JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The petitioners claiming themselves to be employee of the Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited (hereafter referred to as the HPC) have approached this Court being aggrieved by the order dated 2.2.1994 designating theme as the employees of Nagaland Pulp and Paper Company Limited (hereafter referred to as the NPPC) and deploying them to the Nagaon Paper Mill (hereafter referred to as the NPM). They seek an appropriate writ to cancel the said order of deployment and/or to declare them as regular employees of NPM to be provided with all service benefits including pay revision available under the HPC Rules w.e.f. 1/1/1992 and/or 2.2.1994. 2. I have heard Mr. A.K. Purkayastha, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.N. Sharma and Mrs. Mili Hazarika, Sr. Advocates for respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 3. The pleaded version of the petitioners is that the NPM is a unit of HPC, which is a Government of India undertaking. NPPC is a joint venture of HPC and Government of Nagaland and is a subsidiary company of HPC being under the direct control of the latter. They are the permanent employees of HPC and have been working as such for several years. Their salary etc. are being paid by the UPC though appointed against various permanent posts in NPPC. According to them, being appointed by the HPC, the petitioners had been posted with the NPPC on various dates in the years ranging from 1979 to 1991. While serving as such, they were, along with others, transferred to NPM on deployment by the order dated 2.2.1994 issued by the Deputy Manager (Personnel and Administration) of HPC. Though NPPC and NPM are under the control of the HPC and the service conditions of the employees thereof, like all other units and subsidiary companies of HPC are governed by the HPC Service Rules, 1975, on their deployment, the petitioners were not accorded service benefits extendable to the employees of the NPM or NPPC. In other words, though before their deployment, the petitioners had been sanctioned the service benefits by the NPPC under the HPC Rules, after the aforementioned order and their placement with the NPM they were neither released their service benefits under the NPPC nor as employees of NPM. This was discriminatory as Supervisors and Executives similarly transferred from NPPC to NPM were not denied the service benefits. This was discriminatory as Supervisors and Executives similarly transferred from NPPC to NPM were not denied the service benefits. Though the HPC accepted the recommendation of the 3rd Pay Commission for revision of pay, the benefits thereof were not granted to the-petitioners. Under the HPC Temporary Transfer Rules (hereafter referred to as the Transfer Rules) placement of an employee on temporary transfer basis cannot be more than 180 days and, therefore, in any view of the matter on the expiry of the said period, the petitioners were entitled to be confirmed as regular employees of NPM. The petitioners were also not paid deployment allowance in full. Being the employees of the HPC, the petitioners, though entitled to be treated at par with the employees of NPM, they were discriminated against, and were denied their due seniority in service and avenues for promotion either in the NPM or NPPC. The reliefs as above have been sought for in the above premises. 4. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in their counter while admitting that NPPC is a joint venture of the HPC and Government of Nagaland have contended that in view of its dismal performance since the commencement of its operation and the resultant loss, it came under the purview of the Board for Industrial Financial Re-construction (hereinafter referred to as the BIFR) in April, 1992 and eventually became non-operational from the month of October that year. According to the answering respondents, the NPPC though a subsidiary company of HPC is managed by an independent Board and separate Board of Directors and is a distinctly different company having its own set of rules not liable to be treated at par with the NPM or the Cachar Paper Mill. According to them, parity in the scales of pay and other related benefits was maintained among the units of HPC excluding Mandya Paper Mill till December, 1991. Though the revision of pay w.e.f. 1.1.1992 was actually implemented from January, 1996, uniformity with regard thereto could not be maintained in respect of NPPC in view of the Government Guidelines and recommendations of the BIFR. Resultantly, though the pay scales of the HPC were revised w.e.f. 1.1.1992 with the approval of the Government of India, corresponding revision of pay scales of the NPPC was not effected. Resultantly, though the pay scales of the HPC were revised w.e.f. 1.1.1992 with the approval of the Government of India, corresponding revision of pay scales of the NPPC was not effected. They have categorically