JUDGMENT D. K. SETH, J. A very interesting point has been raised by Mr. Gupta in this case where the assessee who was granted exemption under section 8(5) as it stood prior to its amendment effective from June 1, 2002 pursuant to the Notification No. 1660 FT dated July 9, 1996 could be affected by reason of the amendment brought about by Act 20 of 2002 with effect from June 1, 2002 pursuant to which a fresh Notification No. 2373 FT dated August 2, 2002 was issued. Mr. Gupta pointed out relying on the decision in State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. [2004] 136 STC 35 (SC); [2004] 6 SCC 465, Bakul Cashew Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, Quilon [1986] 62 STC 122 (SC) and Union of India v. Godhawani Brothers [1997] 11 SCC 173 distinguishing the decision in Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC) relied upon by the learned single judge in deciding the case against Mr. Gupta's client, contended that these exemptions are available to an assessee only in a case where the State Government is satisfied in the public interest that it is necessary to be so exempted to grant tax holiday wholly or in part. The moment it becomes necessary in the interest of public then such tax holiday, which does not confer any vested right on the assessee so exempted, can be withdrawn. According to him the very section itself indicates the exercise of the power to be made only in public interest and not otherwise. At the same time, he had also argued on the question of prejudice and in his usual fairness pointing out that the amendment and the notification cannot be retrospective but prospective and as such would not prejudice the assessee since the assessee could pass on the tax and he would not suffer any loss therefor. He had also sought to make a distinction between the right to enjoy the exemption and the eligibility to the exemption. He also contends that this distinction is an entitlement which is subject to the law governing the field namely the revenue legislation where no estoppel could be pleaded. He also contends that in the facts and circumstances of the case and by reason of the amendment in the legislation there could be no case of promissory estoppel or estoppel. He also contends that this distinction is an entitlement which is subject to the law governing the field namely the revenue legislation where no estoppel could be pleaded. He also contends that in the facts and circumstances of the case and by reason of the amendment in the legislation there could be no case of promissory estoppel or estoppel. Inasmuch as the legislative power of the Legislature is a plenary jurisdiction on which no restriction can be imposed and as such principle of estoppel and promissory estoppel cannot apply and the notification having been issued on the basis of the amendment brought about in the statute the principle of promissory estoppel has no application. On this ground he submits that the order under appeal should be set aside. However, Mr. Gupta had elaborated his argument and took us through various decisions and various principles of law. We need not deal with those questions in view of the fact that it would be unnecessary for the purpose of deciding the case at hand for the simple reason which we will deal with a little later. Mr. Sumit Kumar Chakraborty, learned counsel on the other hand pointed out that the decision cited by Mr. Gupta are distinguishable and none of the decisions had eroded the efficacy or eclipsed the ratio decided in Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC). On the other hand his case is squarely covered by the said decision. He had also distinguished the decision cited by Mr. Gupta and relied upon the decision in Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilizers Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1991] 83 STC 234 (SC), Civil Asbestos v. State of Gujarat [1995] 96 STC 154 (Guj) and an unreported decision of this court in Health Guard Laboratories v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [W.P.T.T. No. 2 of 1999] disposed of by the honourable justice Ruma Pal and honourable justice Surya Kumar Tiwari (as their lordships then were) on May 12, 1999 in support of his contention that the right that had accrued by virtue of the notification issued in 1996 cannot be affected by reason of the subsequent amendment and the notification issued thereunder. Alternatively he argued that even if there is any doubt about the question, in that event the benefit of doubt should be available in favour of the assessee as was held in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Industrial Coal Enterprises [1999] 114 STC 365 (SC). Therefore, according to him the appeal should be dismissed and the order of the learned single judge should be affirmed. In reply Mr. Gupta ably assisted by Mr. S. Banerjee points out that the notification issued on August 2, 2002 specifically makes a distinction between the entitlement to enjoy the benefit of tax holiday in respect of sales of those goods made by him on the day when such sale is made as it appears in column 3 against item No. 3 of the table prescribed under the said notification. According to him the tax holiday referred to in section 39 had nothing to do with the prospectivity of the amendment brought about which would affect the prospective sales and would be applicable in respect of the entitlement. According to him the entitlement has not been taken away but it has been restricted by imposing the condition that only the sales made to the registered dealer and the Government would entitle the assessee to tax holiday and the