RUDRENDRA NATH BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THESE appeal and revisional application are directed against the order dated January 18, 2002 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Third Court, Howrah allowing a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act and a petition under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure code for review of the judgment and decree dated February 15, 1993 passed in Money Suit No. 8 of 1991. ( 2 ) INITIALLY, the plaintiff, Minati Engineering Works, filed this Money suit No 8 of 1991 in the trial Court inter alia against the Union of India, the general Manager, Bharat Cooking Coal Limited, for realisation of Rs. 6,36,206. 67 paisa, as price of valves of different sizes supplied by the plaintiff-firm upon acceptance of tender by the defendant, Bharat Cooking Coal Limited. In the said suit the plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs : "a) Decree for realization of the entire amount i. e. Rs. 6,36,196. 87p. from the defendants be passed. B) Decree for interest as per Govt. rate for withholding payment illegally. C) Any other equitable relief/reliefs as the plaintiff is entitled to get. D) Cost of the suit. E) Attachment. " ( 3 ) THE said suit was decreed on February 15, 1993 ex parte for Rs. 6,36,196. 87 paise with interest at the rate of 22. 25% per month till realisation of decree. ( 4 ) THE judgment of the trial Court runs as under : "plaintiff files hazira Defendant takes no steps. The suit is taken up for ex parte hearing. Examined one witness as P. W. 1 and discharged. Documents marked exts as per list. ( 5 ) THIS is the suit for realisation of an amount of Rs. 6,36,196. 87 p. ( 6 ) THE plaintiffs case in brief is that the plaintiff is a proprietorship firm and manufacturer of valves having its office at 32 Buxara Road, P. O. Buxara, district-Howrah by acceptance of tender vide No. 1282-77/2/770/01/89-1097 accepted the quotation for supply of some valves under the trade name of minoti Brand caser iron, Lubricated taper plug valves of different sizes and by acceptance the defendant accepted the quotation/tender furnished by the plaintiff including the casting thereof vide quotation No. Minoti/quot/102/89 dated 28. 8. 89. The defendant accepted the quotation by letter dated 17. 1. 90 vide no. 128277/2/770/01/89-2035. 8. 89. The defendant accepted the quotation by letter dated 17. 1. 90 vide no. 128277/2/770/01/89-2035. Accordingly, the plaintiff supplied the goods to the defendant worth Rs. 6,36,196. 87 p. but the amount is still lying due from the defendant, demands were made on different occasions. Lastly notice under section 80, C. P. C. was also served upon the defendant but to no effect. Hence, this suit for realisation of the price with interest @ 22. 25% per annum till the satisfaction of the decree. ( 7 ) CLAIM is proved by ex parte evidence of P. W. 1 complied with the documents marked exts as per list. ( 8 ) C. F. paid is correct. Hence it is ordered "that the suit be and the same is decreed ex parte with cost against the defendants. Plaintiff do hereby get a decree for Rs. 6,36,196,87 p. with cost and interest @ 22. 25% per month till the satisfaction of the decree. The defendants are hereby directed to pay the decreetal dues within 6 months from this order failing which the plaintiff shall be at liberty to execute the decree according to law. " ( 9 ) THE plaintiff-firm put the decree in execution by filing Money execution Case No. 2 of 1993. ( 10 ) THE judgment-debtors/respondents filed an application under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code challenging the executibility of the decree passed in said Money Suit No. 8 of 1991. The said application under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code was registered as Misc. Case No. 52 of 1993 and the same was dismissed on January 21, 1994. ( 11 ) THEREAFTER, the decree was transferred to the Court of the learned subordinate Judge, 1 st Court at Dhanbad, Bihar, for execution and satisfaction of the decree; the proceeding was registered as Execution Case No, 2 of 1994. In the said Court, the judgment-debtors filed another application under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, which was rejected on July 29, 1995 by the said Court. ( 12 ) THEREAFTER, the judgement-dedtors filed Revisional Application No. 314 of 1995 in the High Court at Patna before the Ranchi Bench and the High court dismissed the revisional application on September 28, 1995. ( 12 ) THEREAFTER, the judgement-dedtors filed Revisional Application No. 314 of 1995 in the High Court at Patna before the Ranchi Bench and the High court dismissed the revisional application on September 28, 1995. ( 13 ) THEREAFTER, the judgment-debtors/respondents filed yet another application under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code before the Dhanbad court challenging the executibility of decree passed in the said money suit. On july 24, 1996, the said application under section 47 of the Civil Procedure code was allowed and the execution case was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court passing the said money decree. ( 14 ) THE appellant/decree holder filed Revisional Application No. 400 of 1996 against the said order dated July 24, 1996, before the Ranchi Bench of the High Court at Patna ; the High Court allowed the said revision on October 8, 1996. ( 15 ) THE respondents/judgment-debtors then moved the Supreme Court of India by filing a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 212 of 1997 against the said judgment and order of the High Court. On January 20, 1997 the Supreme court of India dismissed the special leave petition. The respondents/judgment-debtors then filed the review petition (Civil No. 742 of 1997) in the Supreme court of India on the ground, inter alia, that the interest at the rate of 22. 