JUDGMENT P.G. Agarwal, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.6.2002 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Morigaon in Sessions Case No. 17 of 2000. 2. Heard Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. P.C. Barpujari, B.K. Singh and R.B. Deb, learned Counsel for the Appellants and Mr. K. Munir, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam. 3. The Appellants before us as well as the informant and the prosecution witnesses are all neighbours residing at Satchapari village and they are also related to each other. On 1.4.1998 a minor quarrel took place between the children of two sides in connection with a hen and this small quarrel erupted into a big incident wherein as many as three human lives were lost and some other persons sustained injuries. 4. The First Information in the present case which was registered as Mayong P.S. Case No. 36 of 1998 under Section 147/148/149/320/302, IPC was lodged by Mr. Ibrahim Ali, a School Teacher stating that the accused persons, named in the FIR, Ext. I, armed with dao, lathi etc. attacked his father Altab Ali and as well as Intaj Ali and the informant and other relations. As a result of which Intaj Ali died at the spot whereas Altab Ali was removed to Morigaon Civil Hospital where he succumbed to the injuries. In the above incident, Abdul Sobhan, Siddique, Dukumjan also sustained injuries on their person. The seven accused-Appellants before us were tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Morigaon in Sessions case No. 36/98 for commission of offence under Sections 147/148/149/320/ 302, IPC and on conclusion of the trial the learned Sessions Judge, Morigaon convicted all the accused-Appellants under Sections 147/148/302 read with Section 149, IPC and they were sentenced to life and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default to further imprisonment for six months under Section 302/149, IPC. The accused persons were also convicted under Section 148/149, IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one year and also to go for rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months for their offence under Section 147/149, IPC. All the different sentences were directed to be run consecutively. Hence, the present appeal. 5. It may be mentioned at this stage that for the said incident of 1.4.1998, one Md. All the different sentences were directed to be run consecutively. Hence, the present appeal. 5. It may be mentioned at this stage that for the said incident of 1.4.1998, one Md. Joynul Abedin also filed an FIR stating inter alia that as many as 11 accused persons named in the said FIR, armed with lethal weapons attacked them and killed his sister-in-law Majida Khatun and assaulted other persons, namely, Akbar Ali, Samiruddin, Nekbor and it was registered as G.R. Case No. 211 of 1998 Sessions Case No. 42 of 1999. Both the Sessions cases being cross-case were tried together by the learned Sessions Judge, Morigaon and vide impugned judgment and order dated 20.6.2002 the learned Sessions Judge, Morigaon acquitted all the accused persons in the Sessions Case No. 42 of 1999. Thereafter, the informant Md. Jainal Abedin has filed Criminal Revision No. 488 of 2002 the interest of justice and for the purpose of convenience both the appeal and the Criminal revision were heard together but, as required under law, they are disposed of separately by separate orders. 6. In the present case, the information Ibrahim Ali, P.W. 2 is not an eye-witness. On being informed about the incident he came back from school and found his uncle Intaj Ali lying dead in the courtyard. His father Altab Ali was also lying with injuries and he was in position to speak. His father Altab Ali told him that accused-Appellants Akbar Ali, Samimddin, Azizul Haque, Nekbor Ali, Ayub Ali, Mustt. Ambia Khatun and Jamiruddin have assaulted him and Intaj Ali with dao, lathi etc. He took his father to Morigaon Civil Hospital but his father died around 8.30 p.m. at the hospital. Thereafter, he lodged the FIR. 7. Mustt. Fatema Khatun, P.W. 3 is the own daughter of Intaj Ali (since deceased). She has deposed that on the date of occurrence, around 2.00 p.m. an altercation took place between Nekbor Ali on one side and Altab Ali on the other. 8. The neighbours intervened in their quarrel and asked both the parties to sit for discussion and settlement. It was around 3.00 p.m. and both the sides took their seats under a Mango tree, situated on the road side. It may be mentioned here that the said road was situated in between the houses of the two sides. 8. The neighbours intervened in their quarrel and asked both the parties to sit for discussion and settlement. It was around 3.00 p.m. and both the sides took their seats under a Mango tree, situated on the road side. It may be mentioned here that the said road was situated in between the houses of the two sides. Abdul Sobhan also came out to join the discussion, whereupon the accused Samiruddin made accusation that Abdul Sobhan is carrying a pistol. One person from the public namely, Abdul Kadir searched the person of Abdul Sobhan but did not find anything. The accused persons thereafter ran back to their homestead and brought out daos, lathis, ballams etc. The accused Nekbor Ali gave a dao blow on the head of Intaj Ali, whereas Jamiruddin pierced Intaj's eye with ballam and Samiruddin further pressed the said ballam in the eye of