JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar, J. 1. To a citizen, no right is dearer than the right to protection to life and liberty and against arrest and detention guaranteed by Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. A constitutional protection is given to the detenu which mandates the grant of liberty to the detenu to make a representation against detention, as imperated in Article 22(5) of the Constitution and it also impetrates the authority to whom the representation is addressed to deal with the same with utmost expedition inasmuch as personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional value. Infringement of the constitutional rights conferred under Article 22(5) invalidate detention order. In the present writ petition the only points to be considered are (1) whether the habeas corpus petition challenging the actions of the detaining authority for infringement of the fundamental rights of the detenu under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India is to be dismissed on the ground of imperfect pleadings or not; (2) whether the detaining authority/state government absolved the compulsion under the constitution and provisions of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short NSA) to deal with the representations with utmost expedition only on the ground that representations filed by the detenu against the detention order was not filed within 12 (twelve) days from the date of detention order or after the detention order passed by the District Magistrate under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the NSA was approved by the State Government whichever was earlier. 2. Heard Mr. H.N.K. Singh, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. Gopeswar Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, Shri Th. Ibohal Singh, learned G.A. appearing for the Respondents 1, 3, 4 and 5 and Shri N. Ibotombi Singh, learned CGSC appearing for the Respondent No. 2. 3. The Petitioner/detenu, by an order of the District Magistrate Imphal West, Manipur being No. Cril/NSA/No. 53 of 2005, Imphal, the 29th April, 2005 in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of NSA read with Home Department's order No. 17(1)/49/80-H(pt) dated 3.3.2005, had been put under detention. The aforesaid detention order dated 29.4.2005 had been approved by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (4) of Clause 3 of NSA under an order dated 7.5.2005. The aforesaid detention order dated 29.4.2005 had been approved by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (4) of Clause 3 of NSA under an order dated 7.5.2005. The District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur under his letter being No. Cril/NSA/No. 53 of 2005 dated Imphal the 2nd May, 2005 had furnished the grounds of detention to the detenu/writ Petitioner. Under the said letter of the District Magistrate, Imphal West dated 2.5.2005, the detenu/writ Petitioner had been informed that he had the right to make representation to the detaining authority within 12 days from the date of detention or till the order was approved by the State Government whichever was earlier. The representation was to be sent to the District Magistrate, Imphal West, representation, if any would be placed before the Advisory Board within 3 weeks time from the date of detention and such other documents/papers connecting with his detention as the Government was bound under the law to produce before the Board for its consideration. The detenu/Petitioner filed his representation dated 15.6.2005 giving reasons, one of which was no detention order was supplied to him at any point of time but only a copy of the Government Order approving the detention order had been supplied to him, for cancellation/revocation of the detention order to the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur, Imphal through the Superintendent of Police, Manipur Central Jail, Manipur, Imphal. The State Govt. ultimately, confirmed the detention order made by the District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur dated 29.4.2005 under its order being No. 17(1)/879/2005-H dated 15.6.2005. 4. The Petitioner/detenu assailed the detention order in the present writ petition mainly on 3 (three) grounds viz. of Manipur, Imphal through the Superintendent of Police, Manipur Central Jail, Manipur, Imphal. The State Govt. ultimately, confirmed the detention order made by the District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur dated 29.4.2005 under its order being No. 17(1)/879/2005-H dated 15.6.2005. 4. The Petitioner/detenu assailed the detention order in the present writ petition mainly on 3 (three) grounds viz. (i) representation dated 15.6.2005 has not yet been disposed of; (ii) the copy of the detention order dated 29.4.2005 had not been supplied to the detenu/writ Petitioner at any point of time as a result thereof, his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 22(5) has been violated inasmuch as no effective representation could be made without the copy of the detention order dated 29.4.2005; and (iii) some of the copies of the documents which formed the basis of grounds of his detention furnished to the detenu/Petitioner under the said letter of the District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur dated 2.5.2005 are not readable as a result thereof fundamental rights of the detenu/Petitioner guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India had been violated and deprived of by the State Respondents and the detaining authority. The Respondents 1, 4 and 5 filed their joint affidavit-in-opposition in the present writ petition. In