denied that the petitioners are the permanent employees of the HPC and have contended that they are so of the NPPC and governed by the terms and conditions applicable thereto (NPPC), They have asserted that the petitioners were appointed by HPC. for NPPC for administrative convenience against sanctioned posts of NPPC and not against posts of HPC or NPM. According to them, the petitioners were the regular employees of NPPC who were deployed in NPM as the NPPC was closed since October, 92 to utilize the idle manpower with the stipulation that they would be reverted to NPPC with the commencement of its production activities, the petitioners who were deployed in NPM on their existing pay scale with the NPPC had not been released thereby from the rolls of NPPC and had been drawing their emoluments as per the NPPC rules as well as compensatory allowances as applicable to them. The answering respondents have contended that neither the petitioners were entitled to receive the benefits as sanctioned for the regular employees of HPC nor they could be compared with the Executives and Supervisors who were recruited on all India basis and have All India Transfer Liability. For the said reason, the petitioners were also not at par with the regular employees of NPM. It was contended that their deployment could not be construed to be a transfer on regular basis and that; therefore, the allegation of discrimination was untenable. According to the respondents, the arrangement for deployment was made to avoid retrenchment of the petitioners following the closure of NPPC. 5. During the pendency of the petition, by Office order dated 29.7.2002 issued by the Dy. General Manager (P & A), HPC, the petitioners 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 were repatriated to NPPC in their existing capacity and pay scale with immediate effect. As this development was brought to the notice of this Court, by an affidavit of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, an application was filed by the petitioners praying for stay of the said order. As this development was brought to the notice of this Court, by an affidavit of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, an application was filed by the petitioners praying for stay of the said order. The petitioners referred to a process of amicable settlement initiated by the parties and contended that the order of repatriation without sanctioning them the service benefits under the HPC Rules, while the issue has been sub judice before this Court, was wholly untenable. The answering respondents in their affidavit while acknowledging the endeavour made by the parties for on amicable settlement denied that any final resolution thereof could be brought about. As in the meantime there were foreseeable prospects of restarting the NPPC, it was decided to repatriate the petitioners and accordingly the order dated 29.7.2002 was passed. According to them, pursuant thereto, most of the petitioners joined NPPC w.e.f. 12.8.2002. 6. Mr. Purakayastha has argued that the petitioners having been appointed by the HPC on permanent basis, they are the regular employees thereof and being governed by the HPC Service Rules are entitled to all benefits at par with its employees. Referring to the advertisement of the posts culminating in the appointment of the petitioners thereto and their individual appointment orders, the learned Counsel argued that NPPC being the joint venture of HPC and Government of Nagaland in which HPC holds more than 50% of the shares, the petitioners are for all intents and purposes the employees of the HPC and, therefore, the impugned action of subjecting them to deployment to NPM and denying them the status and benefits at par with the employees of the HPC is grossly illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory. The very fact that the petitioners wore deployed to NPM by the HPC is a clear indication that they were the regular employees of the former, he urged. Drawing the attention of the Court to the Transfer Rules, Mr. Purkayastha submitted that in terms of Clause-1 thereof, the duration of the petitioners deployment could not exceed 180 days and, therefore, on the expiry of the said period, in any view of the matter, they were entitled to be treated as regular employees of the NPM and consequently entitled to the service benefits as extendable to the employees thereof. Purkayastha submitted that in terms of Clause-1 thereof, the duration of the petitioners deployment could not exceed 180 days and, therefore, on the expiry of the said period, in any view of the matter, they were entitled to be treated as regular employees of the NPM and consequently entitled to the service benefits as extendable to the employees thereof. By this he sought to contend that the action of the respondent-authorities in continuing the petitioners in deployment with NPM but denying them the service benefits at par with the employees of the NPM