Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 670 (GAU)

State of Tripura v. Sephal Chandra Roy @ Saha

2005-09-13

A.B.PAL, TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2005
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This First Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.10.1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No. 1, West Tripura, Agartala in Title Suit No. 17 of 1991. 2. We have heard Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. R.B. Sinha, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants. We have also heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, the learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. T.K. Deb, Mr. S. Ghosh and Mr. S. Majumdar, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. 3. The appeal has arisen out of the following facts and circumstances. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 8, who were the Plaintiffs in the suit, instituted T.S. No. 17of 1991 against the Appellants herein before the learned Subordinate Judge, West Tripura (now redesignated as Civil Judge, Senior Division) for a decree of declaration and payment of compensation valued at Rs.5,44,833.39 paise. The case of the Plaintiffs, in brief, is that they are the owners of the TATA Truck bearing Registration No. TRL-2091, which they used to lend on hire to other businessman for earning their livelihood. The Defendant No. 5, i.e. the proforma Respondent herein had purchased 4 (four) truck loads of original billet firewood from 1089 Plantation Coupe at Chellagong, South Tripura District on payment of royalty of Rs.4,720/- for which he hired the said vehicle of the Plaintiffs for transportation. When one of the loaded vehicles, i.e. TRL-2091 reached Champaknagar on 31.03.1989, the Appellant No. 4 detained the vehicle alongwith the firewood even after showing him the transit pass etc. The Appellant No. 4 thereafter seized the vehicle along with the firewood and the transit pass from the proforma Respondent on the ground that transit pass was a forged one. The Plaintiffs approached the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala on 11.04.1989 for releasing the said vehicle along with the firewood, but that did not materialize since the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. Thereafter, the Appellant No. 3 asked Subal Bhowmik, the predecessor in interest of the Plaintiffs No. 2 to 8 to appear before him on 02.05.1989 in connection with the seizure of the vehicle and the firewood. Thereafter, the Appellant No. 3 asked Subal Bhowmik, the predecessor in interest of the Plaintiffs No. 2 to 8 to appear before him on 02.05.1989 in connection with the seizure of the vehicle and the firewood. When the said Subal Bhowmik appeared before the Appellant No. 3 through the Plaintiff No. 1 showing him all the relevant documents, the Appellant No. 3 did not release the seized vehicle. It would appear that the Appellant No. 3 in the meantime by his letter dated 01.04.1989 wrote to the Divisional Forest Officer, Gumti Division, Jatanbari to verify the genuineness of the transit pass issued in the name of the proforma Respondent. The Divisional Forest Officer, Gumti Division informed the appellate No. 3 that the transit pass of the proforma Respondent was genuine. Inspite of this, the Appellants refused to release the sized vehicle and the firewood or disposed of the confiscation proceeding, which led the Respondents to approach this Court by a writ petition. The writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 13.07.1989 in Civil Rule No. 243 of 1989 by directing the Appellants to dispose of the confiscation proceeding or release the vehicle within 2 (two) weeks. Purportedly on the basis of this order, the Appellant No. 3 abruptly passed the order dated 28.07.1989 confiscating the seized vehicle Under Section 52A(2) of the Indian Forest (Tripura Second Amendment) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to 'the Act' for short). 4. Aggrieved by the order of confiscation, the Plaintiff No. 1 preferred a criminal appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura Under Section 52A(5) of the Act. The learned Sessions Judge by his judgment dated 28.09.1989 allowed the appeal, set aside the order of confiscation and directed the Appellants to release forth with the seized vehicle to the Plaintiffs. The Appellants challenged the said judgment before this Court in Criminal revision No. 44 of 1989. This Court by order dated 10.01.1990 dismissed the revision whereupon the Appellants released the vehicle along with firewood on 05.04.1990. The grievance of the Plaintiffs as asserted in the plaint is that during the period in which the vehicle was detained, the same was kept in an open place before the Champaknagar Police Out Post, as a result whereof, extensive damage was caused to the same. The grievance of the Plaintiffs as asserted in the plaint is that during the period in which the vehicle was detained, the same was kept in an open place before the Champaknagar Police Out Post, as a result whereof, extensive damage was caused to the same. According to the Plaintiffs, both the engine and the body of the vehicle were completely damaged and that the damage was such that the have to two the vehicle to a workshop. The Plaintiffs alleged that they would require Rs.1,45,383.39 paise for rebuilding of the body and for repairing the engine of the vehicle. They also alleged that they have to incur a loss of Rs.5,44,833.39 paise for the illegal detention of the vehicle by the Appellants. Hence, the suit. 5. The Appellants contested the suit and filed their written statement wherein they asserted that the vehicle was seized on 31.03.1989 at Champaknagar Forest Drop Gate for transporting illegal timbers of reserved species in the form of firewood billets. They further asserted that the transit pass was issued in respect of ordinary billet firewood, but on checking, it was found that the vehicle was carrying reserved species such as Awal, Jam, Kanak and Amloki by misleading the Forest Personnel. The Appellants vehemently denied that the seized vehicle was not in good condition when it was released and asserted that the same was kept under tarpaulin cover. According to the Appellants, the certificate procured by them from the local workshop to prove their claim are false document and could not be accepted or acted upon. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of both the parties, the learned Civil Judge framed the following issues: A) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? B) Whether the Defendants illegally seized the truck in question of the Plaintiff and seized on 31.3.89 and detained it upto 5.4.90 without any valid reason and without any authority? C) Whether the said truck in question was badly damaged due to the said illegal detention of the same? D) Whether the Plaintiff are entitled to any relief and if so, upto what extent? 7. The following additional issues were subsequently framed by the trial Court on the direction of this Court and the same are reproduced below: I) Whether the seizure and confiscation of the vehicle was done in good faith? D) Whether the Plaintiff are entitled to any relief and if so, upto what extent? 7. The following additional issues were subsequently framed by the trial Court on the direction of this Court and the same are reproduced below: I) Whether the seizure and confiscation of the vehicle was done in good faith? II) Whether there was any sort of negligence on the part of Forest Officials in detaining the vehicle in the manner they did so? III) Whether the Forest Officials are guilty of negligence in discharging of their duties? IV) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to get decree for a sum of Rs.5,44,833.39? 8. In the course of trial, the Plaintiffs examined as many as 6 witnesses to prove their case. They also exhibited the documents marked Exbt. 1 - 26 to substantiate their claim. The Appellants also examined 3 witnesses and exhibited some documents marked Exbt."A" (2) "G" to prove their case. By the impugned judgment and decree, the Plaintiffs succeeded in their case. Aggrieved by this, the Appellants are preferring this appeal. 9. From the materials on record, it becomes obvious that the first point for determination in this appeal is whether there was probable and reasonable cause for the seizure and subsequent detention of the vehicle by the Respondents till its release on the order of this Court? Ext. 6 is the receipt for the royalty paid by the Respondent No. 9 for four truckloads of billets firewood from 1989 Plantation Coupe at Chellangong. Ext. 7 is the transit pass issued by the Forest authorities for carrying one truckload of the said billet firewood. It is the case of the Respondents that on the basis of the said transit pass, the firewood were loaded onto the seized truck for transporting them towards Champaknagar on 30.03.1989 and that the truck and the firewood were seized from the Respondent No. 9 on the ground that the transit pass was a fraudulent one. However, nowhere in the plaint or in their evidence, the Respondents ever mentioned that they did not carry any protected species of trees in the seized vehicle. It is the case of the Appellants that the seized vehicle was carrying prohibited forest produces such as Awal, Jam, Amloki, Kanak etc. at the time of its seizure by the O/C, SFPP of Champaknagar on the basis of the transit pass issued only for ordinary firewood. Ext. It is the case of the Appellants that the seized vehicle was carrying prohibited forest produces such as Awal, Jam, Amloki, Kanak etc. at the time of its seizure by the O/C, SFPP of Champaknagar on the basis of the transit pass issued only for ordinary firewood. Ext. 8 is the seizure memo issued by the O/C, SFPP, which reveals that the vehicle was seized alongwith 18.722 cum billet-woods. Apart from asserting that the seized vehicle was carrying firewood on the basis of the transit pass, the Respondents never denied/disputed the seizure of Awal, Jam, Amloki, Kanak alongwith vehicle. It is however, contended by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the deposition of P.W. 5 (the then D.F.O.) Gumti Division) in Court and his letter dated 04.04.1989 (Ext. 25) corroborated their case that the transit pass was a genuine document and not a fraudulent document This contention of the Respondents completely overlooks the case of the Appellants that the vehicle and the firewood carried by it were seized by the Appellant No. 4 on the ground that billets like Awal, Jam, Amloki, Kanak along with ordinary firewood were being illegally transported clandestinely by the Respondents by using the transit pass did not authorise the Respondents to remove prohibited billet-firewoods such as Awal, Jam etc. found on the seized vehicle and that both the vehicle and the said forest produces were seized when it was fond that prohibited species of trees referred to earlier were carried in the vehicle. It may also be noted that the trial Court also observed that Ext. 25 was clear enough to establish the claim of the Plaintiffs and the proforma Defendant as the Divisional Forest Officer, Gumti Division sold those reserved species as billets and firewood. This finding of the trial Court rather supports the case of the Appellants. 