B. S. PATIL, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER is before this Court Challenging the order dated 18. 06. 2005 passed by the 2nd respondent vide Annexure-L whereby the request made by the petitioner seeking payment of salary and allowances attached to the post of Junior Assistant is deferred until completion of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her. The second relief sought by the petitioner is for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the petitioner as duly confirmed as junior Assistant upon completion of six months period of probation. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that the she was appointed temporarily on 20th March, 1996 as 'assistant' under the respondents. Petitioner was regularly appointed as Junior Assistant on 16. 09. 2000 with a condition that she shall be on probation for a period of six months. It is stipulated in the order of appointment, copy of which is produced at Annexure-B, that during the period of probation she would be paid the minimum pay admissable to the post at Rs. 2,775-per month and upon satisfactory completion of the period of probation, regular pay scale attached to the post would be payable. ( 3 ) ON 02. 12. 2002, the services of the petitioner came to be terminated on the ground that the appointment itself was not regularly made. This order was challenged in W. P. No. 44995/2002. By order dated 24. 01. 2005, the writ petition was allowed remitting the matter back for taking fresh action in accordance with law. After affording opportunity to the petitioner, respondents dropped the proceedings initiated against the petitioner vide order dated 04. 06. 2005, copy of which is produced at Annexure-G. Thus, the action initiated against the petitioner got concluded. In the meanwhile, petitioner was transferred to Dharwad. She filed another writ petition in W. P. No. 7071/2005 challenging the order of transfer and also seeking a direction to the respondents to pay the salary and allowances admissable to the post as she was paid only the basic pay attached to the post. This Court, by order dated 31. 03. 2005 disposed of the said writ petition rejecting the challenge made to the transfer order but directing the respondens to consider the representation made by the petitioner for payment of salary and allowances admissable, in accordance with law. This Court, by order dated 31. 03. 2005 disposed of the said writ petition rejecting the challenge made to the transfer order but directing the respondens to consider the representation made by the petitioner for payment of salary and allowances admissable, in accordance with law. Petitioner was permitted to make appropriate represenation in this regard. Accordingly, representations were submitted on 21. 04. 2005 and 06. 05. 2005, copies of which are produced at Annexures-J and K respectively. Upon consideration of these representations, respondents have passed the impugned order dated 18. 06. 2005 intimating the petitioner that her request for payment of salary and allowances shall stand deferred till the completion of enquiry intitiated as per the charge sheet dated 06. 06. 2005. It is to be noticed here that the Governing council, on 01. 06. 2005 took a decision to initiate disciplinary action against the petitioner with regard to certain allegations to misconduct and had further resolved to continue her on probation, consequent whereof, the order under challenge came to be passed. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that as per the terms of the order of appointment petitioner is entitled for payment of full pay and allowances admissable as she had completed the probationary period. Subsequent initiation of enquiry after the completion of the period of probation cannot be a ground to deny the salary and allowances is what is contended. The second submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that in the absence of extension of the period of probation, the petitioner shall be deemed to have completed the period of probation upon the expiry of the period of six months. It is lastly contended by the learned Counsel that the maximum period of probation as per the relevant Rule namely Rule 14 of Centre of entrepreneurship Development of Karnataka Service Rules, 1999 (for short 'the Rules') is two years beyond which, the period of probation cannot be extended and therefore the resoluation passed by the Governing Council and the consequent order passed by the 2nd respondent extending the period of probation after the expiry of the maximum period of two years is illegal and without authority of law. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the respondents contends that the Service Rules do not provide for deemed confirmation and in the absence of any such provision providing for deemed confirmation, unless the probationary period is declared as satisfactorily completed the petitioner continues to be on probation and therefore the action taken by the respondents both in extending the period of probation and as also in denying the full salary and allowances attached to the post are consistent with the provisions. ( 6 ) HAVING heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, the points that arise for consideration are: i) Whether, in the absence of declaration of satisfactory completion of the period of probation, the petitioner can be said to have completed the period of probation ? ii) Whether, the action of the respondent authorities in denying the full pay and allowances admissable to the post of Junior Assistant is legally tenable?( 7 ) THE order of appointment of the petitioner, copy of which is produced at Annexure-B states that the petitioner is appointed as Junior Assistant and she shall be on probation for a minimum period of six months from the date she reports for duty. Condition No. 3 incorporated in the said order states that during the period of probation the petitioner shall be paid the basic scale payable to the post at Rs. 2,775/- Condition No. 4 of the appointment order, however, makes it clear that upon satisfactory completion of the period for probation the petitioner shall be entitled for payment of all other allowances including the basic pay payable. It is an admitted fact that the period of probation of the petitioner is not extended by recording any reasons after completion of the initial period of probation of six months. It is in the this context the counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been confirmed and her probationary period deemed to have been satisfactorily completed upon the completion of the period of six months. To consider this argument, references to Rule 14 which is the relevant rule becomes necessary, which is extracted hereunder "14. All appointments in CEDOK will be on probation for a period of six months. The period of probation may be extended by the Appointing Authority, but not more than two years for the reason given in writing. To consider this argument, references to Rule 14 which is the relevant rule becomes necessary, which is extracted hereunder "14. All appointments in CEDOK will be on probation for a period of six months. The period of probation may be extended by the Appointing Authority, but not more than two years for the reason given in writing. " ( 8 ) A perusal of the rule would make it clear that the Appointing Authority has the power to extend the probationary period but the outer limit is fixed as two years meaning thereby the probationary period cannot be extended beyond two years. Inevitable inference that emerges from the understanding of this rule is that after the completion of the maximum period of probation of two years, the probationary period cannot be extended. The undisputed facts in the instant case would reveal that the petitioner was appointed on 16. 