ORDER 1. Workmen of Toyota Kirloskar Motor Private Ltd. are seeking for a writ of certiorari to quash the notifications dt. 5-1-2005 (Annexure-A), 30-11-2001 (Annexure-R3) and 30-6-2005 (Annexure-K) in this petition. They further seek a direction directing the respondent not to give effect to the notification dt. 5-1-2005, in this petition. 2. Respondent company is a Multi National company and is incorporated in Japan. The Company wanted to expand its activities in India and earn fabulous profits by exploiting the work force. The State Government gave several concessions including the grant of nearly 430 acres of land in Bidadi belonging to farmers by acquiring the lands and the company established its plant in the Bidadi Industrial Area. Commercial production started in the year 1999. The company started manufacturing ‘Qualis’ a multi utility service, ‘Toyota Crolla’, and ‘Innova’ a sports utility vehicle. The Company is manufacturing on an average about 200 Innova vehicles per day and there is a great demand for these vehicles. They are sold as soon as they come out of the plant. There is no stock of the vehicles because there is already booking for these vehicles. It is submitted that though the company has made tremendous progress on the production side, as far as the recruitment of workmen/employees are concerned, the company has not made recruitment proportionately. In the year 1999 the company recruited only 600 workmen and the total number of permanent workers as on today is only about 1400. In addition to this there are about 900 staff members including top executives. Besides this the company has also employed equal number of casuals, apprentices and contract labour. With such small work force, the company is extracting maximum work from the workmen. The workmen are suffering because of increased work load. Workmen employed in the company are highly qualified. They have been taken as trainees. Though they are designated as trainees they were put in charge of production immediately. Since workmen did not have a union to agitate for the collective grievances they wanted to organize and register a trade union. Some of the workmen who initiated to organize a union were victimized. With a view to see that the workmen do not ever entertain an idea of forming a Union, the management in its own initiative and encouragement formed a Union called ‘Team Members Association’. Some of the workmen who initiated to organize a union were victimized. With a view to see that the workmen do not ever entertain an idea of forming a Union, the management in its own initiative and encouragement formed a Union called ‘Team Members Association’. Workmen had no confidence in the said association as it was a management dominated union. It is a clear case of unfair labour practice as defined under Sec. 2(ra) r/w fifth schedule to the ID Act. The workmen formed an union and registered during July, 2001. Management adopted several hostile measures and used unfair tactics and methods to destroy the union. The State Government openly supported the management. An industrial dispute was raised by the union regarding confirmation of a workman by name Sri Girish Arose. Since the management was not willing to take a reasonable stand to settle the dispute, the union submitted a strike notice and there was a strike for 52 days. Thereafter the matter was referred to adjudication. Despite the same the management went on suspending office bearers of the Union. On 26-6-2002, a settlement was signed which was valid for a period of two years. The management started various provocative acts, such as insisting on the workmen to work over and above the working hours. On refusal workmen were suspended. Union protested against the illegal suspensions and demanded reinstatement of the suspended workmen. Workmen boycotted the lunch on 24-1-2004. The management suspended some more workmen without any charge sheet. Even though the workmen approached the conciliation officer for resolving all outstanding issues of raising an industrial dispute, the management was not willing to discuss for the simple reasons that the Union was being advised by CITU leaders. A Conciliation notice was issued. The management did not co-operate and did not resolve any of the disputes. The management did not want the CITU leaders to take over the leadership of the Union even though the Union has already sought and obtained affiliation to CITU. Workmen were suspended fairly for a long time and no action was taken. The Union demanded that the workmen who were dismissed from service/placed under suspension be taken back to duty. The union also demanded for revision of wage scales, dearness allowance, increments and all other benefits. A true copy of the Charter of demands submitted by the Union is as per letter dt. 24-3-2005. The Union demanded that the workmen who were dismissed from service/placed under suspension be taken back to duty. The union also demanded for revision of wage scales, dearness allowance, increments and all other benefits. A true copy of the Charter of demands submitted by the Union is as per letter dt. 24-3-2005. The management unilaterally gave certain increases without any basis with a view to create a division among the workers. This action of the management is also an unfair labour practice. The management was not interested in resolving the industrial dispute. This created total frustration