25% per month was excessive. The Supreme Court of India dismissed the review petition on February 26, 1997. The respondents/judgment-debtors filed an application before the Supreme Court of India for clarification of the said order, which was, also, held not maintainable. ( 16 ) THE respondents/judgment-debtors, on February 24, 1998 filed a petition before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 3rd Court, Howrah under Order 47 Rule 1 read with section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code being misc. Case No. 11 of 1998 for review of the judgment and decree dated February 15, 1993 passed in the Money Suit No. 8 of 1991 along with a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. ( 17 ) THE Court below rejected the said application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Case No. 11 of 1998 for review of the judgment and decree dated February 15, 1993 passed in the Money Suit No. 8 of 1991 along with a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. ( 17 ) THE Court below rejected the said application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The respondents/judgment-debtors then filed a revisional application before this Court being C. O. No, 275 of 2000, which was allowed by Pratap Kumar Ray, J. , inter alia, holding that never at any point of time it was an issue before any proceeding that there was a mistake in the judgment and decree on the issue of granting interest and, therefore, the trial Court was directed to decide the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act afresh. ( 18 ) THEREAFTER, learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 3rd Court, Howrah allowed the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and condoned the delay in preferring the application under Order 47 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure code on January 18, 2002. The Court below, also, allowed the review application and rectified the decree passed in Money Suit No. 8 of 1991 by changing the rate of interest as 22. 25% per annum instead and in place of 22. 25% per month as the same was a mistake apparent on the face of the record. ( 19 ) THE appellant/decree holder filed the instant revisional application under C. O No. 980 of 2002 against order dated January 18, 2002 allowing the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and, also, filed the instant First miscellaneous Appeal No. 355 of 2002 challenging the order allowing the application for review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 20 ) BY consent of the parties both the appeal and the revisional application were taken into consideration together. ( 21 ) AT the very outset, it may be mentioned that the order dated January 18, 2002 passed in Misc. Case No. 11 of 1998 allowing the petition for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been seriously challenged before us. However on perusal of the petition and the order dated january 18, 2002 in Misc. Case No. 11 of 1998 allowing the petition for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been seriously challenged before us. However on perusal of the petition and the order dated january 18, 2002 in Misc. Case No. 11 of 1998, we hold that the Court below was justified in allowing the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act condoning the delay in filing the application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil procedure Code for review of the decree dated February 15, 1993. ( 22 ) ON perusal of the materials on record, we find that the Court below considered the factual aspects of the case and the bonafide of the applicants/ judgment-debtors and held, in substance, that the said judgment-debtor/ respondent was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the petition under order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code within the prescribed time limit. ( 23 ) WE do not think that the Court below acted illegally or with material irregularity in passing the order allowing the petition under section 5 of the limitation Act, ( 24 ) THE undisputed chequered back grounds of the case have, already, been mentioned. It appears that by filing the petition for review, the respondents/ judgment-debtors prayed for rectification of the rate of interest mentioned in the said decree dated February 15, 1993. It was contended in the application for review that while in the body of the judgment the Court below granted the interest at the rate of 22. 25% per annum, but, in the ordering portion, the Court below, by mistake, mentioned the rate of interest as 22. 25% per month. By filing the said application for review the respondents/judgment-debtors have prayed for removal of such inadvertent mistake in the judgment and decree. ( 25 ) MR. Ajay Krishna Chatterjee, learned senior Advocate for the appellant/decree holder, M/s. Minati Engineering Works, has challenged the impugned order mainly on the ground that the rate of interest being already a question before the Supreme Court of India in Review Petition No. 742 of 1997, arising out of the said special leave petition, the trial Court, which allowed the petition for review, had no jurisdiction to amend such rate of interest under guise of review of the decree. Mr. Mr. Chatterjee has drawn out attention to the statements in the review petition filed before the Supreme Court of India, particularly the ground No. 1; it was contended in the said application that the trial Court granted interest at the excessive rate of 22. 25% per month contrary to the provisions of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. According to Mr. Chatterjee, learned senior Advocate, such review petition being dismissed by the Supreme Court of India, the said ground set forth in the application for review is to be treated as has been adjudicated and not accepted by the Apex court and hence the subsequent rate of interest decreed by the trial Court in the review application is barred under law. Mr. Chatterjee in support of his contention cited the decisions in the cases of Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and anr. v. K. Santhakumaran and Ors. reported in (1998)7 SCC 386 and Gopabandhu biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty and Ors. reported in (1998)4 SCC 447 . ( 26 ) IN Abbai Maligai (supra) the Supreme Court of India held that the high Court had no power of jurisdiction to review the self-same order, which was the subject matter of challenge in the special leave petitions before the supreme Court of India. In the present case, however, the situation was quite different. The point for consideration