10. At this stage, it may be useful to refer to the provisions relating seizure of property liable to confiscation as under: Section 52(1) Whether there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any forest produce, such produce together with all tools, boats, carts, vehicles or cattle used in committing such offence, may be seized by any Forest Officer or Public Officer. The term "forest offence" is defined by Section 2(3) to mean an offence punishable under this Act or under any rule made there Under Section 33 provides the penalties for acts in contravention of the notification Under Section 30 or of rules made Under Section 32 and the punishment prescribed therein is imprisonment for a term of which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extent to five hundred rupees, or with both. In terms of the Notification dated 17.07.63 issued by the Forest Department, Government of Tripura, some 44 numbers of species of trees have been declared to be reserved species in the protected forests of Tripura. Among those species of trees are Jam, Kanak, Amlok' Clause 1 of the rules for the regulation concerning a protected forest promulgated by the Forest Department, Government of Tripura in the Notification dated 29.04.1952, is relevant for our purpose, which is reproduced below: 1. No tree of any species declared to be reserved by any Notification of the time being in force Under Section 30 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (Act XVI of 1927), shall be lopped, felled, cut converted, girdled, barked, sawn, burnt or in any way injured without the written permission of the Divisional Forest Officer and without payment of royalty there of at the prescribed rates or on settled contract basis approved by the Forest Department. 2. Trees other than the species referred to in paragraph 1 above or any forest produce shall not be lopped, felled, cut, girdled, barked sawn, collected, used or removed, or cattle grazed in a protected forest without the written permission of a Forest Officer empowered to issue permits and without payment of royalty or grazing fee there of at the prescribed rates. Thus, it is obvious that contravention of the aforesaid rules by any person is a punishable offence. Consequently, if any forest-offence has been committed in respect of such forest-produce, both the produces and the vehicle which carries it are liable to be confiscated Under Section 52 of the Forest Act, 1927 (as amended in the State of Tripura). At this stage, we may notice that the learned senior Counsel for the Respondents does not assail the findings recorded by the trial Court that the initial seizure was legal but the further detention of the vehicle by the Respondent-Appellant No. 4 after the receipt of Ext. At this stage, we may notice that the learned senior Counsel for the Respondents does not assail the findings recorded by the trial Court that the initial seizure was legal but the further detention of the vehicle by the Respondent-Appellant No. 4 after the receipt of Ext. 25 from the Divisional Forest Officer, Gumti Division till its release on 05.04.1990 was illegal. In other words, by this concession, the learned senior Counsel has agreed that the Appellant No. 4 had then reason to belief that a forest-offence has been committed in respect of the firewood carried by the Respondents in the vehicle. It is the established fact on record that the vehicle was detained by the Appellant till 05.04.1990. What is then contended by the learned senior Counsel for the Respondents is that there was no probable and reasonable ground for the detention of the vehicle once the letter at Ext. 25 was received by the Appellants from the DFO, Gumti Division, who clarified that the transit pass was a genuine document. As noticed earlier, the trial Court was of the view that by Ext. 25, the Appellant No. 4 became free from all confusion, that he came to know that the Respondent No. 9 was carrying billets firewood legally and the unreserved species were not the factors to detain the vehicle and further that Ext. 25 was clear enough to establish the claim of the Respondents and the further that the Appellants had no right to detain the vehicle further. 11. For better appreciation of the controversy involved, we may briefly refer to the sequence of events upto the release of the vehicle. The vehicle along with the said forest produces were seized by the Appellant No. 4 on 31.03.1989, vide Ext. 8. The seizure was reported to the Conservator of Forest, Western Circle on 01.04.1989. On 12.04.1989, an application was moved by the Respondents before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala, for release of the vehicle to their custody. In the meantime, the Conservator of Forest, Western Circle on 15.04.1989 vide Ext. 8. The seizure was reported to the Conservator of Forest, Western Circle on 01.04.1989. On 12.04.1989, an application was moved by the Respondents before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala, for release of the vehicle to their custody. In the meantime, the Conservator of Forest, Western Circle on 15.04.1989 vide Ext. D wrote to the DFO, Teliamura Division informing him about the seizure of the vehicle by Forest Beat Officer, Chellagong and stating that though the transit pass was issued for ordinary firewood, the vehicle carried protected species of trees, for which necessary action under the forest rules betaken and that the irregularities in the transit pass should be referred to DFO, Gumti Division for clarification. By the letter dated 04.04.1989 (Ext. 25), the DFO, Gumti Division clarified that the transit pass was a genuine document. By the order dated 24.04.1989, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala disposed of the application after observing that the he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. On the same days, the Appellant No. 3 directed the Respondent No. 2 (now deceased