among the workers. A General Body meeting of the union was held on 15-5-2005. A secret ballot was conducted wherein 967 members voted in favour of the strike. A strike notice was issued. The management, instead of negotiating with the workmen and entering into a settlement pertaining to wage revision, unilaterally announced a wage revision to divide the workmen. The management also issued a letter stating that the company is notified as Public Utility Service by the Government in terms of the order dt. 5-1-2005 and hence strike in violation of the directive law is a punishable offence under law. After filing of the petition, the Government has issued one more notification dt. 30-6-2005 declaring automobile and auto component manufacturing industries (set up in Auto Parks) as Public Utility Service with effect from 1-7-2005 for a period of six months. Petitioner also states that the Government by notification dt. 30-11-2001 included automobile and auto component manufacturing industries (set up in Auto Parks) at sl. No. 39 of the first schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Sec. 2(n) of the said Act. Petitioner states that these notifications suffer from various illegalities in terms of the provisions of the ID Act. They are before me challenging these notifications. 3. Notice was issued and the management has filed a detailed counter statement. They dispute various averments/allegations made against them. They essentially say that advisability of adding an industry to the first schedule is a matter of policy and a policy decision cannot be questioned. Public interest is a dynamic proposition. What is public interest today may not have been public interest yesterday and vice-versa. What is public interest is for the Government to decide based on the society requirements. They essentially say that advisability of adding an industry to the first schedule is a matter of policy and a policy decision cannot be questioned. Public interest is a dynamic proposition. What is public interest today may not have been public interest yesterday and vice-versa. What is public interest is for the Government to decide based on the society requirements. There has been great efforts made by the State Governments and the Central Government to encourage setting up industries in the respective States. Incentives were provided for the purpose of investing foreign capital in India. If workmen strike work without exhausting other means available in law for redressal of grievances, it would send wrong signals to the prospective investors in the State. The State would lose industry thereby employment potential would be affected. The impugned notification has not in any way taken away the privilege of the workmen to strike work. In fact the Industrial Disputes Act has not conferred any right on the workmen to strike work. The Constitution has also not conferred any right on the workmen to strike work. Through the impugned notification, a reasonable restriction is imposed on the workmen in the matter of strike. There are large number of industrial establishments which are declared as public utility services and in which workmen have struck work after issuing notice required before striking work. All that the notification requires is, that workmen should give 14 days advance notice to the management before striking work and should strike work within six weeks from the date of the notice. This provision is practical and has worked well right from the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes Act. No trade union in an industry specified as public utility service has approached any Court on the ground that unreasonable restrictions are imposed in the matter of striking work. Respondent is a joint venture collaboration between Toyota Motor Corporation, a Corporation set up under the laws of Japan and ‘Kirloskar Systems Ltd., a Indian Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The Toyota Motor Corporation is a world renowned automobile manufacturer with operations in over 36 countries. The respondent set up its factory and plant at the address mentioned in the cause title after obtaining the permission of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board and all other requisite statutory authorities. The Toyota Motor Corporation is a world renowned automobile manufacturer with operations in over 36 countries. The respondent set up its factory and plant at the address mentioned in the cause title after obtaining the permission of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board and all other requisite statutory authorities. The total investment of the respondent is about Rs.1500 crores and the investment of the Group Companies of the respondent is 600 crores. The respondent in its six years of operations had paid Central Excise to the tune of Rs.21,290 Million, Customs duty to a tune of Rs.15,571 Million, Income Tax to a tune ofRs.79 Million, effected Income Tax Deduction at source to a tune ofRs.1,102 Million and Professional Tax to the tune of Rs.11 Million. This has together aggregated to aboutRs.38,053 Million revenue to the Government in the last six years of its operation. Respondent has dealers spread across India. The dealers sell the finished products of the respondent while the suppliers supply the required raw material and components for the production activities of the respondent. Currently there are about 47 dealers