Birjis Khatun v. Welfare Commissioner, Bhopal Gas Victims
2005-05-18
R.V.RAVEENDRAN, SHANTANU KEMKAR
body2005
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Raveendran, C.J. -- 1. On the night intervening between 2nd and 3rd December 1984, a colossal disaster occurred in Bhopal on account of release of highly toxic and dangerous gas (Methyl Isocyanate) from the plant of the Union Carbide (India) Ltd, Bhopal. As a result, thousands died and lakhs suffered ill-effects resulting in declining health and increasing ailments. The petitioner claims that she is a resident of Bhopal and that she suffered seriously on account of the said leak. She filed a claim in 1985 before the Directorate of Claims, Bhopal, which was subsequently transferred to the Deputy Commissioner, Bhopal Gas Victims, Ward No. 40, Bhopal. The claim was registered as Case No. 602K/93 and a compensation of Rs.25,000/- was awarded by order dated 5.2.1994. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal on 27 .5.1994 before the Third Additional Welfare Commissioner, Bhopal Gas Victims, Bhopal, seeking enhancement of the compensation. The Third Additional Welfare Commissioner registered the appeal as a revision on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation. The said revision petition (SMR No. 266/ 1995) was dismissed by order dated 10.3.1995. 2. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Welfare Commissioner, Bhopal Gas Victims (the first respondent or "Commissioner" for short) on 11.9.1997. The said petition was registered as SMR No. 01/266/98. The learned Welfare Commissioner by order dated 20.9.2003, dismissed the said petition as "barred by limitation", as it was filed beyond one year from the date of order of the Additional Welfare Commissioner. He followed the decision in the case of Savitribai (MJC No. 01/1073/03 decided on 26.7.2003) wherein he had held that the period of one year would be just, proper and reasonable time for a claimant to prefer a revision against the order of the Additional Welfare Commissioner d any revision filed beyond that period will not be entertained in exercise 10 motu power conferred on him under para 13(3) of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of Claims) Scheme, 1985. 3. The said order of Welfare Commissioner is challenged in this writ petition.
3. The said order of Welfare Commissioner is challenged in this writ petition. The petitioner contends that neither the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 ("Act" for short) nor the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of Claims) Scheme, 1985 ("Scheme" for short) prescribed any period of limitation for filing a revision before the Commissioner and in the absence of any such provision, the Commissioner cannot, by a quasi-judicial order, lay down a condition that the period of limitation for revision petitions shall be one year and then apply the said period of limitation to other revisions. It is also contended that a quasi-judicial order fixing a period of limitation without publication either in the Official Gazette or in any other manner known to law, cannot be a binding precedent on those who were not parties to the said order. At all events, it is submitted, any decision of the Welfare Commissioner that the limitation shall be one year in a quasi-judicial proceedings can only have prospective operation and cannot apply to revision petitions filed before the date of such decision. Lastly, it is contended that having regard to the provisions of the Act and the Scheme, which are beneficial provisions intended to help the victims of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the refusal by the learned Welfare Commissioner to examine whether there was sufficient cause to explain the delay, is wholly erroneous. 4. One the other hand, the learned Advocate General appearing for the first respondent submitted that the Commissioner has the power and authority to regulate his own procedure in all matters arising out of discharge of his functions under the Scheme; that in view of it, he can also prescribe a period of limitation for invoking his suo motu power of revision under para 13(3) of the Scheme. It is also contended that no claimant has a right to demand that his revision petition should be entertained and decided irrespective of any delay. Lastly it is submitted that the Commissioner was constrained to fix a period of limitation having regard to the peculiar situation arising out of innumerable revision petitions being filed long after the decision of the Additional Commissioner.
