Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. This order shall dispose of 16 Civil Writ Petition Nos. 14139 to 14154 of 2003 since all these petitions arise out of a common award, dated March 13, 2003, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.T, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the Labour Court). For the sake of convenience, the facts are borrowed for Civil Writ Petition No. 14139 of 2003. 2. The petitioner has claimed that he joined duties on daily wage basis with the Divisional Forest Officer, Union Territory, Chandigarh in the year 1984-85 and continued to work in that capacity up to February 8, 1994 on which date his services were retrenched. It was claimed by him that the aforesaid retrenchment of the workman was in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Accordingly, the demand notice dated February 15, 1994, was issued by him claiming reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages. On failure of conciliation proceedings, the matter was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court. The claim of the workman was contested by the management on various pleas. The parties led their evidence before the Labour Court. A large number of references of similarly situated persons, such as, Babu Ram, workman, were also referred for adjudication before the Labour Court and all the references were clubbed together. 3. Vide an award dated September 1, 1998, the Labour Court, Chandigarh, declined the reference of the workman. It was held that the workman had not put in 240 days of service prior to their date of retrenchment. The aforesaid award was challenged by all the workmen by filing a bunch of writ petitions before this Court being Civil Writ Petition No. 13128 of 2000 and other cases. During the course of hearing of the aforesaid writ petitions, the parties agreed that the aforesaid award passed by the Labour Court be set aside and the matter be remitted back for fresh decision on certain terms and conditions. Consequently, this Court vide order, dated October 29, 2002, set aside the aforesaid award passed by the Labour Court. The following order was passed by this Court on agreement between the parties. 1. Consequently, this Court vide order, dated October 29, 2002, set aside the aforesaid award passed by the Labour Court. The following order was passed by this Court on agreement between the parties. 1. The impugned award, dated September 1, 1998, may be set aside and the matter may be remanded the Labour Court for a fresh trial as per the terms of this order; 2. All these matters will be consolidated, dealt with and disposed of by a common judgment by the learned trial Court, the lead case being Babu Ram case; 3. Each party, the workmen and the management would be granted two opportunities each to complete their entire evidence. No further time would be allowed to either of the parties except for paucity of time with the Court; 4. The muster-roll sought to be produced before this Court shall be produced by the workman itself before the Labour Court with liberty to the management to produce such documents, as they may deem fit and proper, however before the commencement of the evidence; 5. The workman shall produce all the documents one week prior to the date which is given by this Court for appearance and direction before the Labour Court. On that date itself, the management shall also produce the documents, whichever they desire to produce. 6. The petitioner(s) are at liberty to file copies of the muster-rolls and such other documents as they wish to place or which have been placed on record of this Court. The documents will be filed before that Court as directed above. The petitioners are at liberty to obtain certified copies of the record expeditiously so as to enable them to carry out the afore-noted directions; and 7. The matter shall be listed on December 3, 2002 before the learned Tribunal for appropriate directions. The parties shall appear on that date before the Tribunal. The above agreed terms and conditions are otherwise just, fair and equitable. We are of the considered view that they would meet the ends of justice and would provide fair opportunities to the parties to the lis to complete their evidence in accordance with law. The writ petition stand disposed of in the above terms and conditions. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. 4. We are of the considered view that they would meet the ends of justice and would provide fair opportunities to the parties to the lis to complete their evidence in accordance with law. The writ petition stand disposed of in the above terms and conditions. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. 4. When the matter was taken afresh before the Labour Court, an application was filed by the workmen for inspection of the records of the management. The following record was sought by the workmen by filing the aforesaid application: (i) Complete muster-rolls with effect from January 1, 1985 to March 1994. (ii) Complete muster-rolls issuance register with effect from January 1, 1985 to March 1994, (iii) Original vouchers/muster-rolls with effect from March 1992 to March 1994. (iv) Complete quotations/tenders in respect of the contractors with effect from March 1992 to March 1994. (v) Records/ledgers of payment to the Contractor, if any. (vi) Records of estimation of the works from January 1, 1985 to March 1994. In the aforesaid application, dated January 27, 2003, the workmen made the following averments: That the management has withheld the best evidence from this Hon ble Court. The management has tried to mislead this Hon ble Court by contending that the workmen had worked with few forest guards. In fact they were working in Kansal Beat Loh Ghat, Brotiwala Beat and Rest House (Zoo) Beat. The workmen were working in the beat not with a particular guard. Accordingly, the management, relying upon the plea of the workmen that they were working in Kansal Beat, Loh Ghat, Brotiwala Beat and Rest House (Zoo) Beat produced the relevant record of the aforesaid beats only. When an argument was raised before the Labour Court that the other record, as required by the workmen was not produced, a plea was raised by the management that since as per their own showing, the workmen were employed, at various points of time, in only the aforesaid four beats, therefore, the other record which pertained to other beats was not relevant and, therefore, not produced. 