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Gauhati High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 673 (GAU)

A. Sarmah v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.

2005-09-13

AMITAVA ROY

body2005
JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The challenge is to the communication dated 2.4.2002/3.4.2002 issued by the Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation') cancelling the contract No. EB/RBG/MM/NZR/SHD/SJS/MEG/OT/014 for Shot hole drilling (Mechanised) and Seismic Job Services for one field party for Type-III in Meghalaya and similar areas in N.E. awarded to the Petitioner. 2. I have heard Mr. M. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. P.K. Roy, learned standing counsel for the Corporation. 3. The pleaded cases of the parties present the rival versions. The Petitioner has introduced itself as a partnership firm and an existing contractor of the Corporation. In the year 2001, the Corporation issued a tender for the above contract pursuant to which, the Petitioner submitted its offer. On the evaluation thereof, the Corporation by communication dated 20.11.2001 awarded the contract to it. The area of operation assigned was Type III areas of Meghalaya and similar type of areas elsewhere in the North Eastern States. The duration of the contract was for two field sessions i.e. 2001-2002 and 2002-2003. Thereafter, an agreement was entered into between the parties on 12.12.2001 embodying various terms and conditions governing the contract. The value of the contract was estimated to be Rs. 2.93 crores per session. The Petitioner deposited the earnest money to the tune of Rs. 40 lakhs and furnished security deposit of Rs. 21.83 lacs in the form of bank guarantee. In terms of the contract, the Petitioner was to mobilize its resources to meet the job requirements, camp establishment and camp mobilization activities within a period of 90 days i.e. by 17.2.2002. The resources included equipment, men, materials etc. Amongst others, the agreement required deployment of 20 Top Drive Hydraulic man portable mechanized rotary drilling rig (Model No. SS 175 Jarco) manufactured by Seismic Singapore Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'rig'). As stipulated under the contract, the Petitioner was to provide an average of 20-25 shots on each field/working day in a calendar month. According to the Petitioner, the rig specified was not manufactured in India and was to be imported from Singapore for which a heavy custom duty was payable. Considering the number of rigs to be deployed, an amount of Rs. 75 lakhs was leviable as custom duty for importing the same. According to the Petitioner, the rig specified was not manufactured in India and was to be imported from Singapore for which a heavy custom duty was payable. Considering the number of rigs to be deployed, an amount of Rs. 75 lakhs was leviable as custom duty for importing the same. Situated thus, the Petitioner approached the Respondent Corporation and the latter assured it to provide the Essentiality certificate to procure the rigs with custom duty exemption. The Corporation thereafter issued one certificate on 1.1.2002 to the effect that the rigs were necessary for execution of the contract by the Petitioner. The Petitioner thereafter, approached the Director General of Hydrocarbon, Respondent No. 3, the issuing authority of the Essentiality Certificate on 4.1.2002. The certificate issued by the Corporation was also annexed and the Petitioner requested the authority concerned to issue the Essentiality certificate. In the meantime, the Petitioner having procured 10 rigs and organized other infrastructural essentials, awaited instructions of the Corporation authorities to start the work. However, it was not allowed to do so and was instead asked to deploy 20 rigs in compliance of Clause 4.8 of the agreement to the said effect. As the delay was causing serious loss to the Petitioner, it having mobilized its resources men and material at the camp site, it submitted a representation on 28.2.2002 before the General Manager (M.M.), E.R.B.C. requesting the latter to permit it to start the work with the available 10 rigs. At that stage, Basin Manager (A & A.A.), Basin, Jorhat, Respondent No. 7 forwarded a formal proposal on 5.3.2002 to the Director General of Hydrocarbon for issuing the Essentiality certificate in favour of the Petitioner for importing 20 rigs from Singapore. The formal of proposal contained all necessary informations relating to the issue. Though the expected dates of shipment and the arrival of the rigs were 15.3.2002 and 16.3.2002 respectively, the rigs could not be brought as scheduled in absence of the Essentially certificate. In response to a query made by the Respondent No. 3 in the matter, the Corporation sought for a clarification from the Petitioner as to whether the rates offered by it were based on custom duty. 4. In response to a query made by the Respondent No. 3 in the matter, the Corporation sought for a clarification from the Petitioner as to whether the rates offered by it were based on custom duty. 4. It was at that stage that by the impugned communication the