in India currently dealing only with the products of the respondent and totally employ about 3500 people. There are 78 exclusive dedicated suppliers and they totally employ around 2700 persons. In addition, the industry of the respondents and its dealers and suppliers have provided an indirect employment to about 1400 persons in other non-production related areas like gardening, security, house keeping, civil work etc. Therefore in addition to the direct employment to about 2400 persons, the industry of the respondent has generated an indirect employment through its dealers and suppliers to about 7600 persons and they are all depending on the functioning of the company. The company follows on the job training method and it also provides special development programme for better production purpose. The current average monthly salary for each worker is about Rs.13,606/-. The company provides vehicle for travelling of the workmen and canteen facilities at a subsidised rates to all the workers. The company provides better benefits when compared with other industries similarly situated. The company commenced its production in 1999. The company has several documents with regard to the misconduct committed by the workmen. Several annexures have been produced in support of their submissions. They would also say that a settlement was arrived at in terms of annexure-R-17. The company provides better benefits when compared with other industries similarly situated. The company commenced its production in 1999. The company has several documents with regard to the misconduct committed by the workmen. Several annexures have been produced in support of their submissions. They would also say that a settlement was arrived at in terms of annexure-R-17. Settlement provides for certain benefits in the matter. The Company has given several details with regard to the industrial unrest for some time. They refer to the various incidents in the lengthy objections statement filed by them. 4. Sri K. Subba Rao, learned senior counsel would argue that the impugned notifications dt. 30-11-2001, 5-1-2005 and 30-6-2005 suffer from arbitrariness and unreasonableness; that notifications have been issued only to benefit the fourth respondent in view of the industry being a joint venture in terms of the pleadings; that the respondents have acted contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India; that the public utility notification has to be with reference to the essential character of an industry in the light of the very definition itself; that the respondents have failed to apply their mind to the legal requirement in terms of Sec. 2(n) of the Act; that these two notifications have been issued without hearing the workmen and that therefore it suffers from violation of rules of natural justice that a right given to the workmen in terms of Article 19 is taken away by these two notifications; that no public service as such is shown while issuing these notifications; that these notifications have been issued only to support the trade union activities by the management. He attacks these two notifications in the light of violation of statutory object and on the principle of interpretation of statutes. Learned counsel would complain that the company is adopting unfair labour practice in terms of the ID Act. In so far as Government files are concerned, he would say that those files would indicate arbitrariness and non-application of mind to the given circumstances. Ultimately he wants this Court to strike down these two notifications on the facts and circumstances of this case. 5. Per contra, Sri Ganesh, learned Senior counsel would say that no right of the petitioner as such is taken away by these two notifications. Ultimately he wants this Court to strike down these two notifications on the facts and circumstances of this case. 5. Per contra, Sri Ganesh, learned Senior counsel would say that no right of the petitioner as such is taken away by these two notifications. He would say that both these notifications would require a notice under Sec. 22 and 23 of the ID Act. Similar restriction is also placed on the management in the matter of lockout. In so far as the first notification is concerned he would say that Sec. 40 provides for sufficient power and jurisdiction for the purpose of issuance of a notification; that public interest would take different shade and different colours; Public good would be a relevant factor for the purpose of public interest; that the respondent is a joint sector having invested several crores with better service facilities and that industry cannot be paralysed with frequent strikes. With this laudable object, the Government in its wisdom with a view to provide good industrial atmosphere has chosen to include the same in the schedule and it is purely legislative in character. In so far as the second notification is concerned, learned counsel would say that what the section would require is to take into consideration the public interest in terms of Sec. 2(n) (vi) of the Act. Learned counsel would say that these two notifications being in the form of subordinate legislation, Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with these notifications unless on exceptionally - grounds. Learned counsel would say that the principle of judicial review as in the case of administrative decision would not be available in the case of subordinate legislation. He would also take me through the various material facts to say that the Government is justified in the given circumstances in issuing these two notifications. He would also invite my attention to the new industrial policy 2001-2006 in support of his argument of public interest. 