( 1 ) THIS civil miscellaneous second appeal is filed by the third party- objector, in E. P. No. 101 of 1997 in O. S. No. 101 of 1986 on the file of the Senior civil Judge, Kadapa. ( 2 ) THE 1st respondent (since died, and represented by his legal representatives, respondents 2 to 5), filed O. S. No. 101 of 1986 for recovery of certain amount against the 6th respondent, Gajula Venkata Subbaiah (since deceased, and represented by his legal representatives respondents 7 to 9 ). He also filed I. A. No. 514 of 1986 under order 38 Rule 5 C. P. C. , for attachment of an item of immovable properly, before judgment. The LA. was ordered on 22-8-1986. Ultimately, the suit was decreed on 26-3-1987. ( 3 ) THE 1st respondent died on 24-4-1987. Thereafter, respondents 2 to 5 filed E. P. No. 101 of 1997, for realizing the benefits of the decree. The property, which was attached through orders in LA. No. 514 of 1986, was sought to be proceeded against. At that stage, the appellant filed e. A. No. 288 of 1998 under Rule 101 of order 21 C. P. C. , with a prayer to raise the attachment. It was pleaded that she purchased the said property through a sale deed dated 2-5-1988, not being aware of the attachment or decree in the suit or the decree, that was passed thereafter. It was urged that the property was purchased for valuable consideration, without notice of attachment, and as such, the respondents cannot proceed against it. It was also urged that the decree-holders can proceed against other properties, owned by the legal representatives of the judgment- debtor. ( 4 ) THE respondents 2 to 5 resisted the application on several grounds. They pleaded that the E. A. was not maintainable, since the attachment took place during the pendency of the suit itself. It was also urged that the alleged transfer of the property between the 6th respondent on the one hand, and the appellants herein, on the other hand, is non-existent in the eye of law, since it was brought about, while the property was under attachment. ( 5 ) THE Executing Court dismissed the e. A. through its order dated 15-12-1999. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed C. M. A. No. 9 of 2000 in the Court of II Additional district Judge, Kadapa. ( 5 ) THE Executing Court dismissed the e. A. through its order dated 15-12-1999. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed C. M. A. No. 9 of 2000 in the Court of II Additional district Judge, Kadapa. The appeal was also dismissed on 3-8-2000. Hence, this c. M. S. A. ( 6 ) SRI S. Satyanarayana Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant is the bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, and that her rights cannot be taken away, several years after the purchase. He contends that the 6th respondent did not inform the appellant about the pendency of the suit, much less about the attachment before judgment. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the attachment was not in accordance with law, and therefore, the sale in favour of the appellant cannot be said to have been vitiated. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of a division Bench of this Court in Gurunadha rao v. Gamini Krishnayya, 1955 (1) an. WR 684 and Mohd. Hussain v. Syed raheemuddin, 1978 (1) APLJ 253 . ( 7 ) SRI K. G. Krishna Murthy, learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 5, on the other hand, submits that the E. A. , under rule 101 of Order 21, cannot be maintained for the relief of raising of attachment, and the application was misconceived. He contends that the question as to whether the appellant had knowledge of the attachment of the property, when she purchased it, is of little consequence, and that the sale itself was vitiated. He contends that the 6th respondent brought about the sale in favour of the appellant, with the sole objective of defeating the claim in the suit, and if such steps are permitted, the very process of adjudication becomes nugatory. As regards the plea of irregularity in the attachment, urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, sri Krishna Murthy, submits that it was not taken either before the Executing Court or before the appellate Court, and that it cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time, in the C. M. S. A. He contends that the property has since been sold; sale was confirmed, and that the sale consideration was withdraw by his clients. He also contends that the C. M. S. A. is defective, inasmuch as the auction-purchaser is not impleaded. He also contends that the C. M. S. A. is defective, inasmuch as the auction-purchaser is not impleaded. ( 8 ) THE 1st respondent filed the suit against the 6th respondent for realization of certain amount. As a measure of precaution, he obtained attachment of the schedule property before judgment, under Order 38 rule 5 C. P. C. The suit was decreed on 26-3-1987 and the decree became final. Despite these developments, the 6th respondent has chosen to sell that very property to the appellant on 2-5-1988. In the execution proceedings, instituted by the respondents 2 to 5, the appellant raised an objection, by filing an application under rule 101 of Order 21 C. P. C. , with a prayer to raise attachment. In support of her claim, the appellant examined PWs. 1 and 2 and marked Exs. A-1 to A-7. The respondents 2 to 5 examined RWs. 1 and 2 and marked Exs. B-1. ( 