Intaj. Altaf Ali tried to intervene whereupon accused Nekbor, Akbar Ali, Ambika Khatun, Samiruddin, Jamiruddin, Ayub Ali and Azijul Haque assaulted Altaf Majida Begum who used to treat Intaj as her godfather came to save Intaj and in the process some of the dao blows fell on her body. The accused persons also assaulted Abdul Sabhan Ali, Sukurijan and Siddique Ali. 9. Osman Ali, P.W. 5 is the son of the deceased Intaj Ali and he has fully supported the statement made by his sister Mustt. Fatema Khatun, P.W. 3. The evidence of Meherun Nessa, P.W. 6, wife of the deceased Altaf Ali is on identical line. Amjad Ali, P.W. 7 is not an eye-witness. Mustt. Hasnara Begum, P.W. 8 is the daughter of the deceased Altaf Ali and she has also corroborated the evidence of the two other eye-witnesses, P.W. 3 and P.W. 5. The evidence of P.W. 9, Md. Syed Ali is immaterial as he has not seen the incident P.W. 10, P.W. 11, P.W. 12 and P.W. 13 are the four investigating police officers. On going through the evidence of the three eye-witnesses, we find that all of them have given a consistent version of the incident as to how the incident occurred except some minor discrepancies here and there, which are not material and which do not strike at the root of the case. We find that how a small incident as regards a hen has snow balled into a major tragedy, causing loss of three human lives. We find that how a small incident as regards a hen has snow balled into a major tragedy, causing loss of three human lives. Both sides are next door neighbours and relations and their houses are separated by a road only and the villagers tried to settle the dispute by bringing both sides together. However, the things went awry when the accusation made against Abdul Sobhan turned out to be false. 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has, however, submitted that although the incident allegedly took place in presence of the neighbours and co-villagers, none of them have come forward to support the prosecution case and, as such, non-examination of these independent witnesses may be considered to be fatal to the prosecution. We do find that none of the neighbouring witnesses have come forward to depose but in the present case the incident as such is not in dispute. There is a cross-case as regards the same incident and defence came out with the plea that in the said incident one Majida Begum also sustained injuries and died. Shri Bhattacharjee, learned Sr. Advocate was fair enough to submit that there is no scope to presume that no incident had taken place on the date, time and at the place in view of the cross-cases. At this stage we may recapitulate the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and other, 1999 (2) Crimes 45 (SC), wherein it was held: The over insistence on witnesses having no relation with the victim often results in criminal justice going awry. When any incident happens in a dwelling house the most natural witnesses would be the inmates of that house. It is unpragmatic to ignore such natural witnesses and insist on outsiders who would not have even seen any thing. If the Court has discerned from the evidence or even from the investigation records that some other independent person has witnessed any event connecting the incident in question then there is justification for making adverse comments against non-examination of such person as prosecution witness. Otherwise, merely on surmises the Court should not castigate a prosecution for not examining other persons of the locality as prosecution witnesses. Otherwise, merely on surmises the Court should not castigate a prosecution for not examining other persons of the locality as prosecution witnesses. Prosecution can be expected to examine only those who have witnessed the events and not those who have not seen it though the neighbourhood may be replete with other residents also. 11. Learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, has submitted that the neighbouring witnesses, who tried to settle the dispute however refused to depose in favour of either side and, as such, we find that in both the cases they did not come forward to depose before the Court; may be they do not want to get involved out of fear or apprehension or that they were disgusted with the conduct of their neighbours, hi the case of State of U.R v. Anil Singh, 1989 Cri LJ 88, the Apex Court observed: In an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court observed that in the great majority of cases, the prosecution version is rejected either for want of corroboration by independent witnesses, or for some falsehood stated or embroidery added by witnesses. In some cases, the entire prosecution case is doubted for not examining all witnesses to the occurrence. The indifferent attitude of the public in the investigation of crimes could also be pointed. The public are generally reluctant to come forward to depose before the Court. It is, therefore, not correct to reject the prosecution version only on ground that all witnesses to occurrence have not been examined. It is also not proper to reject the case for want of corroboration by independent witnesses if the case made out is otherwise true and acceptable. 