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2005 DIGILAW 665 (GAU)

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Archana Paul

2005-09-09

I.A.ANSARI

body2005
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By making the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the claimant-Respondent herein sought for compensation for the death of her husband Ramen Paul, which took place, on 21.12.98, at PWD road of Salna Tea Estate, while the claimant-Respondent's husband was travelling in a mini truck bearing registration No. AS-02/6034. This application gave rise to MAC Case No. 212/98 and by an award, dated 24.05.2002, passed therein, the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaon, granted Rs. 1,90,500/- as compensation in favour of the claimant-Respondent herein and directed the insurer of the said vehicle, namely, the Petitioner herein to make payment of the same. Aggrieved by this award, dated 24.05.2002, the Petitioner has impugned the same in the present writ petition on the ground that the said deceased was a gratuitous passenger in the said truck and the Petitioner, being insurer of the said vehicle, was not liable to indemnify the insured-owner, i.e. Respondent No. 2 herein and yet the learned Tribunal, contrary to the relevant insurance policy and also the provisions of the law contained in that behalf, directed the insurer-Petitioner, relying upon New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh reported in (2000) 1 SCC 237 , to make payment of the said compensation amount to the claimant. 2. I have heard Mr. D. Sur, learned Counsel for the insurer-Petitioner and Mr. B. Rahman, learned Counsel for the claimant-Respondent. 3. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani reported in (2003) 2 SCC 223 , Mr. Sur has submitted that in respect of a gratuitous passenger, insurance is not compulsory and since in the case at hand, the terms of the policy did not cover gratuitous passenger (s) travelling in the said vehicle, the learned Tribunal wrongly fastened the insurer with the liability to indemnify the insured by directing the Petitioner to pay to the claimant the compensation amount determined by the Tribunal. 4. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the insurer-Petitioner Mr. Rahman has submitted that even in the case of gratuitous passengers, the insurer must, first, make the payment of the awarded amount to the claimant, and, then, recover the amount, so paid, from the insured-owner. In support of this contention, Mr. Rahman has placed reliance on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. Rahman has submitted that even in the case of gratuitous passengers, the insurer must, first, make the payment of the awarded amount to the claimant, and, then, recover the amount, so paid, from the insured-owner. In support of this contention, Mr. Rahman has placed reliance on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 2340. 5. In the case at hand, there is no dispute that deceased Ramen Paul, in respect of whose death, compensation has been awarded to the claimant-Respondent No. 1 herein, was a gratuitous passenger travelling in the vehicle aforementioned. In the face of this admitted fact, two questions arise from determination in the present writ petition, namely, (i) as to whether statutory insurance as perceived by Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act covers a gratuitous passenger and (ii) in respect of gratuitous passengers, whether the insurer has the initial liability to make payment of compensation and, then, recover the amount, so paid as compensation, from the owner of the vehicle and, if so, how. 6. While considering the two questions posed above, what is of paramount importance to note is that with the coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1988 Act'), the 'goods carriage', as defined in Section 2(14), of the 1988 Act, is no longer permitted unlike what the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1939 Act'), did to carry passenger (s) in 'goods carriage', for a 'good carriage', according to Section 2(14) under 1988 Act (which replaced the expression 'goods vehicle' defined under Section 2 of the 1939 Act) means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use solely for the carnage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods. In other words while a goods vehicle, under the 1939 Act, could carry even passengers, the 'goods carriage', under the 1988 Act, cannot carry passengers. 7. However, not withstanding the changes, which had been introduced, as indicated hereinabove, in the 1988 Act, the Apex Court held, in Satpal Singh (supra), that the expression 'any person', occurring in Section 147 of the 1988 Act, would include even gratuitous passengers travelling in a goods vehicle and, hence, the insurer would not be able to avoid its liability to indemnify the insured-owner. The correctness of the decision rendered in Satpal Singh (supra) came to be considered in Asha Rani (supra) by a Bench of three Judges. 8. In the face of the changes, which the 1988 Act had introduced, particularly, the definition of the goods carriage, the Apex Court held, in Asha Rani (supra), that the decision in Satpal Singh (supra) was incorrectly rendered and that the words 'any person', occurring in Section 147, would not include passenger (s) in the goods vehicle. Hence, according to the decision in Asha Rani (supra); as correctly pointed out by Mr. Sur, gratuitous passengers travelling in the goods vehicle are no longer covered by compulsory insurance as perceived under Section 147. These aspects of the matter have been succinctly highlighted in Asha Rani (supra), wherein S.B. Sinha, J, in his concurring judgment, observed as follows: ...Section 2(35) of the 1988 Act does not include passengers in a goods carriage whereas Section 2(25) of the 1939 Act did as even passengers could be carried in a good vehicle. The difference in the definitions of the "good vehicle" in the 1939 Act and "good carriage" in the 1988 Act is significant. By reason of the change in the definitions of the terminology, the Legislature intended that a goods vehicle could not carry any passenger, as the words "in