Lastly it is submitted that the Commissioner was constrained to fix a period of limitation having regard to the peculiar situation arising out of innumerable revision petitions being filed long after the decision of the Additional Commissioner. The following detailed reasons given by the learned Commissioner in Savitribai's case (supra) while holding that the period of limitation should be one year, are relied on in support of the contention: "The most unfortunate gas tragedy of the last century had struck Bhopal on 2/3.12.1984. More than 18 years have already passed by but there does not appear to be any end to the litigation that had commenced some time in the year 1992. The Courts of Dy. Commissioners, Additional Welfare Commissioners and Welfare Commissioners have already disposed of more than 10 lac claim cases. Out of which, looking to the nature of the injury and the ailments suffered by the claimants, more than 5,69,000 claimants have already been awarded compensation. It appears that in the year 1984, according the Census, 10 lac was not even the population of Bhopal. Obviously, on account of some floating population, claims were preferred, which have been decided. After all, such litigation has to come to an end. Pendency of the cases for more than 18 years, ever since the Bhopal Gas Disaster had taken place, is sending a wrong signal to the society. To some extent, such delay casts a slur on the judicial process. No doubt it is true that sympathy has to be shown to the genuine claimants but it cannot be extended to such an extent that judicial system may itself collapse because of the false and frivolous claims which have been preferred by claimants. The claimants' who were well aware of their right to prefer appeal or to file an application to take it up under suo motu powers, have slept over their right and appear to have gone into hibernation, Courts or legal process are not meant to help such litigants. Thus a period of limitation has to be prescribed and the same has to be fixed. Some reasonable period has to be fixed so as to make the claimants aware of the period of limitation, under which an application for exercising powers of suo motu revision by the Welfare Commissioner could be preferred by an aggrieved claimant.
Thus a period of limitation has to be prescribed and the same has to be fixed. Some reasonable period has to be fixed so as to make the claimants aware of the period of limitation, under which an application for exercising powers of suo motu revision by the Welfare Commissioner could be preferred by an aggrieved claimant. As has been mentioned above, the Scheme of 1985 does not provide any revision against the order of Additional Commissioner. It merely confers power on Welfare Commissioner to suo motu call for the record of any case and revise the order passed thereon, if found necessary. Therefore, under the Scheme of 1985, no substantive right of revision has been conferred on a claimant. Thus, considering the matter from various angles and looking to the facts and features of the cases and the history under which all these matters have come up to this stage, I am of the considered opinion that period of 1 year would be just, proper and reasonable time to the claimant to have preferred revision in case he feels aggrieved by the order passed by Additional Welfare Commissioner, meaning thereby that all those revisions which have been preferred beyond a period of one year from the date of the passing of the order by the Additional Welfare Commissioner, the same cannot be entertained in exercise of the powers conferred on this Court under sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 13 of the Scheme, 1985. This period of one year has been fixed by me so as to give sufficient and ample opportunity to the claimant to exhaust further remedy against the impugned order. A question may however, untill, still arise as to why only one year has been fixed, why not 2 years, 3 years and some may say it should be, till infinity. But as has been said earlier that all litigation, even if it is under a benevolent scheme for the advantage of the gas affected person, has to come to an end. But certain amount of reasonableness has to be there. In fact according to me, a period of few months alone would have been just and sufficient if it had not been a case of gas affected person.
But certain amount of reasonableness has to be there. In fact according to me, a period of few months alone would have been just and sufficient if it had not been a case of gas affected person. But here as I have mentioned above, thousands and thousands of persons were affected, thus with an intention to extend the benefit to all those who still felt aggrieved a period of one year for exercising suo motu powers of revision would be just and proper. For what I have said above, all those revisions which have been preferred within a period of 1 year from the date of passing of the order by Additional Welfare Commissioner alone are to be heard and disposed of on merits as suo motu revisions 'on application'. Where the claimants have been sleeping over their right, they shall have no further remedy of applying for exercise of suo motu revisional powers of this Court, beyond a period of 1 year from the date of passing of the impugned order. Since all the aforesaid matters have been admittedly preferred beyond a period of one year from the date of the impugned order the same are not maintainable and are liable to be dismissed on this preliminary ground of limitation. (emphasis supplied) 5. Shri Dharmendra Sharma, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the second respondent (Central Government) supported and reiterated the contentions urged by the first respondent. 6. On the said contentions, the following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether a claimant aggrieved by an order of the Additional Welfare Commissioner can invoke the suo motu power of the Welfare Commissioner by filing a revision petition under para 13(3) of the Scheme? (2) If so, in the absence of a provision in the Scheme prescribing any period of limitation, whether the Welfare Commissioner can fix one year as the period of limitation? (3) Whether the period of 'limitation' prescribed by a quasi-judicial order has the effect of 'law' so as to bind other aggrieved persons? 7. Before taking these points for consideration, a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules and the object of the Act will be useful. 7.1.