12. So far the death of Altaf Ah and Intaj Ali is concerned, there is overwhelming oral evidence on record and it is supported by the medical evidence. Dr. L.C. Nath, P.W. 4, who held the autopsy over the dead body of Altaf Ali found as follows: External appearance-A male dead body of 60 years of age, lying in post-mortem examination hall. Rigor mortis present in all limbs. The blood stained bandage on the head was removed and on the scalp I found lacerated injuries on the left of the parietal and right side of the parietal region of scalp of ill-defined border with 4" X 3" long on the scalp. Except the above mentioned injuries, there was no other injury found. Rigor mortis present in all limbs. The blood stained bandage on the head was removed and on the scalp I found lacerated injuries on the left of the parietal and right side of the parietal region of scalp of ill-defined border with 4" X 3" long on the scalp. Except the above mentioned injuries, there was no other injury found. There was no any ligature mark on the neck. Thorax-I did not find any positive finding. Cranium and spinal cord-There was a linear fracture of left parieto-temporal bone and right parietal bone of scalp. Membrane of the brain-Rupture of duramatter on both parietal regions of brain lobes. Brain and spinal cord-There was not any finding on the vertebrae bone. There was presence of intra-cranial collection of blood. More details description of injuries- (1) One lacerated injury on the scalp. (2) Fracture of left parieto-temporal and right parietal bone. (3) Duramatter ruptured with intra-cranial collection of blood. Injuries are ante-mortem in nature. Opinion-In my opinion, the actual cause of death is due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of major head injury. 13. P.W. 4 also found the following injuries on the person of the body of Intaj Ali: External appearance.-A dead body of 65 years of age, male is lying in the post-mortem examination hall. Rigor mortis present. Externally there was one cut wound of 6" x ½" x ¼" on right side of parietal region of scalp exposing fractured scalp. Right eye-ball is collapsed with lacerated and penetrating wound through the right eye-ball. There was no injury externally except the injury described above. There was no any ligature mark on the neck. Cranium and spinal canal-As described above. Membrane-Brain matters of frontal region. Intracranial collection of blood with lacerated frontal lobe of brain. Thorax-Normal. Right lung and left lung-Collapsed and no injury. More details description of injuries: (1) Incised wound on scalp (right side) causing fracture of parietal bone with injury to duramatter (2) Penetrating injury of right eye-ball causing injury to frontal lobe of brain and duramatter (3) Presence of intra-cranial haemorrhage-All injuries are ante mortem in nature. Opinion-In my opinion, the actual cause of death is due to haemorrhage and shock as a result of major head injuries. 14. The medical evidence has not been challenged as such and we concur with the findings of the trial Court that this is a case of homicidal death. Opinion-In my opinion, the actual cause of death is due to haemorrhage and shock as a result of major head injuries. 14. The medical evidence has not been challenged as such and we concur with the findings of the trial Court that this is a case of homicidal death. 15. In the present case, as stated, the filing of the cross-case by the accused person has been stated and admitted by them in their statement under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure The presence of P.W. 3, P.W. 5, P.W. 6 and P.W. 8, at the place of occurrence has also been admitted by accused Appellants in their statement under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure as the presence of these eye-witnesses have been admitted and considering the fact that being the inmates of the house, near which the incident took place, they were the most natural witnesses, the trial Court has relied on their testimony. There is no dispute at the bar that these eye-witnesses are the close relations of the deceased persons learned Counsel for the Appellants have placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 . Before discussing the evidence of the witnesses we might mention a few preliminary remarks against the background of which the oral statements are to be considered. All persons to whom the oral statements are said to have been made by Manju when she visited Beed for the last time, are close relatives and friends of the deceased. In view of the close relationship and affection any person in the position of the witness would naturally have a tendency to exaggerate or add facts which may not have been stated to them at all. Not that this is done consciously but even unconsciously the love and affection for the deceased would create a psychological hatred against the supposed murderer and, therefore, the Court has to examine such evidence with very great care and caution. Not that this is done consciously but even unconsciously the love and affection for the deceased would create a psychological hatred against the supposed murderer and, therefore, the Court has to examine such evidence with very great care and caution. Even if the witnesses were speaking a part of the truth or perhaps the whole of it, they would be guided by a spirit of revenge of remedies against the accused person and in this process certain facts which may not or could not have been stated may be imagined to have been Stated unconsciously by the witnesses in order to see that the offender is punished. This is human psychology and no one can help it. 16. In a recent case State of U.P. v. Binode Kumar 1992 Cri. LJ 115, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated its earlier observation in the following words: Mere interestedness by itself is not a valid ground for discarding or rejecting the sworn testimony and nor can it be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction. What all that is necessary is that the evidence of interested or related witnesses should be subjected to a very careful scrutiny with extreme care and caution and if on such scrutiny the testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable then that evidence may he relied upon in the circumstances of the particular case to base a conviction thereon. 