contract was cancelled on the ground of non-compliance of Clause 3 of the agreement, the Petitioner having failed to deploy 20 rigs within the prescribed period of 90 days. Thereby the security deposit of Rs. 21.83 lacs was also forfeited and the Petitioner was further called upon to deposit Rs. 10,000/- per day for not providing service with effect from 18.2.2002 till the date of cancellation. The Petitioner on 10.4.2002 submitted a representation on which it was assured that it's case was being considered by the higher authorities. The Petitioner also on 7.4.2002 addressed a communication to the Corporation expressing its desire to refer the dispute to arbitration as comprehended under the agreement. Apart from contending that the cancellation of its contract was unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary in the attending facts and circumstances more particularly in absence of any prior notice therefor, the Petitioner alleged discrimination as well. According to it, though the case of a similarly situated contractor M/s Tonmoy Gohain had been favoured to obtain the Essentiality certificate, the Corporation Had dragged a cold feet so far it was concerned. 5. In its counter, the Corporation has questioned the maintainability of the writ petition inter alia on the ground that the dispute raised is in the realm of a contract governed by the express terms and conditions and therefore not resoluble under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It pleaded that the Petitioner having approached the Corporation to refer the dispute to arbitration, the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court ought not to be exercised in the face of an alternative remedy available and further as the same would involve an enquiry into the disputed questions of fact, the writ jurisdiction ought not to be invoked. 6. On merits, the Corporation has contended that at the time of entering into the contract, the Petitioner was aware of the requirement of mobilization of 20 rigs within the time specified therein and also the consequences of the breach thereof. It denied that the Petitioner had mobilized its resources as per Clause 4.8 of the agreement. 6. On merits, the Corporation has contended that at the time of entering into the contract, the Petitioner was aware of the requirement of mobilization of 20 rigs within the time specified therein and also the consequences of the breach thereof. It denied that the Petitioner had mobilized its resources as per Clause 4.8 of the agreement. It was also denied that the Corporation had assured the Petitioner to provide the Essentially certificate. The certificate issued on 1.1.2002 by the Corporation was only to confirm that the contract had been awarded to the Petitioner. According to it, the Petitioner having represented that it had deployed 10 rigs pending receipt of the Essentiality certificate, those were examined and on scrutiny it transpired that the "base plates and masts" of the rigs bore the same serial number as of those produced by another contractor who had been awarded the contract for a different location. As a matter of fact, the said rigs belonged to the said contractor and not to the Petitioner. The Corporation asserted that the Petitioner thereafter removed the rigs without informing the concerned authority. It was denied that TO rigs were sufficient to provide an average of 20-25 shots per day and maintained that the requirement of 20 rigs was incorporated in Clause 4.8 keeping in view the time frame fixed for completion of the work. It averred that as per Clause 3.3 of the agreement, the Petitioner was required to mobilize the resources including 20 rigs within a period 90 days i.e. by 17.2.2002, but the Petitioner failed to do so. Before the impugned decision to cancel the contract was taken, the Corporation by various letters from time to time intimated the Petitioner of the requirement to mobilize 20 rigs but it failed to do so within the time prescribed. Moreover, by letters dated 1.3.2002 and 11.3.2002, the Petitioner was further informed that in case, it failed to comply with the said contract requirement, the Corporation might invoke the relevant clauses for cancellation thereof. Copies of the said letters/communications have been annexed to the counter. 7. According to the Corporation, for the delay, it had suffered huge financial loss to the tune of Rs. 4.92 crorers besides wasting time in exploring oil. As the project was a time bound one, as per Annual Exploration work Programme, the same had to be eventually abandoned. Copies of the said letters/communications have been annexed to the counter. 