and represented by his legal representatives) to appear before him on 09.05.1989 or submit his written statement against the proposed confiscation of the vehicle Under Section 52-A(2) of the Act, vide Ext. E. From Ext. F, it is seen that the said Respondent did not appear personally but was represented by his authorised attorney, who did not apparently produce any documentary evidence in support of his authorisation and that the DFO, Teliamura Division, therefore, requested the said Respondent to appear by himself or his authorised attorney be him on There is nothing in the pleadings of the Respondents or in the record to show that the Respondent No. 2 appeared by himself or through his attorney before the Appellant No. 3 or submitted his written statement against the proposed confiscation. It would appear from the record that the Respondent No 2 subsequently filed Civil Rule No. 243 of 1989 before this Court, which by the order dated 13.07.1989 disposed of the same by directing the Appellant No. 3 to dispose of the confiscation proceeding or release the vehicle within a period of two weeks. Thereafter, the Appellant No. 3 by the order dated 27.07.1989 confiscated the vehicle. Thereafter, the Appellant No. 3 by the order dated 27.07.1989 confiscated the vehicle. This order was challenged by the Respondents before the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, who by the judgment dated 28.09.1989 in Crl.A. No. 7(3)89 set aside the confiscation order and directed the Appellants to release the vehicle forthwith. The revision petition filed by the Appellants before this Court in Crl. Rev. No. 44 of 1999 was also dismissed by the order dated Pursuant to this order, the Appellants released the vehicle to the Respondents on 05.04.1990. 12. As noticed earlier, the trial Court, from the aforesaid sequence of events, was of the view that there was no reasonable cause for further detention of the vehicle after receipt of the letter dated 04.04.1989 (Ext. 25) from the DFO, Teliamura. What are the contents of Ext. 25 and the effect thereof can best be understood by reproducing the same hereunder: NO.F.3-7/GMT-89/53-54 Government of Tripura Office of the Divisional Forest Officer Gumti Division, Jatanbari. Dated 4/4/89 To The Divisional Forest Officer, Teliamura Forest Division, Teliamura, Subject-Regarding seizure of vehicle No. TRL2901 alongwith TP. No. 159306 dated 30.3.89 issued by Shri Niranjan Majumdar, Fr. B.O. Chellagong. Ref.: Your No. F.7-1 1/TD-89/5999-6000 dated 1.4.89. Sir, In inviting a reference to your above quoted letter I am to state as under: 1. T.P. No. 159306 dated 30.3.89 has been issued by the Beat Officer, Chellogong Shri Niranjan Majumdar, Fr. from the T.P. Book No. 3187 issued by the undersigned to Range Officer, Duburnagar who in turn issued the same to Beat Officer, Chellogong in fulfilling all the formal procedures. There are no reasons to doubt the validity of the T.P. No. 159306 dated 30.3.89 issued by B.O. Chellogong. The office copy of T.P. No. 159306 dated 30.3.89 seems to reflect the true replica of the copy issued to the party as maybe seen from the ensured attested copy. 2. The T.P. was issued by the Beat Officer, as per the verbal order of Range Officer, Dumurnagar dated 21.1.89 as has been confirmed by the R.O. Dumurnagar. The office copy of T.P. No. 159306 dated 30.3.89 seems to reflect the true replica of the copy issued to the party as maybe seen from the ensured attested copy. 2. The T.P. was issued by the Beat Officer, as per the verbal order of Range Officer, Dumurnagar dated 21.1.89 as has been confirmed by the R.O. Dumurnagar. It may be mentioned here that the petition of Shri Santosh Debnath, S/o Late Hari Charan Debnath, P.O. and Vill-Champaknagar has duly been forwarded by B.O. Chellogong and R.O. Dumurnagar vide their No. 52/CB dated 30.3.89 and No. F. 18/DNR-89/390 dated 31.3.89 of B.O. Chellogong and R.O. Dumurnagar respectively and the said petition has been received by this office on 1.4.89. In the forwarding itself Beat Officer, Chellogong has very clearly commented that he has already realised royalty for 4 (four) trucks of billet firewood vide G.P. No. 147152 dated 30.3.89 from Shri Santosh Debnath. It may further be mentioned here that Shri Santosh Debnath produced the aforesaid G.P. before the undersigned today during my enquiry. It is stated by Shri Santosh Debnath that the said G.P. was also produced by him before the Officer-in-charge, SFPP Champaknagar on 31.3.89 in presence of quite a good numbers of villagers. 3. As regards para IV of letter No. F.4/SEPPCKR-89/131-32 dated 1.4.891 am to state that it is clearly written on the body of the G.P. and T.P. (G.P. No. 147157 dated 30.3.89 and T.P. No. 159306 dated 30.3.89 in question) that the seized firewood were extracted from 1989 plantation coupe. Since the system of extraction through permit is not in vogue in forest Department, there cannot be any reason to give vent to preconceive any other system of extraction other than Departmental operation. Further there is no scope to question the mode of operation when the materials are carried under the cover of valid G.P. and T.P. 4. The Chellogong coupe is located cut of the way connecting the regular communication system by a fair whether kacha road extending over a stretch of 6 to 7 K.M. which is nothing but a Jeep feeding kacha road in fair, whether a full loaded truck can hardly ply over this road and considering the distance from plantation coupe to Champaknagar via Teliamura the time of 48 hours allowed by B.O. Chellogong seems to be justified. As regards checking and passing by Beat officer, Chellogong (item 6 of the aforesaid letter of S.F.P.P. Champaknagar) it may be mentioned here that the T.P. can only be