(3) Whether the period of 'limitation' prescribed by a quasi-judicial order has the effect of 'law' so as to bind other aggrieved persons? 7. Before taking these points for consideration, a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules and the object of the Act will be useful. 7.1. The Parliament passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 ("Act" for short) to confer certain powers on the Central Government so that claims arising out of or connected with the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster could be dealt with speedily, effectively, equitably and to the best advantage of the claimants. Section 6 enabled the Central Government to appoint a Commissioner for the welfare of the victims of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster, and such other officers and employees to assist him as it may deem fit, for the purpose of assisting the Central Government in discharging its functions under the Act. Section 9 enabled the State Government to frame, by notification published in the Official Gazette. a scheme for carrying into the effect the purposes of the Act. Subsection (2) of section 9 provides that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (J), the Scheme may provide for all or any of the following matters. namely: (a) the registration of the claims under the scheme and all matters connected with such registration; (b) the processing of the claims for securing their enforcement and matters connected therewith. (c) ..... (d) ..... (e) ..... (f) ..... (g) ..... (h) ..... (i) the functions of the Commissioner and other officers and employees appointed under Section 6. Section II states that the provisions of the Act and any scheme framed thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than the said Act or any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than the said Act. 7.2. In exercise of powers under section 9 of the Act, the Central Government framed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of Claims) Scheme. 1985. Paragraph 3 provides that the Deputy Commissioners appointed under section 6 of the Act shall be the authorities for registration of claims. Paragraph 4 provides the manner of filing claims. Paragraph 5 provides for categorisation and registration of claims.
1985. Paragraph 3 provides that the Deputy Commissioners appointed under section 6 of the Act shall be the authorities for registration of claims. Paragraph 4 provides the manner of filing claims. Paragraph 5 provides for categorisation and registration of claims. Subparas (3) and (4) of para 5 empower the Deputy Commissioners to consider the claims and pass appropriate orders allowing the claim by deciding the appropriate category or rejecting the claim. Sub-para (5) provides that if the claimant is not satisfied with the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner under sub-para (3) or (4), he may prefer an appeal against such order to the Additional Commissioner, who shall decide the same. Sub-para (6) provides that the appeal to the Additional Commissioner shall be filed within 60 days from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the claimant preferring the appeal. Paragraph 6 specifies the matters to be taken into consideration by the Deputy Commissioner for categorisation of the claims. Paragraph 8 prescribing the procedure to be followed reads thus: "8. Procedure: The Commissioner shall have the power to regulate his own procedure, and the procedure to be followed by the Deputy Commissioner and other officers and employees appointed under section 6, in all matters arising out of discharge of his or, as the case may be, their functions under this scheme, including the place or places there he shall hold his sittings." Paragraph 10 deals with creation of "Claims and Relief Fund" for disbursal of amounts in settlement of claims. Paragraph 11 provides for the manner of disbursal and appointment, etc. Paragraph 13 deals with functions of the Commissioner and other officers appointed under section 6 of the Act. The same is extracted below: "13(1). The Commissioner shall be in charge of supervising the work relating to receipts, registration, processing and settlement of claims filed under this Scheme and all other matters connected with the administration of the said scheme. (2) Where an appeal has not been filed against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, passed under sub-paragraph (3) or subparagraph (4) of paragraph 5, the Additional Commissioner, may call for the record of any claim filed under paragraph 4.