6. Learned Advocate General would support the notification by saying that the Government in its wisdom have taken into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances and has chosen to issue these two notifications with the larger interest of industrialisation and in the larger interest of industrial peace. He would also refer to the various material facts to say that the Government is fully justified in issuing these two notifications. He would also refer to the various material facts to say that the Government is fully justified in issuing these two notifications. He would also refer to the Government files in support of his submission. 7. In reply, Sri K. Subba Rao, learned senior counsel would reiterate his earlier contentions. He would further say that the principle of ejusdem generis would apply to the facts of this case and in terms of the principle of interpretation of statutes. He strongly relies on ONGC case AIR 1990 SC 1851 as it would be an answer in so far as the argument of the respondent is concerned. He would once again say that judicial review is permissible in a matter like this and that therefore the matter requires interference. 8. After hearing the learned counsel exhaustively on various dates and after going through the material record, the following issues would arise for my consideration. 1. Back ground of the case. 2. Validity of the notification dt. 30-11-2001 vis-a-vis the scope of Section 40 of the Act. 3. Validity of the notification annexure-K dt. 1-7-2005 vis-a-vis the scope of Sec. 2(n) (vi) /Judicial review. 4. Relief. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 9. Before touching upon the merits of the case, certain relevant facts are required to be noticed. The State Government has evolved an industrial policy and the said policy would provide for package of incentives and concessions for new investors. In the preamble of the policy it is stated that the State has demonstrated its strength over a wide spectrum of sectors in industry had has outstanding example of success in the old economy. In recent times, Karnataka has emerged as the knowledge and technology capital of the country making rapid strides in the new economy as well. II and related industries, biotechnology and strong research and development institutions have given Karnataka a pride of place in the global market. Karnataka is amongst the top five industrialised States in the country. The achievements in promoting hi-tech industries in key sectors like electronics, telecommunications, information technology, precision engineering, automobiles, ready made garments, biotechnology and food processing have been noteworthy. II and related industries, biotechnology and strong research and development institutions have given Karnataka a pride of place in the global market. Karnataka is amongst the top five industrialised States in the country. The achievements in promoting hi-tech industries in key sectors like electronics, telecommunications, information technology, precision engineering, automobiles, ready made garments, biotechnology and food processing have been noteworthy. During the periods 1996-97 to 2000-2001, the achievements in the industrial sector were as under : (See Table below) Bangalore has the distinction of being the destination for a large number of multinational companies in knowledge based industries and technology driven sectors and is today recognised as one of the top 10 technopolies in the world. The growth in the information technology sector has been phenomenal. From a mere US $ 45 million software exports in the year 1995-96, Bangalore today exports US $ 1.2 billion. The tremendous growth notwithstanding, there has been a general deceleration in industrial activity in the country, which over the last few years, has had its impact on the industrial sector of Karnataka too. The set back to the Asia economies added in no small measure, to the problems of the core sector industry such as steel, cement, automobiles etc. The industrial policy of 1996 was formulated keeping mind the challenges of the liberalisation of the Indian economy, globalisation of trade and the logic of privatisation of public sector enterprises. The Government in the new policy has provided the mission, objectives, strategy, technology upgradation, infrastructure support, human resource development etc. The Policy further provides for three automobile training institutes one each at Bidadi, Shimoga and Dharwad. A reading of the industrial policy would show that the Government wants to encourage automobile industry in particular and for this reason, it has set up three automobile training institute at Bidadi, Shimoga, and Dharwad. Respondent industry is situated at Bidadi. Respondent industry is a joint venture collaboration between Toyota Motor Corporation, a Corporation set up under the laws of Japan and ‘Kirloskar Systems Ltd. and Indian Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The Toyota Motor Corporation is a world renowned automobile manufacturer with operations in over 36 countries. The respondent set up its factory and plant at the address mentioned in