Defendants too had sent the intimation of the sale to the predecessor in interest of the Petitioner by Exhibit 5, which according to the postal department was served on him vide Exhibit 6. The statement on oath is that after 15.5.1999, no rent was paid. In his cross examination, however, the witness stated that he had send the sale notice, Exhibit 2 to the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners and Exhibit 4, the certificate issued by the postal department did not contain any seal and Exhibit 3, the postal receipt did not disclose the address of the addressee. The evidence of PW2 is more or less in the same lines. He testified that after the purchase of the suit premises, they demanded rent from the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners. According to the witness even after receipt of the notice, Exhibit-2, the tenants did not contact them. 18. DW1, in his testimony inter alia stated that the opposite party Plaintiffs having refused to accept the rent for the month of July, 1998, they started depositing rent in Court. According to him, they approached the opposite party Plaintiff every month to accept the rent but on their refusal, rent was deposited in Court. In cross examination, however, this witness stated that the opposite party had become owners in 1966-67 and admitted that the rent deposit cases for the year 1999 were not in Court. He, however, denied the suggestion that no tender was made before deposit of rent and that no steps had been taken to issue notice of the deposit to the landlord. The evidence of DW2 is substantially the same. He, however, added that no notice about the factum of sale was received on 15.5.1999. He further testified that though steps were taken for calling for the Rent Cases records since July, 1998, apart from a few records for the year 1998 and 2001 Ors. could not be located. The evidence of DW2 is substantially the same. He, however, added that no notice about the factum of sale was received on 15.5.1999. He further testified that though steps were taken for calling for the Rent Cases records since July, 1998, apart from a few records for the year 1998 and 2001 Ors. could not be located. DW 3 deposed that in the month of August, 1998, he had gone to the house of the opposite party Plaintiffs with Pradip Chakraborty to tender rend for the month of July, 1998 refused to accept the same without any cause and that thereafter rent was deposited in Court as per law. 19. The rent receipts introduced in evidence by the Petitioners can be categorized into two groups. While those marked as Exhibit A, B, C, D and E relate to the period 1953 to May 1998, Exhibit G series are challans of deposit of rent in Court for the period 1998 to 2003. These inter alia include challans for the deposit of rent for the months of April, 1999, May 1999 and June, 1999 corresponding to Misc. NJ Case No. 1633/1999, Misc. NJ Case No. 1865/99 and Misc. NJ Case No. 5027/99. The records of the said misc. cases however have not been produced or proved. Exhibit H is the application calling for the records of the relevant NJ Cases which include those for the deposits, for the above months. Exhibit I and Exhibit J are reports of the concerned Office Assistant to the effect that the records of the Misc. NJ Cases mentioned therein could not be located. The list includes the aforementioned cases. The fact remains therefore that the only evidence of deposit of rent in Court immediately after 15.5.1999 are the treasury challans for the months of April, May, June, 1999, as referred to above marked as Exhibit G(48), G(49) and G(46) respectively. The other treasury challans pertaining to the subsequent months have not been referred to for obvious being not relevant. 20. The procedure and manner for deposit of rent in Court under the Act is delineated in Section 5(4) thereof. The other treasury challans pertaining to the subsequent months have not been referred to for obvious being not relevant. 20. The procedure and manner for deposit of rent in Court under the Act is delineated in Section 5(4) thereof. Thereunder where a landlord refuses to accept rent offered by his tenant, the latter may within a fortnight of its becoming due deposit in Court the amount of such rent together with process fees for service of notice upon the land lord and on receipt of such deposit the Court would cause a notice of such deposit, to be served on the landlord and the amount of deposit may thereafter be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Court in their behalf. The said provision of the Act provides that a tenant who makes a deposit in the manner so prescribed would not be treated as a defaulter under Clause (e) of the proviso of Section 5(1). 21. The pre-eminent essentials of a valid deposit as can be gathered from hereinabove are that before the same is made the lawful rent has to be tendered to the Petitioner by the landlord and if the landlord refuses to accept the same it is permissible for the tenant within a fortnight of its falling due to deposit the same in Court accompanied by the process fee for service of notice on the landlord who on receipt thereof may thereafter withdraw the amount so deposited. It is now a trite law that any deposit not in conformity with the above mandate of Section 5(4) of the Act is not a valid one and consequently the protection to a tenant as envisaged thereunder would not be extendable in such an eventuality. 22. The evidence on record discloses the consistent stand of the Petitioners that the opposite party Plaintiffs as their landlord having refused to accept rent lawfully tendered for the month of July, 1998 onwards they started depositing the same in Court. The Plaintiffs/witnesses however, have given a different version. They have denied any offer or refusal. Further through suggestions made to the witnesses of the Petitioners/Defendants, opposite party/Plaintiffs have sought to convey that the steps contemplated under Section 5(4) of the Act following the deposit have also not been taken. 23. The Plaintiffs/witnesses however, have given a different version. They have denied any offer or refusal. Further through suggestions made to the witnesses of the Petitioners/Defendants, opposite party/Plaintiffs have sought to convey that the steps contemplated under Section 5(4) of the Act following the deposit have also not been taken. 