before the Supreme Court of India was the executibility of money decree, but not whether there was any typographical or arithmetical mistake in the operative part of the judgment of the Court below. For the same reason, the decision in Gopabandhu Biswal (supra) is not applicable. No appeal was preferred against the ex parts judgment and decree dated February 15, 1993, nor in any of the earlier proceedings neither the apex Court nor the High Court at Patna was ever invited to consider as to whether there was any typographical or arithmetical mistake in mentioning the rate of interest in the operative part of the judgment passed in the money suit. ( 27 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Sakli Nath Mukherji, learned senior Advocate for the respondents cited the decision in the case of Kunhayamned and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. ( 27 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Sakli Nath Mukherji, learned senior Advocate for the respondents cited the decision in the case of Kunhayamned and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in Judgement Today (2000)9 Supreme Court 110 and urged that the order dismissing an application for special leave to prefer an appeal by the Supreme Court of India does not constitute any declaration of law nor constitute a binding precedent. What is impugned before the Supreme Court of India can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then by assuming appellate jurisdiction over it and there cannot be any applicability of doctrine of merger. In the present case, the supreme Court of India dismissed the special leave petition and the review petition in connection thereto summarily. ( 28 ) MR. Mukherji, also, cited the decision in the case of Delhi administration and Ors. v. Madan Lal Nangia and Ors. reported in (2003)10 SCC 321 and has urged that by dismissing this special leave petition summarily and the review petition thereto, the Supreme Court of India has not closed the door of dismissing this appeal on merit. In other words, it is not proper to dismiss this appeal only on the ground of dismissal of the special leave petition and the review petition thereto. In the said case, it has been observed that if a special leave petition is summarily dismissed, such dismissal does not stand as a bar to consider the appeal on merit. We find substance in the said submission of mr. Mukherji and the principles laid down in both the aforesaid decisions may be applied in the present context in favour of the respondents. ( 29 ) WE find from the impugned order passed by the Court below that the Court below practically exercised its jurisdiction of amendment of the decree under sections 151 and 152 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the body of the judgment dated February 15, 1993 in Money Suit No. 8 of 1991, the rate of interest was mentioned to be awarded at the rate of 22. 25% per year, whereas, in the operative part of the judgment such rate has been mentioned as 22. 25% per month. The Court below has noticed such discrepancy as a typographical mistake on the part of the Court for which none of the parties can be blamed. 25% per year, whereas, in the operative part of the judgment such rate has been mentioned as 22. 25% per month. The Court below has noticed such discrepancy as a typographical mistake on the part of the Court for which none of the parties can be blamed. Practically speaking for such mistake on the part of the Court, the judgment-debtors cannot be asked to pay excessive rate of interest without any fault. ( 30 ) MR. Mukherji has urged that there cannot be any limitation nor can there be any other embargo for rectifying such mistake committed by the Court itself and for which the party cannot be blamed. We find substance in such submission of Mr. Mukherji, who has relied upon the decisions in the case of radha Kissen Chamria and Ors, v. Keshardeo Chamria reported in 50 Cal WN 592, Pratul Chandra Ray Chowdhury and Anr. v. Prafulla Kumar Roy Chowdhury and Ors. reported in (1990)2 Cal HN 360 and Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha kissen Chamria and Ors. reported in AIR 1953 SC 23 . ( 31 ) ALTHOUGH those cases relate to the provisions of section 151 "of the civil Procedure Code, the principles laid down therein are very much applicable to the present of set of facts where, practically, the Court below has acted under section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code rectifying the mistake of the court itself in mentioning the rate of interest as 22. 25% per month in the operative portion of the judgment which was contrary to the rate of interest mentioned in the body of the judgment. The trial Court had no intention to pass a decree granting interest at the rate of 22,25% per month. ( 32 ) IN this connection the decision reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1440 (Samarendra Nath Sinha and Anr. v. Krishna Kumar Nag) as cited by Mr. Mukherji, learned senior Advocate, may be relied upon. It has been held in the said decision that under section 152 of Civil Procedure Code, the clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either on its own motion or on an application by any of the parties. ( 33 ) THE slip or omission was due to the learned judges' mistake. ( 33 ) THE slip or omission was due to the learned judges' mistake. The courts have a duty to see that their records are true and they represent the correct state of affairs. In this case, the Court had no intention to grant interest to the decree holder at the rate of 22 25% per month; actually, the Court intended to grant interest at the rate of 22. 25% per annum to the decree holder. When the Court's attention was drawn to such mistake, the Court corrected such mistake, which crept in the decree as an accidental slip. A decree can always be amended if it is in variance with the judgment. ( 34 ) THUS, considering all the factual and legal aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that there is nothing to interfere with the impugned orders challenged in C. 0. No. 980 of 2002 and in F. M. A. No. 355 of 2002. ( 35 ) HENCE, both the revisional application and the miscellaneous appeal are dismissed on contest. We make no order as to costs.