the cause title after obtaining the permission of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board and all other requisite statutory authorities. The Toyota Motor Corporation is a world renowned automobile manufacturer with operations in over 36 countries. The respondent set up its factory and plant at the address mentioned in the cause title after obtaining the permission of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board and all other requisite statutory authorities. The total investment of the respondent is about Rs.1500/- crores and the investment of the Group Companies of the respondent is 600 crores. The respondent in its six years of operations had paid Central Excise to the tune of Rs.21,290 Million, Customs duty to a tune ofRs.15,571 Million, Income Tax to a tune of Rs.79 Million, effected Income Tax Deduction at source to a tune of Rs.1,102 Million and Professional Tax to the tune of Rs.11 Million. This has together aggregated to about Rs.38,053 Million revenue to the Government in the last six years of its operation. Respondent has dealers spread across India. The dealers sell the finished products of the respondent while the suppliers supply the required raw material and components for the production activities of the respondent. Currently there are about 47 dealers in India currently dealing only with the products of the respondent and totally employ about 3500 people. There are 78 exclusive dedicated suppliers and they totally employ around 2700 persons. In addition, the industry of the respondents and its dealers and suppliers have provided an indirect employment to about 1400 persons in other non production related areas like gardening, security, house keeping, civil work etc. Therefore in addition to the direct employment to about 2400 persons, the industry of the respondent has generated an indirect employment through its dealers and suppliers to about 7600 persons and they are all depending on the functioning of the company. The company follows on the job training method and it also provides special development programme for better production purpose. The current average monthly salary for each worker is about Rs.13,606/-. The respondent has certain expansion plans for the future and this would generate further additional employment to about 4000 more persons. This would lead to creation of 16000 new jobs by the dealers and suppliers of the respondent either directly or indirectly. The company provides for on the job training to its workmen in terms of the averments made in the objection statment. The company spends roughly about Rs.17,500/- on a workman. The company has also adopted various welfare measures. This would lead to creation of 16000 new jobs by the dealers and suppliers of the respondent either directly or indirectly. The company provides for on the job training to its workmen in terms of the averments made in the objection statment. The company spends roughly about Rs.17,500/- on a workman. The company has also adopted various welfare measures. Industrial Disputes Act is an Act to make provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain other purpose. The Act provides for a detailed procedure. Strikes and Lockouts are dealt with in chapter 5. It deals with prohibition /general prohibition of strikes and lockouts, illegal strikes and lockouts and prohibition of financial aid to illegal strikes and lockouts. With this background of the laudable object of settlement in terms of the Industrial Disputes Act and in the light of laudable object of bringing foreign investment in terms of the policy and in terms of the history of the case, let me see as to whether the notifications issued in terms of the amended provisions would be valid, legal and enforceable. VALIDITY OF THE NOTIFICATION Dt. 31-11-2001. 10. Industrial Disputes Act defines the term public utility in terms of Sec. 2(n) of the Act. After setting out five categories of industries to be emergency industry, the Act provides for any industry specified in the first schedule which the appropriate Government may, if satisfied that public emergency or public interest requires by notification in the official gazette, declare to be a public utility service for the purposes of this Act, for such period as may be specified in the notification. There is a reference to first schedule in Sec. 2(n) (vi) of the Act. S. 40 provides that if the Government is of the opinion that it is expedient or necessary in public interest to include any industry to the first schedule, it may do so by a notification in the official gazette. On any such notification being issued, the first schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. It is seen from the material on record that the State Government has chosen to issue a notification No. LD 16 KABANI 2001 dtd. 30-11-2001 in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Sec. 40 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On any such notification being issued, the first schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. It is seen from the material on record that the State Government has chosen to issue a notification No. LD 16 KABANI 2001 dtd. 30-11-2001 in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Sec. 40 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By the said notification the Government has chosen to include (1) bio-technology industry (2) Agro food Processing