Judgment :- All these Crl. Miscellaneous Applications in the above appeals are filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking enlargement of time for surrendering before the trial court for execution of the sentence awarded by this Court. 2. All the above appeals were disposed of by this Court. Even though the applications filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be legally entertained, taking into consideration the importance of the question, this Court is inclined to entertain the applications and consider the applications on merits. 3. It is seen that some of the applicants/accused in the above appeals were not in a position to surrender before the original court on the date fixed by this Court either due to illness or due to the delay in getting certified copy of the judgment from this Court. The jurisdictional power of the appellate court is dealt with in Sections 372 to 394 of Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). The question to be decided in the above applications is with regard to the power of the appellate court as contemplated under Section 388 of the Code which reads as follows: "388. Order of High Court on appeal to be certified to lower Court.-(1) Whenever a case is decided on appeal by the High Court under this Chapter, it shall certify its judgment or order to the Court by which the finding, sentence or order appealed against was recorded or passed and if such Court is that of a Judicial Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the High Court's judgment or order shall be sent through the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and if such Court is that of an Executive Magistrate, the High Court's judgment or order shall be sent through the District Magistrate. (2) The Court to which the High Court certifies its judgment or order shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the judgment or order of the High Court; and, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith." 4. In order to decide the issue, this Court should appreciate the provisions contained in Chapter XXXII of the Code which deals with Execution, Suspension, Remission and Commutation of sentences. In this Chapter, this Court is concerned with Section 418 of the Code which reads as follows: "418. In order to decide the issue, this Court should appreciate the provisions contained in Chapter XXXII of the Code which deals with Execution, Suspension, Remission and Commutation of sentences. In this Chapter, this Court is concerned with Section 418 of the Code which reads as follows: "418. Execution of sentence of imprisonment.-(1) Where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a term in cases other than those provided for by section 413, the Court passing the sentence shall forthwith forward a warrant to the jail or other place in which he is, or is to be, confined, and, unless the accused is already confined in such jail or other place, shall’ forward him to such jail or other place, with the warrant: Provided that where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, it shall not be necessary to prepare or forward a warrant to a jail and the accused may be confined in such place as the Court may direct. (2) Where the accused is not present in Court when he is sentenced to such imprisonment as is mentioned in sub-section (1), the Court shall issue a warrant for his arrest for the purpose of forwarding him to the jail or other place in which he is to be confined; and in such case, the sentence shall commence on the date of his arrest." 5. A reading of the above provision would clearly indicate that once the appellate court considers the appeal after hearing the appellant either in person or through the counsel and on perusing the records and confirms the finding of the court below as well as the sentence awarded, it is the duty of the appellate court to certify that fact and send a copy of the judgment forthwith to the original court in order to take steps for execution of the judgment or sentence as such as provided in Chapter XXXII of the Code. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor, Sri K. Harilal appearing for the State and Sri S. Sreekumar, Standing Counsel for C.B.I. submit that the above applications cannot be entertained as even a modification in the date fixed for surrender of the accused would amount to alteration of the judgment which is not permissible as per Section 362 of the Code. Section 362 of the Code reads as follows: "362. Section 362 of the Code reads as follows: "362. Court not to alter judgment.- Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error." The above provision would show that no Court is empowered to alter or review its judgment or final order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. In this context, learned Standing Counsel for the C.B.I. has invited the attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Hari Singh v. Harbhajan Singh 2000 (3) KLT 935. In paragraph 8 of the above judgment, the Apex Court held as follows: "We have noted with disgust that the impugned orders were passed completely ignoring the basic principles of criminal law. No review of an order is contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. After the disposal of the main petition on 7-1-1999, there was no lis pending in the High Court wherein the respondent could have filed any miscellaneous petition. The filing of a miscellaneous petition not referable to any provision of Code of Criminal Procedure or the rules of the Court, cannot be resorted to as a substitute of fresh litigation. The record of the proceedings produced before us shows that directions in the case filed by the respondents were issued apparently without notice to any of the respondents in the petition. Merely because the respondent No.1 was an advocate, did not justify the issuance of directions at his request without notice to the other side. The impugned orders dated 30th April, 1999 and 21 st July, 1999 could not have been passed by the High Court under its inherent power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuance of fresh directions in such miscellaneous petitions by the High Court are unwarranted, not referable to any statutory provision and in substance, the abuse of the process of the Court." 7. In the light of the contentions taken up by the prosecution, this Court shall now consider whether the prayer made in the above applications are for alteration or review of the judgment of this Court. In the light of the contentions taken up by the prosecution, this Court shall now consider whether the prayer made in the above applications are for alteration or review of the judgment of this Court. The limited prayer of the petitioners in the above applications is for extending the time fixed by this Court for surrendering before the trial court. This cannot be taken as a prayer either for alteration or review of the judgment. To decide this issue, this Court should first of all consider whether the appellate court has the power or jurisdiction to fix a particular date for surrender of the accused on confirming the judgment of the trial court. In this regard, the appellate court has no power other than those conferred by the Code. Fixing of such date or time for surrender of the accused would amount to usurpation of the power of the original court. Further, it is also possible that the execution court is not in a position to issue warrant in time on the basis of the date and time for surrender fixed by this Court. Hence, this Court is of the view that fixing of the date for surrender is improper and irregular. It will also create an unhealthy practice. At the same time, the trial court should see that there is no unreasonable delay in issuing warrant and taking steps for execution of the sentence. It is also possible that in certain cases, the trial court may find it difficult to get the appearance of the accused. In such circumstances, the appellate court can direct the original court to take steps contemplated under the Code to compel the presence of the accused for execution of the sentence. 8. Yet another contention taken up by the prosecution is that once a date or time is fixed by this Court either under the appellate power or the revisional power, it is not proper for this Court to alter that date or time except in cases where the Court orders imprisonment till the rising of the Court. 8. Yet another contention taken up by the prosecution is that once a date or time is fixed by this Court either under the appellate power or the revisional power, it is not proper for this Court to alter that date or time except in cases where the Court orders imprisonment till the rising of the Court. Even though this Court holds that as per the provisions of the Code, the appellate court or the revisional court has no jurisdiction to fix any date for surrender of the accused on confirming the judgment of the trial court, this Court is of the view that no prejudice will be caused to either side if the date already fixed by this Court is extended for a further period. 9. As stated earlier, some of the accused were not in a position to surrender before the original court on the date fixed by this Court due to illness and other inconvenience. In the above circumstances, this Court is of the view that the above applications can be allowed, not as a legal right or as a precedent but to satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court. Accordingly, the date fixed for surrender of the accused in the above applications is extended for a further period of 15 days. The Crl. Miscellaneous Applications are disposed of as above.