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2005 DIGILAW 678 (CAL)

Durgadas Mukhopadhyay v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2005-11-08

D.K.SETH, SOUMITRA PAL

body2005
Judgment :- (1.) THE principal appeal, being MAT No. 2643 of 1998, was disposed of earlier. It was contended that the other connected appeal being MAT No. 2589 of 1998 and the cross-objection, being COT No. 3019 of 1998, though was heard, was not disposed of. It appears from the order disposing of the principal appeal that no order was passed in relation to the other appeal and the cross-objection. This matter was mentioned, accordingly, it was placed and the matter has been heard on the other appeal, being MAT No. 2589 of 1988 and the cross-objection, being COT No. 3019 of 1998. (2.) THE principal appeal was dismissed and the order of the learned Single judge was not interfered with. The learned Single Judge was pleased to set aside the disciplinary proceedings with liberty to proceed afresh within three months from the date the decision of the learned Single Judge was rendered in 1998. In view of the pendency of the appeal, the appellant did not proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. Initially, there was a stay for a limited period, however, after sometime the stay stood vacated or lapsed. (3.) THE fact remains that the disciplinary proceedings was not proceeded with despite there being no interim order prohibiting from continuing with the disciplinary proceedings, the respondent/cross-objection retired in 2002. It was stated by Mr. Dutta that since the appeal has been dismissed, therefore, the cross-objection has to be allowed so far as it relates to the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings after retirement. According to him, sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of the Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and unaided) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 1969 rules) postulates a disciplinary proceeding only against a teacher in service. There is no provision in sub-rule (8) which authorizes continuation of disciplinary proceedings after retirement of a teacher. He relied on the decision in Biswanath Seth vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. , 2005 (1) CLT 541 (HC) delivered by one of us (Soumitra pal, J.) sitting singly wherein such a view was taken relying on the decisions in bhagirathi Jena vs. Board of Directors, OSFC and Ors. , AIR 1999 SC 1841 , hindusthan Copper Ltd. vs. Krishnendu Narayan Ghosh and Ors. , 2001 (3) CHN 122 , of this Court. , 2005 (1) CLT 541 (HC) delivered by one of us (Soumitra pal, J.) sitting singly wherein such a view was taken relying on the decisions in bhagirathi Jena vs. Board of Directors, OSFC and Ors. , AIR 1999 SC 1841 , hindusthan Copper Ltd. vs. Krishnendu Narayan Ghosh and Ors. , 2001 (3) CHN 122 , of this Court. According to him paragraph 19 (5) of the West Bengal recognised Non-Government Educational Institutions Employees (Death-cum-Retirement) Benefit Scheme, 1981 does not permit continuation of disciplinary proceedings against an employee after retirement. It only provides for the contingency as to what would happen if any disciplinary/judicial proceeding is/ are continued against a retired employee. It does not authorize continuation of disciplinary proceedings as such. According to him, the Pension Scheme is an executive action and has no statutory force and it cannot override the management of the Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and unaided) Rules, 1969. He also relies on the Recognised Non-Government educational Secondary Institutions Pension Rules, effective from 1st of April 1966 and contends that this Rule, being a statutory rule and being still effective and having not been repealed and there being no provision if the said Rule for continuing disciplinary proceedings against a retired employee, the Scheme cannot simply, by reason of its reference in paragraph 19 (5), conferring of jurisdiction as to the continuation of disciplinary proceedings against a retired employee. According to him, this Rule also does not provide as to who will continue with the disciplinary proceedings unlike Rule 10 of the West Bengal service (Death-cum-Retirement) Benefit Rules, 1971 wherein a specific jurisdiction has been conferred by recognising the disciplinary proceedings within the meaning of the said rules to be continued by the authority by winch the proceedings was so initiated before retirement. Therefore, according to him, there is no provision under which disciplinary proceedings can be proceeded with a against a retired teacher, as was held in Biswanath Seth (supra). Therefore according to him, this Court should direct payment of all retirement benefits in terms of paragraph 19 (5) of the Pension Scheme and direct that the service of the respondent/cross-objector should be treated as in service till retirement and entitled to all service benefits accordingly. (4.) MR. Ghosh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant opposes the contention of Mr. (4.) MR. Ghosh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant opposes the contention of Mr. Dutta on the ground that a disciplinary proceedings can be continued under paragraph 19 (5) of the Pension Scheme. There is nothing in sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of the 1969 rules which prohibits continuation of disciplinary proceedings against an employee initiated before bis retirement. According to him, the proceedings could not be proceeded with in view of the pendency of the appeal challenging the order passed by the learned single Judge which was the subject-matter of the appeal. He also contends that if such a proposition is accepted in that event it would be difficult for the management to realize any amount defalcated, as in the present case. (5.) BOTH the learned Counsel had relied on certain decisions to which reference would made it appropriate stage. (6.) RULE 28 (8) of the 1969 rules provides that a disciplinary proceedings can be initiated for removal or dismissal against a permanent or temporary teacher after obtaining sanction from the Board submitting