ORDER These two writ petitions involve almost identical facts originating from a common order dated 10-5-1999 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore South Sub-Division, Bangalore, passed under the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short, 'the Ace), on an application filed by, the common fourth respondent in these petitions, and one involving the validity of the transactions that had taken place in respect of 2 acres of land in Sy. No. 68/19 of Kothaganahalli Village, Sarjapura Hobli, Anekal Taluk, that had been granted in favour of one Kalappa, a person belonging to depressed class in terms of the grant order dated 18-11-1943, are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Both the petitioners are purchasers of parcels of land that originally comprised in the two acres that had been granted to Kalappa, as narrated above. 3. The petitioner in W.P. No. 18611 of 2004 traced his title to a sale deed dated 20-11-1995 executed by one Thimma Bhovi, who in turn had purchased the same from one Gangamma by another sale deed dated 30-8-1968, who in turn had purchased the land to an extent of 20 guntas, under sale deed" dated 19-8-1948 in favour of Venkatarama Bhovi by the original grantee Kalappa. 4. Likewise, petitioner in W.P. No. 18612 of 2004 traced his title to an extent of one acre of land from out of 2 acres that had been originally granted in favour of Kalappa through sale deed 14-11-1996 executed by one Smt. Venkatamma wife of Venkata Bhovi, who in turn had got the land from her father Venkata Bhovi under a gift deed dated 15-10-1959. The said Venkata Bhovi being a common purchaser of the land from Kalappa. 5. It is in respect of these transactions the fourth respondent Ramachandrappa-claiming to be the grandson of the original grantee had filed application under the provisions of the Act praying for invalidation of the first transaction of sale viz., sale deed dated 19-8-1948 and all other subsequent transactions in favour of persons who claim under the said Venkatarama Bhovi. 6. The Assistant Commissioner conducted an enquiry. 6. The Assistant Commissioner conducted an enquiry. Though it is claimed that the writ petitioner in W.P. No. 18612 of 2004 had not been impleaded as a party nor had been put on notice, the enquiry went on and ultimately the Assistant Commissioner on noticing that the grant being one in favour of a person belonging to Scheduled Caste, subject to the condition that the land should not be alienated for ever by the grantee and such a land having been sold in terms of the sale transaction dated 19-8-1948 in favour of Venkatarama Bhovi, the transaction and all subsequent transactions are clearly one attracting the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act, as the sale was in violation of the condition of the grant and accordingly in terms of the order dated 10-5-1999 invalidated the transactions and directed resumption of the land in favour of the State and restitution of the land to the applicant. 7. Quite naturally, both the petitioners in these writ petitions being the purchasers appealed to the Deputy Commissioner, questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. The Special Deputy Commissioner under two separate orders dated 18-8-2000 (which is under challenge in W.P. No. 18611 of 2004) and 15-9-2001 (which is under challenge in W.P. No. 18612 of 2004) dismissed the appeals. During the course of disposal of the appeals and in the body of the order, the Deputy Commissioner had occasion to refer to the issue of sale of the land in the year 1948 and the persons claiming under the said sale having perfected their title to the land by being in continuous uninterrupted possession of the land, which they claim under Venkatarama Bhovi who had purchased the land as per the sale deed dated 19-8-1948, and though noticed that such enjoyment and possession was for more than 30 years and though had also referred to the legal position as laid down by this Court to be applied under such a situation, in the case of V. Muniswamy v Deputy Commissioner, Kolar and Others I, nevertheless without applying the law laid down in this case, as was required, having dismissed the appeals, the aggrieved purchasers are before this Court praying for setting aside the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner as also the Assistant Commissioner and for rejection of the application filed by the legal heir of the original grantee. 8. I have heard of Sri T.N. Vishwanatha, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri Prakash T. Hebbar, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent in both the petitions, as also Sri Bharamagouda B. Goudar, learned Government Pleader, appearing for the State and the statutory authorities. 9. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners is that the Assistant Commissioner has not followed proper procedure while holding an enquiry; that in the case of the petitioner in W.P. No. 18612 of 2004, there was not even a notice to the petitioner by the Assistant Commissioner, in which even the entire proceedings become null and void; that there was no evidence to indicate that the land was a granted land. Above all, the petitioners claiming under a purchaser who had purchased the land in the year 1948, have perfected their title by presumption, as the period of enjoyment and possession of the land after the first transfer from the original grantee put together by all the successive purchasers exceeds 30 years and even in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Manche Gowda v State of Karnataka 1 and as clarified in the case of Sunkara Rajalakshmi v State of Karnataka2, the sale being prior to 1-1-1949 i.e., even 30 years prior to 'the Act came into force, the transaction is saved and the provisions of the Act will not apply. Under these circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Muniswamy to which decision, the Deputy Commissioner though has adverted to the legal position as indicated in this decision, has failed to apply the law as enunciated and laid down by this decision to the facts of the present case; that the petitioners having put forth the specific plea of petitioners having perfected their title by adverse possession and the Deputy Commissioner having examined this, but not having applied the law in fact was applicable to and referred to, the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner as well as Assistant Commissioner requires to be set aside and if the provisions of the Act themselves are not applicable, invalidation of the transaction of sale dated 19-8-1948 by the original grantee in favour of Venkatarama Bhovi - the predecessor-in-title of both the petitioners - the application can only be rejected and therefore the matter could be allowed to rest there. 