9 ) BASICALLY, Rule 101 does not provide for filing of any application. In a way, it can be said that it restates the mandate contained in Section 47 of C. P. C. , requiring the determination of the questions, relating the execution, before that Court itself. However, in terms, it refers to the determination of applications filed under Rule 97, which are filed for removal of obstructions, and those under Section 99, filed by the persons, other than the judgment-debtors, who are dispossessed, during the course of execution. Therefore, the very filing of application by invoking Rule 101 of Order 21, does not accord with law. If the cited provision is ignored and the prayer in the application is taken as the basis, it fits into the one under Rule 58 of Order 21. Notwithstanding the doubt as to whether an application is maintainable by a third party for raising attachment, which was ordered under Order 38 Rule 1, it needs to be seen as to, how far the claim of the appellant is tenable. ( 10 ) IT is not in dispute that as on the date of the sale in favour of the appellant, the property was attached. The prayer by a purchaser of an attached property to raise the attachment amounts to an attempt erase, the very basis, on account of which, such a purchase became illegal. ( 10 ) IT is not in dispute that as on the date of the sale in favour of the appellant, the property was attached. The prayer by a purchaser of an attached property to raise the attachment amounts to an attempt erase, the very basis, on account of which, such a purchase became illegal. It is not in dispute that any sale or purchase of a property during the subsistence of attachment made, either before or after judgment, is not valid in the eye of law. Unlike, in the cases of certain transactions, under the Transfer of Property Act, saving the rights of a purchaser, for consideration, without notice, is unknown to the process of execution under C P C It makes little difference, whether or not the concerned person had the knowledge of attachment when he purchased the attached property The encumbrance certificates, marked as Exs. A-2, A-3 and A-7 or the certificates issued by the Sarpanch of the village i e. , Exs. A-4 and A-5, are of no use or relevance. Therefore, the claim put forward by the appellant cannot be entertained. ( 11 ) IT is strongly urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the attachment was effected through a cryptic order of the trial Court, while ordering I. A. No. 514 of 1986 and that the Court did not prohibit the 6th respondent from alienating the property It is submitted that unless such a specific direction was issued by the Court ordering the attachment, it cannot be said that there existed a valid attachment in the eye of law, and thereby the sale in favour of the appellant is not vitiated. ( 12 ) IT is true that in Gurunadha Rao v Gamini Krishnayya (supra), a Division bench of this Court held that to be valid an attachment must be specific and clear in its purport. In that case, the parties raised the specific plea and adduced oral and documentary evidence, in support of their contention. In the instant case, the appellants did not raise any plea as to the validity or otherwise of the attachment, either before the Executing Court or before the lower appellate Court. To enable the court to record any finding on that aspect, the objector is required not only to raise the issue specifically, but also to lead oral and documentary evidence to prove it. To enable the court to record any finding on that aspect, the objector is required not only to raise the issue specifically, but also to lead oral and documentary evidence to prove it. The c. M. S. A. is a second appeal under section 100 C. P. C. , for all practical purposes when there is a clear prohibition contained in Section 100 C. P C. , for interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the courts below, it is totally impermissible for this Court to address a question of fact, which was not at all raised before the courts below. ( 13 ) THERE is another serious infirmity in this C. M. S. A. The property was brought to sale on 18-7-2000. It was not confirmed because the highest bidder did not deposit balance of consideration. Thereafter, the sale was held on 19-10-2000. This could not be proceeded with, on account of stay granted by this Court in this C. M. S. A. The appeal dismissed for default on 17-7-2003. It was restored only on 5-2-2004. It is represented by the learned Counsel for the respondents 2 to 5 that the sale has since been confirmed and that sale certificate was issued to the auction-purchaser. The auction-purchaser is not made a party to the C. M. S A. The money deposited by him is said to have been withdrawn by the respondents 2 to 5, in satisfaction of the decree. In that view of the matter, it is impermissible to undertake any further exercise at this stage, unless the auction purchaser is party. In fact, he would be the most effected party. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, the C. M. S. A. is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs ( 15 ) IT is, however, made clear, in case the auction-purchaser is agreeable to receive the amount paid by him and the related expenses from the appellant and to give up his claim, this judgment does not come in the way of such a settlement.