(2) Where an appeal has not been filed against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, passed under sub-paragraph (3) or subparagraph (4) of paragraph 5, the Additional Commissioner, may call for the record of any claim filed under paragraph 4. If the Additional Commissioner, after examination of record consider it necessary or expedient so to do, he may revise, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner: Provided that where the order in revision is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the claimant, no such order shall be passed in revision unless the claimant has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order. The provisions of this sub-paragraph shall also apply to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, passed under paragraph 11 of this Scheme for which appeal is contemplated in sub-paragraph (5) thereof. (3) The Commissioner may, suo motu, call for the record of any claim filed under this Scheme and (f he considers it necessary or expedient so to do, revise, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the order passed thereon: Provided that where the order in revision is likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the claimant, no such order shall be passed in revision unless the claimant has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order. (4) All officers appointed under section 6 of the Act shall work under the supervision of the Commissioner and assist him in carrying out the day-to-day administration of the Scheme and the provisions of the Act." 8. While dealing with the Constitutional validity of the Act, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [AIR SC 1480] observed thus: "We reiterate that the basis of categorisation and the actual categorisation should be justiciable and judicially reviewable -- the provisions in the Act and the Scheme should be so read... We, however, make it clear that in respect of categorisation and claim, the authorities must act on principles of natural justice and act quasi-judicially. The Act was conceived on the noble promise of giving relief succour to the dumb, pale, meek and improverished victims of a industrial gas leak disaster, a concomitant evil in this industrial age of technological advancement and development.
The Act was conceived on the noble promise of giving relief succour to the dumb, pale, meek and improverished victims of a industrial gas leak disaster, a concomitant evil in this industrial age of technological advancement and development. The Act had kindled high hopes in the hearts of the weak and worn, wary and forlorn. The Act generated hope of humanity. The implementation of the Act must be with justice ... It is, therefore necessary to reiterate that the promises made to the victims and hopes raised in their hearts and minds can only be redeemed in some measure if attempts are made vigorously to distribute the amount realised to the victims in accordance with the Scheme as indicated above. That would be a redemption to a certain extent." Re : Point (1): 9. Under para 13(3) of the Scheme, the Commissioner is entrusted with the suo motu power to call for the record of any claim filed under the Scheme and revise the order passed thereon if found necessary or expedient to do so, for reasons to b recorded in writing. The Commissioner is required to give a hearing to the claimant if the revision is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the claimant. 10. The Legislature or its delegate, normally vest the power of revision in an authority to be exercised either (a) suo motu, or (b) on an application by a person aggrieved. Significantly, sub-para (3) of para 13 of the Scheme does not contain any provisions for exercise of power of revision at the instance or on the request of any aggrieved person, but only provides for exercise of power suo motu. When it is said that the Commissioner's power to revise the order passed by any lower authority, is to exercised suo motu, it means that the Commissioner may act on information derived from his own sources, that is, either by perusal of the records of the case or the media reports or the representations/complaints received from any aggrieved person. When a claimant files a partition requesting the Commissioner to revise the order of a lower authority, the Commissioner may decide to act on the information contained in such an application and exercise his suo motu power.