7. According to the Corporation, for the delay, it had suffered huge financial loss to the tune of Rs. 4.92 crorers besides wasting time in exploring oil. As the project was a time bound one, as per Annual Exploration work Programme, the same had to be eventually abandoned. The Corporation has also referred to a communication dated 21.4.2003 issued by M/s Wave and Marine International with whom the Petitioner represented to have placed orders for supplying the rigs to the effect that it (Petitioner) had failed to make even the initial advance payment therefor. The company confirmed that accordingly no rig was sold to the Petitioner. The representation that the Petitioner had arranged 10 rigs was therefore, false and misleading, according to the Corporation. The answering Respondents confirmed that the Petitioner by letter dated 7.4.2002 expressed its desire to refer the dispute to arbitration as per Clause 19 of the contract agreement, but subsequently requested the Corporation to wait having approached the higher authority for redress. With regard to the allegation of discrimination, the Corporation asserted that the contract awarded to M/s. Tonmoy Gohain was different from that of the Petitioner. Though, all possible help by the Corporation was extended to both the contractors to obtain the Essentiality certificate, it was due to the sole enterprise of M/s. Tonmoy Gohain that it could obtain the Essentiality certificate in time. The Corporation is categorical in its stand that the Petitioner's contract was cancelled as it failed to mobilize the required number of rigs as per the contract agreement. 8. Mr. Bhuyan has argued that a' reading of Clause 2.15.1 and 2.15.2 of the agreement pertaining to camp mobilization and camp establishment no requirement of mobilization of rigs within 90 days of the issuance of the letter of intent (for short 'LOI') or work order is discernible and therefore, the cancellation of the contract on the said ground is per se, illegal and arbitrary. Referring to Clause 2.6 of the agreement, the learned Counsel has urged that the period of 90 days to start the work having been prescribed in addition to an identical period for mobilizing the resources, the decision to cancel the contract before the expiry of 180 days (90+90) was in contravention of Clause 2.6 and is therefore unsustainable in law. Referring to Clause 2.6 of the agreement, the learned Counsel has urged that the period of 90 days to start the work having been prescribed in addition to an identical period for mobilizing the resources, the decision to cancel the contract before the expiry of 180 days (90+90) was in contravention of Clause 2.6 and is therefore unsustainable in law. There being no fixed period for mobilization of men and material under Clause 2.15.1 and 2.15.2 of the agreement, violation of Clause 4.8 relating to deployment of 20 rigs cannot be a ground to cancel the contract, he urged. As the Corporation was fully aware of the steps taken by the Petitioner to obtain the Essentiality certificate, immediately after issuance of the recommendatory certificate by the Corporation, the cancellation of the contract by its authorities though informed of the mobilization of other infrastructural requirements is grossly unfair, unreasonable and unjust. Mr. Bhuyan was particularly critical about the contravention of Clause 6.4 in contending that no notice as contemplated therein having been issued, the order of cancellation is patently illegal and dehors the contract agreement. The Petitioner, having in the meantime made huge investments to the knowledge of the Corporation authorities, the decision to forfeit the security money and to impose the penalty of Rs. 10,000/- per diem has been in arbitrary exercise of powers. The learned Counsel reiterated the assertion of discrimination qua M/s Tonmoy Gohain contending that the Corporation had adopted a step motherly attitude towards the Petitioner and on that count as well, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. In any view of the matter, according to Mr. Bhuyan, the impugned decision suffers from the vice of unfairness in administrative action warranting interference of this court. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Canara Bank and Ors., Appellants v. Debasis Das and Ors., Respondents (2003) 4 SCC 557 . 9. Per contra, Mr. Roy has pleaded that as the controversy raised is in the domain of a contract, the writ petition is not maintainable and is therefore liable to be dismissed in limine. No fundamental right or statutory right of the Petitioner having been contravened, this Court would not exercise its power of judicial review in the instant case. 9. Per contra, Mr. Roy has pleaded that as the controversy raised is in the domain of a contract, the writ petition is not maintainable and is therefore liable to be dismissed in limine. No fundamental right or statutory right of the Petitioner having been contravened, this Court would not exercise its power of judicial review in the instant case. He urged that the Petitioner having invoked Clause 19 of the agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration, exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not warranted in the face of alternative equally efficacious remedy available. The learned Counsel following a profuse reference to the pleaded statements in the Corporation's counter relating to the steps taken by it before cancelling the contract, contended that the plea of unfairness in the attending facts and circumstances is wholly untenable. The Petitioner having entered into the contract being aware of its obligations dischargeable within time limit fixed thereby, it cannot complain against any action contemplated on the transgression of the stipulations, more particularly, when it had been notified about the same much in advance from time to time. The cancellation having been effected strictly in terms of the contract agreement, the impugned action cannot be faulted with and therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Roy, has relied on the following decisions. (i) (1994) 4 SCC 104 , Assistant Excise Commissioner and Ors., Appellants v. Issac Peter and Ors., Respondents; (ii) (2003) 7 SCC 410 , National Highways Authority of India, Appellant v. Ganga Enterprises and Anr., Respondents. 