23. The evidence of the witnesses of the Petitioners noticeably are not very categorical with regard to the deposit of rent in particular after 15.5.1999. Their testimony is general in nature on the factum of offer, refusal and deposit from July, 1998. This assumes importance in view of the clear and categorical stand of the opposite party alleging default from 15.5.1999. Admittedly the records of the NJ Cases for the deposit of rent for the months of May and June, 1999, could not either be produced or proved by the Petitioners. The only documentary evidence relied upon by them to substantiate their plea of deposit of rent for the month of May and June, 1999 and the subsequent months are related treasury challans referred to above. The evidence of DW3 with regard to the steps taken for summoning the records of Misc. NJ Cases mentions about non-availability of such cases for the deposits made in the year 1998 and 2001. Though the reports, Exhibit H and I indicate that as on those dates, the records of the relevant NJ cases were not available, no attempt seems to have been made by the Petitioners to adduce better evidence to prove and/or establish that the prescriptions of Section 5(4) of the Act vis-a-vis the deposits made for the period after 15.5.1999 have been scrupulously complied with. The Petitioners/Defendants having taken the categorical plea that rent for every month had been offered to the landlord and that on refusal to accept the same they had made the deposits in Court, in my view it was their exclusive burden to prove that the mandatory directives of Section 5(4) of the Act had been complied with so as to legitimately avail the protection comprehended thereunder. The challans of deposit of rent referred to above per se do not establish compliance of all the requirements of Section 5(4) of the Act. The records of the connected NJ cases would have disclosed the correct state of affairs. The challans of deposit of rent referred to above per se do not establish compliance of all the requirements of Section 5(4) of the Act. The records of the connected NJ cases would have disclosed the correct state of affairs. In the face of non-availability of the said records in my view it was incumbent on the Petitioners/Defendants to adduce further evidence to the effect that the mandate of Section 5(4) in the instant case had been satisfied. The evidence adduced by the Petitioners falls short of the said demand. 24. Though an attempt has been made on behalf of the Petitioners while cross-examining PW1 and PW2 to discredit the certificate Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 6, a close scrutiny of the other proved documents taken together persuades one to hold that the notices Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 5 were addressed to the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners and served on him in due course. The cut off date of 15.5.1999 to ascertain the default in payment of rent as cited by the opposite party/Plaintiffs is logical. 25. The observations of this Court in Smti. Renu Roy and Ors. (on the death of Rashik Roy his heirs) v. Shri Bolo Ram Kalita (supra), that if two views are reasonably possible on the question under examination, one favouring the tenant has to be adopted, in my view does not advance the cause of the Petitioner, they having failed to discharge their burden that the statutory mandate of Section 5(4) had been complied with in the instant case. 26. The acts required to be performed as prescribed by Section 5(4) of the Act being those of the tenant, the presumption of validity of official acts referred to in Ms Lumbini Baruah, (supra), is of no consequence in the present setting of facts. 27. The Apex Court in M/s Dutta Cycle Stores, (supra), negatived the concurrent findings of the Courts below that the tenant was in arrear of rent in absence of any evidence adduced by the landlord countering the tenant's assertion on the materials on record to the contrary. In the present case, the opposite party/Plaintiffs have adduced categorical evidence that no rent was tendered for the months in default and that they were unaware of any deposit in Court. This decision as well therefore, is of no assistance to the Petitioners being distinguishable on facts. 28. In the present case, the opposite party/Plaintiffs have adduced categorical evidence that no rent was tendered for the months in default and that they were unaware of any deposit in Court. This decision as well therefore, is of no assistance to the Petitioners being distinguishable on facts. 28. The decision in Nabajyoti Mahanta, (supra), has been pressed into service to underline that for a tenant to be a defaulter the failure to pay rent has to be willful. Such not being the prescription of the Act involved, with all humility, I do not consider that this decision is of any relevance in the instant case. 29. In Ms. Grewal and Anr. (supra), the Apex Court underscored the necessity of a court of law to adopt a justice oriented approach and eschew technicalities lest the same outweighs the course of justice. The essential pre-conditions of a valid deposit postulated in Section 5(4) of the Act cannot by any means be comprehended as inessential technicalities. On the other hand, the statutory protection from default being extendable only on the compliance of the prescriptions thereof the reported decision cannot advance the case of the Petitioners. 30. A Full Bench of this Court in Amar Bahadur Thapa and Anr. v. Abdul Hai and Anr. AIR 1970 Gau 59 , had rejected deposit of the rent made in noncompliance of the requirements of Section 6(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1955 (which is peri materia with Section 5(4) of the preset Act) as irregular and refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts pertaining thereto. 31. In view of the above narrative, I am constrained to hold that the finding of the learned Court below on the issue of default against the Petitioners cannot be faulted with. The conclusion recorded by the learned lower Appellate Court is preceded by an exhaustive analysis of the pleadings and the evidence of the parties and the findings cannot be said to be either arbitrary or perverse. No patent illegality in the approach is discernible either. The petition being without any merit is, therefore, dismissed. At this stage, Mr. Atal Tiwari, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits on instructions that they may be granted six months time to vacate the premises. The prayer in the facts and circumstances of the case being reasonable is allowed. No patent illegality in the approach is discernible either. The petition being without any merit is, therefore, dismissed. At this stage, Mr. Atal Tiwari, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits on instructions that they may be granted six months time to vacate the premises. The prayer in the facts and circumstances of the case being reasonable is allowed. The Petitioners are granted six months time therefrom to vacate the premises. No costs. Petition dismissed.