10'Sri-Prakash T. Hebbar, learned Counsel appearing for the fourth respondent-applicant, on the other hand submits that the plea of adverse possession is a plea which should have been specifically set up and it should have been made good by supporting evidence and materials placed in this regard; that the petitioners not having pleaded such adverse possession in the first instance cannot be allowed to claim the benefit of adverse possession as and when they choose, particularly in the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner. It is also the submission of Sri Hebbar that even in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court as indicated in the case of D.N. Venkatarayappa v State of Karnataka3, that the purchaser of a granted land if he had remained in possession and enjoyment of the land for a long duration should have, for the purpose of claiming title by adverse possession even as against the Government, set up such title against the Government by declaring his title under his vendor and it should have asserted upon and hostile title to the enjoyment of the true owner namely the Government and this having not been done, such a plea being conspicuously absent in respect of both the purchasers, the petitioners cannot sucked on the ground of adverse possession and perfecting their title before this Court particularly Article 227 proceedings therefore the matter does not call for interference and the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 11. One another ground urged by Sri Hebbar is that the writ petitions should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as in respect of the orders passed in the years 2000 and 2001 these writ petitions have been filed after lapse of more than three years from the date of passing of the impugned orders and therefore this could should not entertain the writ petition. One other contention urged on behalf of the fourth respondent by Sri Hebbar is that even assuming that the matter requires interference, the matter should be remanded either to the original authority or to the Appellate Authority for the purpose of examining the question of adverse possession particularly in the light of the pleadings, transactions as taken place as to whether the purchasers had enjoyed the land in question continuously without any interruption adverse to the ownership of the Government etc. 12. 12. Sri Vishwanath, learned Counsel for the petitioners drawing my attention to the petition averments, submits that though the impugned orders of the Deputy Commissioner are of the years 2000 and 2001, they have never been communicated to the petitioners; that there was only when the Assistant Commissioner had taken steps to resume the possession from the petitioners, they came to know that their appeals had been ordered adversely and immediately ~hey took steps to obtain certified copies of the orders and thereafter filed the writ petitions. 13. In the light of the specific averments in the writ petition that the impugned orders had not been communicated to the petitioners immediately on passing of the same by the Deputy Commissioner, though the fourth has taken the plea that the petitioner had the knowledge of the impugned orders challenged by them in the respective petition, it remains a plea and a counter plea. In the absence of any records indicating the petitioners in fact had been communicated with· the impugned orders, I am inclined to accept the explanation offered by the petitioners and accordingly, I am of the view that the writ petitions could not be thrown out only on the ground of delay and laches. 14. I am afraid, I· cannot accept the submission of Sri Prakash T. Hebbar, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent regarding want of sufficient plea on the part of the petitioners for the purposes of claiming title by way of adverse possession for the reason that the Deputy Commissioner acting as an Appellate Authority, under both the impugned orders does focus his attention to this question as an issue. It is only when there is a dispute on the pleas, an issue arises. At any rate, if the Deputy Commissioner is considering the question as to whether the appellants before him had perfected title by way of adverse possession for the reason that they are claiming under a purchaser in whose favour was the first sale by the grantee in the year 1948, then the submission that there was no plea of setting up title by way of adverse possession, rescinding the title under the ·sale deed and putting forth an adverse plea against the Government all recedes to the background. When once the Appellate Authority which is the Competent Authority to go into both facts and law, shows its awareness and makes it as an issue on the question of the petitioners having perfected their title though while adding the period beginning with the first sale by the grantee in the .ear 1948 and going beyond 1-1-1979, the date on which the Act came into force by calling in aid and principle of tacking to which they are entitled to, the reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent on the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of D.N. Venkatarayappa and K.T. Huchegowda v Deputy Commissioner1, does not further the case of the fourth respondent for invalidating the sale transaction of the year 1948 under the provisions of the Act. The errors that is committed by the Deputy