addition to passengers" occurring in the definition of goods vehicle in the 1939 Act were omitted. Furthermore, it categorically states that "goods carriage" would mean a motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use "solely for the carriage of goods". Carrying of passengers in a "goods carriage" thus, is not contemplated under the 1988 Act. .... Section 147 of the 1988 Act, inter alia, prescribes compulsory coverage against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a "public service. Vehicle". The proviso appended thereto categorically states that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in a goods vehicle would be limited to the liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It does not speak of any passenger in a "good carriage". In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words "any person" must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used, i.e., "a third party". It does not speak of any passenger in a "good carriage". In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words "any person" must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used, i.e., "a third party". Keeping in view the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefore. Furthermore, Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, whereas Sub-clause (ii) thereof deals with liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. An owner of a passenger carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks of the passengers. If a liability other than the limited liability provided for under the Act is to be enhanced under an insurance policy, additional premium is required to be paid. But if the ratio of this courts decision in New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh [2000] 1 SCC 237 : (2000) 99 Comp Cas 258 (SC) is taken to its logical conclusion, although for such passengers, the owner of a goods carriage need not take out an insurance policy, they would be deemed to have been covered under the policy wherefor even no premium is required to be paid. We may consider the matter from another angle. Section 149(2) of the 1998 Act enables the insurers to raise defences against the claim of the claimants. We may consider the matter from another angle. Section 149(2) of the 1998 Act enables the insurers to raise defences against the claim of the claimants. In terms of Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act one of the defences which is available to the insurer is that the vehicle in question has been used for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle was used. Such a statutory defence available to the insurer would be obliterated in view of the decision of this court in Satpal Singh's case (2000) 99 Comp Cas (SC) (supra). For the foregoing reasons, I am in respectful agreement with My Lord the Chief Justice of India that the decision of this court in New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh [2000] 1 SCC 237 : (2000) 99 Comp Cas 258 (SC) has not laid down the law correctly and should be overruled. 9. That the expression 'any person', occurring in Section 147(1)(b)(i). did not include everyone, who was carried in a goods vehicle, or, in fact, in any vehicle is amply clear from the fact that Section 147(1)(b)(i) had to undergo an amendment in the year 1994 and the words 'any person' came to be substituted by the words, 'any person including owner of the goods or its authorized representative carried in the vehicle'. This amendment is not really clarificatory or amplicatory in nature. The expression 'any person' did not include, as already pointed out above, an occupant or a passenger of a vehicle and it was, for this reason, that the legislature, in their own wisdom, thought it proper to make specific provisions for compulsory insurance in respect of a person, who happens to be the owner of the goods or authorized representative of such owner of the goods carried in the vehicle. 10. The above aspects of the matter are clearly discernible from the observations made in Asha Rani (supra), which run as follows: In Satpal's case (2000) 99 Comp Cas 258 (SC) (supra) the court assumed that the provisions of Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, are identical with Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46 by which expression "injury to any person" in the original Act stood substituted by the expression "injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle" the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid amendment Act of 1994, even if the widest interpretation is given to the expression "to any person" it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of Clause 46 also states that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. It is no' doubt true that sometimes the Legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994 and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression "including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle which was added to the pre-existed expression "injury to any person" is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the Legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and make it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in the case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. The judgment of this Court in Satpal's case (2000) 99 Comp Cas 258 (SC), therefore must be held to have not been correctly decided and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court accordingly are set aside and these appeals are allowed. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury. 11. In its subsequent judgment in Oriental Insurance Ltd. v. Devireddy Konda Reddy reported in (2003) 2 SCC 339 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in placing reliance upon Satpal Singh (supra) in view of its reversal by Asha Rani (supra) and that, accordingly, the insurer would not be liable to pay compensation to the family of the victim, who was travelling in a goods vehicle. 