5. The Labour Court evaluated the evidence produced by the workmen and the management. 5. The Labour Court evaluated the evidence produced by the workmen and the management. On such evaluation, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that since none of the workmen has shown to have completed 240 days service in any calender year or within the last 12 preceding months prior to their date of termination, no relief could have been granted by the Labour Court in their favour. Accordingly, the references were answered against the workmen vide an award, dated March 13, 2003. The aforesaid award, dated March 13, 2003 has been appended as Annexure P2 with the present petitions and has been impugned by the workmen in various writ petitions. 6. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at some length and have also gone through the record of the case. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner-workman has vehemently argued that the award of the Labour Court was liable to be set aside inasmuch as the management had not produce the best evidence available with it in spite of the request made by the workmen for production of the record. On that basis, the learned Counsel has argued that the Labour Court was bound in law to have drawn an adverse inference against the management and since no such adverse inference has been drawn against the management, therefore, the findings recorded by the Labour Court were liable to be set aside. Additionally, it has been argued by the learned Counsel that the record of the case showed that the workmen had indeed completed 240 days of service and, therefore, the case was liable to be remitted back to the Labour Court. 8. On the other hand Sri Rajiv Atma Ram, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-management has contested the aforesaid contentions of the petitioners. Learned senior counsel has drawn our pointed attention to the application filed by the workmen on January 27, 2003 for production of the record. On that basis, it has been argued that the workmen had themselves admitted that they were working in four beats, namely, Kansal Beat, Loh Ghat, Brotiwala Beat and Rest House (Zoo) Beat and the entire record of the aforesaid four beats had been produced. The said fact had been duly noticed by the Labour Court also. On that basis, it has been argued that the workmen had themselves admitted that they were working in four beats, namely, Kansal Beat, Loh Ghat, Brotiwala Beat and Rest House (Zoo) Beat and the entire record of the aforesaid four beats had been produced. The said fact had been duly noticed by the Labour Court also. However, in proceedings before the Labour Court the workmen had sought production of the entire records of the District Forest Officer, from 1985-1994 which were not only irrelevant but also it was not possible for the management to produce the entire record of the office, for the aforesaid period. It has further been argued by the learned Counsel that it was for the workmen to have proved that they had worked for a period of 240 days in the last 12 preceding months prior to their retrenchment and since the workmen had failed to prove the aforesaid fact, therefore, no relief could be granted to the workmen wither by the Labour Court or by this Court. Our pointed attention has also been drawn to the statement of PW-1 Babu Ram (workman) whereby he had tendered an affidavit Exhibit W13 in which it was admitted that he was working in Kansal Range. It has also been admitted by the aforesaid workmen that there were four beats in Kansal Range. Thus, it has been contended that once the record of the aforesaid four beats had been produced, then there was no further record which was not produced by the management and, therefore, the question of drawing of any adverse inference against the management did not arise. 9. We have duly considered, the rival contentions of learned Counsel for the parties and, in our considered view, the present writ petitions are without any merit. 10. From the perusal of the order passed by this Court on October 29, 2002, noticed by us above, it is apparent that the parties had consented to the remand of the case on an earlier occasion on certain terms and conditions. It was conceded by the workmen that two opportunities each would be granted to the parties to complete their entire evidence. It was also conceded by the workman that they would produce their entire records before the Labour Court, at their own responsibility. Similarly, the management had also agreed to produce the relevant records itself. It was conceded by the workmen that two opportunities each would be granted to the parties to complete their entire evidence. It was also conceded by the workman that they would produce their entire records before the Labour Court, at their own responsibility. Similarly, the management had also agreed to produce the relevant records itself. It is, thus, clear that the parties had agreed to produce the relevant record themselves. Once the matter had been remanded by this Court to the Labour Court on an agreement between the parties, on certain agreed terms and conditions, then the workmen could not be heard to claim that it was for the management to produce some record in support of the plea which the workmen were raising and on account of the non-production of the said record, any adverse inference was liable to be drawn against the management. In our considered view, the aforesaid contention of the petitioners would be contrary to the agreement reached between the parties on an earlier occasion before this Court on October 29, 2002. 