ORDER A.K. Shrivastava, J. By this petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the validity of order dated 9-7-1998 (Annexure-P/3) passed by respondent No. 1 dismissing the services of the petitioner and order dated 7-7-1999 (Annexure-P/5) passed by respondent No. 2 in appeal, affirming the dismissal order of respondent No. 1. The unfolded facts are that the petitioner at the relevant point of time was serving as a constable under the establishment of Central Industrial Security Force, Bhopal. The Central Industrial Security Force is an armed force and comes under the Home Ministry of the Government of India. This Security Force is established for the purpose of security of Industries of the Government of India Undertaking. On account of major misconduct committed by the petitioner, a departmental enquiry was initiated against him in respect of two charges. The first charge is that without obtaining any prior permission he remained absent on 4/5-9-1997 in between 1.00-2.00 a.m. and when on 5-9-1997 he was interrogated in regard to the theft of Rs. 3,025/- of Head Constable Jiledar Singh, he on the pretext of coming after five minutes, run away from the unit. The second charge which was framed against him is that when on 5-9-1997 at 12.40 hours he run away from the unit. Three letters dated 6-9-1997, 16-9-1997 and 30-9-1997 were sent to his home address by registered post but neither he came on the duty nor sent any information. The charges were denied by the petitioner and thereafter enquiry officer examined the witnesses. The enquiry officer submitted his report holding both the charges to be proved. The enquiry report of the enquiry officer has been placed on record as Annexure-P/1-A. The disciplinary authority sent the enquiry report of the enquiry officer to the petitioner and directed him to submit the representation against the report. This letter was sent on 22-5-1998 (Annexure-P/l) along with the enquiry report. The petitioner submitted his explanation vide Annexure-P/2 dated 27-6-1998 which was not found to be satisfactory as a result of which, respondent No. 1 vide its order dated 9-7-1998 (Annexure-P/3) passed a detailed order concurring with the view of the enquiry officer and found that the charges are proved. The petitioner submitted his explanation vide Annexure-P/2 dated 27-6-1998 which was not found to be satisfactory as a result of which, respondent No. 1 vide its order dated 9-7-1998 (Annexure-P/3) passed a detailed order concurring with the view of the enquiry officer and found that the charges are proved. The disciplinary authority came to hold that from 5-9-1997 to 9-11-1997 i.e. for 65 days the petitioner remained absent from his duty without obtaining any leave and without submitting any application. The conduct of petitioner was also found to be suspicious because under the false pretext from the officer who was interrogating him in regard to the theft he fled away from the Unit. According to the disciplinary authority the conduct of the petitioner amounts to major misconduct and in disciplinary. The disciplinary authority (respondent No. 1) passed the order of punishment by dismissing the services of the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter preferred a departmental appeal before the DIG, Central Industrial Security Force at Mumbai (respondent No. 2) and the DIG after examining the entire case concurred with the view of the disciplinary authority and rejected the appeal on 7-7-1999 (Annexure-P/5). Hence this petition. Shri S.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. U.O.I. and Others, has submitted that the charges framed against the petitioner were not specific and vague and, therefore, the departmental enquiry is vitiated. Learned counsel by placing reliance on B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, and Single Bench decision of this Court in Ravindra Nath Tiwari v. M.D. Food Corporation of India and Others, 1998 MPSLR 229 has submitted that when the departmental enquiry has not been fairly conducted and the misconduct is not proved then this Court while exercising writ jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can interfere not only on the quantum of punishment but may also quash the departmental enquiry. It has been further contended that if the conclusion or finding of the punishing authority is such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate. Shri Upadhyay by placing heavy reliance on Syed Zaheer Hussain Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, has submitted that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. Shri Upadhyay by placing heavy reliance on Syed Zaheer Hussain Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, has submitted that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. On these premised submissions it has been contended by Shri Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner, that this petition be allowed and the impugned order be quashed. After having heard learned counsel for the petitioner I am of the view that this petition deserves to be dismissed. On going through the order passed by the disciplinary authority Annexure-P/3, it is gathered that the petitioner admitted that he remained absent for 65 days. On bare perusal of Annexure-P/2 which submitted by the petitioner against the show cause notice to the disciplinary authority, it is found that he admitted this fact that without obtaining leave he went away from the duty. His explanation is that on account of illness of his son he went away and for that purpose he asked permission from Head Constable Jiledar Singh but his request was not accepted. