Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 636 (GAU)

Naorem Ibomcha Singh v. Joint Secretary

2005-08-31

MAIBAM B.K.SINGH, T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2005
JUDGMENT T. Nanda Kumar Singh, J. 1. This appeal relates with the allotment of land by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (for short MLR & LR Act, 1960) and Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules 1962 (for short Allotment Rules, 1962) and also show cause notice issued by the Joint Secretary (Revenue) to the Government of Manipur for cancellation of allotment orders issued by the Deputy Commissioner. Sections 11 and 14 of the MLR & LR Act, 1960 and Rule 15 of the Allotment Rules, 1962 will be relevant for the purpose of deciding the present writ appeal. Accordingly for easy reference those relevant Sections and Rules are quoted hereunder in entirety: 11. (1) All lands, public roads, lanes and paths and bridges, ditches, dikes and fences on or beside the same, the beds of rivers, streams, nallahs, lakes and tanks; and all canals and water courses, and all standing and flowing water, and all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, which are not the property of any person, are and are hereby declared to be the property of the Government. (2) Unless it is otherwise expressly provided in the terms of a grant made by the Government, the right to mines, minerals and mineral products shall vest in the Government, and it shall have all the powers necessary for the proper enjoyment and of such rights. (3) Where any property or any right in or over any property is claimed by or on behalf of the Government or by any person as against the Government and the claim is disputed, such disputed, shall be decided by the Deputy Commissioner whose order shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be final. (4) Any person aggrieved by an order made under Sub-section (3) or in appeal or revision therefrom may institute a civil suit to contest the order within a period of six months from the date of such order, and the decision of the civil court shall be binding on the parties. 14. (4) Any person aggrieved by an order made under Sub-section (3) or in appeal or revision therefrom may institute a civil suit to contest the order within a period of six months from the date of such order, and the decision of the civil court shall be binding on the parties. 14. (1) The Deputy Commissioner may allot land belonging to the Government for agricultural purposes or for construction of dwelling houses in accordance with such rules as may be made in this behalf under this Act, and such rules may provide for allotment of land to persons evicted under Section 15. (2) The (State Government) shall power-- (a) To allot any such land for the purpose of an industry or for any purpose of public utility on such conditions as may be prescribed, or (b) to entrust the management of any such land or any rights therein to the Gram Panchayat of the village established under any law for the time being in force. 15. An allotment of land under Sub-section (1) of Section 14 shall be subject to the following conditions, namely: (i) The land shall not be transferred by the allottee within ten years from the date of allotment without the written consent of Deputy Commissioner: Provided that the land may be mortgaged to a co-operative society, a co-operative bank or land mortgage bank or the Government without such consent. (ii) An allottee on giving three months' notice before the end of an agricultural year and on payment of all Government dues in respect of the allotted land up to the end of the said agricultural year may surrender the land allotted to him. On such surrender being made, the land shall revert to the Government. (iii) In case the allottee is a co-operative framing society and the registration of such society is cancelled within ten years from the date of allotment, the land allotted to such society shall thereupon be deemed to have been resumed by the Government and the Government shall not be liable to pay any compensation. Any person holding or retaining possession of such land thereafter shall be deemed to be a trespasser. (iv) In case of waste land allotted for agricultural purposes, the allottee shall bring the whole area under cultivation within three years from the date of allotment. Any person holding or retaining possession of such land thereafter shall be deemed to be a trespasser. (iv) In case of waste land allotted for agricultural purposes, the allottee shall bring the whole area under cultivation within three years from the date of allotment. (v) The allottee shall be liable to pay such amount as land revenue as may be assessed under the Act and the rules made thereunder. (vi) The allottee shall within the time framed in the allotment order pay to the Government an amount equal to the market value of the trees and structures, if any, standing on the land. (vii) The allotment shall be liable to be cancelled if, except in cases falling under Clause (iv), the land is not used within 2 years of the date of allotment for the purpose for which it was allotted or if the allottee commits a breach of any of the conditions of allotment or the provisions of these rules and the Deputy Commissioner may re enter on the land: Provided that no such cancellation or re-entry shall be made unless the allottee is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (viii) No compensation shall be payable by the Government on account of cancellation of any allotment or of any re-entry by the Deputy Commissioner under these rules, but if the allottee has built any constructions on the land he shall be allowed a reasonable opportunity to remove the same. 2. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 for dismissing the writ petition (C) No. 287/2000 filed by the present Appellants assailing the show-cause notice dated 7.3.2000 issued by the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur for cancellation of the allotment orders of the land issued in favour of the Appellants. The only question to be decided in the present appeal is that who is the competent authority to issue the said show cause notice for cancellation of the orders of the Deputy Commissioner for allotment of the land belonging to the Government for agricultural purposes in exercise of his power under Section 14(1) of the MLR & LR Act, 1960 and also whether the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur has the power and jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000. 