10. In reply, Mr. Bhuyan contended that the plea of alternative remedy is not available to the Corporation inasmuch as the Petitioner withdrew its request for arbitration on being prevailed upon by it (Corporation) representing that, it would reconsider the impugned decision. Moreover, as the Corporation did not appoint its arbitrator as required under Clause 19 of the contract agreement and thus did not discharge its obligation thereunder, it was estopped from contending that the petition was not entertainable on account of an alternative remedy. Moreover, as the Corporation did not appoint its arbitrator as required under Clause 19 of the contract agreement and thus did not discharge its obligation thereunder, it was estopped from contending that the petition was not entertainable on account of an alternative remedy. The Corporation having not conveyed in any of its previous letters/communications of its decision to cancel the contract in exercise of powers under Clause 6 and no prior opportunity of hearing having been provided to the Petitioner, the impugned order of cancellation is in violation of the aforesaid clause and is liable to be adjudged null and void. No disputed fact being involved in the instant proceeding, Mr. Bhuyan contended that the plea of non-maintainability on that ground is without any substance. As it is in an appropriate case, the writ jurisdiction can be permissibly exercised also to examine disputed facts he urged. Mr. Bhuyan also cited the decision of the Apex Court in ABL International Ltd. and Anr., Appellants v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors., Respondents (2004) 3 SCC 553 . 11. I have extended my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the parties, before dealing therewith on merits, the relevant clauses of the contract agreement need be noticed. 12. Clauses 2.15.1 and 2.15.2 relating to Camp mobilization and Camp establishment appear under the Caption "General Description of the Jobs" at 2.15. Under Clause 2.15.1, a contractor was required to undertake his resources and camp mobilization activities within 90 days from the date of issuance of LOI or the work order whichever is later. Under Clause 2.15.2, the mobilization establishment jobs as enumerated therein were needed to be completed also within the above period. Clause 2.6 provided that the contractor should mobilize resources to meet the job requirement within 90 days of the issuance of the job order and start the work within a period not exceeding 90 days as per Clause 3.3. Clause 3 prescribes the period of contract. The mobilization time allowed under Clause 3.3 was 90 days from the date of issue of job order. It is clarified thereunder that mobilization of all resources including all equipments, men, material should be completed by 17.2.2002 (date of work order being 20.11.2001). It further postulated that in view of the exigencies of work, the contractor should make all efforts to mobilize its resources before 31.12.2001. It is clarified thereunder that mobilization of all resources including all equipments, men, material should be completed by 17.2.2002 (date of work order being 20.11.2001). It further postulated that in view of the exigencies of work, the contractor should make all efforts to mobilize its resources before 31.12.2001. The requirement of deploying minimum 20 number of rigs is contained in Clause 4.8. The consequences of failure to mobilize men, material/equipment at the camp site within the time permitted are set out in Clause 6 of the contract agreement. It underlined that time was the essence of the contract and reiterated that the mobilization of the contractor's men, material/equipment etc. should be complete within 90 days of the date of issuance of the LOI/job intent. One of the consequences was cancellation of the contract by serving 15 days advance notice to the contractor under Clause 6.4. Penalty of Rs. 10,000/- per day was impossible under Clause 7. Provision for arbitration is contained in Clause 19. 