17. learned Counsel for the Appellants have also submitted that the accused persons had acted in exercise of their right of private defence as the prosecution witnesses, including the deceased had forcibly entered into their house to cause assault and in this connection Appellants have placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jai Dev and Hari Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 612 . (12) In appreciating the validity of the Appellants' argument, it would be necessary to recall the basic assumptions underlying the law of self-defence. In a well-ordered civilized society it is generally assumed that the State would take care of the persons and properties of individual citizens and that normally it is the function of the State to afford protection to such persons and their properties. This, however, does not mean that a person suddenly called upon to face an assault must run away and thus protect himself. This, however, does not mean that a person suddenly called upon to face an assault must run away and thus protect himself. He is entitled to resist the attack and defend himself the same is the position if he has to meet an attack on his property. In other words, where an individual citizen or his property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State machinery is not readily available, the individual citizen is entitled to protect himself and his property. That being so, it is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of private defence that the violence which the citizen defending himself or his property is entitled to use must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is to be averted or which is reasonably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose. The exercise of the right of private defence must never be vindictive or malicious. (13) There can be no doubt that in judging the conduct of a person who proves that he had a right of private defence, allowance has necessarily to be for his feelings at the relevant time. He is faced with an assault which causes a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt and that inevitably creates in his mind some excitement and confusion. At such a moment, the uppermost feeling in his mind would be to ward off the danger and to save himself or his property, and so, he would naturally be anxious to strike a decisive blow in exercise of his right. It is no doubt true that in striking a decisive blow, he must not use more force than appears to be reasonably necessary. But in dealing with the question as to whether more force is used than is necessary or than was justified by the prevailing circumstances, it would be inappropriate to adopt tests of detached objectivity which would be so natural in a Court room, for instance, long after the incident has taken place. That is why in some judicial decisions it has been observed that the means which a threatened person adopts or the force which he uses should not be weighed in golden scales. To begin with, the person exercising a right of private defence must consider whether the threat to his person or his property is real and immediate. That is why in some judicial decisions it has been observed that the means which a threatened person adopts or the force which he uses should not be weighed in golden scales. To begin with, the person exercising a right of private defence must consider whether the threat to his person or his property is real and immediate. If he reaches the conclusion reasonably that the threat is immediate and real, he is entitled to exercise his right. In the exercise of his right, he must use force necessary for the purpose and he must stop using the force as soon as the threat has disappeared. So long as the threat lasts and the right of private defence can be legitimately exercised, it would not be fair to require, as Mayne has observed, that 'he should modulate his defence step by step, according to the attack, before there is reason to believe the attack is over. The law of private defence does not require that the person assaulted or facing an apprehension of an assault must run away for safety. It entitles him to defend himself and law gives him the right to secure his victory over his assailant by using the necessary force. This necessarily postulates that as soon as the cause for the reasonable apprehension has disappeared and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to rout, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence. If the danger is continuing, the right is there; if the danger or the apprehension about it has ceased to exist, there is no longer the right of private defence. (Vide Sections 102 and105 of the Indian Penal Code). This position cannot be and has not been disputed before us and so, the narrow question which we must proceed to examine is whether in the light of this legal position, the Appellants could be said to have had a right of private defence at the time when the Appellant Jai Dev fired at the victim Jai Dev and the Appellant Hari Singh fired at the victim Jai Narain. 