the chargesheet, explanation and other papers. After the disciplinary proceedings is concluded, in order to inflict any punishment of dismissal or removal all papers and documents whereof are to be placed before the Board for its approval. Therefore, the very coinage of sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of 1969 rules itself indicates that even if any punishment to the extent of removal or dismissal is to be passed against a teacher, the same is to be passed after obtaining approval of the Board. If a teacher is retired, there is no question of removal or dismissal after retirement and at the same time, there is no scope of obtaining prior permission or approval from the Board for such removal or dismissal after retirement. Therefore, no punishment of dismissal or removal could be passed after retirement since there cannot be any question of retrospective removal or dismissal. (7.) SO far as sub-rule (8a) of Rule 28 of the 1969 rules is concerned, it deals with punishment other than removal or dismissal which is specified as stoppage of one to three increments of pay, reduction of pay in the time-scale and censor. (7.) SO far as sub-rule (8a) of Rule 28 of the 1969 rules is concerned, it deals with punishment other than removal or dismissal which is specified as stoppage of one to three increments of pay, reduction of pay in the time-scale and censor. Again, these three punishments can be inflicted only with the prior approval of the Board after holding a disciplinary proceeding, observing the procedure laid down in sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of the 1969 rules. Therefore, in any event after retirement, none of the three punishments, mentioned above, could be passed. There cannot be any reduction in pay in the time scale or stoppage of increment after retirement. It would be preposterous to censor a person who is not in employment or active service. Nothing, therefore, appears from sub-rule (8) or (8a) of Rule 28 of 1969 rules to indicate that a disciplinary proceeding could be continued after retirement, as was rightly held in the decision of Biswanath seth (supra) following the Apex Courts decision. (8.) MR. Dutta had also relied on the decision in Chandra Singh and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. , 2003 (6) SCC 545 , wherein the said principle has been again acknowledged by the Apex Court with the following expression: "we also cannot accept the contention of Mr. Rao that in the case of Mata deen Garg, the departmental proceedings could be kept pending despite the passing of the impugned order. The High Court had not passed any order in the departmental proceedings. It sought to invoke the jurisdiction which was conferred on the High Court and the State by reason of a statutory rule. A departmental proceeding can continue so long as the employee is in service. In that event, a disciplinary proceeding is kept pending by the employer the employee cannot be made to retire. There must exist specific provision in the pension rules in terms whereof whole or a part of the pension can be withheld or withdrawn wherefor a proceeding has to be initiated. Furthermore, no rule has also been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. In the absence of such a proceeding, the High Court or the State cannot contend that the departmental proceedings against the appellant mata Deen Garg could continue. " (9.) THE principle appears to be well-settled. Furthermore, no rule has also been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. In the absence of such a proceeding, the High Court or the State cannot contend that the departmental proceedings against the appellant mata Deen Garg could continue. " (9.) THE principle appears to be well-settled. We need not elaborate. (10.) NOW the question arises as to whether by reason of paragraph 19 (5) of the Pension Scheme the disciplinary proceeding could be continued. Admittedly, unlike Rule 10 of the West Bengal Service (Death-cum-Retirement) Benefit rules, no authority has been conferred to continue a disciplinary proceeding after retirement specifically neither any authority has been recognized as to who has been empowered to continue with the disciplinary proceedings after retirement of an employee. Therefore, in a case where Rule 28 (8) and (8a) of the 1969 rules did not provide for continuation of disciplinary proceedings after retirement, we are of the view that without any specific authorization or creation of a disciplinary authority or recognition of a disciplinary authority, it is very difficult to accede to the contention of Mr. Ghosh that by reason of paragraph 19 (5) of the Pension Scheme, a disciplinary proceeding could be continued. Unless an authority is conferred the jurisdiction, and an authority is created or recognized by the Pension Scheme, no disciplinary proceeding could be continued for the purpose of inflicting any kind of punishment in terms of Rule 28 (8) and (8a) of the 1969 rules. (11.) IN any event, such a disciplinary proceeding could not continue for the purpose of Pension Scheme. If it is so, in that event, the Pension Scheme has to make appropriate provision therefor. In the absence of appropriate provisions, it is not for the Court to fill up the gaps for remedy the lacuna or supplement the rules. Then again the Pension Scheme does not appear to be statutory rule, on the other hand, it seems to be an executive exercise without having a statutory force. It is not necessary to decide as to whether the Pension Scheme, referred to by Mr. Dutta is a statutory rule. In any event, that would not lead us anywhere since the Pension Scheme does not provide anything from which it can be held that the disciplinary proceedings can be continued after retirement. It is not necessary to decide as to whether the Pension Scheme, referred to by Mr. Dutta is a statutory rule. In any event, that would not lead us anywhere since the Pension Scheme does not provide anything from which it can be held that the disciplinary proceedings can be continued after retirement. (12.) ON the other hand, a plain reading of paragraph 19 (5) of the Pension scheme, makes it clear that the eligibility