ORDER 1. This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Company Judge on 13th July, 2005 in Company Petition No. 5 of 2003, which was a petition under Sections 433 and 434 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956, filed by Damodar Valley Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "D.V.C."} for winding up of the appellant Company Akshaya Technologies Private Limited, Jharkhand. 2. Admittedly, the appellant Company had obtained supply of electricity from D.V.C. and had defaulted in payment of its dues which was quantified by D.V.C. as Rs. 3,37,004.06 on account of bills and a further sum of Rs. 2,59,65,004/- on account of Delayed Payment Surcharge and additional interest at the rate of two per cent per month. 3. In the winding up petition, it was mentioned that although the appellant Company agreed to pay the outstanding dues in twenty instalments, after payment of some of the instalments, it discontinued the payment of the other instalments, as a result whereof, D.V.C. was compelled to file the winding up petition. 4. The matter was contested on behalf of the appellant Company before the learned Company Judge mainly on account of the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and in particular Section 22 thereof. 5. It was contended on behalf of the appellant Company that a reference had been made to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as "B.I.F.R.") under Section 15 of the aforesaid Act and that the same had been dismissed. Thereafter, an appeal was preferred by the appellant Company under Section 25 of the above Act before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as "A.A.I.F.R."). It was contended that having regard to the pendency of the appeal and the provisions of Section 22 of the aforesaid Act, the proceeding before the learned Company Judge for winding up of the appellant Company was not maintainable. It was contended that having regard to the pendency of the appeal and the provisions of Section 22 of the aforesaid Act, the proceeding before the learned Company Judge for winding up of the appellant Company was not maintainable. The learned Company Judge, upon consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the stand taken on behalf of the appellant Company that it had already been revived and the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Maize & Chemicals Limited v. State of U.P., , came to the conclusion that since the appellant Company had accepted the default, it was liable to comply with the undertaking given by it notwithstanding the fact that the matter was pending before the A.A.I.F.R. On the basis of the said conclusion, the learned Single Judge directed publication of notice in two National Newspapers and, it is against such order and direction, that the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant Company. 6. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. A.K. Jain, learned Advocate, reiterated the statements made before the learned Single Judge with regard to the express provisions of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Mr. Jain contended that having regard to the said provisions contained in the Statute itself, the learned Single Judge erred in law in continuing with the winding up proceeding and directing publication in the Newspapers. For the sake of reference, the provisions of Section 22(1) of the above Act, which are relevant for our purpose, are set out hereinbelow :- "22(1). Jain contended that having regard to the said provisions contained in the Statute itself, the learned Single Judge erred in law in continuing with the winding up proceeding and directing publication in the Newspapers. For the sake of reference, the provisions of Section 22(1) of the above Act, which are relevant for our purpose, are set out hereinbelow :- "22(1). Where in respect of an Industrial Company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an Industrial Company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the Industrial Company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the Industrial Company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the Industrial Company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the Industrial Company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the Industrial Company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority." 7. Mr. Jain submitted that having regard to the language of the aforesaid section and in view of the pendency of the A.A.I.F.R. Appeal No. 313 of 2002 filed on behalf of the appellant Company, the winding up proceedings before the learned Company Judge was liable to be stayed. 8. Mr. Jain submitted that the question involved in the instant appeal had been considered by the Honble Supreme Court and various other Courts and an uniform view had been taken regarding the suspension of coercive steps for recovery of monetary dues during the pendency of proceedings either before the B.I.F.R. or before the A.A.I.F.R. In support of the submissions, Mr. Jain referred to the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in (i) Gram Panchayat and Anr. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. and Ors. Jain referred to the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in (i) Gram Panchayat and Anr. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. and Ors. , (ii) Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and Anr., and (iii) Real Value Appliances Ltd. v. Canara Bank and Ors., . Various other decisions were also referred to by Mr. Jain which will only amount to multiplication of the views expressed in these matters. 9. In all these cases, it has been emphasised that where an inquiry is pending under Section 16 or 17 or an appeal is pending under Section 25 of the 1985 Act, there would be cession of coercive activities of the nature mentioned in Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act to permit the B.I.F.R. to consider what remedial measures it could take with regard to Sick Industrial Companies. 10. Mr. Jain submitted that having regard to the above, the learned Company Judge was not justified in continuing with the winding up proceedings on the ground that the Company had since become profit making and, upon placing reliance on the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) to the effect that the petitioner would not be entitled to claim that it was not required to make any payment for supply of electrical energy, pending the decision of the proceedings before the B.I.F.R. 11. Appearing for D.V.C., Mr. Delip Jerath, learned counsel, has urged that when an undertaking had been given by the appellant Company for payment of its dues in instalments, it was bound by such undertaking and mere pendency of the matter before the B.I.F.R. and/or A.A.I.F.R. would not be sufficient in itself to allow the appellant Company the luxury of non-payment of the instalments as undertaken by it. Mr. Jerath pointed out that question had been gone into by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A No. 97 of 2003 which had been filed by the present appellant Company and that the same had been dismissed on the finding that the learned Single Judge had correctly held that the State Electricity Board did not have the right to supply electricity to the appellant Company. Mr. Mr. Jerath submitted that the said decision of the Division Bench had become final between the parties and the appellant Company was, therefore, under an obligation to make payment of the instalment dues to D.V.C. while it was enjoying the supply of electricity from the Jharkhand State Electricity Board. 12. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and while we may have misgivings about the manner in which the appellant had defaulted in its obligation to pay the instalments of D.V.C., as agreed by it earlier, we also cannot ignore and/or shut our eves to the provisions of Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act which prohibits the use of any coercive measure for recovery of any monetary dues during the pendency of a reference before the B.I.F.R. or an appeal before the A.A.I.F.R. There is no dispute that an appeal preferred by the appellant Company is pending before the A.A.I.F.R. and that the same has not yet been disposed of. It has been submitted by Mr. Jain that the said matter has been taken up by the A.A.I.F.R. and after hearing judgment has been reserved in the appeal. 13. We may also record that it has been submitted by Mr. Jain, on behalf of the appellant Company, that it was not the intention of the appellant Company not to pay the dues of D.V.C. but that such payment would be made as and when the Company was in a position to do so and/or subject to any order that may be passed in the pending appeal before the A.A.I.F.R. 14. Having regard to the provisions of Section 22(1) of the aforesaid Act, we are inclined to agree with Mr. Jain that the learned Company Judge erred in law in continuing with the winding up proceedings despite the pendency of the appeal before the A.A.I.F.R. The provisions of Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act are very clear and unambiguous and have been clearly analysed in the various decisions cited by Mr. Jain. 15. Jain that the learned Company Judge erred in law in continuing with the winding up proceedings despite the pendency of the appeal before the A.A.I.F.R. The provisions of Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act are very clear and unambiguous and have been clearly analysed in the various decisions cited by Mr. Jain. 15. In such circumstances we allow the appeal, stay the proceeding before the learned Company Judge and direct that the same will be subject to such order as may be passed by the A.A.I.F.R. We also make it clear that this order will not prevent D.V.C. from approaching either the A.A.I.F.R. or the B.I.F.R. in terms of Section 22(1) of the above Act for continuing with the winding up proceedings before the learned Company Judge or from taking any other measure for recovery of its dues. 16. There will be no order as to costs.