18. From the evidence on record we find that no incident had taken place inside the house and the earlier altercation/quarrel regarding a hen subsided and the incident rook place on the road when a talk of compromise or settlement was going on. 18. From the evidence on record we find that no incident had taken place inside the house and the earlier altercation/quarrel regarding a hen subsided and the incident rook place on the road when a talk of compromise or settlement was going on. The accused persons has not claimed or pleaded the right of private defence but in view of the settled position of law that even when the right of private defence is not specifically pleaded, the Court may examine the same if a case is made out. On perusal of the evidence on record, we find that it was the accused persons who found themselves on the wrong foot when their accusations were found to be untrue and, therefore, they took the law into their own hands, brought out lethal weapons and assaulted the deceased and hence in the facts and circumstances of the case no case of right of private defence was made out as the Appellants were the aggressors. 19. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also submitted that in the present case one of the family members of the accused persons died and some other accused persons had sustained injuries on their persons and, as such, the prosecution was required to or duty bound to explain the injuries on the person of the accused persons. In the case of Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 2263 , the Apex Court observed: It is well settled that fouler the crime, higher the proof, and hence in a murder case where one of the accused is proved to have sustained injuries in the course of the same occurrence, the non-explanation of such injuries by the prosecution is a manifest defect in the prosecution case and shows that the origin and genesis of the occurrence had been deliberately suppressed which leads to the irresistible conclusion that the prosecution has not come out with a true version of the occurrence. 20. 20. The entire case law on the subject was again considered by the Apex Court in the case of Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing and other, 2001 (6) SCC 145 and these were reiterated in the case of Kashi Ram and other v. State of M.R 2002 (1) SCC 71 , wherein the Apex Court held: In Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing and other, JT 2001 (Supp 1) SC 415: (2001) 6 SCC 145 , this Court has held that the Court ought to make an effort at searching out the truth on the material available on record with a view to find out how much of the prosecution case was proved beyond reasonable doubt and was worthy of being accepted as truthful and the approach of rejecting prosecution case in its entirety for non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused persons is erroneous. This Court further held: "It cannot be held as a matter of law or invariably a rule that whenever the accused sustained an injury in the same occurrence, the prosecution is obliged to explain the injury and on the failure of the prosecution to do so the prosecution case should be disbelieved. Before non-explanation of the injuries on the persons of the accused persons by the prosecution witnesses may affect the prosecution case, the Court has to be satisfied of the existence of two conditions: (i) that the injuries on the person of the accused were of a serious nature; and (ii) that such injuries must have been caused at the time of the occurrence in question. 21. In a recent case of Rizan and another v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2003 (5) SCC 661, the Apex Court observed: The number of injuries is not always a safe criterion for determining who the aggressor was. It cannot be stated as a universal rule that whenever the injuries are on the body of the accused person, a presumption must necessarily be raised that the accused persons had caused injuries in exercise of the right of private defence. The defence has to further establish that the injuries so caused on the accused probabilises the version of the right of private defence. Non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance. The defence has to further establish that the injuries so caused on the accused probabilises the version of the right of private defence. Non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance. But mere non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case in all cases. This principle applies to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. 