their very short and cryptic affidavit-in-opposition, their only answer to the representation dated 15.6.2005 was that the same was submitted to the Manipur Central Jail only on 20.6.2005 and the same had been forwarded to the State Government on the same date. No representation was filed within the prescribed time. 5. The learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner had been hammering on the first ground mentioned above that the representation dated 15.6.2005 has not yet been disposed of by the State Government and the detaining authority till today as the main ground for allowing the present writ petition on the very first day of hearing of the present writ petition on 2.9.2005. On 2.9.2005 after hearing the arguments at length, this Court in the interest of justice and fair play, put a very pertinent question to the learned Government Advocate "whether the representation dated 15.6.2005 had been dealt with by the State government with utmost expedition or not and also was it pending for disposal. The learned G.A. forgetting his duty to the court, declined to answer the question of the court. The learned G.A. forgetting his duty to the court, declined to answer the question of the court. On 2.9.2005, if the learned G.A. had no knowledge: he could have answered frankly to the court that further instructions will be required to ascertain as to whether the representation dated 15.6.2005 had been disposed of or not, but he did not do so. We, even if have the sufficient powers to deal with such a situation passed an order dated 2.9.2005 that further hearing will be made on the next Wednesday. We are constraint to observe in this writ petition about the duties of the P.P./G.A. to the Court. The Apex Court in a catena of cases had observed the duties of the Public Prosecutor/Government Advocate (PP/GA) to the court. This Court (Division Bench) in Baya Das Bowril v. State of Assam reported in (1981) 1 GLR 110 held that in a welfare state the stand of the Public prosecutor must be in harmony with the preamble, directive principles and in symphony with three-fold pillars of the Article 21 of the Constitution and duty of the Public Prosecutor is not to win a case by hook or by crook. Mr. Justice K. Lahiri (as then he was in Baya Das Bowril's case) observed that 1. In a welfare State the stands of Public Prosecutor must be in harmony with the Preamble, the Directive Principles and in symphony with the three-fold pillars of Article 21 of the Constitution - "fair, just and reasonable". A Public Prosecutor under the Constitutional law as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure must have the strength "not to disown the poor or bend his knees before the insolent might. He should have strength to raise his mind high above the daily strives and surrender his strength that he derives from law to the service of the people with love Lawyer's assistance is invaluable to a Judge and Justice may be defeated if the Public Prosecutor fails to lay all the cards fairly and squarely before the Court to enable it to look into the materials in the midst of voluminous records. A judgment is the reflection of the learning of "the bar" and is a contribution to the lawyer. Justice is blind - "justice discards party, friendship and kindred and is therefore, represented as blind" - (Joseph Eden- "The Spectator"). A judgment is the reflection of the learning of "the bar" and is a contribution to the lawyer. Justice is blind - "justice discards party, friendship and kindred and is therefore, represented as blind" - (Joseph Eden- "The Spectator"). A judge is not interested in either of the party to the litigation the State or the subject. It is immaterial who wins or loses. The prime duty and concern of judiciary is "to do justice within the four corners of law". However, often judges struggle for justice confronted with law which at first blush may not appear to be in conformity it with justice. At this juncture lawyer's assistance is an invaluable asset to the Judge. A Public Prosecutor is appointed by the State to uphold its case but not "to trample justice". The duty of the public prosecutor is not to win a case by hook or by crook. "Prosecution" cannot be the object of a welfare State nor the aim and object of the Public Prosecutor be projected to achieve that end. A Public prosecutor must be an "open book". Fair, just, impartial and ever ready to unfold all material facts fairly and squarely to uphold the cause of justice, no matter in whose favour the justice flows. In the instant case, we are charmed by the conduct of Shri Achyut Chandra Deka who has done his constitutional duty and performed his obligation in the true spirit of the Constitution and the law. He has assisted a disabled indigent accused "in the year of disabled persons." placed before us all facts in favour of the State as well as the indigent accused. He has acted in the true tradition of the noble profession to which he belongs. We deem it our duty to record our satisfaction and proceed to dispose of the case on its merit. 6. As stated above most precious right of the citizen in India guaranteed by Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India cannot be dealt with casually. We expect that the Respondents 1, 4 and 5 had filed their joint affidavit-in-opposition after knowing fully the case of the Petitioner in the present habeas corpus petition. 