3. The present case has a very chequered history. 3. The present case has a very chequered history. The facts, stated very short, which would be sufficient for deciding the present writ appeal are that; the present Appellant No. 3, Yelangpokpi Champrakhong Collective Farming Co-operative Society is a registered society having registration No. 83/69-70 and formed by the landless agricultural workers. Out of a total area of 206.78 acres of land de-reserved from the State Government Fishery land, by the then Deputy Commissioner of Manipur Central District, in exercise of his power under Section 14(1) of the MLR & LR Act, 1960 and MLR & LR Act (Allotment Rules), 1962 initially allotted 200.208 acres of land to the Respondent No. 3, Co-operative society for agricultural purposes under allotment order dated 9.5.1972. The said allotment of land by the Deputy Commissioner under his order dated 9.5.1972 was subject to the conditions of allotment contemplated in Rule 15 of the (Allotment Rules), 1962. The land so allotted for agricultural purposes to the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society under the said allotment of the Deputy Commissioner dated 9.5.1972 is situated in Khoijuman Khunou Village No. 40, formerly within the Central District of Manipur and subsequently within the Bishnupur District on trifurcation of the then Central District, Manipur. In pursuance of the said allotment order dated 9.5.1972 the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society paid necessary premium and took the delivery of possession of the allotted land. A Deed of allotment dated 9.8.1972 was executed between the then Deputy Commissioner (Central) and Chairman of the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society and was duly registered in the special Registrar, Bishnupur. After completion of the formalities, necessary application was filed being Misc. Case No. 73/SDC/B/72(N) for preparation of the patta etc. and record of rights in respect of the said allotted land i.e. 200.208 acres of land so allotted to the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society under the said allotment order dated 9.5.1972. The SDC, Bishnupur, North also passed necessary order dated 28.11.1972 in Misc. Case No. 73/SDC/B/72 (N) for preparation of the patta etc. and record of right over the said allotted land. Accordingly, Patta & Jamabandi of the said allotted land were prepared. 4. The SDC, Bishnupur, North also passed necessary order dated 28.11.1972 in Misc. Case No. 73/SDC/B/72 (N) for preparation of the patta etc. and record of right over the said allotted land. Accordingly, Patta & Jamabandi of the said allotted land were prepared. 4. The said allotment of land to the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society under the said order of the then Deputy Commissioner, Central dated 9.5.1972 was challenged before this court by filing a writ petition being C.R. No. 31/73 by some interested persons. This court passed an order dated 3.8.77 in C.R. No. 31/73 directing the then Deputy Commissioner, Central to consider the allotment of the land afresh and the then Deputy Commissioner, Central after consideration as per the direction of this court in the judgment and order dated 3.8.77 issued a fresh allotment order, in exercise of his power under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962, bearing No. DC(C)/80/216/Revenue/73 dated 19.9.1978 allotting only 174.43 acres out of the earlier allotted land measuring 200.208 acres to the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society. In pursuance of the second allotment order dated 19.9.1978 necessary premium was paid partly by adjusting with the payment previously made and fresh Jamabandi/Patta was prepared in favour of the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society. 5. Against the said second allotment order dated 19.9.1978 allotting 174.43 acres of land to the Appellant No. 3 Co-operative Society another writ petition being C.R.No. 23/79 (Imphal Bench) was filed before this Court. This court by passing final judgment and order dated 23.8.1993 had disposed of the said C.R. No. 23/79. Relevant portion of the said judgment and order of this court dated 23.8.1993 is quoted hereunder: 3. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted, and very graciously too that the 1st Respondent is prepared to forego 10 acres out of 174.43 acres so that this extent also will be available for settlement to individuals. 4. Petitioners have a grievance inasmuch as they submitted applications for settlement in 1972 and no settlement has been effected. The difficulty, as pointed out by the learned Government Advocate is that all the records of the then Deputy Commissioner (Central) were destroyed by fire about two years ago. 4. Petitioners have a grievance inasmuch as they submitted applications for settlement in 1972 and no settlement has been effected. The difficulty, as pointed out by the learned Government Advocate is that all the records of the then Deputy Commissioner (Central) were destroyed by fire about two years ago. If that be so it is for the present Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur to settle the matter immediately. The writ petition is disposed of as follows: (1) 1st Respondent will retain possession of the land allotted to it except 10 acres of land which will be surrendered to the Government. (2) The remaining unallotted land as also the 10 acres of land referred to above will be allotted by the Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur under the relevant Rules for which he shall call for applications within two months from today. A copy of the judgment shall be given to the learned Government Advocate. 6. After surrendering 10 acres of land out of 174.73 acres of land allotted under the second allotment order dated 19.9.78 in pursuance of the judgment and order of this court dated 23.8.1993 in C.R. No. 23/79, Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society is still in possession of the allotted land measuring 164.43 acres of land as owner in actual possession by growing paddy crops and seasonal vegetables in some part and doing pisciculture in other parts. 