was unreasonable, unfair and unjust as well. He relied inter alia on para 13 of the affidavit filed by the respondents 1 and 2 to reinforce his contention that the petitioners were the regular employees of HPC. He also pressed into service, the decision rendered by this Court in CR 163(K)/96, Bendangkokba and Anr. v. B. Longkumar and Ors. in support of the petitioners' claim for revision of pay scale as employees of NPPC, Mr. Purakayastha also placed reliance on the HPC Service Rules, 1975 (hereafter referred to as the 1975 Rules) and contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, denial of service benefits to the petitioners at par with those of the employees of the HPC amounted to violation of the equality maxim ordained by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 7. Mr. Sharma as against this has argued that the assertions relating to the petitioners' status as permanent and regular employees of HPC ought not to be entertained in absence of any prayer for such relief in the petition. Reiterating the stand of the answering respondents in their counter, the learned Sr. Counsel pleaded that HPC and NPPC are two different Companies being governed by separate sets of Rules applicable to their employees. According to him, HPC being the holding Company of NPPC, it exercises only an administrative control over the latter but the same by no means, convey that the employees of NPPC could be treated as those of HPC to claim identical service benefits. He maintained that the deployment of the petitioners, employees of NPPC, to the NPM was warranted as NPPC had to be referred to BIFR as a sick industry as well as to avoid their immediate retrenchment from service. He maintained that the deployment of the petitioners, employees of NPPC, to the NPM was warranted as NPPC had to be referred to BIFR as a sick industry as well as to avoid their immediate retrenchment from service. As with time, the situation improved and NPPC became functional, the order of deployment was recalled. He maintained that the 1975 Rules arid the Transfer Rules of the HPC were not applicable to the petitioners and thus no benefit therefrom could be drawn by them. The petitioners being of workman category are governed by the standing orders of the NPPC and the HPC Rules, meant for the Executives with all India transfer liability are of no avail to them. The order of deployment having in the meantime been recalled, according to the learned Sr. Counsel, the petition has become infructuous. He was, however, fair in submitting that; the petitioners, in view of the renderings in CR 163 (K)/1996 were at best entitled to reliefs in terms thereof. 8. I have extended my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. In (view of the prayer to provide the petitioners with service benefits as available under the HPC Rules and, the assertion on oath that they are the permanent employees of the HPC, I am inclined to examine the said claim, the preliminary objection to the contrary notwithstanding. The advertisement referring to the posts to which the petitioners amongst others were appointed had been issued by the NPPC. The sample appointment order of petitioner No. 9 reveals that the same had been issued also by the concerned authority of the NPPC. The terms and conditions subject to which the offer of appointment was made inter alia prescribe that the appointee would abide by the Rules and Regulations of the NPPC, on the acceptance of which the appointment letter had been issued. Their is no reference of the HPC therein to indicate in any. manner that the appointee was or would be deemed to be an employee of the HPC. The 1975 Rules, more particularly, Rule 2 thereof is explicit that the same applies to all the employees of the HPC except inter alia the employees of the subsidiary companies unless the same had been adopted by the Board of Directors of those companies. manner that the appointee was or would be deemed to be an employee of the HPC. The 1975 Rules, more particularly, Rule 2 thereof is explicit that the same applies to all the employees of the HPC except inter alia the employees of the subsidiary companies unless the same had been adopted by the Board of Directors of those companies. There is no material on record to even suggest that the 1975 Rules had been adopted by the Board of Directors of the NPPC, which admittedly is a subsidiary company of the HPC. 9. Section 3(1) defines 'employee' as a person appointed to any position in the Corporation (i.e. HPC) including a probationer. The transfer liability of an employee of the HPC is contained in Rule 11. Thereunder, an employee in the service of the HPC is liable to serve in any of its own Mills or subsidiary companies in any part of the country or abroad as decided by the order of the Chairman or such other subordinate authority to whom this power may be delegated. It further provides that an employee in the service of a subsidiary company shall be liable to serve in the Corporation and in any of the subsidiary companies as decided by the order of Chairman or such subordinate authority to whom the power may be delegated. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied on this provision of the Rules to identify the petitioners as employees of HPC, in my considered view, no such prescription is borne out therefrom. Though the above provision of the Rules permits posting, of employees of the HPC in any of its mills and subsidiary companies on transfer and vice versa that by itself is not demonstrative of the status of the employees of such subsidiary companies as its (Corporation) employees. The provision only facilitates an administrative arrangement without affecting and/or altering the service conditions of the individual employees. 10. The Transfer Rules applicable to the employees of the HPC, therefore, logically are of no assistance to the petitioners by the same analogy. In any view of the matter, Clause-1 thereof deals with temporary transfer and has no relevance in the view of the arrangement of deployment in the instant case. The two situations cannot be equated. 11. 10. The Transfer Rules applicable to the employees of the HPC, therefore, logically are of no assistance to the petitioners by the same analogy. In any view of the matter, Clause-1 thereof deals with temporary transfer and has no relevance in the view of the arrangement of deployment in the instant case. The two situations cannot be equated. 11. The clear and categorical stand of the HPC is that the petitioners are the permanent employees of NPPC governed by the terms and conditions applicable to its employees and that they had been sent on deployment to the NPM only on temporary basis. Para 13 of the Counter on which emphasis had been laid on behalf of the petitioners discloses the HPC's stand that the petitioners had been appointed by it for NPPC for administrative convenience against the sanctioned posts of NPPC and that they were not recruited or appointed either for HPC or NPM. The answering respondents are specific in asserting that the petitioners after the deployment had been drawing the emoluments as per the NPPC Rules as well as compensatory allowance on the emoluments as applicable to them. According to answering respondents, to repeal, the arrangement has to be resorted to for accommodating the petitioners in view of the closure of NPPC and to avoid their consequential retrenchment. As a matter of fact, the orders of deployment clearly disclose that the petitioners were the employees of NPPC and had been placed with the NPM in their existing capacity and pay scale and that they were to be retained on the rolls of the NPPC. All these leave no manner of doubt that the petitioners are the employees of the NPPC and they were treated to be so during their deployment with NPM. Only because NPPC is a subsidiary company of HPC, it cannot be concluded in the face of the other overwhelming materials on record that the petitioners are entitled to be treated as regular employees of HPC and being governed by its Rules, are entitled to the same service benefits as those of its employees similarly situated like them. 12. This Court in Kastoor Chandel v. Chairman and Managing Director Hindustan Paper Corporation and Ors. 12. This Court in Kastoor Chandel v. Chairman and Managing Director Hindustan Paper Corporation and Ors. 2004 GLT 188 was seized with the question whether the petitioner therein, an employee of NPPC was entitled to the benefit of a voluntary retirement scheme of HPC This Court on a consideration of the contextual facts and precedents on the issue held that the HPC and NPPC were two distinctly different juristic persons, the HPC being only a shareholder in NPPC. In coming to this conclusion reference inter alia was made to the decision of the Apex Court in Karanpura Development Company v. Union of India and Ors. 1988 (Supp) SCC 488 dealing with holding and subsidiary companies under the Companies Act. While noticing that the petitioner in that case was an employee of NPPC, this Court held that the transfer order by HPC and the publication of seniority list by it were part of its duties as holding company and were actions taken in the usual course of management of the business of the subsidiary company which by itself was not a guarantee that the employee of the subsidiary company be treated as an employee of the holding company. The question posed was thus answered in the negative. 