Judgment :- (1.) This appeal is at the instance of the employer, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. challenging the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent Ramesh Prasad Srivastav was allowed and the punishment awarded to him as a result of the departmental proceedings against him was set aside. By the impugned order, the learned Judge set aside the orders dated 7.7.1991 and 18.6.1992 and directed the appellant to forthwith place the case of the petitioner with appropriate Selection Committee within a period of three months from the date of service of a copy of the order upon the respondent employer. In short, the writ petitioner-respondent was held to be wholly exonerated on the facts and was ordered to be reinstated to his earlier position. (2.) By way of facts we may state that the original writ petitioner was working with the appellant herein and while so working was served with a charge- sheet dated 17.2.1987. In the charge-sheet, three charges were levelled against the writ petitioner. They being (a) that he failed to maintain absolute integrity, (b) that he had acted in a manner prejudicial to the interests or image of the company and (c) fraud and dishonesty in providing employment to a non-entitled person. Amongst the allegations it was stated that while the delinquent officer was posted in the position of Senior Personnel Officer, he received an Office Order No. GM-Pers/MP/Bhowra/XI/84/4521-26 dated 10/11 May, 1984 signed by the Personnel Manager, Bhowra Area purporting to be a transfer order in respect of one Monoj Kumar Sinha, mechanical fitter/helper, who was not actually an employee with the appellant, from Bararee Fire Project to Bhowra North Project. It was pointed out that this Monoj Kumar Sinha was not an employee at all and the delinquent officer had marked the office order to one Narsingh Sharma, Head Time-Keeper Bararee Colliery which was duly diarised in Bararee Colliery Register. It was then pointed out that this order was not acted upon and no release order was issued for four months. However, in the month of September, 1984 another unattested copy of the said transfer order was put up before the delinquent officer and on the basis of that unattested copy, the delinquent officer ordered to type the release order. It was then pointed out that this order was not acted upon and no release order was issued for four months. However, in the month of September, 1984 another unattested copy of the said transfer order was put up before the delinquent officer and on the basis of that unattested copy, the delinquent officer ordered to type the release order. Accordingly the release order was prepared on 8.9.1984 and that release order was countersigned by the delinquent officer. It was then alleged that the release order was given in the hands of Monoj Kumar Sinha in order to get it counter signed by the Project Officer, Bararee Fire Project. Some forgeries were made in that release order and on the strength of such release order Monoj Kumar Sinha, who was never an employee of the appellant-company, reportedly got the posting at the transferred place. It was further alleged that all these amounted to misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer. A full-fledged inquiry went on and as a result of that inquiry ultimately a punishment of censure was passed against the delinquent officer. (3.) As a result of pendency of the inquiry, the original writ petitioner was not promoted to the next post and his case could not be considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee and in that he lost about two years time. However, ultimately, in keeping with the rules, the delinquent officer was promoted but with effect from 1989. A sealed cover procedure was adopted in his case and it was clearly pointed out to him, in his promotion order, that his promotion order would be subject to the result of the pending inquiry. Promotion was given to him perhaps because the departmental inquiry was not proceeding and a view was taken probably that he should not suffer on account of pendency of the departmental inquiry. He was given the promotion two years after his immediate junior was promoted, that is, from 1989. Ultimately, with the verdict of guilt and the consequent punishment of censure, the said promotion granted to him in 1989 was also withdrawn, but a fresh promotion was given to him with effect from 1992, The petitioner firstly challenged the punishment order of censure as also the subsequent order by which his promotion granted in 1989 was withdrawn and he was granted a fresh promotion in the year 1992. (4.) The learned Single Judge took the view that it could not be said that the petitioner had committed any misconduct. The learned Judge went into the facts of the matter and held that it could not be said that the petitioner had acted deliberately and had committed any misconduct. However, the learned Judge concluded that though the petitioner could not be said to have committed any fraud or any other misconduct as contained in the charge memo, the petitioner could be said to have acted negligently. This is how the learned Judge records his findings : "From the charge-sheet as well as from the case as made out before the Enquiry Officer it appears that the respondent employer really proceeded against the petitioner for negligence. Although many strong words were used in the charge-sheet but in point of fact correct reading of the charge sheet would