7. It is said that the Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur (Shri I.S. Laishram, IAS) clandestinely arranged with the high officials of the Co-operative Department, Government of Manipur for cancelling the registration of the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society so that it might be liquidated for the purpose of cancellation of the said allotment order in favour of the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society and made available for fresh allotment to those adversaries of the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society. It is also said that the said Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur wrote a letter dated 30.3.95 to the Government of Manipur for cancellation of the said allotment in favour of the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society. It is also said that the said Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur wrote a letter dated 30.3.95 to the Government of Manipur for cancellation of the said allotment in favour of the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society. Basing on the said letter of the Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur dated 30.3.95, the Commissioner, Revenue, Government of Manipur, Imphal issued an order being No. 23/13/95-R Imphal 26.3.1996 for resumption of the said land allotted to the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society under the said allotment orders of the then Deputy Commissioner (Central) in exercise of his power under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962. The said order dated 26.3.96 was said to have been issued by the Government of Manipur under Rule 15(iii) of the Allotment Rules, 1962 allegedly on the ground that the said allotted land was not used by the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society for the purpose for which it was allotted. 8. The Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society and others filed the writ petition being C.R. No. 386/96 assailing the said order of the Government of Manipur dated 26.3.96 before this Court (Imphal Bench). This Court by passing judgment and order dated 28.1.99 had allowed the said C.R. No. 386/96 with certain observation and direction, relevant portion of which are quoted hereunder: A reading of Rule 15(vii), particularly the proviso to rule will make it amply clear that unless the allottee is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard; no cancellation shall be made. Admittedly, in this case the allotment is sought to be cancelled by an impugned order on the ground that the allottee commits a breach of any of the conditions of the allotment and in that view the opportunity of reasonable hearing was absolutely necessary so as to afford the Petitioner to explain the position. This apart, the proviso to Rule 15(vii) makes it clear that reasonable opportunity of being heard must be afforded to the allottee before the cancellation has been made. It is, therefore, clear that the impugned order dated 26.3.96 and the Corrigendum order dated 6.7.96 are in violation of Rule 15(vii) or Rule 15(vii) of the Rules. This apart, the proviso to Rule 15(vii) makes it clear that reasonable opportunity of being heard must be afforded to the allottee before the cancellation has been made. It is, therefore, clear that the impugned order dated 26.3.96 and the Corrigendum order dated 6.7.96 are in violation of Rule 15(vii) or Rule 15(vii) of the Rules. It is because of this reason the impugned order dated 26.3.96 and the Corrigendum order dated 6.7.96 cannot stand the test of law and they are hereby quashed and set aside. It is open to the Respondents to pass any order as deem fit and proper after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the writ Petitioners, if so advised. 9. It would be required to see who are the Respondents in the C.R. No. 386/96 inasmuch as this court had directed the concerned Respondents under the judgment and order dated 28.1.99 passed in C.R. No. 386/96 to pass any order as deemed fit and proper after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner, if so advised. The Respondents in the C.R. No. 386/96 are-1) Commissioner, Revenue, Government of Manipur, 2) The Deputy Commissioner (Bishnupur), Manipur, 3) State of Manipur, 4) Mr. Khomdram Chaoyaima Singh and 5) Shri Leimapokpam Thoiba Singh. Accordingly, the observation and direction of this court in the judgment and order dated 28.1.99 passed in C.R. No. 386/96 is to be carried out by the concerned statutory authority in compliance with the provision of the relevant statutes. In the present case, admittedly, the relevant statute and rules are the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962. 10. Purportedly, in pursuance of the observation of this Court made in the judgment and order dated 28.1.99 passed in C.R. No. 386/96, the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur issued the impugned show cause notice being No. 40/43/96-R Imphal 7.3.2000 to the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society to show cause as to why the allotment of land under the order of the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of the power under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 should not be cancelled. The effective portion of the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000 reads as follows: Now, in compliance of Hon'ble High Court's order dated 28.1.99 passed in Civil Rule No. 386 of 1996, notice is hereby given to the Chairman and the Secretary of Elangpokpi Champrakhong collective Farming Co-operative Society Ltd. to show cause as to why the allotment order issued in favour of aforementioned Society should not be cancelled in view of letter No. 3/82/93 (R) dt. 30.3.95 read with Rule 15 of the MLR and LR (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962. AND, it is further informed that the Chairman and the Secretary of the above mentioned Society shall furnish reply to this show cause Notice within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of this Notice to the undersigned by enclosing documents i.e. Allotment orders, list of the promoters/members of the Society and other relevant documents, if any. Receipt of this notice should be acknowledged. 