6. As stated above most precious right of the citizen in India guaranteed by Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India cannot be dealt with casually. We expect that the Respondents 1, 4 and 5 had filed their joint affidavit-in-opposition after knowing fully the case of the Petitioner in the present habeas corpus petition. It appears that our expectation was not correct inasmuch as even on 9.9.2005 on which hearing of the present writ petition was concluded the Respondents 1, 4 and 5 did not answer the questions put to the learned G.A. on 2.9.2005. But on 9.9.2005 the learned G.A. placed his letter dated 31.8.2005 to the Special Secretary, Home Govt. of Manipur for perusal. The content of his said letter is "With reference to the above case, i.e. W.P.(Cril) No. 27/2005, I am to inform you that the Hon'ble High Court requires the part file concerning the disposal of representation of the Petitioner both to the Govt. of Manipur and Union of India relating to the representation dated 20.6.2005 filed by the detenu through Superintendent of Police, Jail, Manipur. It is, therefore, requested to send the said file during the course of 1.9.2005 because the case is to be heard on 2.9.2005." This Court is not required to see the correspondences between the Govt. Advocate and the Special Secretary, Home, Govt. of Manipur but this Court for just decision of the present writ petition required to know the answer of the said questions put to the learned Government Advocate on 2.9.2005. 7. We may here recall the observations of Hon'ble Mr. Justice v. Khaild for the Apex Court in Hem Lall Bhandari v. State of Sikkim reported in (1987) 2 SCC 9 that "It is not permissible, any matter relating to the personal liberty and fame of a citizen, to take either a liberal or generous view on the lapses on the part of the officers. Any matter where the liberty of the citizen involved, it is necessary for the officers to act with utmost expeditions and strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of law for expeditious action is insisted upon as a safeguard against manipulation. In the present case, we are of the firm view that there are lapses on the part of the officers. This would even be sufficient for quashing the detention order of the present writ Petitioner. 8. In the present case, we are of the firm view that there are lapses on the part of the officers. This would even be sufficient for quashing the detention order of the present writ Petitioner. 8. It is a well settled position of law that even the normal civil suit, the court should be slowed to throw out a claim on mere technicality such as imperfect pleadings and also there are exceptions to the rule of pleadings. The Apex Court in Smt. Manjushri Raha and Ors. v. B.L. Gupta and Ors. etc. reported in AIR 1977 SC 1158 held that pleadings have to be interpreted not with formalistic rigour but with latitude or awareness of low legal literacy of poor people. The Apex Court in Nagubai Animal and Ors. v. B. Sharma Rao and Ors. reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 held that rule of specific pleadings has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue though no specific issue has been framed thereon and adduced evidence relating thereto, and in that circumstances, absence of specific pleadings on the question was a mere irregularity which resulted into no prejudice to them. In the present case in hand, even though there is no specific pleadings about the non-disposal of the representation dated 15.6.2005 filed by the Petitioner/detenu by the State Government and detaining authority in the present writ petition, both the parties argued in support of their rival contentions knowing quite well that the question of disposal or non-disposal of the said representation dated 15.6.2005 was very much in issue in the present writ petition. This Court for fair procedure in the present writ petition, passed the order dated 2.9.2005 for giving opportunity to the learned Govt. Advocate to inform the court as to whether the representation dated 15.6.2005 had been disposed of or not. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Nagubai Animal's case (supra) had been reiterated in Bhagwati Prasad v.Chandramaul reported in AIR 1966 SC 735 (C/B) that if a plea is not specifically made mand yet it is covered by an issue by implication and the party knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon. 9. 9. Again, the Apex Court in Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram and Ors. reported in AIR 1976 SC 461 held that the pleadings are loosely drafted in the court, and court should not scrutinize the pleadings with such meticulous care so as to result any genuine claim being defeated on trivial ground. The Apex Court while dealing with the matter relating with the life and liberty of a citizen guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Constitution, in a criminal appeal arising out of a writ of habeas corpus petition in Mohinuddin @ Moin Master v. District Magistrate, Beed and Ors. reported in (1987) 4 SCC 58 held that the court was not justified in dismissing a habeas corpus petition merely on the ground of imperfect pleadings of the Petitioner. Para-4 of SCC in Mohinuddin @ Moin Master (supra) reads as follows: 4. It was an improper exercise of power on the part of the High Court in disallowing the writ petition on the ground of imperfect pleadings. Normally, writ petition are decided on the basis of affidavits and the Petitioner cannot be permitted to raise grounds not taken in the petition at the hearing. The same rule cannot be applied to a petition for grant of a writ of habeas corpus. It is enough for the detenu to say that he is under wrongful detention, and the burden lies on the detaining authority to satisfy the court that the detention is not illegal or wrongful and that the Petitioner is not entitled to the relief