rest are not. This would not create any prejudice as already argued by him. Erudite argument was made by Mr. Gupta and Mr. Chakraborty had also laboured hard to make out his point. The question boils down to a very short score namely as to whether the subsequent amendment and the notification having prospective application could effect the exemption already granted to the assessee under the notification dated July 9, 1996 on the basis of section 8(5) as it stood prior to its amendment effective from July 1, 2002. In fact the notification dated July 9, 1996 was also issued under sub-section (5), without the phrase in clause (a) "to a registered dealer or the Government", after having satisfied that it was necessary so to do to grant tax holiday to the assessee for a period of five years as contemplated under the said notification. Sub-section (5) was amended by Act 20 of 2002 effective from June 1, 2002 by inserting the restriction with regard to the sales for which tax holiday was available, namely sales made only to the registered dealer or the Government. Sub-section (5) was amended by Act 20 of 2002 effective from June 1, 2002 by inserting the restriction with regard to the sales for which tax holiday was available, namely sales made only to the registered dealer or the Government. By reason of this amendment the notification dated August 2, 2002 was issued in consonance with the amendment brought about. But this notification has a distinction which we will deal with at a later point of time. But the fact remains that this notification cannot be said to have been issued without being satisfied that it was so necessary to do in the public interest. This notification was also issued in the public interest. But could such public interest would curtail the existing right of the assessee available under the earlier notification under which tax holiday was granted to him for a period of five years. Admittedly the assessee is entitled to the tax holiday for the unexpired years after the amendment was brought about. So far as the decision in Nestle India Ltd. [2004] 136 STC 35 (SC); [2004] 6 SCC 465 is concerned, it had dealt with a question of promissory estoppel in regard to grant of exemption that was announced by the concerned Minister in his Budget speech. It was a case where admittedly there was no notification in order to make such exemption available. In that context the court had been considering the question as to whether the principle of promissory estoppel would be applicable. In this context the court had gone into the question of delegated legislation and conditional legislation and had come to the conclusion that no estoppel can be presumed. When it was given with de hors provisions of a statute, it cannot be held to be an estoppel on the part of the Government from going back on the promise. This decision, therefore, in our view, would not help us to answer this question which we had called upon to answer on the face of the decision on the facts that in that case the benefit had already been passed on and the traders had changed their position on the basis of such promise. This decision, therefore, in our view, would not help us to answer this question which we had called upon to answer on the face of the decision on the facts that in that case the benefit had already been passed on and the traders had changed their position on the basis of such promise. So far as the decision in Bakul Cashew case [1986] 62 STC 122 (SC) is concerned, it dealt with a question whether a notification could affect retrospectively when the provisions of the statute was amended to empower the Government to issue a notification either prospectively or retrospectively in the context of which this ratio was laid down which we do not think would be of any help to answer the present question. So far as the decision in Godhawani Brothers [1997] 11 SCC 173 is concerned, the principle laid down therein is an established proposition of law. In that case the court was deciding a question with regard to the availability of plea of promissory estoppel to a party against issuance of a notification in exercise of the statutory powers superseding the exemption from duty or tax granted earlier for a specified period. It was held to be settled by the decision in Kasinka Trading v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 874 wherein such a plea of the assessee was rejected. This decision in Kasinka Trading v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 874 dealt with the question with which we are now supposed to answer in paragraph 27 in a different context in relation to an exemption granted under section 25 of the Customs Act in relation to import of PVC resins for a particular period. This decision in Kasinka Trading v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 874 dealt with the question with which we are now supposed to answer in paragraph 27 in a different context in relation to an exemption granted under section 25 of the Customs Act in relation to import of PVC resins for a particular period. In the said decision the decisions in Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC) and Shri Bakul Oil Industries [1987] 64 STC 304 (SC); AIR 1987 SC 590 were also considered and distinguished on the reasoning mentioned in paragraph 27 thereof which reads thus : "Indeed, the submission on the fact situation is not controvertible but in the absence of any material placed before the High Court or even in this appeal to establish that the notification dated August 29, 1980 was issued for any oblique or extraneous consideration and was not 'in public interest', it