12. The correctness of the decision rendered in Asha Rani (supra) came for consideration before a three Judges Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 2340. While taking note of Baljit Kaur's case (supra), it may, once again, be pointed out that in Asha Rani (supra), it was held that the previous decision in Satpal Singh's case was incorrectly rendered and that the words "any person", as used in Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, would not include passengers in the goods vehicle, but would, rather, be confined to the legislative intent to provide for 'third party' risk. 13. Agreeing with the law laid down in Asha Rani (supra), the Court, in Baljit Kaur (supra), observed and held as follows: 11. 13. Agreeing with the law laid down in Asha Rani (supra), the Court, in Baljit Kaur (supra), observed and held as follows: 11. Admittedly, it is incumbent upon a Court of law to show that interpretation of a statute that would serve to negative its true import or to render the words of any provision as superfluous. Nonetheless, we find no merit in the above submissions preferred by the learned Counsel for the Respondent. The effect of the 1994 amendment on Section 147 is unambiguous. Where earlier, the words "any person" could be held not to include the owner of the goods or his authorized representative travelling in the goods vehicle, Parliament has now made it clear that such a construction is no longer possible. The scope of this rationale does not, however, extend to cover the class of cases where gratuitous passengers for whom no insurance policy was envisaged and for whom no insurance premium was paid, employ the goods vehicle as a medium of conveyance. 12. We find ourselves unable, furthermore, to the contention of the Respondents that the words "any person" as used in Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, would be rendered otiose by an interpretation that removed gratuitous passengers from the ambit of the same. It was observed by this Court in the case concerning New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani (supra) that the true purport of the words "any person" is to be found in the liability of the insurer for third party risk, which was sought to be provided for by the enactment. 13. It is pertinent to note that a statutory liability enjoined upon an owner of the vehicle to compulsorily insure it so as to cover the liability in respect of a person who was travelling in a vehicle pursuant to a contract of employment in terms of proviso (ii) appended to Section 95 of the 1939 Act does not occur in Section 147 of the 1988 Act. The changes effected in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act as regard definitions of 'goods vehicle', 'public service vehicle' and 'stage carriage' have also a bearing on the subject inasmuch as the concept of any goods carriage carrying any passenger or any other person was not contemplated. 14. The changes effected in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act as regard definitions of 'goods vehicle', 'public service vehicle' and 'stage carriage' have also a bearing on the subject inasmuch as the concept of any goods carriage carrying any passenger or any other person was not contemplated. 14. In a situation of this nature, the doctrine of suppression of mischief rule as adumbrated in Hydon's case 2 Co Rep 7a, 76 ER 637 shall apply. Such an amendment was made by the Parliament consciously. Having regard to the definition of 'goods carriage' vis-a-vis 'public service vehicle', it is clear that whereas the goods carriage carrying any passenger is not contemplated under the 1988 Act as the same must be used solely for carrying the goods. 17. By reason of the 1994 Amendment what was added is "including the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle". The liability of the owner of the vehicle to insure it compulsorily, thus, by reason of the aforementioned amendment included only the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle besides the third parties. The intention of the Parliament, therefore, could not have been that the words 'any person' occurring in Section 147 would cover all persons who were travelling in a goods carriage in any capacity whatsoever. If such was the intention there was no necessity of the Parliament to carry out an amendment inasmuch as expression 'any person' contained in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 would have included the owner of the goods or his authorised representative besides the passengers who are gratuitous or otherwise. 18. The observations made in this connection by the Court in Asha Rani case (supra) to which one of us, Sinha, J, was a party, however, bear repetition: 26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words 'any person' must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used i.e. "a third party". In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words 'any person' must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used i.e. "a third party". Keeping in view provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefore. 19. In Asha Rani (supra) it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1998 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 Amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods for his authorised representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise. 20. It is, therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994 the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorised representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorised representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people. 21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree.... 14. 21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree.... 14. From what has been laid down in Baljit Kaur (supra), it is clear that a passenger travelling in a goods vehicle is not covered by the compulsory insurance as perceived by Section 147. 15. It may be noted that in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bommithi Subhayamma and Ors. reported in 2005 (2) TAC 1, the Supreme Court, relying upon the decision in Asha Rani (supra) and Baljit Kaur (supra), and also taking into account its decisions in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Bhatathamma and Ors. reported in 2004 (8) SCC 517 , Pramod Kumar Agarwal and Anr. v. Mushari Begum (Smti) and Ors. reported in 2004 (8) SCC 667 , and also in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chinamma and Ors. reported in 2004 (8) SCC 697 , confirmed the views taken by the Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bommithi Subhayamma (supra). 