issued by the T.P. issuing officer when he is fully satisfied about the validity of carriage of forest produces. As regards mixing up of species like Jam, Awal, Kanak, Amloki etc. the reason my very well be ascertained from inscription on the body of the G.P. and T.P. that the materials were extracted from plantation coupe. In fine, I do not find any reason to doubt the T.P. No. 159306 dated 30.3.89 issued by B.O. Chellogong Beat to be a fraud. Yours faithfully Sd/- Divisional Forest Officer Gumti Division, Jatanbari 13. A critical examination of the letter extracted above will show that the DFO, Gumti Division, Jatanbari merely stated therein that the transit pass in question was not a fraudulent document and nothing more. He neither stated therein that the transit pass permitted the removal of protected species of Jam, Awal, Kanak and Amloki nor did he state that such reserved species of trees were not carried in the seized truck. What is apparent from Ext. 25 is that the said DFO was quite evasive in his report as if he was concealing something. In our considered view, when the DFO by Ext. 25 did not categorically assert that no protected species of trees were carried in the vehicle, in the light of the seizure report made by the Appellant No. 4 at Ext. 8, there was reasonable and probable cause for not releasing the vehicle. As recorded earlier, the Respondent No. 2 instead of appearing before the Appellant No. 3 or filing his written statement, which is the remedy prescribed by Section 52-A(3)of the Act, approached courts of law for ventilating his grievances. It is true that the order dated 27.7.1989 confiscating the vehicle is perfunctory in nature, but then it cannot be overlooked that the Respondent No. 2 did not respond to the show cause notice given to him earlier. The fact remains that the vehicle was seized by the Appellant No. 4 on the ground that contraband billet-woods were carried under the cover of the transit pass, which was issued for transporting ordinary firewood. As noted earlier, the report made by the DFO, Gumti Division in Ext. The fact remains that the vehicle was seized by the Appellant No. 4 on the ground that contraband billet-woods were carried under the cover of the transit pass, which was issued for transporting ordinary firewood. As noted earlier, the report made by the DFO, Gumti Division in Ext. 25, upon which heavy reliance is placed by the Respondents, merely stated that the transit pass was a genuine document and not a fraudulent one, but did not say that no prohibited species of trees such as Jam, Awal, Kanak, Amloki etc. were carried by the vehicle nor did it say that the transit pass authorised the Respondent No. 2 to carry such items in the vehicle. 14. The term "reasonable and probable cause" means an honest belief founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautions man to the conclusion arrived at. "Reasonable and probable cause" simply means reasonable cause, the word probable being with its original meaning of "probable" and hence reliable". The conjunction of the adjectives "reasonable" and "probable" is a heritage from the redundancies in which the old pleaders delighted. Salmon observes that probable is synonymous with reasonable and means a good cause and that probabilis cause is not unknown to classical Latin.- see S.T. Sahibs v. N. Ghasan Ghani Sahib AIR 1957 Mad 646 . Necessarily, the Plaintiff must show that the Defendant detained the vehicle from 30.3.1989 to 5.4.1990 without reasonable and probable cause. It is when he has led some evidence to this effect that the Defendant can be called upon to show the existence of such a cause. The onus lies heavily upon the Plaintiff like any civil suit. This rule may appear to require the Plaintiff to prove a negative viz. that the Defendant had no reasonable and probable cause for the detention of the vehicle during that period. But if the assertion of a negative is an essential part of the Plaintiff's case, the proof of the assertion still rests upon the Plaintiff. When the Plaintiff has produced the evidence which, if unrebutted would entitle him to succeed, the onus shifts to the Defendant to establish to the contrary, that is the presence of reasonable and probable cause. But if the assertion of a negative is an essential part of the Plaintiff's case, the proof of the assertion still rests upon the Plaintiff. When the Plaintiff has produced the evidence which, if unrebutted would entitle him to succeed, the onus shifts to the Defendant to establish to the contrary, that is the presence of reasonable and probable cause. In other words, the Plaintiff in proving the absence of reasonable and probable cause has to prove a negative, but he is required to give slight evidence of such absence. 15. In the instant case, the case of the Respondents is that once the Appellant No. 4 received the letter at Ext. 25, there was no reasonable and probable cause for further detention of the seized vehicle. As noticed earlier, this letter merely states that the transit pass was not a fraudulent document but did not say either that the species of trees such as Jam, Awal, Kanak, Amloki, which are admittedly [prohibited species of trees, found mixed up with ordinary billet-woods were permitted to be removed by the transit pass. In the absence of any evidence to satisfy that the seized vehicle did not carry such prohibited species of trees, in our considered view, the Appellant No. 4 had reasonable and probable cause to detain the vehicle even after the receipt of the letter at Ext. 25. The confiscation order was challenged before the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura by the Respondents in Cril. A. No. 7 (3) 89 whereupon the order was set aside by directing the Appellant to release the seized vehicle to the Respondent No. 2. Aggrieved by this order, the Appellants preferred revision petition before this Court in Cril. Rev. No. 44 of 1989 and by the order dated 10.01.1990, the revision came to be dismissed. The vehicle was not immediately released since the Appellants took sometime for obtaining a copy of the order and for taking a decision on the desirability or feasibility of approaching the Apex Court. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the Appellants did not have any reasonable and probable ground for detaining the seized vehicle from 30.3.1989 to 5.4.1990. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the Appellants did not have any reasonable and probable ground for detaining the seized vehicle from 30.3.1989 to 5.4.1990. Consequently, the trial Court has misdirected itself in holding that the Appellant No. 4 had a mala fide intention to harass the Respondents and to cause a loss to them without any valid and reasonable and that there was no explanation from the Appellants as to why the Appellant No. 3 had been sitting idle with the confiscation matter in respect of the seized vehicle. On these findings made by us, we hold that the Respondents are not entitled to any compensation/damages for the detention of the seized vehicle from 30.3.1989 to 5.4.1990 and the decree passed to that effect by the trial Court is liable to be set aside. 16. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the trial Court is correct in awarding a sum of Rs.1,45,383.39 paise for repairing of the engine of the vehicle and for re-building of the body of the vehicle. It is the case of the Respondents that the seized vehicle was kept in front of Champaknagar Police Out-Post under open sky without proper care and attention for more than a year and in that process, the vehicle was extensively damaged necessitating massive repair and rebuilding of the engine and the body respectively. The learned Civil Judge recorded the findings that there was no one to take care of the engine of the seized vehicle while it was kept before the Police Out-Post and that the evidence on record and the normal experience of life are sufficient to prove that if a vehicle is kept for long without operating it, the engine would get damaged and would require repairing for service. Thus, according to the learned Civil Judge, there was no doubt regarding the damage on the wooden structure of the body of the seized vehicle and on the engine for keeping it idle for a long period. Thus, according to the learned Civil Judge, there was no doubt regarding the damage on the wooden structure of the body of the seized vehicle and on the engine for keeping it idle for a long period. As to the extent of damage caused to the vehicle, the learned Civil Judge took into consideration the fact that the vehicle was purchased in 1981 and that the place from where the firewood were brought did not have good road, and that a good and serviceable vehicle was required to carry billets, firewood therefrom and further that a TATA vehicle like the Plaintiffs would be in good running condition for 8 years from the date of its production, in absence of any accident. From this the learned Civil Judge concluded that the vehicle of the Plaintiffs was in good condition when it was seized by the Appellants. In so far as the expenditure required for the purpose of repairing of the engine and rebuilding of the body of the vehicle, the learned Civil Judge accepted the evidence of the 3 witnesses in the staff of M/s Surana Motors produced by the Plaintiffs and accordingly held that the Plaintiffs were entitled to Rs.1,45,383.39 paise for such repair and rebuilding. In reaching this conclusion, the learned Civil Judge took into consideration the absence of any evidence produced on behalf of the Appellants to discredit the said witnesses from Surana Motors. 17. We have carefully gone through the depositions of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 6 and the contents of Ext. 2 and 3 prepared by them. These witnesses were working at Surana Motors, which was engaged in the supply and repair and servicing of vehicles manufactured by TATA Company and, therefore, their competency in assessing the damage caused to the seized vehicle and of the costs to be incurred for the repair, etc. there of, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, cannot be questioned. Consequently, we hold that the findings of the trial Court in respect of the damage caused to the seized vehicle and of the expenditures amounting to Rs.1,45,383.39 paise needed for repairing the engine and rebuilding of the body thereof are fully supported by the materials on record, and do not warrant our interference. Consequently, we hold that the findings of the trial Court in respect of the damage caused to the seized vehicle and of the expenditures amounting to Rs.1,45,383.39 paise needed for repairing the engine and rebuilding of the body thereof are fully supported by the materials on record, and do not warrant our interference. Having held that proper care and attention were not given to the seized vehicle by the Appellants during the period of their detention and that extensive damage was caused to the same, the next question to be determined is whether the Appellants are liable to pay the repairing and rebuilding charge of the vehicle amounting to Rs.1,45,383.39 Paise? Once the vehicle was seized, it was held by the State through the Forest Officials as custodia societus, unless it is found that the detention was illegal in which case it shall be deemed to have been held for the benefit of the person from whom it was seized. Even if the detention is found to be legal, detaining authority has the duty to give proper care