When a claimant files a partition requesting the Commissioner to revise the order of a lower authority, the Commissioner may decide to act on the information contained in such an application and exercise his suo motu power. In that event the exercise of revisional power by the Commissioner is not a result of any right of the claimant to seek revision, but is a result of the Commissioner deciding to exercise the power of revision suo motu on the basis of information gathered from the representation/ petition filed by the claimant. 11. When a petition is filed by a claimant seeking revision of an order of a lower authority, the Commissioner has the discretion to either refuse to entertain such a request or accept the request and revise the order suo motu on the basis of information supplied in the petition. As a claimant aggrieved by an order of the lower authority has no right to file a revision before the Commissioner, there is no need for the Commissioner to hear such a petitioner before taking a decision either to entertain or reject an application given by the claimant seeking revision. Rejection of a petition seeking, case of suo motu power is not an order prejudicial to the interest of the ant and, therefore, there is no need to give an opportunity of showing cause before rejection. Where, however, the Commissioner, on examination of the record, or otherwise, finds some irregularity or error in the order of a lower authority and proposes to exercise the power to revise such order suo motu, resulting in prejudice to a claimant then of course, the Commissioner will have to give a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed order, as required under the proviso to para 13(3), before passing final orders in exercise of the power of revision. 12. Thus, the exercise of power of revision being suo motu at the discretion of the revisional authority, no claimant can seek exercise of power of revision by the Commissioner as a matter of right. Re: Points (ii) & (iii): 13. Having regard to the beneficial object of the Act and the Scheme, when a claimant seeks exercise of suo motu power of revision, the Commissioner has to apply his mind to such petition. He can reject the petition if he finds no ground is made out to exercise the suo motu power.
Re: Points (ii) & (iii): 13. Having regard to the beneficial object of the Act and the Scheme, when a claimant seeks exercise of suo motu power of revision, the Commissioner has to apply his mind to such petition. He can reject the petition if he finds no ground is made out to exercise the suo motu power. He can also reject the petition if he finds that the claimant had been guilty of delay and laches. But where the delay is explained and does not affect any other person and the grievance is in regard to a manifest illegality, the Commissioner may, and in fact should, exercise the suo motu power of revision. Any refusal to exercise discretion, in particular judicial or quasijudicial discretion, should be on relevant grounds. When referring to discretion, we can do no better than recall the celebrated words of Lord Greene in the decision of Court of Appeal in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1947(2) All ER 680] : "For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably' ..... Warrington, L.J., I think it was, gave the example of the red-haired teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. That is unreasonable in one sense. In another sense it is taking into consideration extraneous matters." Equally relevant are the observations of a Full Bench of this Court in Ushadevi v. State of M.P "and others [1990 RN 77= 1990 MPLJ 353 ], while dealing with section 42 of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, it observed: "It cannot be jurisprudentially disputed that revisional jurisdiction is of the nature of supervisory jurisdiction exercised generally by the superior Court or authority and when such Court or authority is invested with power to act suo motu, it carries the implication that complete independence of action is thereby allowed to such Court or authority to exercise that power to fulfill the purpose statutorily contemplated...
Indeed, that power is meant to be exercised to ensure that the purpose and object of the enacted Jaw is not defeated and powers exercise subordinate authorities under the relevant enactment do not transgress any prescribed parameters producing forbidden result. The revisional authority, in essence, carries the responsibility of ensuring due administration of the law and implementation of the policy underlying the various provisions of the law in question." 14. Neither para 13 of the Scheme nor the Act prescribe any period of limitation for exercise of revisional power. The question is whether in such a provision, a period of limitation can be imported or engrafted by a quasijudicial order of the Welfare Commissioner. In M.R. Patel v. The State of Bihar [ AIR 1966 SC 343 ], a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the very question, that is, whether there can be any limitation for exercise of power of revision suo motu. The question arose with reference to power of revision of Board of Revenue under section 8(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1959. The Supreme Court held that "the Board of Revenue may exercise its power of revision under section 8(3) suo motu. No period of limitation is prescribed by the Act for exercise of power of revision under section 8(3) ...In a case where the Board exercises its power of revision its own motion. 120 question of I imitation arises." [emphasis supplied] 14.1. If there can be no limitation, the next question is whether the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised at "any time". In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghavnatha [ AIR 1969 SC 1297 ]. the Supreme Court considered section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, where no period was fixed for exercise of power of revision. The question was whether the revisional authority can revise the order at any time.
