Judgment :- (Prayer: Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the relief of issuance of writ of declaration, declaring the clauses (2) to (9) and especially Clauses (2), (3) and (9) of the mortgage deeds dated 6.1.1998, 11.2.1999, 28.4.1999, 6.3.1998, 15.3.1999, 28.12.1998, 16.11.1999, 16.11.1999, 16.11.1999, 7.4.1999, 20.10.1999, 8.5.2000, 14.5.1998, 30.11.2000, 16.11.1999, 30.8.1999, 5.5.2000, 15.3.1999, 17.2.1995, 15.3.1999, 13.9.2000, 23.1.1998, 17.4.2000, 18.8.1999 and 6.11.1997 relating to the loan sanction order No.1246, 1311, 371, 8660, 1394, 1392, 1391, 1335, 1384, 1412, 1272, 1424, 1393, 724, 1414, 8659, 30/94-95, 8661, 9232,1252,473,724 and 1242 of the 3rd respondent society respectively, as invalid and void and consequently, forbearing the respondents from enforcing the impugned Clauses (2) to (9) and especially Clauses (2),(3) and (9) for recovery of the loan sanctioned.) In all these Writ Petitions, the petitioners have prayed for declaration, declaring that the clauses (2) to (9) and especially Clauses (2), (3) and (9) of the mortgage deeds dated 6.1.1998, 11.2.1999, 28.4.1999, 6.3.1998, 15.3.1999, 28.12.1998, 16.11.1999, 16.11.1999, 16.11.1999, 7.4.1999, 20.10.1999, 8.5.2000, 14.5.1998, 30.11.2000, 16.11.1999, 30.8.1999, 5.5.2000, 15.3.1999, 17.2.1995, 15.3.1999, 13.9.2000, 23.1.1998, 17.4.2000, 18.8.1999 and 6.11.1997 relating to the loan sanction order No.1246, 1311, 371, 8660, 1394, 1392, 1391, 1335, 1384, 1412, 1272, 1424, 1393, 724, 1414, 8659, 30/94-95, 8661, 9232,1252,473,724 and 1242 of the 3rd respondent society respectively, as invalid and void and consequently, forbearing the respondents from enforcing the impugned Clauses (2) to (9) and especially Clauses (2),(3) and (9) for recovery of the loan sanctioned. 2. As the relief of declaration is asked on the same averments in all these Writ Petitions, the facts as stated in the affidavit filed in support of Writ Petition in W.P. No.2727/2005 are only referred to and they are as follows: The petitioner is a member of D.D.301, Andipatti Cooperative Building Society Limited, Andipatti. The Society had sanctioned the loan amount of Rs.1,50,000/- to the petitioner and the said amount is repayable in a period of ten years with interest at 17% p.a. spread over to 120 equal monthly instalments. For availing the loan, the petitioner was asked to furnish immovable property as security by means of a simple mortgage. A hypothecation bond was also executed by the petitioner in favour of the society in the form of a mortgage deed on 6.1.1998. One of the conditions in the mortgage deed is that the petitioner should pay interest at 35.5%. For availing the loan, the petitioner was asked to furnish immovable property as security by means of a simple mortgage. A hypothecation bond was also executed by the petitioner in favour of the society in the form of a mortgage deed on 6.1.1998. One of the conditions in the mortgage deed is that the petitioner should pay interest at 35.5%. Aggrieved by the rate of interest as against the interest said to have been agreed at 17% p.a. When the loan was sanctioned, the petitioner has approached this Court. On the same set of facts and grounds, other Writ Petitions have also been filed. In my opinion, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable as the terms and conditions are purely contractual and the challenge to such terms and conditions cannot be the subject of the Writ Petitions. As the Writ Petitions are held to be not maintainable, I am not elaborating the clauses as contained in the mortgage deed, more particularly Clauses 2,3 and 9. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Central Bank Of India Vs Ravindra (A.I.R. 2001 SC 3095) to contend that the conditions of loan cannot be varied detriment to the borrower. That case arose only on a suit for recovery of money filed by the Banking institution against the borrowers and in that context, the Supreme Court while considering Section 34 C.P.C. has held that the principal sum on the date of suit so adjudged, shall be treated as "principal sum" within meaning of Section 34 on which interest pendente lite and future interest i.e. Post-decree interest may be awarded by the Court. 