claimed. This Court on more occasions than the one has deal with the question and it is now well settled that it is incumbent on the state to satisfy the court that the detention of the Petitioner/detenu was legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory provisions of the act but also strictly in accord with the constitutional safeguards embodied in Article 22(5). In return to a rule nisi issued by this Court or the High Court in a habeas corpus petition, the proper person to file the same is the district magistrate who had passed the impugned order of detention and he must explain his subjective satisfaction and the grounds therefore; and if for some good reason the District Magistrate is not available, the affidavit must be sworn by some responsible officer like the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Home department who personally deal with or processed the case in the Secretariat or submitted it to the Minister or other officer duly authorised under the rules of business framed by the Government under Article 166 of the Constitution to pass orders on behalf of the Government in such matter: Niranjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Habibullah Khan v. State of West Bengal, Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar and Mohd. Alam v. State of West Bengal. 10. Clause (4), Clause (5), Clause (6) and Clause (7) of Article 22 deals with the fundamental rights of the detenu under the preventive detention law. Clause (4) and (5) of Article 22 reads as follows: 22(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention; Provided that nothing in this Sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under Sub-clause (b) of Clause (7); or (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under Sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause (7). (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. 11. (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. 11. The Parliament in the 31st Year of Republic has enacted the National Security Act, 1980 for detention of a person with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, relation with India with the Foreign Power, of the Security of India and acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of NSA provides for empowering the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police by the State Government to exercise the powers of detention. Such detention order issued by the District Magistrate shall remain in force upto 12 days unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government. The detention order issued by the District Magistrate which had been approved by the State Government within 3 weeks from the date of detention of the detenu under the said order is required to be placed before the Advisory Board along with the materials mentioned in Section 10 of the NSA. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 12 of the NSA has to take its opinion about the sufficient cause for detention of a person on considering the report of the Advisory Board and in the presence of sufficient cause, detention order issued by the District Magistrate is to be confirmed and in the case of non-sufficiency of the cause detention order is to be revoked. From the conjoin reading of Sections 3 to 12 of the National Security Act, 1980, it is cleared that it is the order of the District Magistrate which is required to be approved and further confirmed by the State Government for continue detention for a period of 12 months from the date of detention. It is the prerogative of the State Government to revoke or modify the detention order independent of the report of the Advisory Board. It is the prerogative of the State Government to revoke or modify the detention order independent of the report of the Advisory Board. Therefore, the power for revocation or modification of the detention order of the District Magistrate which has been approved and confirmed by the State Government after receiving the report of the Advisory Board, still lies with the State Government in exercising its power Under Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980. As such availability or non-availability of the report of the Advisory Board is immaterial while the State Government exercising its prerogative power Under Section 14 of the NSA. 12. Views of ours have the solid support of a catena of decisions of the Apex Court which would be considering in the proper places in the following paras. The Apex Court had considered the right of the detenu guaranteed by Article 22(5) in S.K. Abdul Karim and Anr. v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1969 SC 1028 and held that the constitutional right to make a representation guaranteed by Article 22(5) must be to include by necessary implication the constitutional right to a proper consideration of the representation by the authority to whom it is made. The right of representation under Article 22(5) which is a valuable constitutional right is not a mere formality. It is obvious that apart from the procedures of reference to the Advisory Board the State Government has ample power Under Section 13 of the Act (the Preventive Detention Act, 1950) to revoke the order of detention at any point of time. The ratio laid down in S.K. Abdul Karim's case is that the authority to whom representation is made is bound to consider and dispose of and the State Government has the ample power to revoke any order of detention at any point of time and for doing so reference to the Advisory Board is not mandatory. The Apex Court again in Vimal Chand Jawantraj Jain v. Pradhan and Ors. reported in AIR 1979 SC 1501 held that