JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J. 1. By the judgment and order, dated 12.3.2003, passed in Sessions Case No. 6 (S-C) 2002, the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Sivsagar, has convicted the accused-Appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one year. 2. The case against the accused-Appellant, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be stated as follows: On 13.01.1997, at about 7/8 P.M., at Laichang Gaon, the villager had assembled, on the occasion of Bihu, at a place, where they had organized a feast. The crowd, which had so assembled there, included men, women and children of the said village. When some of the villagers were warming themselves, sitting by the side of fire, which had been lit by the villagers, the accused-Appellant appeared there. Diganta Phukan (since deceased) was also present there. When Diganta Phukan stood up and proceeded to the main camp (Bhela Ghar), the accused-Appellant followed him, took out a weapon, which looked like Khukri or dao and gave blows with the same on Diganta Phukan. The accused-Appellant, at the same time, shouted that he would kill all others. Hearing the shouts of the accused-Appellant, those, who had assembled there, fled away. None of those, who had witnessed the occurrence, however, informed the other co-villagers and/or the members of the family of the said deceased. On the following day, i.e., on 14.01.1997, P.W. 7 (headman of the said village), on coming to know that a dead body was lying near a drain in the village, went there, saw the said dead body and orally reported the matter to Sepon Out-post. The In-Charge of the said out post made, on the basis of the oral information so given by the said headman (P.W. 7), an entry in the General Diary, came to the place, where the said dead body had been found and held inquest over the same. After the police had already found, the said dead body, P.W. 1 (Debananda Phukan), brother of the said deceased, lodged a written Ejahar with the police and treating the same as First Information Report, Moran police Station Case No. 06/97 under Section 302 IPC, was registered against unknown assailant. After the police had already found, the said dead body, P.W. 1 (Debananda Phukan), brother of the said deceased, lodged a written Ejahar with the police and treating the same as First Information Report, Moran police Station Case No. 06/97 under Section 302 IPC, was registered against unknown assailant. On completion of investigation, police laid charge-sheet against two accused persons, namely, Anil Phukan and Diganta Phukan, under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 3. During trial, to the charge framed under Section 302, read with Section 34 IPC, both the accused aforementioned pleaded not guilty. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 10 witnesses. The two accused were, then, examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure and in their examinations aforementioned, both the accused denied that they had committed the offence alleged to have been committed by them, the case of the defence being that of total denial. No evidence was, however, adduced by the defence. On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court, while acquitting the accused Diganta Phukan, found the present accused-Appellant guilty of the charge under Section 302 IPC and convicted him accordingly and passed sentence against him as mentioned hereinabove. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence passed against him, the accused-Appellant has preferred this appeal. 4. We have heard Ms. R. Borborah, learned Counsel, as Amicus Curiae, for the accused-Appellant and Mr. D.K. Das, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 5. Let us, first consider the evidence of the doctor (P.W. 5), who held post mortem examination on the said dead body. According P.W.5, he found as follows: External appearance, Dead Body of an adult male, in fresh condition rigor mortis present, eyes closed, mouth, half opened. External injury No. 1. incised wound, sharp margins extending for occipital region up to left temporal region, size 4" x 1/4" x bone completely cut. Injury No. 2 Incised wound with sharp margins, extending from left pre-auricular region upto left angle of mouth, size 5" x l/4'lx bone deep. Injury No. 3. Multiple incised wounds of various sizes over part of left cheek. Scalp: As described in external injury No. 1. Skull: Occipital bone upper part and left temporal bone squamous part were completely cut. Vertebrae healthy. Membrane and brain: Congested and lacerated under the fracture bones of the cranial bones. Injury No. 3. Multiple incised wounds of various sizes over part of left cheek. Scalp: As described in external injury No. 1. Skull: Occipital bone upper part and left temporal bone squamous part were completely cut. Vertebrae healthy. Membrane and brain: Congested and lacerated under the fracture bones of the cranial bones. Brain: Underneath the fractured cranial bone is highly congested and there was accumulation of blood over the brain surface which compressed the brain. Abdomen: Contains semi digested food but no smell of alcohol. Fracture No. 1. Fracture of occipital bone; Fracture No. 2. Fracture of temporal bone. More detail description of injury: On direction incised wound with sharp margins, extending from occipital region upto left temporal region, size 4" x 1/4" x bone cut. Brain and membrane highly congested blood compressed brain surfaces there were multiple incised wounds ever left cheek, Mire were clotted blood in and around the tissues. 6. In the opinion of the doctor, the injuries were ante mortem and homicidal in nature and the death was caused as a result of the injuries sustained by the said deceased, Ext. 3 being the post mortem report in this regard. In his cross-examination, P.W. 5 has clarified that the injury No. 1 aforementioned in itself was sufficient to cause death of a person. 7. The fact that the said deceased sustained the injuries as described by P.W. 5 and/or the correctness of the opinion of P.W. 5 with regard to the cause of death of the said deceased, there is no dispute. This apart, we have no reason to doubt the veracity of the evidence given by P.W. 5 nor do we have any reason for not agreeing with the opinion expressed by him with regard to the cause of death of the said deceased. 