Commissioner is not applying the relevant law to which he shows awareness, but does not decide the case by applying that law, instead dismisses the appeal by referring to other aspects, an order of this nature does call for interference even in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. Insofar as the factual position is concerned, there is not much dispute that the entire extent of 2 acres of land that had been granted in favour of Kalappa-original grantee-had been transferred by the grantee in terms of the sale deed dated 19-8-1948. Both the petitioners claim only under the subsequent purchasers or persons claiming under the first purchaser namely Venkatarama Bhovi. Therefore, if the transaction dated 19-8-1948 is one that is required to the invalidated, others also repeat the same consequence. Only if the transaction of the year 1948 is sustained, the other transactions may sustain and the sale deeds in their favour, so also the land. 16. Undisputedly, the sale took place before 1-1-1949 i.e., more than 30 years prior to the date on which the provisions of the Act came into force. Any person in continuous possession and enjoyment of even a granted land for a period of more than 30 years can claim adverse possession against the Government also and can perfect the title against the Government in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Manchegowda and as reviewed and clarified in the case of Sunkara Rajyalakshmi. 17. 17. Though Sri Hebbar, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent has made a valiant effort to pick holes in this legal position by drawing my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.T. Huchegowda, I find that in both these cases, the Supreme Court was seized of the question as to whether a person who claims title by way of adverse possession could have perfected his title even such adverse possession for a period of 12 years and not beyond 30 years, as adverse possession in respect of a granted land for which the grantee had not been given absolute title and has remained with the Government, it should be for a period of 30 years enjoyment and anything else. The Supreme Court was seized of the question as to whether a person who has set up adverse possession as against the vendor by itself can perfect his title against the Government and the question being answered in this behalf. Moreover, these two decisions of the Supreme Court do not refer to the legal position as discussed in the case of Manchegowda and as clarified in the case of Sunkara Rajyalakshmi. Though it is contended by Sri Hebbar, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent that in the light of the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, which reads as under: "11. Act to override other laws.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith, continued in any other law for the time being in force or any customs, usage or contract or any decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority". Act to override other laws.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith, continued in any other law for the time being in force or any customs, usage or contract or any decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority". That the provisions of Section 11 of the Act operate and efface even a title which has been claimed by adverse possession and therefore, it matters little if the petitioners have set up title by way of adverse possession and claim to have perfected their title to the land in question which had been transferred by the grantee in violation of the terms of the grant and therefore even such title acquired by and perfected by way of adverse possession also hit by the provisions of Section 11 of the Act and that the Supreme Court having not referred to this provision either in the case of Manchegowda or Sunkura Rajyalakshmi and the decision having been referred without noticing the provisions of Section 11, the said decision cannot come in the way of the fourth respondent to claim the benefit of Section 11, I am afraid I cannot accept this submission as the law deceased by the Supreme Court, particularly when it was examined the constitutional validity of the provisions of the very Act and the entire gamut of the Act including Section 11, and having expressed the opinion, which is the law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, it is not open for this Court to examine such contention. The submission is referred to only because it was urged at the Bar, and not for examination by this Court. 18. Though Sri Hebbar, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent has vehemently contended that if the matter warrants interference, it should be remanded for a further enquiry and appropriate finding on the question of adverse possession either by the Deputy Commissioner or by the Assistant Commissioner, I am of the view that it is not necessary, as the remand should be for some definite and useful purpose and not for the sake of mere remand. If the transaction of the year 1948 is not invalidated, even by applying the provisions of the Act and if it is saved, about which transaction there is not much dispute as amongst the parties, there is no occasion for any further action, as the petitioners claim only under this provision and not otherwise. In the circumstance, I am of the opinion that the remand will not serve any purpose at all, as the transactions are not hit by the provisions of the Act. The provisions of the Act are not attracted particularly in respect of transaction dated 19-8-1948. 19. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner as well as the Assistant Commissioner are quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. The application filed by the fourth respondent under the provisions of the Act stands rejected. Rule issued and made absolute. 20. The cost that has been deposited by the petitioners before this Court towards litigation expenses payable to the fourth respondent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- in each case, is permitted to be drawn by the fourth respondent through his Counsel.