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that a charge of theft was not framed and, therefore, punishment could not have been accorded by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority did not pass the order of punishment on account of theft but it was found to be proved in the departmental enquiry that when interrogation in regard to the theft of Rs. 3,025/- of Head Constable Jiledar Singh was being made from the petitioner on 5-9-1997, at that juncture, under the false pretext of taking the leave of five minutes from the officer he fled from the Unit by jumping from the wall and this charge was found to be proved. The petitioner himself admitted that he remained absent for 65 days without obtaining any leave. The submission of the petitioner in regard to the ill-health of his son was also taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority. The disciplinary authority by examining the medical certificates of the son of petitioner, came to hold that the son of the petitioner was not hospitalised and he was only advised for the bed rest. By taking into consideration the entire case, the disciplinary authority came to hold that the charges are proved and eventually passed the order, dismissing the service of the petitioner. By taking into consideration the entire case, the disciplinary authority came to hold that the charges are proved and eventually passed the order, dismissing the service of the petitioner. The appellate authority vide its order dated 7-7-1997 (Annexure-P/5) came to hold that there is no procedural irregularity in holding the departmental enquiry. Earlier, the enquiry was being conducted by enquiry officer S.C. Bahuguna, Assistant Commandant of CISF Unit, but, on the request of the petitioner, enquiry officer was changed and Inspector EXC R.S. Saman of CISF Unit GAIL was appointed as enquiry officer on 22-1-1998 to conduct the departmental enquiry. The appellate authority also considered the arguments of the petitioner that defence assistance was not provided to him during the departmental enquiry. On going through the order, it is found that the appellate authority after considering the departmental enquiry proceedings came to hold that opportunity to take defence assistance was provided to the petitioner, but, he denied to take any defence assistance. The argument of the petitioner was also turned down by the appellate authority that the charge framed regarding commitment of theft of Rs. 3,025/- was false and this charge is not proved. In the order, the appellate authority specifically gave finding that the charge framed against the petitioner was specific and very clear. He was not charge sheeted for committing theft of money, but for running away from the preliminary enquiry which has been duly proved. The appellate authority after considering the case of the petitioner came to hold that the charges are proved and dismissed the appeal. So far as the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra) and B, C. Chaturvedi (supra) and a Single Bench decision of this Court Ravindra Nath Tiwari (supra) is concerned, there is no quarrel to the preposition laid down in these cases but the question is whether they are applicable in the present case or not. Shri Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra) submits that the charges are vague. However, on going through the charges framed against the petitioner, I do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. Two charges which were framed against the petitioner are quite specific and, therefore, the decision of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra) is not applicable in this case. However, on going through the charges framed against the petitioner, I do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. Two charges which were framed against the petitioner are quite specific and, therefore, the decision of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra) is not applicable in this case. So far as the applicability of the principle laid down in B. C. Chaturvedi (supra) is concerned, there is no quarrel to the preposition that if the departmental enquiry has been conducted in a manner inconsistence with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or whether the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence, this Court may interfere with the conclusion or the finding and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate. But, in the present case this situation does not arise as the enquiry was conducted in accordance with statutory rules and by following the principle of natural justice. The finding arrived at by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority is based on the evidence placed on record and, therefore, the case of B. C. Chaturvedi (supra) is also not helpful to the petitioner. On the same ground the decision of Single Bench of this Court in Ravindranath Tiwari (supra) is also not applicable in the present factual scenario. Much emphasis has been placed by Shri Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Zaheer Hussain (supra) and has contended that in that case also a delinquent employee was absent unauthorisedly and the Apex Court interfered in the quantum of punishment of dismissal from service, holding it to be too harsh and lesser punishment was awarded. The contention of learned counsel is that in the case of Syed Zaheer Hussain (supra) the Apex Court reduced the punishment and directed to reinstate the employee with continuity in service with 50% backwages from the date of dismissal. It be seen that in the case of Syed Zaheer Hussain (supra), employee remained absent only for seven days i.e. from 9-1-1985 to 15-1-1985. It be seen that in the case of Syed Zaheer Hussain (supra), employee remained absent only for seven days i.e. from 9-1-1985 to 15-1-1985. However, in the present case the petitioner remained absent for 65 days without obtaining any leave and his conduct is also very objectionable as during the course of interrogation in regard to the theft, under the false pretext he took leave of five minutes and fled away from the Unit by jumping from the wall and thereafter he did not turn up for 65 days and, therefore, in these facts and circumstances the decision of Syed Zaheer Hussain (supra) is not applicable in the present case. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Sujata Malhotra, the delinquent employee remained absent from duty for about four years. The High Court directed to treat the period of absence as extra-ordinary leave as that itself would be a punishment of overstay. In that context the Apex Court held and decided that the conclusion of High Court was erroneous inasmuch as the order of an employer to treat a particular period of absence as extraordinary leave, by no stretch of imagination can be held to be an order of punishment. It would be relevant to rely paras-3 and 5 of the said decision which read thus :- 3. Against the said order of termination she approached the High Court by filing a writ petition. By the impugned judgment the High Court being of the opinion that the punishment of termination is grossly disproportionate to the delinquency in question, set aside the order of termination and directed reinstatement and payment of 50 per cent as backwages with the further direction that the period of absence would be treated as extraordinary leave which, according to the High Court, is itself punishment for overstay. The aforesaid conclusion of the High Court, on the face of it, is erroneous inasmuch as the order of an employer to treat a particular period of absence as extraordinary leave when the employee has no leave due by stretch of imagination can be held to be an order of punishment. Having considered the rival submissions and on examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, we find considerable force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. Having considered the rival submissions and on examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, we find considerable force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The High Court possibly would not be within its power to interfere with an order of punishment inflicted in a departmental proceeding unless and until any lacuna in the departmental proceeding is noticed or found. But having regard to the fact that the order of reinstatement has already been implemented and the respondent is continuing in service subsequent to the date of the order of the High Court, we are not inclined to interfere with that part of the order of the High Court even though we find considerable force in the arguments of the counsel for the State of Rajasthan. While, therefore, the order directing reinstatement of the respondent is upheld, we cannot sustained the other part of the order directing payment of backwages to the extent of 50 per cent for the period the respondent was not in service. We, therefore, set aside that part of the order of the High Court. For the purpose of clarification, we reiterate that though the respondent would be entitled to be reinstated in service and the period of her absence would be treated as a part of continuity in the service for the purpose of retrial benefit, but she would not be entitled to any pecuniary benefits for the total period of her absence till the date of her reinstatement in service. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. The Supreme Court in the case Director General R.P.F. and Others Vs. Ch. Sai Babu, has held that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, normally should not be disturbed by High Court or a tribunal except when, after examining all the relevant factors, the punishment found grossly or shockingly disproportionate. It would be condign to rewrite paras 6 and 7 which read thus : 6. As is evident from the order of the learned Single Judge, there has been no consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case including as to the nature of charges held proved against the respondent to say that penalty of removal from service imposed on the respondent was extreme. Merely because it was felt that the punishment imposed was extreme was not enough to disturb or modify the punishment imposed on a delinquent officer. Merely because it was felt that the punishment imposed was extreme was not enough to disturb or modify the punishment imposed on a delinquent officer. The learned Single Judge has not recorded reasons to say as to how the punishment imposed on the respondent was shockingly or grossly disproportionate to the gravity of charges held proved against the respondent. It is not that in every case of imposing a punishment of removal or dismissal from service a High Court can modify such punishment merely by saying that it is shockingly disproportionate. Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works. In the present case we do not find that there has been a consideration of all the relevant facts and the learned Single Judge has not recorded reasons in order to modify the punishment imposed. The Division Bench of the High Court also did not examine the matter in proper perspective but simply concurred with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Normally in cases where it is found that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, High Courts and tribunals may remit the cases to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration on the quantum of punishment. In this case the disciplinary proceedings were initiated in the year 1989 and to shorten the litigation, we think it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and remit Writ Appeal No. 952 of 1998 to the Division Bench of the High Court to reconsider the case only on the quantum of punishment imposed on the respondent having regard to all relevant factors including the facts that the respondent was a member of the Railway Protection Force and in the light of the observations made above. Since the proceedings are pending for quite sometime, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ appeal expeditiously. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is ordered in the above terms. Since the proceedings are pending for quite sometime, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ appeal expeditiously. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is ordered in the above terms. No costs." In the present case, judging from all the angles, looking to the conduct of the petitioner, the penalty imposed to him cannot be said to be grossly or shockingly disproportionate. For the reasons stated hereinabove, I do not find any ground to interfere in the impugned orders Annexures-P/3 and P/5 passed by the disciplinary authority and appellate authority, respectively. The petition is found to be devoid of any substance and the same is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.