Article 22(5) enjoins upon the detaining authority to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation must implicitly means that such representation, must, when made, be considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible other wise, it is obvious that obligation to furnish earliest opportunity to make a representation losses its purpose and meaning. Further, the Apex Court held that the State Government is not bound by the opinion of the Advisory Board and it may still on considering the representation of the detenu or otherwise decline to confirm the order of detention and release the detention even if according to the opinion of the Board there is a sufficient cause for the detention. Para-4 of AIR in Vimal Chand's case (supra) reads as follows: 4. There are thus two distinct safeguards provided to a detenu; one is that his case must be referred to an Advisory Board for its opinion if it is sought to detain him for a longer period than three months and the other is he should be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention and such representation should be considered by the detaining authority as early as possible before any order is made confirming the detention. Neither safeguard is dependent on the other and both have to be observed by the detaining authority. It is no answer for the detaining authority to say that the representation of the detenue was sent by it to the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board has considered the representation and then made a report expressing itself in favour of detention. Even if the Advisory Board has made a report stating that in its opinion there is sufficient cause for the detention, the State Government is not bound by such opinion and it may still on considering the representation of the detenue or otherwise, decline to confirm the order of detention and release the detenu. The detaining authority, is therefore, bound to consider the representation of the detenu on its own and keeping in view all the facts and circumstances relating to the case, come to its own decision whether to confirm the order of detention or to release the detenu. 13. The Constitution Bench had discussed the right of detenu guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India in Kamaleswar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1995) 4 SCC 51 and held that the representations made to the authority which can grant relief, i.e. the authority which can revoke the order of detention and set him liberty, should be considered with utmost expeditious. Paras 31 and 49 of the SCC in Kamaleswar Ishwardas Patel's case (Supra) read as below: 31. reported in (1995) 4 SCC 51 and held that the representations made to the authority which can grant relief, i.e. the authority which can revoke the order of detention and set him liberty, should be considered with utmost expeditious. Paras 31 and 49 of the SCC in Kamaleswar Ishwardas Patel's case (Supra) read as below: 31. With due respect, we find it difficult to agree with both the premises. Construing the provisions of Article 22(5) we have explained that the right of the person detained to make a representation against the order of detention comprehends the right to make such a representation to the authority which can grant such relief i.e. the authority which can revoke the order of detention and set him at liberty and since the officer who has made the order of detention is competent to revoke it, the person detained has the right to make a representation to the officer who made the order of detention. The first premise that such right does not flow Article 22(5) cannot, therefore, be accepted. 49. At this stage it becomes necessary to deal with the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General that some of the detenus have been indulging in illicit smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances on a large scale and are involved in other anti-national activities which are very harmful to the national economy. He has urged that having regard to the nature of the activities of the detenues the cases do not justify interference with the orders of detention made against them. We are not unmindful of the harmful consequences of the activities in which the detenus are alleged to be involved. But while discharging our constitutional obligation to enforce the fundamental rights of the people, more especially the right to personal liberty, we cannot allow ourselves to be influenced by these considerations. It has been said that history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. The Framers of the Constitution being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate in Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22 certain minimum safeguards for the protection 'of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safeguards are required to be "zealously watched and enforced by the Court". Their rigour cannot be modulated on the basis of the nature of the activities of a particular person. These safeguards are required to be "zealously watched and enforced by the Court". Their rigour cannot be modulated on the basis of the nature of the activities of a particular person. We would, in this context, reiterate what was said earlier by this Court while rejecting a similar submission: (SCC para 4). May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus. Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (C/B) reported in (1994) 3 SCC 569 observed that When Law ends, Tyranny begins; Legislation begins where Evil begins. The function of the judiciary begins when the function of the Legislature ends. Because the law is, what the judges say it is since the power to interpret the law vests in the judges. 