Judgment :- (1.) The petitioners are questioning the decision of the acting Chief Justice dated September 23rd, 2004 appointing a former Judge of this Court as the arbitrator. (2.) When disputes and differences arose, the second respondent wanted adjudication by the arbitral tribunal according to procedure agreed upon by the parties. In terms of the contract the parties were to appoint their respective nominees, and the "two nominees were to appoint the umpire, and thus the arbitral tribunal was to be constituted. There is no dispute that the second respondent named its nominee and duly called upon the petitioners to appoint their nominee, but the petitioners did not act for the purpose. (3.) In the circumstances the second respondent filed an application under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Notice of the proceedings was given to the petitioners, but they chose not to enter appearance. By decision dated October 3rd, 2002 the designated Judge disposed of the application directing the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice for appointing a person as the nominee of the petitioners. Direction was also given for appointment of the umpire. When the matter was placed before the acting Chief Justice, the decision dated September 23rd, 2004 was given rescinding the appointment of the nominee of the second respondent and directing appointment of a former judge of this Court as the sole arbitrator. (4.) On receipt of notice from the arbitrator the parties appeared before him, and the petitioners requested him to rule on his own jurisdiction. They contended that in view of decision of the designated judge directing appointment of their nominee and appointment of the umpire by the two nominees, the acting Chief Justice could not have ordered constitution of the arbitral tribunal by the sole arbitrator. It was said that the tribunal, having been improperly constituted, lacked in jurisdiction. By his decision dated February 26th, 2005 the arbitrator ruled against the petitioners, and held that the tribunal had been properly constituted. (5.) It is only thereafter that this writ petition dated July 11th, 2005 was taken out. The decision of the acting Chief Justice is questioned on the same grounds that were raised before the arbitrator. Counsel for the petitioners has cited to me the apex Court decision in National Aluminium Co. (5.) It is only thereafter that this writ petition dated July 11th, 2005 was taken out. The decision of the acting Chief Justice is questioned on the same grounds that were raised before the arbitrator. Counsel for the petitioners has cited to me the apex Court decision in National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Metal Impex Ltd., (2001)6 SCC 372 , and has argued that the tribunal could not have been constituted in any manner other than the one mentioned in the contract. His contention is that since the impugned decision, vitiated by jurisdictional error, has caused grave injustice to the petitioners, they are entitled to question it before the Writ Court, though the arbitrator, on his own jurisdiction, decided against them. (6.) As the law stands today, if aggrieved by the decision dated September 23rd. 2004, the petitioners were entitled to avail of the statutory remedy calling upon the arbitrator to rule on his own jurisdiction first, or to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court contending that on the facts alternative remedy provided by the statute was not the efficacious remedy. There cannot be any dispute that the remedy available before the arbitral tribunal was an alternative statutory remedy. There is also no dispute that decision of the arbitral tribunal, ruling on its own jurisdiction, is not open to judicial review by the Writ Court; in any case, the one made in this case has not been questioned by the petitioners. (7.) To my mind, once the petitioners unsuccessfully availed of the statutory alternative remedy, they should not be permitted to invoke the writ jurisdiction which they were at liberty to invoke before availing of the alternative statutory remedy. They could have questioned the decision of the acting chief Justice, on the grounds an administrative decision can be challenged before the Writ Court. They elected to move the statutory forum before which they were free to question it on all possible grounds. They invited a decision under section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and got it; now they cannot seek a reversal of the arbitral proceedings. (8.) In my opinion, it is as a matter of policy that in such cases one should not be permitted to question a decision given under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. (8.) In my opinion, it is as a matter of policy that in such cases one should not be permitted to question a decision given under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The case would have been definitely otherwise, had the decision of the arbitral tribunal been open to judicial review by the Writ Court; it is not. Hence emerges a situation that, in my view, warrants no interference in the matter by the Writ Court. This being the position, I find no need to express any views about the merits of the grounds on which the petitioners question the decision of the acting Chief Justice dated September 23rd, 2004. For these reasons I am unable to give any relief to the petitioners. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order for costs in it. Counsel for the petitioners prays for stay of operation of my order. Since I have dismissed the writ petition, in my view, there is no scope to make any order for stay. I find no reason to make a restraint order after dismissing the writ petition. Petition dismissed.