show that the real charge against the petitioner was negligent conduct on his part in the matter of issuance of the release order." The learned Judge further observes: "The petitioner held out that there was negligence on his part in not looking at the original transfer order, while issuing the release order for the reason he was asked by his colleague to do so who had been instrumental in preparation of the transfer order." "In such circumstances, the conclusion would be that for the petitioner relied upon his colleagues having similar responsibility failed to attain the highest standard of performance in the matter of discharge of his duties. No ill motive on the part of the petitioner was ascribed at the time when the enquiry was held." Then again, "In a situation of this nature I do not think it could be concluded that the charges as were framed against the petitioner stand proved. Instead it should have been concluded by the enquiry authority that the petitioner has been found to be negligent during the course of the enquiry and, accordingly the petitioner should be cautioned. On the basis of the materials on record I do not think it could be said that the charges as were levelled against the petitioner stand proved." "As aforesaid, even before the enquiry officer it was not the case of the respondent employer that the negligence on the part of the petitioner as propounded before the enquiry officer was gross in nature. In such view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the disciplinary authority could not in the order dated 6th July, 1991 hold that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct for no prudent person on the basis of the materials on record before him could come to such conclusion." (5.) On these findings, ultimately, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the award of punishment to the petitioner was wholly unwarranted and he accordingly allowed the writ petition and passed the directions to which we have already alluded in the earlier part of the judgment. (6.) The learned Counsel for the appellant very seriously challenged the findings by the learned Judge. The learned Counsel pointed out that it is not as if the learned Judge had fully exonerated the petitioner. The learned Counsel is at pains to point out that even if the findings of the learned Judge were to be accepted as they are, yet that would suggest that the original writ petitioner and the delinquent officer was guilty of negligence. The learned Counsel points out that in reappreciating the evidence on record and in rewriting the finding and also interfering with the quantum of punishment, the learned Judge had exceeded his jurisdiction under Article 226. The argument was that under the service jurisprudence, the High Court while dealing with the writ petition under Article 226 does not reappreciate the evidence nor does it act as an appellate authority in respect of a disciplinary proceedings. The learned Counsel therefore suggested that the learned Judge had completely missed one aspect that even negligence was a misconduct under the Conduct Rules. We were taken through the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 wherein Rule 5(9) provides that negligence by itself amounts to a misconduct. (7.) As against this, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioner-delinquent officer very strongly supported the order impugned. According to him, the petitioner had nothing to do with the aforementioned transfer order and he was not the author of that transfer order. It was pointed out that the transfer order was brought before him by some other person and he had no reason whatsoever to doubt or to raise any suspicion about the genuineness of that transfer order. According to him, the petitioner had nothing to do with the aforementioned transfer order and he was not the author of that transfer order. It was pointed out that the transfer order was brought before him by some other person and he had no reason whatsoever to doubt or to raise any suspicion about the genuineness of that transfer order. The learned Counsel was at pains to point out that under the circumstances all that the delinquent officer had done was to act upon a note produced before him by again some other employee of the company. All that he had done was just to order for preparation of the release order on the basis of the transfer order received. Under the circumstances there was in reality no question of any misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer. It was further pointed out that there was no evidence on record worth the name to suggest any ill-motive on the part of the delinquent officer. (8.) In view of that the learned Counsel strongly supported the order and pointed out that the writ petitioner had not only suffered once but had suffered twice. In the first place, the writ petitioner who could have been promoted in 1987 lost his two years on account of pendency of the disciplinary proceedings and secondly, though the minimum punishment of censure was given to him, he was further deprived of four years of the seniority in service in the promoted post. Consequently, the petitioner has unnecessarily become junior to his colleagues. (9.) Considering the rival contentions, it has to be seen that the learned Judge was dealing with the departmental proceedings. It was nobodys case that the principle of natural justice and fair play were not observed in this departmental inquiry. We did