13. A plain reading of the aforementioned clauses makes it explicit that the contractor was obligatorily required to deploy 20 rigs for execution of the work. It is obvious that time was insisted upon to be the essence of the contract. The contractor was compulsorily required to mobilize his men, material/equipment at the camp site and to establish its camp within 90 days from the date of issuance of the LOI or the work order whichever is later. The deadline in the instant case was fixed on 17.12.2002 though in the exigencies of the work the contractor was required to make all efforts to mobilize its resources before 31.12.2001. In other words, the contractor without fail was to mobilize its resources and start the work within a maximum period of 90 days from the date of issue of LOI or the job order whichever was later and in the instant case by any means not beyond 17.2.2002. The contention that a period of 180 days was available to the Petitioner in terms of Clause 2.6 to start the work and therefore the cancellation of work for its failure to mobilize 20 rigs within the maximum period of 90 days from the date of issuance of the LOI or job order was illegal and untenable in the teeth of Clause 3.3 of the contract agreement. Clause 2.6 read conjointly with Clause 3.3 makes the above essentiality manifest. Clause 2.6 read conjointly with Clause 3.3 makes the above essentiality manifest. The clear and categorical stand of the Corporation being that the action contemplated under Clause 6.4 had been taken for the Petitioner's persistent failure to mobilize 20 rigs within the time prescribed, reference of the period available to start the work as mentioned in Clause 2.6 in isolation is of no relevance. 14. It being the Petitioner's plea that the requisition for referring the dispute to arbitration was withdrawn by it on the expectation that the Corporation would reconsider its decision, I am not inclined to reject the petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The petition having been admitted for hearing in the year 2003 and as no arbitration proceeding in law is pending as on date, the contention bearing on the maintainability of the proceeding on the above assertion does not appeal to this Court. 15. The decision of the Apex Court in State of U.P. and Ors., Appellants v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd., Respondents (supra) relied upon by Mr. Roy to buttress the plea of non-maintainability of the petition on this court therefore does not call for a detailed discussion. 16. The pleadings of the parties and the competing arguments, in my view, do not present disputed facts. In other words, to adjudicate the issues involved, no enquiry into the factual details is warranted. Admittedly, the Petitioner has not been able to mobilize 20 rigs within the stipulated period of 90 days as agreed upon. Whereas, the Petitioner's plea is that all possible endeavours had been made on its behalf to procure the rigs in time and that the indifference of the Corporation had delayed the matter, the Respondents' assertion to the contrary, that the Petitioner delayed to mobilize the rigs inspite of sufficient time being granted even beyond the time prescribed. The two pleas when placed in juxtaposition do not yield disputed questions of facts to be enquired into for the resolution of the controversy. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Apex Court in ABL International Limited and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. (supra) is of no consequence in the present factual scenario. This takes us to the key issue. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Apex Court in ABL International Limited and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. (supra) is of no consequence in the present factual scenario. This takes us to the key issue. Is the cancellation of the Petitioner's contract dehors the covenants in the agreement and therefore illegal and unfair in the prevailing facts and circumstances. The contract was awarded to the Petitioner on 20.11.2001 and the communication to the said effect inter alia mentioned that it was to mobilize its resources for execution of its work within 90 days from the date of issue of the work order. The agreement between the parties dated 12.12.2001 laid down the terms and conditions of the contract as noticed hereinabove, requiring the Petitioner to mobilize all resources including the equipment, men, material etc. latest by 17.2.2002. The Petitioner was required to deploy 20 rigs for the execution of the work. Logically, it was aware of the consequences of any default as well. The agreement between the parties admittedly is not under any statute. Be that as it may, the terms and conditions thereof are binding on them. The Petitioner therefore, volunteered to execute the same and undertook the obligations thereunder being fully aware of the implication thereof. According to the Petitioner, the rates quoted by it did not include custom duty and it was not feasible for it either to procure the rigs by paying an amount of Rs. 75 lakhs on that count. It therefore approached the Corporation for a recommendatory certificate to facilitate issuance of the Essentiality certificate by the Director General of Hydrocarbon. The Corporation being approached by the Petitioner it issued the certificate confirming that the contract in question had been awarded to it and that to execute the work, 20 rigs were necessary to be imported. This was on 1.1.2002. It is not clear from the petition as to when did the Petitioner approach the Corporation to issue the said certificate. This assumes importance in view of the date of awarding of contract i.e. 20.11.2001 and of the agreement i.e. 12.12.2001 