16. Yet another question, which the Supreme Court considered, in Baljit Kaur (supra) was as to what would happen to those cases, which had been instituted before the decision in Satpal Singh (supra) had been overruled. On this aspect of the matter, the Court held as follows: 21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position, which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decision of this Court in Satpal Singh. The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the Appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant, if not already satisfied, and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the Appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant, if not already satisfied, and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as it the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in terms of whereof, it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claim as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding. 17. What emerges from the above discussion held, as a whole, is that the statutory insurance, as provided by Section 147, does not cover a gratuitous passenger. However, the decision that for injury caused to, or death of, a gratuitous passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, insurer has not initial liability is prospective in nature. In other words, in respect of cases, which stand decide before 6th January, 2004 (i.e., the date on which the decision in Baljit Kaur (supra) was rendered), the insurer shall have the initial liability to satisfy the award and, then, recover the amount (s), so paid, from the owner of the vehicle concerned; but on or after the 6th January, 2004, (i.e., the date on which the decision in Baljit Kaur (supra) was rendered), the insurer shall have no initial liability to pay to the claimant (s) the compensation amount determined by the Tribunal and that the position of law in respect of gratuitous passenger has been clarified in Baljit Kaur (supra), no Tribunal can saddle the insurer with the initial liability to make payment of the awarded amount and the liability, if any, would be of the owner of the vehicle. 18. 18. What follows from the above discussion is that until 06.01.2004, (i.e., the date on which the decision in Baljit Kaur (supra) was rendered), the insurer shall have the initial liability, even in the case of gratuitous passengers, to pay to the claimant the compensation determined by the Tribunal and recover the amount, so paid, from the insured-owner. On or after 06.01.2004, the insurer would not have even the initial liability to make payment of compensation to the claimant in respect of injury caused to, or death of, gratuitous passengers travelling in goods vehicle. 19. The decisions by the Apex Court in Baljit Kaur (supra) were further clarified in Pramod Kumar Agarwal and Anr. v. Mushari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in (2004) 8 SCC 667 . In Promod Kumar Agarwal (supra), the Tribunal had held that the insurer was not liable to make payment of the compensation and that it was the owner, who must make the payment of the awarded amount from the date of presentation of the claim petition. The appeal filed by the owner and driver of the vehicle against the said award of the Tribunal did not yield any fruitful result. The decision of the High Court came to be challenged before the Supreme Court. Taking note of the decision in Baljit Kaur (supra), the Apex Court, while upholding the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court, however, directed the insurer to make payment of the awarded amount and recover the same from the owner. In this regard, the observations made and the directions given by the Apex Court are of great relevance. Observed and directed the Supreme Court, in Pramod Kumar Agarwal (supra), as follows: 12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the Respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle, i.e., the Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e., Appellant 1 shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1). 20. From the decision rendered in Pramod Kumar Agarwal (supra), it is clear that in respect of accidents, which took place before the decision in Baljt Kaur (supra), the insurer will have the initial liability to make payment of the awarded amount and, then, recover the same from the insurer without being required to file a separate suit for recovery. What was, however, made clear in Pramod Kumar Agarwal (supra) is that before disbursing the amount to the claimant, the Tribunal shall obtain security from the owner of the vehicle against the awarded amount, which is required to be paid by the insurer to the claimant (s). 21. Since the present case arose out of an accident, which took place on 21.02.98 and the impugned award is of 24th May, 2002 the Petitioner, as insurer, in the light of Baljit Kaur (supra), has the initial liability to make payment of the awarded amount to the claimant-Respondent and, then, recover the same in terms of the observations made in Baljit Kaur (supra) and Pramod Kumar Agarwal (supra) from the owner of the vehicle. 22. 22. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition is disposed of with direction to the Petitioner to pay, as insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident aforementioned, the awarded amount of compensation with interest as directed by the learned Tribunal. After making the payment of the amount, as directed, the insurer-Petitioner shall be at liberty to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. To protect the interest of the insurer, it is hereby directed that before releasing the awarded amount, in full, to the claimants, the learned Tribunal shall obtain requisite security from the owner of the vehicle aforementioned. 23. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition shall stand disposed of. 24. No order as to costs. Writ Petition dismissed.