14. Coming back to the present case, admittedly representation dated 15.6.2005 was addressed to the State Government, i.e. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur, Imphal. The prayer sought for in the representation was for revocation or cancellation of the order of District Magistrate. As stated above, it is the order of the District Magistrate which is to be approved and confirmed by the State Government. Further, as discussed above, the State Government in exercise of its power Under Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980 can revoke or modify the detention order issued by the District Magistrate irrespective of it has been confirmed on the basis of the reports submitted by the Advisory Board, at any point of time. Such being the situation, it is absolutely no law or no provisions under Constitution of India and National Security Act, 1980 that representations for revocation or modification of the detention order issued by the District Magistrate should be filed within a certain period to the State Government who undisputedly has the power to revoke or modify the detention order at any point of time. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the plea of the State Government that the said representation dated 15.6.2005 is filed after the limitation is fallacious and holds a little water. Regarding the form of representation, we may gainfully rely upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Smt. Shalini Soni and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 544 wherein the Apex Court held that there is no formula or any magical incantation like "open seasam" to be repeated or chanted in order to qualify a communication as a representation. In that case, the detenu sent a communication dated 27.7.1980 to the authority requesting copies of the statement, documents relied upon by the detaining authority for filing effective representation and in failure to do so, the detenu be released. The Supreme Court held that the said communication dated 27.7.1980 should be treated as representation as there is no form for representation. Para 4 of the SCC in Smt. Shalini Soni and Ors's case (Supra) is quoted hereunder: 4. The writ petition has to succeed on both the grounds. As we mentioned earlier the answer of the Respondents in regard to the ground based on the failure of the detaining authority to consider the representation dated July 27, 1980 submitted by the detenu through his advocate was not that the representation was ever considered but that it was not a representation at all. We are unable to agree with the submission made on behalf of the Respondents. The representation has not to be made in any prescribed form. There is no formula nor any magical incantation like "open seasame" to be repeated or chanted in order to qualify a communication as a representation. So long as it contains a demand or a request for the release of the detenu in whatever form or language couched and a ground or a reason is mentioned or suggested for such release, there is no option but to consider and deal with it as representation for the purpose of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The communication dated July 27, 1980 contains a demand that the detenu should be released forthwith. The communication dated July 27, 1980 contains a demand that the detenu should be released forthwith. It mentions a reason for the demand for release, namely, that copies of statements, documents and materials relied upon by the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction were not furnished to the detenu and that the detention was therefore, illegal. In support of the claim that the detention was illegal reference was made to a decision of the Gujarat High Court. The communication, then, ended with a reiteration of the request for the release of the detenu. We find it impossible to read the communication as anything but a representation against the order of detention. True the detention also asked for copies of documents to enable him to make a representation if the detaining authority was not prepared to accept his demand for revocation of the order of detention. The request for copes of documents to enable the detenu to make a further representation on merits as well as on other grounds in the event of the detaining authority not agreeing to revoke the order of detention for the reason mentioned in the communication would not divest the communication of its character as a representation. We have no doubt that the communication dated July, 27. 1980 was a representation which was in law required to be considered by the detaining authority. Quite obviously, the obligation imposed on the detaining authority, by Article 22(5) of the Constitution, to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation, carries with it the imperative implication that the representation shall be considered at the earliest opportunity. Since all the constitutional protection that a detenu can claim is the little that is afforded by the procedural safeguards prescribed by Article 22(5) read with Article 19, the courts have a duty to rigidly insist that preventive detention procedures be fair and strictly observed. A breach of the procedural imperative must lead to the release of the detenu. The representation dated July, 27, 1980 was admittedly not considered and on that ground alone the detenu was entitled to be set at liberty. 