In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghavnatha [ AIR 1969 SC 1297 ]. the Supreme Court considered section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, where no period was fixed for exercise of power of revision. The question was whether the revisional authority can revise the order at any time. The Supreme Court held: "It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised." [emphasis supplied] In Mansaram v. S.P Pathak [ (1984) 1 SCC 125 ] the Supreme Court observed: "Where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time." In Government of India v. The Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals [ AIR 1989 SC 1771 ], the Supreme Court observed: "In the absence of any period of limitation, it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period.
What would be reasonable period would depend upon the facts of each case." [emphasis supplied] In Ramchand v. Union of India [ (1994) 1 SCC 44 ], the Supreme Court reiterated, "it is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no time limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable." In Mohamed Kavi Mohamed Amin v. Fatma Bai lbrahim [ (1997) 6 SCC 71 ], dealing with exercise of suo motu power under section 84C of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976, Supreme Court observed: "This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghavnatha [ (1969) 2 SCC 187 ] and in the case of Ramchand v. Union of India [ (1994) 1 SCC 44 ], has impressed that where no time limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute, it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time." Following the decision in Raghavnatha (supra), this court in Usha Devi (supra) held that where the provision of law confers a revisional power to be exercised suo motu at any time it means that it will have to the exercised within a reasonable time and what would be reasonable time must be determined with reference to facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. 15. From the above, the following principles emerge: (a) In the absence of prescription of any limitation in the legislation of subordinate legislation which invests an authority with the suo motu power of revision, there can be no 'limitation' for exercise of such of suo motu power. . (b) Non-prescription of limitation does not mean that the power can be invoked or exercised at any time. The power has to be invoked and exercised within a reasonable time. (c) What is reasonable time would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case that is under consideration and the nature of the order that is sought to be revised. The learned Commissioner referred to the decisions in Raghavnatha 's case (supra) and Citedal (supra) in Savitri Bai 's case.
(c) What is reasonable time would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case that is under consideration and the nature of the order that is sought to be revised. The learned Commissioner referred to the decisions in Raghavnatha 's case (supra) and Citedal (supra) in Savitri Bai 's case. The said decisions lay down two principles -- that power should be exercised within reasonable time and that the reasonable time for exercise of power must be determined with reference to the facts of each case and the nature of order which is to be revised. The Commissioner rightly followed the first principle. But while purporting to follow the second principle, he has wrongly applied it to determine the reasonable time with reference to the entire class of cases, instead of with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. In so doing, he has assumed a jurisdiction of prescribing a limitation which is lt1 the realm of the Legislature or its delegate, namely, the rule-making authority. 16. It is well settled that where the law does not prescribe any limitation for a proceeding, the principle of delay and laches will apply and any unexplained or unreasonable delay or laches on the part of a person seeking relief would be a ground for refusal to exercise the power. When a power is vested in an authority as an aid to render justice, without prescribing any period of limitation for exercise of such powers, the power would normally be exercised unless there is unreasonable and unexplained delay in invoking exercise of power by the person aggrieved, or exercise of such power would affect rights accrued to others on account of such delay. 17. In the absence of prescription of period of limitation in the Scheme, the revisional authority can say that he will not exercise the suo motu power if there is delay and laches. But the revisional authority cannot himself fix a period of limitation. The question is not whether the period fixed is reasonable, but whether it can be so fixed. When a power has been conferred without specifying any period of limitation for exercise of such power, it is not permissible for the authority entrusted with the power to prescribe a period of limitation and say that he will not entertain petitions tiled beyond that period.