not find any such plea having been raised on that count. What we see is that the initial finding of guilt and the consequent punishment was appealed against by the delinquent officer and that appeal was also dismissed. In the circumstances when the matter was pending before the learned Single Judge, the only scope for the learned Single Judge was to see as to whether the findings were so absurd that they could not have been accepted by any reasonable person or that the findings were based on no evidence at all. In the circumstances when the matter was pending before the learned Single Judge, the only scope for the learned Single Judge was to see as to whether the findings were so absurd that they could not have been accepted by any reasonable person or that the findings were based on no evidence at all. It is only under these two circumstances that the High Court normally would interfere in the service matter, particularly where there has been no complaint about the natural justice and fair play during the departmental inquiry. It is trite law as enunciated by the judgments of the Supreme Court that where there is a material against the delinquent officer, which comes through the evidence during the departmental inquiry then it is not the task of the High Court to appreciate that material or to come to a different finding than that of the departmental authorities. The High Court is not supposed to appreciate the evidence and come to a different finding even if according to it the findings have been wrongfully arrived at. The High Court is certainly not a Court of Appeal insofar as the service jurisprudence is concerned. What happened in the present case is that the learned Judge has at threadbare discussed the evidence of the witnesses and has come to the conclusion that the writ petitioner-delinquent officer did not have a guilty mind. He has further come to the conclusion that though there was a scope to say that the writ petitioner was negligent in his dealings, the negligence was not that of a degree that can really be termed as gross negligence. In our opinion, such finding could not have been given. However, even if we do not find any fault with the findings of the learned Judge or the approach that the learned Judge has made to the evidence, one thing is certain; that even the learned Judge has found in a clearest possible manner that the delinquent officer had acted in a negligent manner. It is for that purpose that we have quoted the findings by the learned Judge. It is for that purpose that we have quoted the findings by the learned Judge. Now when we glance at the list of misconducts as enumerated in the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978, which are admittedly applicable, we find that clause 5 sub-clause (9) provides as follows : "Neglect of work or negligence in the performance of duty including malingering or slowing down of work." (10.) One thing is, therefore, certain that the negligence of any kind by itself is a misconduct and if the delinquent officer is found to have acted with negligence, there could not have been any scope for the learned Judge to exonerate him completely, as has been done by the learned Judge. Under the circumstances, we must hold that the learned Judge exceeded his jurisdiction firstly in completely exonerating the writ petitioner-delinquent officer and, secondly, setting aside his punishment. After all, when we go through the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978, we find that the minimum punishment that can be given is the censure. Under the circumstances, we do not agree with the learned Judge that the petitioner could not have been awarded the punishment of censure. We hold accordingly. (11.) That leaves us to the second question as to whether the writ petitioner could be deprived of his further promotion since, by the impugned order, his promotion in the year 1989 has been withdrawn and he has been awarded the promotion with effect from 1992. We do not propose to express any opinion on this issue and would keep this issue open as to whether the promotion once granted could be withdrawn and thereafter fresh promotion could be granted to him depriving him of his natural seniority. We are saying this because, in our opinion, if the petitioner was liable to be promoted in 1987 he has already suffered two years of seniority on account of pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. How far it would be proper then to deprive him of further seniority by pushing him to 1992 from 1989? We, however, leave that question open for the authorities to decide. The petitioner shall be allowed to make a representation to the concerned authorities in respect of this part alone. (12.) With these observations, we dispose of the appeal. How far it would be proper then to deprive him of further seniority by pushing him to 1992 from 1989? We, however, leave that question open for the authorities to decide. The petitioner shall be allowed to make a representation to the concerned authorities in respect of this part alone. (12.) With these observations, we dispose of the appeal. Needless to mention that if any representation is made to the authorities, the representation shall be decided within a reasonable time and preferably within 3 months from its receipt. Needless to mention further that the representation shall be considered without being influenced by what has been observed in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of.