22. In the present case, so far the injuries sustained by Majida Begum, which led to her death, is concerned, this has been explained by the prosecution. Prosecution witnesses have stated that Majida Begum all along treated the deceased, Intaj Ali, as her godfather and seeing her god-father being assaulted, she tried to prevent and accidentally sustained the injuries at the hands of the accused persons. The trial Court has accepted the above explanation. So far the injuries on the person of other accused persons are concerned, the defence has not led any evidence as regards the nature of injuries sustained by them, hi the case of Ayodhya Ram v. State of Bihar, 1999 (9) SCC 139 , it was held by the Apex Court that prosecution is not bound to explain each and every injuries of the accused if the injuries are minor and if no explanation is given, the prosecution would not fall on that score. 23. Although the three eye-witnesses on whose testimony the prosecution has relied, are the members of the complainants' family, we find that although they have been cross-examined at length the defence has failed to discredit their testimony in any manner. No doubt, there are some minor contradictions or inconsistency but these are immaterial. The evidence as regards the nature of assault and the cite of the injuries has been fully corroborated by the medical evidence on record. The statement of these eye-witnesses that the accused persons pierced the eye of Intaj Ali with a spear (ballam) have been corroborated by the doctor who found penetrating injury on the right eye ball causing injury to frontal lobe of brain and dura matter. The statement of these eye-witnesses that the accused persons pierced the eye of Intaj Ali with a spear (ballam) have been corroborated by the doctor who found penetrating injury on the right eye ball causing injury to frontal lobe of brain and dura matter. Taking a overall view of the matter we have no hesitation whatsoever to hold that the evidence of these three eye-witnesses inspire confidence and they are reliable and trustworthy. 24. Besides the testimony of eye-witnesses, there is oral dying declaration made by deceased Altaf Ali. P.W. 2 has deposed about the same and we find that it has not been disputed by any meaningful cross-examination. There is no denying the fact that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence and it can form basis for conviction. 25. The Appellants have taken up the plea that the two deceased persons sustained self-inflicted injuries. There is absolutely no material to support the said plea and defence has also not led any evidence on that count or even gave suggestion to witnesses. It has also been submitted that the prosecution was bound to prove the FIR in the cross-case as has been observed by this Court in the case of the State of Assam v. Abdul Jalil and other, 1977 Cri L J 227 (Gau). In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the defence has proved the FIR of cross-case during trial although the cross-case was heard and disposed of analogously. Failure of the prosecution on that count, however, is not sufficient to throw out the entire prosecution overboard. 26. Now, the question that comes for determination is whether the accused persons were member of an unlawful assembly; and whether all of them can be roped in with the help of Section 149, IPC. The genesis of the incident, relates to a hen and there was altercation, accusation, counter-accusation etc. and considering the fact that members of both sides sustained injuries and as a matter of fact members of both sides died in the incident we are, therefore, of the view that this is a case of mutual marpit and under such circumstances the persons who have caused the fatal injuries are responsible/liable for their individual acts. and considering the fact that members of both sides sustained injuries and as a matter of fact members of both sides died in the incident we are, therefore, of the view that this is a case of mutual marpit and under such circumstances the persons who have caused the fatal injuries are responsible/liable for their individual acts. The evidence on record shows that the dao blow on the head of Intaj Ali was caused by Nekbor and Jamiruddin and Samiruddin caused injuries on the eye of Intaj AH, they also assaulted Altaf Ali with dao etc. The evidence on record also shows that Akbar Ali had also assaulted the deceased with a lathi on the head. We, thus, find that so far the four accused Appellants, namely, Nekbor Ali, Akbar Ali, Jamiruddin and Samiruddin are concerned, there is tale tell and specific materials that they assaulted the deceased Altaf Ali and Intaj Ali causing their death. So far the Appellants Mustt. Ambia Khatun, Azizul Haque and Ayub Ah are concerned, the evidence is very scanty and they did not assault the deceased but alleged to have caused simple injuries to other witnesses, who have not come forward to depose and there is also no medical evidence on that count. 27. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of all the accused Appellants under Section 147/148, IPC is set aside. The accused Appellants Ayub Ali, Mustt. Ambia Khatun, Ajijul Haque are acquitted of the charges under Section 302/149, IPC and they be set at liberty forthwith. Mustt. Ambia Khatun is already on bail, as such, she need not surrender to her bail bond. The conviction of the accused-Appellants Nekbor Ali, Akbar Ali, Samiruddin and Jamiruddin is modified and converted to one under Section 302/34, IPC. They are sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay the fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in default to further imprisonment for 15 days each. The appeals stands disposed of as aforesaid. The Appellants Ayub Ali, and Ajijul Haque be released from jail forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.