and the entitlement to pension are circumscribed to the extent that it can be reduced or withheld on certain grounds and certain provisions have been provided therein for determining as to whether the pension should be withheld or be reduced. Sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 19 of the Pension Scheme provides that corruption is one of the charges on which pension can be denied. However, such corruption has to be proved. Admittedly, in the absence of any disciplinary proceedings being concluded in the present case, the alleged charges of corruption cannot be said to have been proved. It is again the Board, in its order of approval, had found that the charges for defalcation was not proved and the punishment of dismissal was upheld or approved only on the other charges for not maintaining the books of accounts properly, etc. However, by reason of the order of the learned Single Judge, this order also stands set aside. Thus there is no possibility of proof of corruption at this stage. (13.) THE only provision that can be attracted in the present case is sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 19 of the Pension Scheme which permits withholding or reduction of pension if a departmental/judicial proceeding is instituted/ continued against an employee. In case of retired employee it is provided that if the departmental or judicial proceeding is instituted or is continued in that event, the retired employer would be entitled to provisional pension till the final order is passed in the proceedings against him to the extent not exceeding the maximum pension admissible to him of his qualifying service upto the date of retirement. Thus it seems, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Dutta, that the limb of sub-paragraph (5) provides for a contingency if any departmental/judicial proceeding is instituted or continued against a person who has retired. Thus it seems, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Dutta, that the limb of sub-paragraph (5) provides for a contingency if any departmental/judicial proceeding is instituted or continued against a person who has retired. By no stretch of imagination this provision can be said to have conferred any power of jurisdiction on the Managing Committee or any other authority and even the competent authority under the Pension Scheme to continue with the departmental proceeding nor had it recognized either the competent authority or the Managing Committee to proceed with such departmental proceedings neither had it provided for any procedure to be followed for such purpose. (14.) EVEN if we accede to the contention of Mr. Ghosh that in such event, rule 28 (8) is to be followed even then such a procedure cannot be followed in respect of a person since retired. It is an admitted position that a judicial proceeding, containing the selfsame allegations, is pending as against the respondent/cross-objector. We, however, refrain from expressing any opinion and make no observation with regard thereto. The same shall be decided in accordance with law by the appropriate authority as early as possible preferably within two years from this date. Whatever benefit would be due to the respondent/cross-objector, the same shall be governed by the order passed in the said judicial proceeding and be subject to the result thereof, till then, in view of paragraph 19 (5) of the Pension Scheme, the respondent/cross-objector will be entitled to provisional pension in terms thereof. (15.) FOR all these reasons, we are of the view that the Pension Scheme does not provide any provision under which a departmental proceeding can be continued against a teacher after retirement. The respondent/cross-objector shall be treated to be in service for all the period since the date of suspension till the date of his retirement and he shall be entitled to all the service benefits payable to him from the date of suspension treating him in service till his retirement. He also be entitled to provisional pension in terms of paragraph 19 (5) of the Pension Scheme. The appropriate authorities shall determine such provisional pension within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order and shall continue to pay such pension to him regularly till the judicial proceeding continues, however, subject to the result of the said judicial proceedings. The appropriate authorities shall determine such provisional pension within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order and shall continue to pay such pension to him regularly till the judicial proceeding continues, however, subject to the result of the said judicial proceedings. The appropriate authority shall also pay the arrear pension to the respondent/cross-objector. The appropriate authority shall also calculate the arrears of pay payable to the respondent/cross-objector after adjusting all amounts, if any, received by the respondent/cross-objector, within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. However, no gratuity shall be paid to him until the judicial proceeding is concluded and the provisional pension paid to him shall be subject to the decision in the judicial proceeding. (16.) IT would be open to the authority concerned under the Pension Scheme to take appropriate decision in relation to the question of reduction or withholding or payment of pension to the respondent/cross-objector after the judicial proceedings is concluded on the basis of the decision given on such proceedings. In case the question of exercising option under the ROPA 1996 has not been exercised by the respondent/cross-objector on account of having been suspended from service, in that event it would be treated that the respondent/cross-objector had exercised his option under ROPA 1996. (17.) IN the circumstances, the cross-objection, being COT No. 3019 of 1998 stands allowed to the extent indicated above. The order appealed against stands affirmed and modified to the extent indicated above. (18.) IN view of the order passed in the principal appeal, being MAT No. 2643 of 1998, the other appeal, being MAT No. 2589 of 1998 stands dismissed. (19.) THERE will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.