and attention as the same is essential for the society. In our considered view, pending finalisation of the confiscation proceeding or the decision of the competent court of jurisdiction when the confiscation proceeding us under challenge, the detaining authority is under obligation to keep the seized vehicle in safe custody under proper care and maintenance. If that is not done, as in the instant case, the Appellants must be held answerable for such negligence on the pain of paying compensation. The observations of the Apex Court in N. Nagendra Rao and Co. v. State of A.P. (1994) 6 SCC 205 , though rendered in the contest of a different stature, are pertinent and are reproduced hereunder: Whether the goods confiscated or seized are required to be returned either under orders of the court of because of the provision in the Act, the objection that the goods having been lost or destroyed the owner of the goods had no remedy in private law and the court was not empowered to pass an order or grant decree for payment of the value of goods cannot be accepted. Public policy requires the court to exercise the power in private law to compensate the owner where the damage or loss is suffered by the negligence of officers of the State in respect of cause of action for which suits are maintainable in civil court. Since the seizure and confiscation of Appellant's goods was not in exercise of power which could be considered to be act of State of which no cognisance could be taken by the civil Court, the suit of the Appellant could not be dismissed. In either view of the matter, the judgment and order of the High Court cannot be upheld. The Supreme Court further observes therein that a search or seizure affected under such law could be taken to be an exercise of power which may in domain of inalienable function. Whether the authority, to whom this power is delegated, is liable for negligence in discharge of duties while performing such functions is a different matter. But when similar powers are conferred under other statute as incidental or ancillary power to carry out the purpose and objective of the Act, then it being an exercise of such state function which is not primary or inalienable, an officer acting negligently is liable personally and the State vicariously. We need not say more in this behalf 18. The trial Court awarded a sum of Rs.10,000/- as cost of litigation. In awarding this amount, the trial Court took into consideration the cases instituted by the Respondents before different courts including this Court for releasing the seized vehicle. On the whole, we are satisfied that the amount decreed as cost of litigations is quite reasonable and does not call for our interference. Similarly, we are not inclined to interfere with the award of Rs.500/- towards the towing charge of the vehicle from Champaknagar Police Out Post to Indranagar, Agartala on 05.04.1990. However, in view of our findings that the Appellants had reasonable and probable cause for detaining the vehicle from 31.3.1989 to 05.04.1990, the question of compensation does not arise in this behalf. The Respondents also claimed a sum of Rs.98,400/- at the rate of Rs.600/- per day on account of loss of earning from 06.04.1990 to 16.09.1990 when the truck could not use for want of repair due to lack of money. The Respondents also claimed a sum of Rs.98,400/- at the rate of Rs.600/- per day on account of loss of earning from 06.04.1990 to 16.09.1990 when the truck could not use for want of repair due to lack of money. Another sum of Rs.67,800/- at the rate of Rs.600/- per day was claimed by him for loss of earning for the period between 17.09.1990 and 07.01.1991 as the vehicle could not be used during this period for want of repair. The learned Civil Judge held that the loss of earning by the vehicle during the period of its detention would be Rs.250/- per day. In reaching this conclusion, the trial Court took into account the age of the vehicle and the depreciation value there of. In our view, this calculation is quite reasonable and the same need not be interfered with. As noted earlier, it is the case of the Respondents that Appellant due to lack of money, no repair of the vehicle could be made thereby rendering the same without any earning from 06.04.1990 to 16.09.1990. There can be no dispute that a considerable time would be required for repairing the engine of the vehicle as well as rebuilding of its body. But in the absence of any evidence to show that the repair of the vehicle was actually undertaken by the Respondents in a workshop from 06.04.1990 to 16.09.1990, whether they sustained loss of earning during that period would only be in the realm of speculation. It is quite possible that due to shortage of liquid cash, the Respondents decided not to repair the vehicle and disposed it of for good. No subsequent pleading were filed by the Respondents to indicate the true state of affairs after its release by the Appellants. In such circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the Respondents incurred loss of earning for about 163 days for repair of the vehicle. This Court cannot grant a relief on the basis of surmise, conjecture and presumption. Consequently, the grant of compensation by the trial court in this behalf is not sustainable in law. As for the claim of compensation for loss of earning by the vehicle from 17.09.1990 to 07.01.1991, we are at a loss as to on that basis this claim was made by the Respondents and was eventually decreed by the trial court. Consequently, the grant of compensation by the trial court in this behalf is not sustainable in law. As for the claim of compensation for loss of earning by the vehicle from 17.09.1990 to 07.01.1991, we are at a loss as to on that basis this claim was made by the Respondents and was eventually decreed by the trial court. The record of the trial Court is conspicuous by the absence of any evidence to substantiate this claim of the Respondents. The basic principle for granting a relief needs no reiteration: No evidence, no decree. Therefore, we hold that the trial Court has gone overboard in decreeing this claim and has, in the process, committed illegally. As for the claim of compensation in respect of loss of earning by the vehicle from 17.09.1990 to 07.01.1991, we are at a loss as to on what basis this claim was made. No evidence was led by the Respondent to substantiate this claim. Therefore, we do not agree with the compensation awarded by the trial Court in this behalf. 