When a power has been conferred without specifying any period of limitation for exercise of such power, it is not permissible for the authority entrusted with the power to prescribe a period of limitation and say that he will not entertain petitions tiled beyond that period. There may be cases where there are justifiable reasons or sufficient explanation for the delay in approaching the authority for exercise of the power. In the absence of any provision in the Act or Scheme prescribing a period of limitation for exercise of suo motu power of revision, the revisional authority cannot, while exercising his quasi-judicial power in deciding a particular case, hold that one year shall be a reasonable time in all cases and that all petitions requesting exercise of suo motu power filed beyond one year will be rejected as barred by limitation. 18. Another aspect requires to be noticed here. A provision of law prescribing a period of limitation, even when validly made, requires publication. Publication means publication in the Official Gazette. A person, who does not have notice of it for want of publication, cannot be bound by it nor be required to follow it. 19. We hasten to add that it is not our intention to say that petitions tiled after one year should be entertained. In fact, even a petition filed before the expiry of one year, say six months, may be rejected on the ground of delay and laches, if there is no satisfactory explanation. What requires emphasis is that rejection on the ground of delay should be with reference to examination of facts of each case, when no period of limitation is prescribed by law. The Commissioner can no doubt set for himself a guideline that normally he will not entertain any request made beyond one year. But he cannot prescribe a limitation period and reject all petitions filed beyond that period as barred by limitation, irrespective of whether there is satisfactory explanation or not. 20. It was argued that para 8 of the Scheme empowers the Commissioner to regulate his own procedure and the procedure to be followed by Officers appointed under section 6 in matters arising out of discharge of his or their functions under the Scheme, and in exercise of such power, the Commissioner can prescribe a period of limitation.
20. It was argued that para 8 of the Scheme empowers the Commissioner to regulate his own procedure and the procedure to be followed by Officers appointed under section 6 in matters arising out of discharge of his or their functions under the Scheme, and in exercise of such power, the Commissioner can prescribe a period of limitation. Firstly, the period of limitation is not prescribed in any regulations framed in exercise of power under para 8, but by an order deciding a revision petition. Secondly, the power under para 8 which enables the Commissioner to prescribe the procedure, does not extend to prescribing any period of limitation. That, as already noted, is a legislative power to be exercised by the Legislature or its delegate. 21. To summarise, the Commissioner entrusted with the suo motu power of revision without prescribing any period of limitation for exercise of said power cannot stipulate any period of limitation for exercise of such power. The power of revision being suo motu, the authority entrusted with the power has the discretion whether or not to exercise such power. When a person aggrieved requests the authority to exercise suo motu power, the authority can refuse to exercise such power where the authority feels that exercise of power of revision is unwarranted or where the party seeking exercise of such power is guilty of delay and laches or where the authority finds on merits that the order does not call for revision. But, there cannot be a threshold bar on the ground that it is filed beyond one year. Therefore, the observation in Savitabai (supra), that period of4imitation is one year, can at best be considered as a self-imposed guideline by the Commissioner that he would not normally entertain an application for suo motu revision beyond one year. But where the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Commissioner will have to proceed further in the matter. Conclusion: 22. Therefore, we are of the view that any order of the Commissioner which rejects a petition requesting exercise of suo motu power of revision merely on the ground that it is tiled beyond one year, amounts to refusal to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him. The proper course would be to examine the petition and decide whether it is a fit case for exercising the power of revision suo motu.
The proper course would be to examine the petition and decide whether it is a fit case for exercising the power of revision suo motu. The Commissioner is not bound to entertain all requests for exercise of suo motu revisional power. The Commissioner may refuse to entertain the request to exercise the suo motu power of revision either on account of delay and laches, or where no case is made out on merits. Such rejection can be without giving any hearing or opportunity to show cause. Such rejection need not even assign reason for his decision not to entertain the request, as exercise of power of revision is suo motu. What is• objectionable is prescribing a period of limitation and rejection on the ground of such limitation. 23. As a consequence, we allow this petition and set aside the order of the Commissioner, dated 29.2.2003 in SMR No. 1/266/98 and request him to consider the matter with reference to the explanation for the delay, that is, whether the delay is satisfactorily explained. Nothing stated above shall be construed as holding that petitions filed beyond one year are to be entertained. It is open to the Commissioner, on considering the delay and the explanation therefore, to decline to entertain the petition (seeking exercise of suo motu revisional power), if there is no satisfactory explanation regarding delay. .......................