Industries (Set up in Agro/food parks) (3) Readymade garments industry (4) Electronics and Telecommunication Industry (5) Automobile and Auto Component Manufacturing Industries (Set up in Auto Parks). The first objection raised by the petitioner is that the inclusion of Automobile and Auto Component Manufacturing Industries (Set up in Auto Parks) is done only to confer favour on the respondent company. There is absolutely no acceptable material placed on record with regard to any favour for the purpose of violation of Article 14 in terms of the pleadings. It is as vague as it could be. Even otherwise it could be seen that the Government has issued this notification with respect to several industries and one such industrty happens to be Automobile and Auto Component Manufacturing Industries (Set up in Auto Parks). If the Government in its wisdom has chosen to include the said industry along with other industries, the same cannot be termed as favouritism as argued by the petitioner. At this stage, I must also notice the industrial policy of the State Government. The State Government with a view to industrialise the State has chosen to give the status of key sector to information technology/software services, readymade garment industries, electronics and telecommunication industry, automobile and auto components manufacturing industries set up in auto parks, bio technology, agro food processing industries set up in agro /food parks), and export oriented industries. If the policy in terms of clause-3 is seen, then the notification is in aid of the said policy. Therefore it cannot be said that the Government has without application of mind has chosen to include the respondent industry either arbitrarily or unreasonably as sought to be made out by the petitioner. The said notification has to be read in the light of the industrial policy of the State Government. Therefore it cannot be said that the Government has without application of mind has chosen to include the respondent industry either arbitrarily or unreasonably as sought to be made out by the petitioner. The said notification has to be read in the light of the industrial policy of the State Government. It is also seen that in the light of the policy of liberalisation and globalisation, the Government has chosen to provide certain benefits for certain key sectors in terms of the policy. The Government file also would show that the Government after applying its mind and in the light of the cabinet decision has chosen to issue this notification. This notification has been issued in terms of the policy of the Government and that therefore there cannot be any arbitrariness or unreasonableness as sought to be argued by the petitioner. Therefore the argument of the workmen that this notification has been issued without application of mind also does not appeal to me. Petitioners also complain that the inclusion is bad in law since according to the petitioners, the industry which could be included under Sec. 40 should have the same colour or shade as in the case of other industries as referred to in Sec. 2(n) (i-v). This argument initially would be attractive but on a closer scrutinisation it would show that this argument cannot be accepted in the case on hand. According to petitioners Sec. 40 provides for inclusion of any industry as public utility service by the Government and any industry has to be understood with reference to the first five industries in terms of Sec. 2(n) (i-v). If the intention of the legislature is to include only such industry as analogous to Sec. 2(n)(i-v), they would not have used the word any industry. Ultimately, when the State in its wisdom and in terms of the policy has chosen to include by way of public interest, this Court cannot nullify that public interest and public utility under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Ultimately, when the State in its wisdom and in terms of the policy has chosen to include by way of public interest, this Court cannot nullify that public interest and public utility under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. At this stage, I must also notice the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of Balco Employees Union, (2002) 1 Lab LJ 550 : ( AIR 2002 SC 350 ) has ruled that the Governments decision embodying its economic policy and bringing about a shift in focus could not per se be interfered with by the Court unless any illegality was committed in its execution or unless it was contrary to law or mala fide. Sri Subba Rao, learned senior counsel, invites my attention to the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in (2005) 5 SCC 598 : ( AIR 2005 SC 2821 ) was also considered in the subsequent judgment also. The Supreme Court has only noticed in para 84 that the economic policies of the State although ordinarily would not be interfered with, but the same are not beyond the pale of judicial review. But the present facts would show that there is —Neither —illegality nor it suffers from mala fides. In these circumstances, the notification has to be accepted and I do so in the case on hand. VALIDITY OF THE NOTIFICATION ANNEXURE-K Dtd. 1-7-2005 VIS-A-VIS THE SCOPE OF Sec. 2(N) (VI)/JUDICIAL REVIEW. 