4. The learned counsel thereafter relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in P. PRABHAKAR NAIDU AND OTHERS VS TIRUVALANGADU COOPERATIIVE PRIMARY AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LIMITED AND OTHERS (2004-1 Law Weekly 690). In that case, the learned Single Judge has considered the penal interest levied by the Cooperative Bank as null and void. 5. He would also rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in M/S KASTURI LAL VS STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR (A.I.R. 1980 SC 1992). That was a case of State largess giving. In that case, the learned Single Judge has considered the penal interest levied by the Cooperative Bank as null and void. 5. He would also rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in M/S KASTURI LAL VS STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR (A.I.R. 1980 SC 1992). That was a case of State largess giving. While considering the limitation of the State in dealing with the grant of largess, the Supreme Court held that " though ordinarily a private individual would be guided by economic considerations of self-gain in any action taken by him, it is always open to him under the law to act contrary to his self-interest or to oblige another in entering into a contract or dealing with his property". Placing on the said judgment, the learned counsel submitted that even in the matter of contracts in the event the action of the Government is arbitrary, the Court could entertain the Writ Petition. 6. The above decisions are distinguishable as in the cases on hand, the petitioners had already entered into an agreement binding themselves to certain clauses as early as on 6.1.1998 and the condition has also been given effect to and acted upon by the petitioners. After a lapse of nearly more than four years, the petitioners seek to challenge the said conditions on the ground that the same are not in conformity with the understanding between the society and the members as to the rate of interest when the loan was sanctioned. Whether the Society agreed to collect only 17.5% interest or not when the loans were sanctioned is a matter in dispute as admittedly the Society is claiming 35.5% interest and incorporated in the mortgage deed also. The issue as to the power of this Court to entertain a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of contract, had come up for consideration before the Supreme Court recently in the judgment reported in National Highways Authority Of India Vs Ganga Enterprises ( 2003 (7) SCC 410 ). In that case it has been held thus in para 6. "6. The respondent then filed a Writ Petition in the High Court for refund of the amount. In that case it has been held thus in para 6. "6. The respondent then filed a Writ Petition in the High Court for refund of the amount. On the pleadings before it, the High Court raised two questions viz., (a) Whether the forfeiture of security deposit is without authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ Petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of a breach of contract. Question (b) should have been first answered as it would go to the root of the matter. The High Court instead considered Question (a) and then chose not to answer Question (b). In our view, the answer to Question (b) is clear. It is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held in the cases of Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil,( 2000 (6) SCC 293 ), State of U.P. Vs V. Bridge and Roof Co.(India) Limited ( 1996(6) SCC 22 and Bareilly Development Authority vs. Ajai Pal Singh( 1989(2) SCC 116 ). This is settled law. The dispute in this case was regarding the terms of offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a Writ court was not the proper forum. Mr.Dave, however relied upon the cases of Verigamto Naveen Vs Government of A.P.( 2001(8) SCC 344 and Harminder Singh Arora vs. Union of India ( 1986(3) SCC 247 ). These, however, are cases where the Writ Court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a writ Court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus, on the ground of maintainability the petition should have been dismissed" On the facts of these cases, I do not find any enforcement of statutory right or duty as the terms and conditions of loan is purely contractual. 7. In view of the above, I find that the Writ Petitions are not maintainable as it is purely a contractual obligation between the parties and the mortgage deeds have also been acted upon. Hence, all the Writ Petitions are dismissed. Consequently, all connected W.P.M.Ps. are also dismissed.