and most importantly the period stipulated to mobilize the rigs i.e. 90 days. The Petitioner being interested in custom duty exemption, having regard to the above time frame was expected to be vigilant and expeditious to complete the process in time. The Petitioner being interested in custom duty exemption, having regard to the above time frame was expected to be vigilant and expeditious to complete the process in time. The documents annexed to the writ petition disclose that the Petitioner being armed with the recommendatory certificate applied to the Director General of Hydrocarbon on 4.1.2002 and it was on 5.3.2002 that a formal proposal was submitted by the Corporation furnishing fuller particulars to the Director General of Hydrocarbon for issuing the Essentiality certificate. The deadline of 17.2.2002 in the meantime, had expired and obviously, breach of Clause 3.3 and 4.8 had occurred. The petition does not disclose as to what follow up steps the Petitioner had taken in this regard between 1.1.2002 and 5.3.2002 more particularly, when for its own interest to avail exemption of custom duty, it was necessary to do so to be time under the contract. Admittedly, the rigs could not be procured. As a matter of fact, from the letter dated 21.4.2003 issued by M/s Wave Marine International, Annexure-G to the Corporation's counter, it is evident that the Petitioner could not even make the initial advance payment and that the rigs had not been sold to it. On the other hand, the letters dated 1.3.2002 and 11.3.2002 issued by the Corporation to the Petitioner disclose that it had been intimated thereby that the mobilization period as per the contract had expired on 17.2.2002, but it had failed to mobilize 20 rigs in terms of Clause 4.8 of the contract agreement. It was highlighted therein that the Petitioner was to arrange for the rigs for exploration immediately failing which the Corporation may be constrained to invoke Clause 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.6 and 7 of the contract. It was thereafter, as the Petitioner failed to mobilize the rigs, the impugned order of cancellation of the contract was issued on 2.4.2002/3.4.2002. The said communication inter alia refer to the aforementioned letters dated 1.3.2002 and 11.3.2002. The ground mentioned therein for cancellation of the contract is the failure of the Petitioner to mobilize the required 20 rigs. 17. In the attending facts and circumstances, the action of the Corporation, in my view cannot be branded as unauthorized, unfair, unreasonable or unjust. The facts of the case do not demonstrate any culpable negligence or indifference of the Corporation or its authorities resulting in avoidable delay in the procurement of the rigs. 17. In the attending facts and circumstances, the action of the Corporation, in my view cannot be branded as unauthorized, unfair, unreasonable or unjust. The facts of the case do not demonstrate any culpable negligence or indifference of the Corporation or its authorities resulting in avoidable delay in the procurement of the rigs. No stipulation in the contract agreement casting any responsibility on the Corporation to obtain the Essentiality certificate for the Petitioner to avail the custom duty exemption is noticeable. The benefit clearly was to be enjoyed by the Petitioner and therefore it was its exclusive responsibility to act in time and/or take necessary steps in that regard. It executed the agreement being aware of the stipulations contained therein and consequences of the breach thereof. Only because, the Corporation refrained to take the decision immediately on the expiry of the period stipulated, the Petitioner's default did not get affected. In other words, the delay on the part of the corporation in cancelling the contract cannot in any way detract from the infringement of Clauses 3.3 and 4.8 of the contract agreement and absolve the Petitioner of its liability therefor. 18. The contention of absence of notice or opportunity before the impugned decision also not convincing. By letters dated 1.3.2002 and 11.3.2002, the Petitioner was informed in categorical terms that it had failed to mobilize the rigs within the time permitted under the agreement. It was informed that in case of its failure to mobilize the rigs immediately for necessary exploration by the Corporation, action under Clause 6 and 7 could be taken as contemplated. Under Clause 6, it was open for the Corporation to cancel the contract by serving 15 days advance notice to the contractor. The underlying objective of the said requirement in my view, was to put the contractor on guard before cancelling the contract. The letters dated 1.3.2002 and 11.3.2002 sufficiently acquainted the Petitioner in advance about its default and cautioned it of the contemplated action under Clause 6 and 7, if it failed to mobilize the rigs immediately. The decision to cancel was taken 15 days after 11.3.2002. It is not the stand of the Petitioner that after receipt of the two letters, it had represented before the Corporation offering its explanation for the delay/default requesting for further time to defer any adverse action as contemplated. The decision