11. In so far as the second notification is concerned, petitioners would complain of specific favour, non-application of mind, arbitrariness etc. as in the case of the earlier notification. With regard to the notification also it is pleaded that the notified industry must have the same colour and shade as in the case of the industries under Sec. 2(n) (i-v) of the Act. In so far as the arbitrary argument is concerned, I have carefully perused the material on record. It is no doubt true that the Government has chosen to issue a notification only in the name of the Toyota Kirloskar Motors vide notification dt. 5-1-2005. When that notification was challenged in the writ petition, the Government in the light of expiry of that notification has chosen to issue a subsequent notification in terms of annexure-K dt. 30-6-2005. From a reading of Annexure-A, it is seen that the notification has been issued in the name of individual industry. 5-1-2005. When that notification was challenged in the writ petition, the Government in the light of expiry of that notification has chosen to issue a subsequent notification in terms of annexure-K dt. 30-6-2005. From a reading of Annexure-A, it is seen that the notification has been issued in the name of individual industry. After noticing the mistake particularly in the light of a specific ground, the Government has chosen to issue a subsequent notification in terms of the policy and in terms of the inclusion in section 40 of the Act. It may appear that the Government has chosen to issue a notification in terms of the respondent company. It cannot be seriously disputed that the said company is a automobile and auto components manufacturing industry and it is set up in auto park. Therefore mere issuance of the notification in the name of the company does not by itself amount to any favouritism or arbitrariness in the case on hand. Even otherwise, that notification has come to an end and this Court has to notice the effect of the subsequent notification annexure-K in the case on hand. In annexure-K, the Government has chosen to say that automobiles and auto components manufacturing industries (Set up in auto parks) public utility services in terms of Sec. 2 (n) of the Act. As I mentioned earlier, the Government has chosen to include the key sector industry in terms of the policy in the first schedule. The Government being satisfied itself with public interest has chosen to issue a subsequent notification for a period of six months. I do not find any unreasonableness in the case on hand. This argument is therefore rejected. In so far as the argument that even while issuing the notification under Sec. 2 (n) (i-v), the Government can issue notification only in respect of industries which have the same colour or shade as in the case of Sec. 2(n) (i-v). Let me see as whether this argument is tenable or not in the case on hand. In so far as the argument that even while issuing the notification under Sec. 2 (n) (i-v), the Government can issue notification only in respect of industries which have the same colour or shade as in the case of Sec. 2(n) (i-v). Let me see as whether this argument is tenable or not in the case on hand. Section 2(n)(i-v) reads as under; ‘Public utility service’ means — (i) any railway service, or any transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods by air; (ia) any service in, or in connection with the working of, any major port or dock; (ii) any Section of an industrial establishment, on the working of which the safety of the establishment or the workmen employed therein depends; (iii) any postal telegraph or telephone service; (iv) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public; (v) any system of public conservancy or sanitation; (vi) any industry specified in the First Schedule which the appropriate Government may, if satisfied that public emergency or public interest requires by notification in the official Gazette declare to be a public utility service for the purposes of this Act, for such period as may be specified in the notification; Provided that the period so specified shall not in the first instance, exceed six months but may, by a like notification, be extended from time to time by any period not exceeding six months, at any one time if in the opinion of the appropriate Government public emergency or public interest requires such extension.’ However by virtue of their essential service itself the first five industries get the label of public utility service. Courts can take judicial notice that industrialisation is taking place all over the globe and it provides better economy and better society in terms of the laws governing the society. Therefore, the legislature in its wisdom has chosen to say that in addition to Sec. 2(n) (i-v), the Government may declare any industry in the first schedule as public utility service provided the Government is satisfied of its public interest in terms of the statute. Therefore the argument of the notifications being bad on account of no shade, no colour in terms of Sec. 2(n) (i-v) does not appeal to me. Let me see as to whether the present notification would stand the test of public interest. Therefore the argument of the notifications being bad on account of no shade, no colour in terms of Sec. 2(n) (i-v) does not appeal to me. Let me see as to whether the present notification would stand the test of public interest. Public interest varies from case to case and from situation to situation. It is not a static word and it cannot be static also. The policy of the Government being liberalisation and globalisation, the Government can consider public interest in terms of its policy decisions. Public interest has been considered by Courts of law. Sri Subba Rao, learned senior Counsel, strongly relies on the following judgments. (a) AIR 1970 SC 1407 , the Supreme Court noticed public utility in paras 25 and 26. 