is not possible to find fault with that notification for the reasons we have already given while dealing with the first batch of cases. The appellants, who are in business, have to be prepared for tides in the business. In Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1987 SC 590 it was the incentive to set up new industry in the State with a view to boost the industrialisation that exemption had been granted and it was in that fact situation that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was held available to the appellant therein. Again in Shri Bakul Oil Industries [1987] 64 STC 304 (SC); [1987] 1 SCC 31; [1987] 1 SCR 185; AIR 1987 SC 142 it was the incentive to set up industries in a conforming area that the exemption had been granted and the court held that the Government could withdraw an exemption granted by it earlier only if such withdrawal could be made without offending the rule of promissory estoppel and without depriving an industry entitled to claim exemption for the entire specified period for which exemption had been promised to it at the time of giving incentive. Both these cases therefore cannot advance the case of the appellant and are distinguishable on facts because the exemption notification under section 25 of the Act which was issued in this case did not hold out any incentive for setting up of any industry to use PVC resins and on the other hand had been issued in exercise of the statutory powers, in public interest and subsequently withdrawn in exercise of the same powers again in public interest. In our opinion, no justifiable prejudice was caused to the appellants in the absence of any unequivocal promise by the Government not to act and review its policy even if the necessity warranted and the 'public interest' so demanded. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of these cases, the appellants cannot invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel to question the withdrawal notification issued under section 25 of the Act." Mr. Gupta had relied on paragraph 9 of Kasinka Trading AIR 1995 SC 874 which reads as follows : "The power to grant exemption from duty, wholly or in part, on the plain language of section 25 (supra) is contingent upon the satisfaction of the Government that it would be in 'public interest' to do so. Thus, 'public interest' is the guiding criteria for exercising the power under section 25 (supra)." Admittedly the question of grant of exemption is definitely contingent upon the satisfaction of the Government that it would be in the public interest to do. There is no doubt that the notification dated August 2, 2002 was issued in public interest. But it has to be read in the context in which it has been issued and whether this prospective application would also affect the assessee in respect of the unexpired period of the tax holiday or not is the question which we are to answer. But it has to be read in the context in which it has been issued and whether this prospective application would also affect the assessee in respect of the unexpired period of the tax holiday or not is the question which we are to answer. This is answered in Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC) in the following language where the exemption could not be recalled by reason of the observations made in pages 5 and 6 of the said decision which runs as follows : "Under the order dated April 11, 1979, new small-scale units were invited to set up their industries in the State of Kerala and with a view to boosting of industrialisation, exemption from sales tax and purchase tax for a period of five years was extended as a concession and the five-year period was to run from the date of commencement of production. If in response to such an order and in consideration of the concession made available, promoters of any small-scale concern have set up their industries within the State of Kerala, they would certainly be entitled to plead the rule of estoppel in their favour when the State of Kerala purports to act differently. Several decisions of this Court were cited in support of the stand of the appellants that in similar circumstances the plea of estoppel can be and has been applied and the leading authority on this point is the case of M.P. Sugar Mills [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC); [1979] 2 SCC 409. On the other hand, reliance has been placed on behalf of the State on a judgment of this court in Bakul Cashew Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, Quilon [1986] 62 STC 122 (SC); [1986] 2 SCC 365. In Bakul Company's case [1986] 62 STC 122 (SC); [1986] 2 SCC 365 this court found : 'That there was no clear material to show any definite or certain promise had been made by the Minister to the concerned persons and there was no clear material also in support of the stand that the parties had altered their position by acting upon the representations and suffered any prejudice. On facts, therefore, no case for raising the plea of estoppel has been made out.' This court proceeded on the footing that the notification granting exemption retrospectively was not in accordance with section 10 of the State Sales Tax Act as it then stood, as there was no power to grant exemption retrospectively. By an amendment that power has been subsequently conferred. In these appeals there is no question of retrospective exemption. We also find that no reference was made by the High Court to the decision in M.P. Sugar Mills' case [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC); [1979] 2 SCC 409. In our view, to the facts of the present case, the ratio of M.P. Sugar Mills' case [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC); [1979] 2 SCC 409 directly applies and the plea of estoppel is unanswerable. It is not disputed that the first order, namely, the one dated April 11, 1979, gave more of tax exemption than the second one. The second notification withdrew the exemption relating to purchase tax and confined the exemption from sales tax to the limit specified in the proviso of the notification. All parries before us who in response to the order of April 11, 1979, set up their industries prior to October 21, 1980, within the State of Kerala would thus be entitled to the exemption extended and/or promised under that order. Such exemption would continue for the full period of five years from the date they started production. New industries set up after October 21, 1980, obviously would not be entitled to that benefit as they had notice of the curtailment in the exemption before they came to set up their industries." In the unreported decision of this court where the court was concerned with a question as to whether an exemption applied for under the existing rule for a tax holiday for a period of two years could be claimed to be extended for a period of five years on the ground that such exemption was granted after the amendment extending the period of five years. While considering such questions in the case of Health Guard Laboratories [WPTT No. 2 of 1999 disposed of on May 12, 1999 - Calcutta High Court] the court held that the exemption so granted created a vested right and it could not be taken away by reason of the subsequent amendment. While considering such questions in the case of Health Guard Laboratories [WPTT No. 2 of 1999 disposed of on May 12, 1999 - Calcutta High Court] the court held that the exemption so granted created a vested right and it could not be taken away by reason of the subsequent amendment. We may beneficially quote the expression used in the said decision which is as follows : "We see no reason to differ from the view expressed by the Tribunal. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. This rule is specially applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights (C. P. Singh's Principle of Statutory Interpretation, 7th Edition, page 367). On the other hand a new enactment affecting matters of procedure only are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is contextually inadmissible. The right in the petitioner crystalised when, according to rule 100, the benefit of tax exemption was applied for by the petitioner. Once that right had vested it could neither be taken away nor affected by any subsequent amendment of the legislation. It was a fortuitous circumstance that the petitioner's application has been kept pending and disposed of after the amendments came into force. If the petitioner's application had been disposed of on the date on which he made it namely on February 14, 1996, and thereafter the amendments effected on July 15, 1996, it is nobodies' case that under the existing rules the petitioner could have been applied under rule 100 for grant of eligibility certificate as the period specified under rule 100 would have long since been over." Now we may turn to the notification dated August 2, 2002 which appears to have been issued for general application to all dealers in respect of the specified items as provided in item 2 on fulfillment of the conditions provided in column 3 therein. The application of this notification was not confined only to newly set up industries whereas the notification dated July 9, 1996 was intended solely and exclusively for newly set up industries. Though, however, the notification dated August 2, 2002 included in item Nos. The application of this notification was not confined only to newly set up industries whereas the notification dated July 9, 1996 was intended solely and exclusively for newly set up industries. Though, however, the notification dated August 2, 2002 included in item Nos. 2 and 3 newly set up industries but that was of general application subject to the fulfilment of the conditions in relation to the goods specified in the respective items. At the same time we may note that the notification dated August 2, 2002 has not prescribed that it was issued in supersession or suppression of the earlier notification. The application of the amendment and the notification being prospective and the earlier notification, which was dealing with newly set up industries alone, having not been superseded or suppressed, it is very difficult to reconcile the two notifications so as to make the subsequent notification applicable to a case where exemption has been granted under the earlier notification in respect of the unexpired period of tax holiday. When an exemption has been granted pursuant to a special notification meant for the newly set up industries alone granting five years' tax holiday subject to the conditions mentioned therein, the same can be said to have created a right as was held in the decision of Health Guard Laboratories [WPTT No. 2 of 1999 disposed of on May 12, 1999 - Calcutta High Court] which cannot be affected by reason of a subsequent amendment and the notification which are of general application. For all these reasons though we appreciate the argument made by Mr. Gupta, yet we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with him. In the circumstances, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The order of the learned single judge is hereby affirmed. There will be no order as to costs. Let urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment and order be given to the parties, if applied for the same.