JUDGMENT Petitioner in M.V.C. No. 1206 of 1998 has filed a claim petition seeking compensation for the personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The Tribunal has awarded a compensation of Rs.35,000/- with interest at 6% per annum from the date of petition till payment. The Tribunal has: directed the owner and insurer of the vehicle to pay the compensation. Aggrieved by this order, the insurer is in appeal. 2. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Appaji (since deceased) and Another v M. Krishna and Another, has held that the provisions of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would not apply in a case where the victim himself is negligent in causing the accident and no compensation could be paid in such cases. It is further laid down that in a case of composite negligence of involvement of two vehicles causing the accident irrespective of negligence of vehicle pertaining to the petitioner, a claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act would lie and when the owner of the offending vehicle and the insurer would be liable to pay the compensation. In this case, it is argued that it is the case of sale negligence of the petitioner and there is no other vehicle involved in the accident. 3. The Supreme Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others v United Insurance Company Limited, Baroda2, at para 66 has made the following observations: "We may notice that Section 167 of the Act provides that where death of; or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to claim of compensation under the Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, he cannot claim compensation under both the Acts. The Motor Vehicles Act contains different expressions as, for example, "under the provision of the Act", "provisions of this Act", "under any other provisions of this Act" or "any other law or otherwise". In Section 163-A, the expression "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force" has been used, which goes to show that the Parliament intended to insert a non obstante clause of wide nature which would mean that the provisions of Section 163-A would apply despite the contrary provisions existing in the said Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 163-A of the Act covers cases where even negligence is on the part of the victim. It is by way of an exception to Section 166 and the concept of social justice has been duly taken care of". 4. Sri Ashok R. Kalyana Shetty, learned Counsel relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Amritsar v Hazara Singh1 to contend that obiter dictum of the Supreme Court on the matter of law is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. B.K. Shadaksharappa and Another v State of Karnataka and Another2, lays down that when the Supreme Court has interpreted certain provisions of law, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court to say whether the interpretation rendered was warranted or not in the context of facts dealt by the Supreme Court. 5. After careful consideration of the decisions cited and the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni, extracted above, it is clear that the observations do constitute an obiter dictum on the matter of law. The Supreme Court in clear terms had stated that the provisions of Section 163-A would apply despite the contrary provisions existing in the said Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 163-A of the Act covers cases where even there is negligence on the part of the victim. The distinction sought to be made out by the learned Counsel for appellant that only in case of a partial or contributory negligence on the part of the victim Section 163-A does attract and when victim himself is solely negligent, Section 163-A docs not apply appears to be an illusory distinction, in view of the ratio hid down by the Supreme Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni's case. 6. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. Amount in deposit to be transmitted to the Tribunal for payment.