8. In the above view of the matter, we hold that the said deceased met with homicidal death. The moot question, however, which falls for determination, is this: Was the accused-Appellant the person, who had caused the death of the said deceased and committed thereby the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC? 9. There are altogether three persons, namely, P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4, who have been examined by the prosecution as eye witnesses to the alleged occurrence. 9. There are altogether three persons, namely, P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4, who have been examined by the prosecution as eye witnesses to the alleged occurrence. Before we endeavour to determine the veracity of the evidence given by these three persons, what is of paramount importance to note is that none of these three persons reported the alleged occurrence to either the village headman (P.W. 7) or any of the members of the family of the said deceased. No wonder, therefore, that the initial oral information, lodged by the headman at Sepon Out-Post, did not reveal as to how the said deceased had met with death or as to who the assailant was. It is also curious to note that though a written Ejahar was lodged by P.W. 1 (that is, the brother of the said deceased), in the afternoon of the following day of the occurrence, this Ejahar too did not disclose the name of any assailant; rather, what the Ejahar revealed was that the said deceased had left home at about 5 P.M. on 13.01.1997 (i.e., on the day of occurrence) and as he had not returned home, a search was made for him in the morning on the following day and, then, his dead body was found lying in a drain. The contents of the Ejahar reveal that despite a search made and conducted by the members of the family of the said deceased, none informed them that the deceased had been assaulted by the accused-Appellant on the night of 13.01.1997. 10. As a matter of fact, the evidence of P.W. 1 is that the said deceased left home with P.W. 2 in the afternoon of13.01.1997 and did not return home. As far as the evidence of P.W. 2 is concerned, he has clarified, in his cross-examination, that it was after three days of the occurrence that the police had visited him and interrogated him and until then, he had not informed and talked to the Gaonbura in this connection nor did he give any information, in this regard, to the family members of the said deceased. It is highly unnatural, on the part of P.W. 2 not to have reported the occurrence, if not on the night of the occurrence, at least, on the following day, to the members of the family of the said deceased, for, the said deceased had left his home on the night of occurrence along with P.W. 2 and a normal person would, at least, inform the members of the family of the said deceased as to how the said deceased had met with his death. This unnatural behaviour of P.W. 2 and also of the remaining two alleged eye witnesses, namely, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4, has been completely ignored by the learned trial Court inasmuch as the learned trial Court has observed, in the impugned judgment, that P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 are all independent witnesses and hence the rule of careful scrutiny does not apply to them. The view, so expressed, by the learned trial Court exhibits complete non-application of mind by the learned trial Court to. the facts of the present case inasmuch as the evidence on record clearly reveals that P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 has not, contrary to what they ought to have in normal circumstances done, reported the occurrence to any one including the members of the family of the said deceased. The evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 ought to have, therefore, been scrutinized carefully. Ordinarily if a witness is not inimical to the accused and is an independent one, inconsistency or incoherence in the description of the occurrence given by such a witness may, in a given set of facts and circumstances, be ignored; but when a witness is one, whose evidence suffers from unnatural behaviour and conduct, the Court is required to put such evidence under careful scrutiny in order to determine if the witness is at all trustworthy, for, an accused in a criminal trial, such as, the one at hand, is presumed to be innocent until the proof of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt is established against him. 11. 11. Bearing in mind the above aspects of the present appeal, when we turn to the evidence of P.W. 2, we notice that in his evidence, P.W. 2 has asserted that the blow with the Khukri or the dao was given by the accused on the right side of the face of the said deceased. When a person is under assault of a weapon, such as Khukri or dao, it is possible that a person, who is witnessing such an occurrence, may, in his excitement, not notice the part of the body, where the blows have fallen; but in the case of present nature, wherein P.W. 2 is a person, who did not disclose the occurrence to any one despite the fact that he (P.W. 2) was the one with whom the said deceased had left his home, when we take the said part of the evidence of P.W. 2 into the account and compare the same with the medical evidence on record, we find that there were two incised wounds on the facial portions of the said deceased and while one of the wounds was on the left side of the cheek, the other one was on the occipital region extending upto the left temporal region. 12. The medical evidence on record, thus, belies the ocular evidence elicited from P.W. 2. This apart, the evidence of P.W. 2 is that the accused-Appellant was alone, when he had assaulted the said deceased. However, when the occurrence was fresher in his mind, P.W. 2 had stated before police that accused Anil Phukan had been accompanied by four more boys. This is yet another aspect of the evidence of P.W. 2, which shows the inconsistent nature of this witness's evidence and makes his evidence, in the face of the facts and attending circumstances of the present, unsafe to place reliance upon. 13. Now, when we turn to the evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 4, we notice that though these witnesses claim to have been present at the place of occurrence, they also claim to have seen the occurrence and their descriptions of the occurrence are, broadly speaking, same as the one, which P.W. 2 has given, what is worth noticing is that the evidence of P.W. 3 is that the said deceased was quite normal on the night of the occurrence. Contradicting, however, this assertion of P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 has deposed that the said deceased had not only drunk alcohol that day too, but that he was so drunk that he was even unable to control himself. 