11. The Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society and present Appellant No. 1 and 2 filed a writ petition being WP (C) No. 287/2000 (Imphal Bench) for assailing the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000 on the main ground that the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur has inherent lack of jurisdiction and power to issue the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000 in the factual context of the present case. The learned Single Judge passed the impugned judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 for dismissing the W.P. (C) No. 287/2000 after holding that the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur is competent to issue the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000 and also that the present Appellant/writ Petitioner have the alternative remedy of filing their show cause statement to prove and defend their case by producing related documents before the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur. Being aggrieved, by the impugned judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 passed in WP (C) No. 287/2000 filed the present writ appeal on the main thrusts that the Deputy Commissioner is the statutory and only authority to issue the show cause notice for cancellation of the land so allotted to the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society under the said order of the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of his power under Section 14(1) of the MLR & LR Act, 1960 and Allotment Rules, 1962. 12. 12. Admittedly the Deputy Commissioner is the only statutory authority who can allot land belonging to the State Government for agricultural purposes, for construction of dwelling houses in accordance with such Rules as may be made in this behalf under the MLR & LR Act, 1960 and such Rule as may be provided for allotment of land to the persons evicted under Section 15 of the Act. Further, admittedly the allotment of the said land to the Appellant No. 3, Co-operative Society for agricultural purposes was by the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of his power under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 subject to the conditions of allotment mentioned in Rule 15 of the Allotment Rules, 1962. Both the Section 14 of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Rule 15 of the Allotment Rules, 1962 had been quoted above in entirety. From bare perusal of the Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 it is crystal clear that the Deputy Commissioner is the statutory and only authority and not the State Government who can exercise power to allot land belonging to the State Government. Therefore, the legislators have carefully excluded the State Government from exercising the power for allotment of land belonging to the State Government for agricultural purposes under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960. 13. As discussed above, legislators speak very clearly that the Deputy Commissioner is the only statutory authority who can allot land belonging to the State Government for agricultural purposes in exercise of the power under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960. In this regard we may here, recall the observation of Mr. Justice Mathew in Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi and Ors. AIR 1974 SC 1868 ; that observation of the procedure laid down by Statute before depriving a person of his property is necessary to generate the feeling that rule of law prevails in this country. When a procedure is prescribed by the legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the legislature has spoken, the judges cannot afford to be wiser." (Underlined is mine). We may also refer to the decision of this Court (Division Bench) in Md. When a procedure is prescribed by the legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the legislature has spoken, the judges cannot afford to be wiser." (Underlined is mine). We may also refer to the decision of this Court (Division Bench) in Md. Iboton Mia and Ors. v. State of Manipur and Ors. (1983) 2 GLR 4, that the power under Section 14(1) of the MLR & LR Act, 1960 must be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner and nobody else. It is an abuse of the power if the discretion is exercised for improper purpose of if the authority acts mechanically and without due care or acts under dictation. 14. It is, No doubt, well settled that; it is basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and word by word. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort should be made to give effect to all parts of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered superfluous, redundant. True meaning of a provision of law is to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law (Reference may be made to Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 111 . The Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Tulsiram Patel etc. reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 (CB) held that; (when there is expression mentioned of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) i.e. the maxim "Expressum facit cessare taciturn" should be applied in construing the statute. (2003) 2 SCC 111 . The Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Tulsiram Patel etc. reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 (CB) held that; (when there is expression mentioned of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) i.e. the maxim "Expressum facit cessare taciturn" should be applied in construing the statute. From the conjoined reading of Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Rule 15 of the Allotment Rules, 1962, keeping in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in construing the statute we are of the considered view that the Deputy Commissioner is the only statutory and competent authority to issue the show cause notice for cancellation or modification of the allotment order for allotment of land for agricultural purposes in exercise of his power under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and allotment Rules, 1962. Accordingly, we are of the firm view that the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur has inherent lack of jurisdiction to issue the impugned show-cause notice dated 7.3.2000. 15. After holding that the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur has inherent lack of jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000 the next question we have to decide is; can the Appellants approach this court by filing the present writ petition i.e. W.P (C) No. 287/2000 for quashing the said impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000 directly. In support of the rival contentions of the contesting parties regarding this question a good number of cases had been cited by them. Learned Counsel for the Appellants, in support of the contention that as the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur has inherent lack of jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000, the present writ petition No. 287/2000 can be filed directly for challenging the impugned show cause notice, has relied heavily on the following decisions of the Apex Court: 1. AIR 1961 SC 1506 : A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhawani and Anr. 2. (1998) 8 SCC 1 : Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. 