09. 2000 placing her on probation initially for a period of six months. It follows, therefore, upon completion of two years namely as on 17. 09. 2002 the petitioner completed the maximum period of probation prescribed as there was no provision for extending the probation beyond two years. It was open for the authorities to take any action that was permissible under the Rules within the period of two years. They did not take any such action to discharge her from the services during the said period. However, on 02. 12. 2002 her services came to be terminated. This was taken exception to by this Court and the order was set aside reserving liberty to the respondents to initiate such action as was open to them in law. Even after the disposal of the writ petition with liberty reserved to initiate fresh action, the respondents have not taken any action. Instead, they dropped the proceedings as is clear from the order dated 04. 06. 2005, copy of which is produced at annexure-G. Having done so, it is not open for the respondents now to resort to the action of extending the period of probation. There is no provision in the rules which state that unless the period of probation is declared the petitioner shall be deemed to be continued on probation. Therefore, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is right in contending that the petitioner has completed the period of probation and the order passed extending the period of probation is illegal. There is no provision in the rules which state that unless the period of probation is declared the petitioner shall be deemed to be continued on probation. Therefore, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is right in contending that the petitioner has completed the period of probation and the order passed extending the period of probation is illegal. The question that however remains to be answered is whether the petitioner is said to have completed the period of probation after completion of six months. The Rules, no doubt, provide that the Appointing Authority can extend the period of probation for a period not exceeding two years but such extension can be made for reasons to be recorded in writing. In the instant case, no such extension of the period of probation is made by recording any reasons in writing. That does not mean that the petitioner shall be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the period of probation after six months as there is no provision in the rule providing for deemed completion of the period of probation either. That apart, there is material to show that the appointing Authority was not fully satisfied with the discharge of duties by the petitioner during the period of probation. This is discernable from the notice issued on 19. 09. 2001 by the appointing Authority, copy of which is produced along with the statement of objections by the respondents at Annexure-R2 where under the petitioner is notified that she was required to correct herself in future. Therefore, it has to be stated in the facts and circumstances of this case that the petitioner cannot be deemed to have completed the period of probation immediately after the expiry of six months. But, what cannot be lost sight is that upon the expiry of the maximum period of two year as per Rule 14 of the Rules the period of probation comes to end and the petitioner shall be deemed to have completed the probationary period. Support can be sought for this conclusion from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Wasim Beg v. State Of Uttar pradesh and Ors. , AIR 1998 SCC 291 . At paragraph 15 and 16 of the said judgment, the Apex court has observed thus: "15. Support can be sought for this conclusion from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Wasim Beg v. State Of Uttar pradesh and Ors. , AIR 1998 SCC 291 . At paragraph 15 and 16 of the said judgment, the Apex court has observed thus: "15. Whether an employee at the end of the probationary period automatically gets confirmation in the post or whether an order of confirmation or any specific act on the part of the employer confirming the employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in the relevant Service rules relating to probation and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of this court dealing with this question. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, this Court has held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless rules provided to the Contrary. This is the line of cases starting with State of Punjab v. Dharam singh AIR1968 SC 1210 , [1968 (17 )FLR9 ], 1968 Lablc1409 , [1968 ]3 SCR1 , M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank (AIR 1987 Suppl SCC 643), Om Parkash maurya v. U. P. Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow (1986 Suppl SCC 95), State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav AIR1987 SC 2135 , (1987 )2 glr1286 , 1987 (2 )SCALE428 , (1987 )4 SCC482 , [1987 ]3 SCR1091 , 1988 (2 )SLJ86 (SC ), 1987 (2 )UJ756 (SC ). " "16. However, even when the Rules prescribe a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the Rules of continuation of such probation beyond the maximum period, the Courts have made an exception and said that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended, in this category of cases we can place Samsher singh v. State of Punjab AIR1974 SC 2192 , (1974 )II LLJ465 SC , (1974 )2 SCC831 , [1975 ]1 SCR814 , 1975 (1 )SLJ1 (SC ) which was the decision of a Bench of seven Judges where the principle of probation not going beyond the maximum period fixed was reiterated but on the basis of the Rules which were before the Court, this Court said that the probation was deemed to have been extended. A similar view was taken in the case of Muncipal corporation, Raipur v. Ashok kumar Misra, AIR1991 SC 1402 , JT1991 (2 )SC 599 , (1991 )II LLJ343 SC , (1991 )3 SCC325 , [1991 ]2 SCR320 , 1991 (2 )UJ170 (SC ). In Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh 1996 I ad (SC )387 , AIR1996 SC 750 , 1996 Lablc757 , 1995 (7 )SCALE138 , (1996 )1 SCC560 , [1995 ]supp5 SCR679 , although the Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order was issued within the extended period of probation. Hence the termination was upheld. " Therefore, it has to be held that the petitioner has satisfactorily completed the probationary period upon completion of two years fixed as maximum period of probation under Rule 14 of the rules. ( 9 ) AS regards the question whether the petitioner is entitled for payment of full salary and allowances admissable to the post, it is to be stated that the condition on which the petitioner was appointed itself makes clear that upon completion of the period of probation petitioner would be entitled for the allowances payable along with the basic pay. Petitioner has completed, as held above, the period of probation on 17. 09. 2002. With effect from the said date, she is entitled for full pay and allowances as a confirmed employee in the post in question. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons the petitioner is entitled to sucessed. Hence, I pass the following: order writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 18. 06. 2005, Annexure-L passed pursuant to the resolution of the Governing Council dated 01. 06. 2005 is quashed. Petitioner is held entitled for payment of salary and allowances in terms of the appointment order with effect from the date of completion of two years of probationary period from the date of her appointment. Petitioner shall be paid the amount to which she is entitled within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Writ petition stands disposed of in terms stated above with no order as to costs.