15. The Apex Court also discussed the question to whom the representation is to be addressed for revocation or cancellation of the detention order in Smt. Gracy v. State of Kerala and Anr. The representation dated July, 27, 1980 was admittedly not considered and on that ground alone the detenu was entitled to be set at liberty. 15. The Apex Court also discussed the question to whom the representation is to be addressed for revocation or cancellation of the detention order in Smt. Gracy v. State of Kerala and Anr. reported in AIR 1991 SC 1090 and held that to whom the representation is to be addressed is of no matter inasmuch as irrespective of the fact where the representation is addressed to the detaining authority or to the Advisory Board or to both, as the detaining authority cannot absolve the mandatory requirements to consider the representation. Para 9 of AIR in Smt. Gracy's case (Supra) reads as follows: 9. It is being settled that the aforesaid dual obligation of consideration of the detenu's representation by the Advisory Board and independently by the detaining authority flows from Article 22(5) when only one representation is made addressed to the detaining authority, there is no reason to hold that the detaining authority is relieved of his obligation merely because the representation is addressed to the Advisory Board instead of the detaining authority and submitted to the Advisory Board during pendency of the reference before it. It is difficult to spell out such an inference from the contents of Article 22(5) in support of the contention of the learned Solicitor General. The contents of Article 22(5) as well as the nature of duty imposed thereby on the detaining authority support the view that so long as there is a representation made by the detenu against the order of detention, the aforesaid dual obligation under Article 22(5) arises irrespective of the fact whether the representation is addressed to the detaining authority or to the Advisory Board or to both. The mode of address is only a matter of form which cannot whittle down the requirement of the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) enacted as one of the safeguards provided to the detenu in case of preventive detention. 16. This Court (Division Bench) in Shri Sena Rokhuma Thangvela v. District Magistrate, South District Manipur and Ors. reported in (1982) 1 GLR 606 had not accepted the plea of the State Government that non-receiving of the representations within the period of 3 (three) weeks prescribed by Section10 of the National Security Act, 1980 is fatal. 16. This Court (Division Bench) in Shri Sena Rokhuma Thangvela v. District Magistrate, South District Manipur and Ors. reported in (1982) 1 GLR 606 had not accepted the plea of the State Government that non-receiving of the representations within the period of 3 (three) weeks prescribed by Section10 of the National Security Act, 1980 is fatal. This Court (Division Bench) in Ahanthem Mema @ Nirmala Devi v. District Magistrate, Imphal East and Ors. reported in 2004 (1) GLT 633 had discussed the effect of non-consideration of the representation dated 31.3.2003 filed to the District Magistrate, Imphal East even after the detention order dated 24.3.2003 had been confirmed by the State Government by its order dated 5.5.2003. In that case the Division Bench held that non-consideration of the representation dated 31.3.2003 by the detaining authority is hit by the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Constitution makes the detention of the Petitioner is illegal. The operative portion of the judgment in Ahanthem Mema @ Nirmala Devi v. District Magistrate, Imphal East and Ors. is quoted below: 24. For the foregoing reasons, discussions and observation, we are of the considered view that: (i) Non consideration of the representation dated 31.3.03 by the detaining authority, Respondent No. 1 is hit by the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and makes the detention of the Petitioner illegal. (ii) There was an inordinate and unexplained delay in considering and rejecting the representation dated 31.3.03 by the State Govt. which vitiates the order of detention. (iii) Non consideration of the representation dated 7.4.03 addressed to the Advisory Board by the Govt. though routed through the Govt. authorities is contrary to the Constitutional mandate. (iv) Rejection of the representation dated 7.4.03 by the Central Govt. on 5.5.03 causing an unreasonable delay without recording any explanation for such delay invalidates the detenu's detention. 17. For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the view that the present writ petition should be allowed only on the ground of non-consideration of the representation dated 15.6.2005 with utmost expedition and non-disposal by the State Government. As such we are not making further endevourance to discuss the other grounds for challenging the present detention order. 17. For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the view that the present writ petition should be allowed only on the ground of non-consideration of the representation dated 15.6.2005 with utmost expedition and non-disposal by the State Government. As such we are not making further endevourance to discuss the other grounds for challenging the present detention order. We hold that the detention order dated 29.4.2005 which had been approved by the State Government under its order dated 7.5.2005 and confirmed by the State Government under its order dated 15.6.2005 are illegal and accordingly quashed. The detenu, namely Shri Nongmaithem Dhanjit @ Inao @ Khamba @ Panthoi, S/o N. Gosai Singh be set at his liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other cases. The Writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.