3. AIR 2003 SC 4086 : Union of India v. Hindalco Industries. 4. AIR 2004 SC 1467 : Special Director v. Mohd. Gulam Ghouse. 5. 2000 (2) GLT 261: Woodcraft Products Ltd. and Anr. 2. (1998) 8 SCC 1 : Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. 3. AIR 2003 SC 4086 : Union of India v. Hindalco Industries. 4. AIR 2004 SC 1467 : Special Director v. Mohd. Gulam Ghouse. 5. 2000 (2) GLT 261: Woodcraft Products Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. 16. It is now well settled that there is no law for putting an embargo on the High Court in entertaining a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the presence of alternative remedy and it is only a self restrain on the part of the High Court from entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 in presence of statutory alternative remedy taking into account of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Apex Court (CB) in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Anr. (supra) had laid down the following ratio: The rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a rule which courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion. (Para 9) The wide proposition that the existence of an alternative remedy is a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned, or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ Petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treated as void non est and that in all other cases. Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such Petitioners cannot be accepted. The two exceptions to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy are by no means exhaustive, and even beyond them a discretion vests in the High Court entertain the petition and grant the Petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. The two exceptions to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy are by no means exhaustive, and even beyond them a discretion vests in the High Court entertain the petition and grant the Petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. The broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the court, and in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the court. (S) AIR 1957 SC 882 and AIR 1958 SC 86 Ref. to. (Paras 8, 10) It is clear from the above ratio laid down by the Apex Court (CB) in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Anr. (supra) existence of alternative remedy is a bar to the entertainment of a writ petition unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned, or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ Petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treated as void or non est. 17. The Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. (supra) had discussed the maintainability of the writ petition filed against the show cause notice and held that writ petitions for quashing show cause notice issued by an authority without jurisdiction in issuing the same (show cause notice) is maintainable. The fact of the case in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. (supra) are spelt out in para Nos. 10 and 11 and decisions of the Apex Court are spelt out in para Nos. 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20 which reads as below: 10. This is also contention of Mr. Sudhir Chandra, Senior Counsel appearing for the Chinar Trust. (supra) are spelt out in para Nos. 10 and 11 and decisions of the Apex Court are spelt out in para Nos. 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20 which reads as below: 10. This is also contention of Mr. Sudhir Chandra, Senior Counsel appearing for the Chinar Trust. He has also contended that the High Court was fully justified in dismissing that petition at the threshold particularly, as the writ petition was directed only against a notice issued under Section 36(4) of the Act requiring the Appellant to show cause why the Registration Certificate be not cancelled. The Appellant, it is contended, should have submitted a reply to that notice and allowed the Registrar to dispose of the whole matter on merits particularly as the Registrar had initiated the action principally on the ground that the Appellant had obtained the renewal of the trade mark by misrepresentation and concealment of relevant facts. 11. Mr. Changla, in reply, has submitted that where the action initiated by a statutory authority is wholly without jurisdiction, it can be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution and the writ petition cannot be dismissed summarily. In the instant case, the Registrar, it is contended, could not have legally acted as the Tribunal as the "proceeding concerned" was pending before the High Court and, therefore, the High Court alone could have acted as a "Tribunal" and initiated action Section 56(4) of the Act. 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the Constitutional law as they still hold the field. 17. A specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh as under: But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. 18. This proposition was considered by a Constitutional Bench of this Court in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and was affirmed and followed in the following words: The passage in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the Petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court. 19. Another Constitution Bench decision in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, Companies Distt. laid down: Though the writ petition of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subject or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subject or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. Writ of certiorari and prohibition can issue against the Income Tax officer acting without jurisdiction under Section 34, Income Tax Act. 20. Much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation. 18. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. (supra) is followed by this Court (DB) in Woodcraft Products Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra). The Apex Court in Union of India v. Hindalco Industries (supra) held that writ petitions against show cause notice issued under Section 11A for inquiry by the Tribunal having no jurisdiction to make an inquiry is maintainable. Para 12 of the AIR in Union of India v. Hindalco Industries (supra) read as follows: 12. There can be no doubt that in matters of taxation, it is inappropriate for the High Court to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution either at the stage of show cause notice or at the stage of assessment, where alternative remedy by way of filing a reply or appeal, as the case may be, is available but these are the limitations imposed by the courts themselves in exercise of their jurisdiction and they are not matters of jurisdictional factors. Had the High Court declined to interfere at the stage of show cause notice, perhaps this court would not have been inclined to entertain the special leave petition; when the High Court did exercise its jurisdiction, entertained the writ petition and decided the issue on merits, we do not think it appropriate to upset the impugned order of the High Court under Article 166 of the Constitution on a technical ground. 19. 19. The Apex Court in Special Director v. Mohd. Gulam Ghouse (supra) held that, unless the High Court is satisfied that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eye of law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into the fact the writ should not be entertained for the mere asking as a matter of routine." The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Special Director v. Mohd. Gulam Ghouse (supra) is that the High Court is to satisfy that the show cause notice was issued by the authority without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants has strenuously submitted that the power for issuing show cause notice for cancellation of the order issued by the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of the power under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Allotment Rules, 1962 is required to be exercised by the concerned authority in the manner prescribed in the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Allotment Rules, 1962. In this regard, we may recall the decision of the Apex Court in the following cases: (1) AIR 1976 SC 789 : Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India and Ors. (2) (2003) 2 SCC 111 : Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors. In Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) held that It is well settled that where power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner and not at all, and all other mode of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more, necessary to observe this rule where the power is of drastic nature and it is exercised in a mode other than the one provided will be violative of the fundamental principle of natural justice. Similarly, the Apex Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors. (supra) held that the statutory interdict on use and enjoyment of property must be strictly construed. It is well settled that the statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner of not at all. The State and other authorities when acting under the Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners thereof. It is well settled that the statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner of not at all. The State and other authorities when acting under the Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners thereof. Coming back in the present case, the State of Manipur and Deputy Commissioner while acting under the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Allotment Rules, 1962 are only creature of statute and they must act within the four corners thereof. As discussed above, it is clear that the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur is not acting within the four corners of Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and Allotment Rules, 1962 while issuing the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000. We may also recall the decision of the Apex Court in Dr. D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1982 SC 579that; it is well settled that a constitutional authority cannot do indirectly what is not permitted to do directly if there is a constitutional provision inhibiting the constitutional authority from doing an act, such provision cannot be allowed to be defeated by adopting any superfluous, that would be clearly a fraud on the constitutional provisions. 20. This court (DB) in exercising the co-ordinate jurisdiction in the writ appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge examined the legality and validity of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and it should be set aside or quashed only when there is patent error on the face of the record or it. is against the established/settled principles of law. If two views are possible a view which is reasonable and logical, has been adopted by the learned Single Judge, the second view has not been accepted, the decision/view adopted by the learned Single Judge should be allowed to prevail. With due respect to the learned Single Judge, we, for the reasons discussed above, cannot support the views of the learned Single Judge in passing the impugned judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 passed in WP (C) No. 287/2000 and we are, also, of the firm opinion that WP (C) No. 287/2000 against the impugned show cause notice dated 7.3.2000 is maintainable. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 passed in WP (C) No. 287/2000 is hereby set aside and Writ Appeal is allowed. In the result, WP (C) No. 287/2000 is allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned show-cause notice dated 7.3.2000 issued by the Joint Secretary, Revenue, Government of Manipur. However, it is left to the Respondents, if necessary, to take up necessary actions within the four corners of the statute, i.e. Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 and rules framed thereunder as the State and other authorities are only the creature of statute while acting under the Manipur Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 as per the observation of this court in the judgment and order dated 28.1.99 passed in C.R. No. 368/96. Taking into consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the present case, parties are to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.