to cancel was taken 15 days after 11.3.2002. It is not the stand of the Petitioner that after receipt of the two letters, it had represented before the Corporation offering its explanation for the delay/default requesting for further time to defer any adverse action as contemplated. As it is, Clause 6.4 which comprehends a notice before the cancellation of the contract does not envisage any opportunity of hearing. In any view of the matter, the Corporation having expressed its mind in clear terms in its letters dated 1.3.2002 and 11.3.2002 on the invocation of its powers under Clauses 6 and 7 of the contract agreement in the event of the failure of the Petitioner to mobilize the rigs immediately, I am of the considered opinion that the plea of want of fairness qua prior notice or opportunity is untenable. The order of cancellation and the consequential directions are within the four corners of Clauses 6 and 7 and cannot be said to be without authority. To repeat, the decision has been taken after the expiry of 15 days of the letter dated 11.3.2002. The word "may" appearing in the aforementioned letters is not demonstrative of any indecisiveness of the Corporation in invoking its powers under the abovementioned clauses of the agreement. On the other hand, its consistent stand in both the letters vis-a-vis, the default of the Petitioner, proclaims that it contemplated to take action thereunder in case the rigs were not immediately mobilized. The Petitioner having failed to act in terms of Clauses 3.3. and 4.8 of the contract agreement, the impugned action of the Corporation cannot in the existing facts and circumstances be construed to be unfair, unjust or unreasonable and by any means unauthorized or without jurisdiction. The decision of the Apex Court in Canara Bank and Ors., Appellants v. Debasis Das and Ors. (supra) on the aspect of natural justice does not advance the case of the Petitioner in the present factual setting. 19. The Apex Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner and Ors., Appellants v. Issac Peter and Ors., Respondents (supra) had held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to for wriggling out of the contractual obligations and the rule of promissory estoppel and estoppel by conduct cannot be invoked to alter or amend specific terms of contract. The Apex Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner and Ors., Appellants v. Issac Peter and Ors., Respondents (supra) had held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to for wriggling out of the contractual obligations and the rule of promissory estoppel and estoppel by conduct cannot be invoked to alter or amend specific terms of contract. It ruled against the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation as well to modify/vary the express terms of the contract. It held that doctrine of fairness or duty to act fairly and reasonably cannot be invoked either to amend, alter and vary the express terms of the contract between the parties. 20. The cardinal principles guiding the process of judicial review of administrative decisions have been succinctly summed up by the Apex Court in Master Marine Services (P) Ltd., Appellant v. Metcalfe, & Hodgkinson (P) Ltd. and Anr., Respondents (2005) 6 SCC 138 , as under: After an exhaustive consideration of a large number of decisions and standard books on administrative law, the Court enunciated the principle that the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible. The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principles of reasonableness but also must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. It was also pointed out that quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. 21. As noticed hereinabove, the facts do not disclose any unfairness or unreasonableness on the part of the Corporation in taking the impugned decision. Not only was the same authorized in the terms of the contract, its decision cannot in the factual background be dubbed as absurd, preposterous or in defiance of logic. 21. As noticed hereinabove, the facts do not disclose any unfairness or unreasonableness on the part of the Corporation in taking the impugned decision. Not only was the same authorized in the terms of the contract, its decision cannot in the factual background be dubbed as absurd, preposterous or in defiance of logic. Only because additional time was granted to the Petitioner to mobilize the rigs, the Corporation was not estopped thereby from taking action as comprehended in Clauses 6 and 7 of the contract agreement. To strike down the impugned action in the existing facts and circumstances would be to allow the Petitioner to take advantage of its own wrong. In exercise of the equitable jurisdiction of this Court, I am not inclined to do so. The Petitioner having failed to comply with the express terms and conditions of the contract agreement entered on its own volition, no interference with the impugned order in exercise of the power of judicial review is called for. 22. In the view of the above narrative and the determination on the issues involved. I do not find any merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.