14. Coupled with the above, the weakness, with which suffers the evidence of P.W. 2, is also the weakness with which suffers the evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 inasmuch as none of these two witnesses, as already indicated hereinabove, disclosed to anyone, until the time interrogated by police, about the alleged occurrence. They have offered no explanation for non-disclosure of the alleged occurrence to any one nor has any explanation, in this regard, been elicited by the prosecution from these witnesses. Moreover, no plausible and convicting explanation for the non-disclosure of the name of assailant to any one is discernible from the materials on record. Situated thus, we have no option, but to hold that none of the three witnesses, namely, P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 could have been held to be witnesses on whom implicit reliance could have been placed. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to have a witness, whose evidence can be implicitly relied upon. Reference, in this regard, made by Ms. Borborah to the case of Hallu and other v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1936 , is not misplaced, for, the Apex Court observed, in paragraph 12 as follows: There is only one more observation which we would like to make about the judgment of the High Court. The High Court has observed in its judgment at more than one place that Musammat Dev Kunwar and Musammat Mahtrin were implicitly reliable. It is generally not easy to find witnesses on whose testimony implicit reliance can be placed. It is always advisable to test the evidence of witnesses on the anvil of objective circumstances in the case. Not only did the High Court not do that but by persuading itself to the view that the two eye-witnesses were implicitly reliable it denied to itself the benefit of a judicial consideration of the infirmities to which we have briefly referred. 15. At any rate, a close scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 shows that none of these witnesses, namely, P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 can be said to be a wholly reliable witness. 15. At any rate, a close scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 shows that none of these witnesses, namely, P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 can be said to be a wholly reliable witness. However, even if their evidence is not rejected out-right as wholly unreliable, yet these witnesses will fall, at best, in the category of those witnesses, who are neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The evidence of a witness, who falls in such a category, can be relied upon only if the evidence, given by such a witness, is supported or corroboration by independent credible evidence, direct or indirect. 16. It is elementary that the evidence of an infirm witness does not become reliable merely because it has been corroborated by a number of witnesses of the same brand; for, evidence is to be weighed not counted. Since the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6 suffered from the same infirmities as that of Smt. Jugatia, it cannot be said that the trial Judge had no basis, whatsoever, for stigmatizing it as unreliable. 17. In view of the fact that evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 is individually unreliable, their evidence cannot become reliable only on the ground that they have given stereotyped and similar descriptions of the alleged occurrence. In other words, they cannot be treated to have credibly corroborated each other; for, it is not, as held in Muluwa (supra), the number of witnesses, but the quality of the evidence given by a witness, which is the pre-requisite of law for placing reliance on the testimony of the witness. 18. What emerges from the above discussion is that the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W.3 and P.W. 4 cannot be safely relied upon or at any rate, their evidence cannot be treated to be sufficiently credible to hold that it was the accused-Appellant, who had assaulted the said deceased and/or caused his death. If the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 is considered unsafe and unreliable, as we do, the prosecution's retains no other evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused-Appellant. 19. We may also pause here to point out that though the Ejahar (Ext. If the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 is considered unsafe and unreliable, as we do, the prosecution's retains no other evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused-Appellant. 19. We may also pause here to point out that though the Ejahar (Ext. 1) has been treated as the First Information Report in this case, this Ejahar was, admittedly, lodged with the police after the police, acting upon the oral information lodged by P.W. 7, had arrived at the place, where the said dead body was found. The contents of Ext. 1 are, therefore, nothing but statement of P.W. 1, reduced into writing by the police during the course of investigation and can be used for the purpose of contradiction and not for corroboration. 20. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we hold that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was not sufficiently convincing, cogent and reliable to substantiate the charge framed against the accused-Appellant and the accused-Appellant ought to have been accorded, at least, benefit of doubt. 21. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal succeeds, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence are hereby set aside. The accused-Appellant is held not guilty of the charge framed against him under Section 302 IPC and is acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt. 22. Let the accused-Appellant be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in connection with any other case. Appeal allowed.