13. I respectfully subscribe to the views expressed in the decision qua the mutual status of holding and subsidiary companies. The plea that the petitioners are the employees of the HPC therefore cannot be upheld. Some administrative control of the HPC over the petitioners as employees of the NPPC though discernible in the facts of the instant case, the same per se does not establish the petitioners' claim as employees thereof (HPC) to claim parity in service benefits with its equally placed employees; 14. Be that as it may, the petitioners' claim for service benefits, as due to them, in the face of their grievance, of being denied their entitlements either as employees of the NPPC or NPM cannot be left unattended. The respondents have contended that in course of the deployment with the NPM, the petitioners had been extended the service benefits sanctioned by the NPPC together with compensatory allowance on such emoluments. The benefit of pay revision otherwise given effect from 1.1.1996 could not be accorded to them in view of the financial stringency of the industry. This aspect of the matter, however, was examined by this Court in Bendangkokba, supra. The benefit of pay revision otherwise given effect from 1.1.1996 could not be accorded to them in view of the financial stringency of the industry. This aspect of the matter, however, was examined by this Court in Bendangkokba, supra. In the reported decision, the NPPC workers union sought for an appropriate writ and/or a direction to extend the benefit of pay revision in terms of the memorandum of understanding dated 29.11.1995 between the management and the workers of the NPM and the Guitar Paper Mill w.e.f. 1.1.1992. The facts reveal that the pay structure of the workers involved was based on a memorandum of understanding between the management and the workmen. In one such memorandum of understanding, executed on 2.6.1989 between the management of the NPM, Cachar Paper Mill and NPPC, the agreed pay structure was to be in effect from 1.1.1987. to 31.12.1991. In the next memorandum of understanding dated 29.11.1995 confined to the management and the workers of the NPM and the Cachar Paper Mill, the new pay structure was made effective from 1.1.1992. The workers of the NPPC were denied the benefit of the revision referred to above, constituting the cause of the lis. It was inter alia contended on behalf of the respondents that the workmen of the NPPC were not entitled to be at par with the others as NPPC was under the rehabilitation scheme and being a subsidiary company was managed by its own Board of Directors with a distinctly different administrative set up and source of funds. It was also contended that the benefit of revision could not be extended to NPPC as the same had been referred to the BIFR. Acute financial crunch was also put forward as a justification for denial of the pay revision benefits. 15. This Court noticing that the workmen of the NPPC on the basis of the memorandum of understanding dated 2.6.1989 had enjoyed the same pay structure along with the workmen of the NPM, Cachar Paper Mill etc. negated the above contentions and directed that the benefits of the memorandum of understanding dated 25.11.1995 be extended to the members of the petitioners Union. negated the above contentions and directed that the benefits of the memorandum of understanding dated 25.11.1995 be extended to the members of the petitioners Union. This decision though not an authority on the point that the employees of the NPPC ought to be treated as employees of HPC is a determination of the right of such employees to the benefits of pay revision at par with the workmen of the NPM and other signatories to the memorandum of understanding dated 25.11.1995. In other words, in the face of the above decision/the stand of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that the petitioners as employees of NPPC could not be extended the benefit of pay revision of the frail financial condition of the NPPC cannot be approved. The petitioners are thus entitled to the benefit of pay revision as admittedly extended to the employees of other units and subsidiaries of HPC governed by the above memorandum of understanding. 16. The petitioners as is evident from the pleaded stand of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been in continuous service and on their repatriation to the NPPC are serving thereunder. They are, therefore, entitled to their service benefits as the employees of the NPPC as allowable under the rules thereof governing their service conditions. As the pleadings on record are deficient in 'facts and particulars, to issue further directions delineating the exact heads of service benefits to be granted to the petitioners it is deemed fit and proper to close this issue with the above declaration with liberty to the petitioners, if so advised, to submit an appropriate representation before the concerned authorities of the NPPC highlighting their claims in service for the period from 2.2.1994 till their joining NPPC on repatriation. If such a representation is made, the respondents, more particularly, the NPPC would consider the same on merits and take an appropriate decision thereon in conformity with the above. This should be done within a period of six weeks from the date of submission of representation, if any. In the wake of the above, the petition stands disposed in the above terms. No costs.