19. The next question, which falls for consideration, is whether the Respondents are entitled to interest on the amount of compensation being decreed. Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior Counsel for the Appellants, vehemently opposed the prayer of the Respondents for award of interest by submitting that no such relief was claimed in the plaint nor was cross-objection filed by the Respondents in this behalf. According to the learned senior counsel, this Court cannot grant relief or reliefs not claimed in the pleadings. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, the learned senior Counsel for the Respondents, however, drawing my attention to the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in State v. Ajit Singh AIR 1979 P & H 179, submits that this Court can grant interest after the date of suit though not expressly not prayed for since such a relief is not inconsistent with the reliefs claimed. It may be noted that though no interest was specifically claimed in the plaint, a general prayed was made to the effect that other order, further reliefs as may be deem fit and proper might be granted. It may be noted that though no interest was specifically claimed in the plaint, a general prayed was made to the effect that other order, further reliefs as may be deem fit and proper might be granted. Mulla in his classic compensatory on Code of Civil Procedure (15th Edn.) at page 1224, after discussing various decisions of the High Courts, observes that under the system of pleading hitherto followed in India, it was usual to add in the plaint a prayer for general relief called "general prayer" which ran thus: "The Plaintiff claims such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require". Under the present rule, it is no longer necessary to specifically ask for such relief. Such relief may now always be given to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided it is not inconsistent with that specifically claimed, and with the case raised by the pleading. It must be remembered that under Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure, it is within the discretion of a court to grant interest from the date of suit to the date of decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable and to further grant interest from the date of decree till realisation of the principal sum adjudged at a rate not exceeding 6 per cent per annum. It may also be noted that the expression "decree for the payment of money" as used in Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure includes a claim to unliquidated damages and is not confined to money suit alone. In the instant case, the suit is for compensation for wrongful detention of a vehicle and damage caused to it due to want of proper care and attention by the detaining authority, etc. In our considered view, grant of interest from the date of suit to the date of decree and from the date of decree upto the date of payment cannot be said to be inconsistent with the reliefs specifically claimed in the plaint. Under the circumstances, we hold that the Respondents are entitled to simple interest on the compensation amount at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of suit to the date of decree and further interest of 6 percent per annum from the date of decree upto the date of payment there of. 20. Under the circumstances, we hold that the Respondents are entitled to simple interest on the compensation amount at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of suit to the date of decree and further interest of 6 percent per annum from the date of decree upto the date of payment there of. 20. In so far as the decree concerning the direction upon the Appellants to draw up departmental proceedings against the Forest personnel, particularly, the Defendant No. 3 is concerned, in the view that we have taken that the Appellants had reasonable and probable cause for seizing and detaining the vehicle till its release by the order of this Court. No such direction is called for and the same is hereby set aside. That apart, no relief or pleadings to that effect were made by the Respondents in the plaint. 21. The offshoot of the discussions in the foregoing is that this appeal is partly allowed. The impugned decree is modified to the extent that the Appellants shall (i) pay a sum of Rs.1,45,383.39 paise to the Respondents for repairing the engine and rebuilding the body of the truck, (ii) pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- as the cost of litigation, (iii) pay a sum of Rs.500/- as the towing charge of the seized truck from Champaknagar Police Station to Indranagar, Agartala, (iv) pay simple interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum on the aforesaid amounts from the date of suit till the date of this decree, (v) pay another simple interest of 6 per cent per annum from the date of decree till the date of realisation of the aforesaid amounts and (vi) cost of the suit, to the Respondents. Prepare the decree accordingly.