Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. This order shall dispose of eight Civil Writ petitions being C.W.P. No. 20018 of 2004, C.W.P. No. 20020 of 2004, C.W.P. No. 0017 of 2004, C.W.P. No. 20019 of 2004, C.W.P. No. 20021 of 2004, C.W.P. No. 0251 of 2004, C.W.P. No. 20022 of 2004 and C.W.P. No. 20239 of 2004 as all the writ petitions involve a common question of law and similar facts. 2. For the sake of convenience, the facts are borrowed from C.W.P. No. 20018 of 004. 3. The workman-respondent Bhupinder Singh was employed by the petitioner-management. He claimed that his services were terminated on December 5, 1996 without allowing the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act). It was further claimed by the workman that he had in fact served with the management for a period of more than 240 days in the twelve preceding months prior to is termination and accordingly he claimed that his retrenchment was bad in law. Consequently, the workman served a demand notice on July 13, 1998 and on failure of conciliation proceedings, the matter was referred by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court. 4. Before the Labour Court, the workman filed a claim statement. The management contested the claim of the workman and filed a detailed written statement. Besides other >leas, it was also claimed that the workman had not put in 240 days of service with the management. It was also denied that his services were ever terminated by the management. The Labour Court framed the following issues: "(i) Whether the reference is not maintainable? OPP (ii) Whether the statement of claim has not been verified by the petitioner, if so its effect? OPM (iii) Whether termination of the services of the workman is justified and in order? OPM (iv) Relief. 5. During the course of the aforesaid reference proceedings, the Labour Court directed the management to lead the evidence at the first instance. This was objected to by the management. As a matter of fact, an application was filed by the management before the Labour Court for directing the workman to lead his evidence at the first instance to prove the facts alleged by him in his claim statement. 6. The Labour Court vide an order dated April 5, 2004 dismissed the aforesaid application filed by the management. As a matter of fact, an application was filed by the management before the Labour Court for directing the workman to lead his evidence at the first instance to prove the facts alleged by him in his claim statement. 6. The Labour Court vide an order dated April 5, 2004 dismissed the aforesaid application filed by the management. Resultantly, the management was required to produce its evidence at the first instance. While dismissing the aforesaid application filed by the management, the following observations made by the Labour Court may also be noticed: "In all the above said cases defendant accepts that the applicants have been serving in defendant in the years stated in their claims. That means the defendant had agreed to the views of the complainants that they have completed more than 240 days in the said calendar year. Defendant accepts that they have not observed that formalities under Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 at the time of termination of services of the complainants. It means the termination of the services of the complainants are illegal. As such now it is the defendant to lead evidence to prove that the termination of services of the complainants are legal and correct. In view of the above, it is justified that the defendant should lead the evidence first for the decision of the case." The aforesaid order dated April 5, 2004 has been appended as Annexure P-l with the present petition and has been impugned by the management before us. 7 The claim of the management has been contested by the workman. A written statement has been filed by the workman in only two matters i.e. C.W.P. No. 20017 of 2004 and C.W.P. No. 20251 of 2004. However, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the workman has adopted similar defense with regard to the claim in all the cases. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and have also gone through the records of the case. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has brought to our notice that the claim of the workman had been contested by the management by filing a written statement. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and have also gone through the records of the case. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has brought to our notice that the claim of the workman had been contested by the management by filing a written statement. In the aforesaid written statement filed before the Labour Court, the management had specifically stated that the workman had not completed 240 days in the twelve preceding months prior to the date of his termination. Additionally, it has been argued by the learned counsel that the onus of proving the fact that the workman had completed 240 days was upon the workman and in these circumstances, it was for him to first prove the aforesaid fact by leading cogent evidence and it was only thereafter that the management could be required to answer the aforesaid evidence. 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-workman has argued that as per issue No.(iii) framed by the Labour Court the onus of proving as to whether the termination of the services of the workman was justified or not was upon the management and, therefore, it was for the management to first lead evidence and prove the aforesaid fact. 11. We have duly considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and in our considered opinion the present petitions must succeed. 12. The Supreme court of India in the case of Range Forest Officer V/s. S.T. Hadimani, had made the following observations:- "For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant is an "industry" or not, through reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat V/s. Pratam Singh Narsinh Parmar, . In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the Management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the Appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the Appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. However, Mr. Hedge appearing for the Department states that the State is really interested in getting the law settled and the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate grounds on the same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two months from today." 13. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Essen Deinki V/s. Rajiv Kumar, wherein the law laid down in Hadimani s case (supra) was reiterated. Even in the recent case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. V/s. State of Rajasthan and Anr., 2004 7 SCALE 624, the Supreme Court has again reiterated the law laid down in Hadimanis case (supra). 14. Accordingly, we find that the order Annexure P.l passed by the learned Labour Court was absolutely contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in various judgments, as noticed above. With regard to onus of proving issue No.(i) placed upon the management, we find that the aforesaid onus has also wrongly been placed upon the management. As noticed above, at the first instance the workman was required to prove that he was employed with the management; the management was an industry; employee was a workman within the definition of the Act; that the workman had completed 240 days in the twelve preceding months prior to the date of his termination; and that while retrenching his services, provisions of Section 25-F read with section 25-B of the Act had not been complied with. It was only thereafter that the management could be required to lead its evidence in defence to answer the aforesaid evidence. It was only thereafter that the management could be required to lead its evidence in defence to answer the aforesaid evidence. Accordingly, we find that the onus of proof placed upon the management while casting issue No.(i) by the Labour Court also cannot be sustained. As a matter of fact, the onus of proving the aforesaid issue has to be placed on the parties, with the workman being required to lead his evidence at the first instance. Accordingly, we also direct that the onus of proving issue No.(iii) would be placed upon the parties and workman would be required to lead his evidence at the first instance, as noticed above. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present writ petitions are allowed and the order Annexure P.1 passed by the Labour Court is hereby quashed. Consequently, the onus of proving issue No.3 shall rest upon the parties and the workman in various references shall be required to lead their respective evidence at the first instance. We further direct that the Labour Court shall make an effort to dispose of the reference in question as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months. The present petitions are disposed of accordingly.