11. A further perusal of the application, dated January 27, 2003, shows that the workmen had themselves conceded that they, were working only in four beats. Thus, the only relevant record to determine the controversy between the parties would be the record of the aforesaid four beats alone. No other record was required to be produced by either of the parties. A further perusal of the application shows that the workmen had in fact ventured into a fishing enquiry when they sought the production of the complete record from 1985 to March 1994. Obviously, the management could not be asked to produce the entire record of their office for the aforesaid period. Neither it was possible for the management to produce the said record, nor the said record was relevant, in any manner. The question of drawing of any adverse inference against the management on account of non-production of any irrelevant record would obviously not arise. 12. The learned Labour Court in Para. 50 of its award has specifically noticed the statement of MW-3 when he had specifically stated that the entire record pertaining to the beats in question had been produced. Accordingly, the Labour Court had rightly held that no adverse inference was liable to be drawn against the management. 13. 12. The learned Labour Court in Para. 50 of its award has specifically noticed the statement of MW-3 when he had specifically stated that the entire record pertaining to the beats in question had been produced. Accordingly, the Labour Court had rightly held that no adverse inference was liable to be drawn against the management. 13. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, had made the following observations at p. 1054 of LLJ: 2. For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant is an "industry" or not, though reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Pratam Singh Narsinh Parmar. In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. However, Sri Hedge appearing for the department states that the State is really interested in getting the law settled and the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate grounds on the same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two months from today. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, wherein the law laid down in Hadimani case (vide supra), was reiterated. Even in the recent case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, wherein the law laid down in Hadimani case (vide supra), was reiterated. Even in the recent case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. 2004-III-LLJ-832 (SC), the Supreme Court has again reiterated the law laid down in Hadimani case (supra). 14 Thus, it is well settled that it is for the workman to prove that he had worked for a period of more 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Once the workman fails to lead any cogent evidence to prove the aforesaid fact, then the management cannot be burdened with any liability nor can the determination of the Labour Court held to be erroneous in any manner. In the present case, the workmen had completely failed in proving the aforesaid fact. 15. Faced with the aforesaid difficulty, learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors.; Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and Ors. and Chief Engineer, RSDC, Irrigation Works, Punjab v. Amarjit Singh 2000 (6) SLR 422, to contend that since the best evidence had been withheld by the management, which was the custodian of the records, therefore, the adverse inference should have been drawn against the management, 16. We have duly considered the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the workmen but find ourselves unable to agree with the same. As noticed above, the management had produced the entire relevant record which was available with it. The other record which was not produced by the management was wholly relevant, even as per own showing of the workmen. In these circumstances, no adverse inference could have been drawn against the management. The authorities relies upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the case. 17. Before parting with this order we may notice another contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners when it has been argued that persons junior to the petitioner-workmen were also retained by the management and, therefore, also the retrenchment of the workmen was illegal. However, from the perusal of the demand notice, served by the workmen, we find that no such dispute was ever raised by them while challenging their termination. However, from the perusal of the demand notice, served by the workmen, we find that no such dispute was ever raised by them while challenging their termination. Accordingly, neither it was open to the Labour Court nor it is open to the petitioners to challenge before this Court their termination on that basis. 18. No other point has been urged before us. 19. Accordingly, we find that the present writ petitions are wholly devoid of any merit and are accordingly dismissed. 20. Petitions dismissed.