25. The intention behind this provision is obviously to classify certain services as public utility services with special protection for the continuance of those services. The named services in the definition answer the test of an industry run on commercial lines to produce something which the community can use. These are brought into existence in a commercial way and are analogous to business in which material goods are produced and distributed for consumption. 26. When Parliament added the sixth clause under which other services could be brought within the protection afforded by the Act to public utility services, it did not intend that the entire concept of industry in the Act, could be ignored and anything brought in. Therefore it said that an industry (underlined in original, printed in single quotation marks in this report-Ed.) could be declared to be a public utility service. But what could be so declared had to be an industry in the first place. We are concerned with the addition of Item 9 service in hospitals and dispensaries. The heading of the First Schedule speaks again of industries which may be declared to be public utility services. The original entries were five and they read : 1. Transport (other than railways for the carriage of passengers or goods, by land, water or air (now air is omitted) 2. Coal 3. Cotton textiles 4. Food-stuffs 5. Iron and steel. It is obvious that general headings are given here. Coal is not an industry but certain aspects of delaing with coal is an industry and that is what is intended. Coal 3. Cotton textiles 4. Food-stuffs 5. Iron and steel. It is obvious that general headings are given here. Coal is not an industry but certain aspects of delaing with coal is an industry and that is what is intended. That dealing must be in an industry in which there are employers and employees co-operating in the production of material goods or material services. Similarly, cotton textiles or food-stuffs or iron and steel, as the entries stand, are not industries. Therefore, the heading of the First Schedule and the words of clause (vi) presuppose the existence of an industry which may be notified as a public utility service, for special protection under the Act. (b) 1978 Lab IC 881, the Bombay High Court has considered the public utility in the said judgment. The Court in para 14 has referred to Sec. 2(n) and thereafter the Court has ruled as under : ‘The intention behind this provision is obviously to classify certain services as public utility services with special protection for the continuance of those services. The named services in the definition answer the test of an industry run on commercial lines to produce something which the community can use. These are brought into existence in a commercial way and are analogous to business in which material goods are produced and distributed for consumption.’ A serious emphasis is laid by the petitioner on AIR 1990 SC 1851 . The Supreme Court no doubt has considered public utility in several cases. The Court would rule in the said judgment in para 21 reading as under : ‘Once a concern is found to be a public utility, at least two consequences follow. One is a duty to serve which is described in American jurisprudence thus : ‘16. General duty to serve The primary duty of a public utility is to serve on reasonable terms all those who desire the service it renders, and it may not choose to serve only the portion of the territory covered by its franchise which is presently profitable for it to serve. General duty to serve The primary duty of a public utility is to serve on reasonable terms all those who desire the service it renders, and it may not choose to serve only the portion of the territory covered by its franchise which is presently profitable for it to serve. Upon the dedication of a public utility to a public use and in return for the grant to it of a public franchise, the public utility is under a legal obligation to render adequate and reasonably efficient service impartially, without unjust discrimination, and at reasonable rates, to all members of the public to whom its public use and scope of operation extend who apply for such service and comply with the reasonable rules and regulations of the public utility. This obligation is one implied at common law and need not be expressed by statute or contract, or in the character of the public utility.’ The second constraint is in regard to the rates that can be charged by such an undertaking : ‘A public utility may, in the absence of a legislative prescription or limitation of rates, fix and exact reasonable rates for services furnished, in which respect the reasonableness of the rate is to be considered in relation to the value of the property used by the utility in the public service. Thus, in the absence of legislation, carriers are ordinarily entitled to establish such rates and to adopt such policy of rate making as they may deem best. They may voluntarily render service for less than they could be compelled to accept. The right of a public utility or carrier to set its own rates is subject to the limitation that such rates must be non-discriminatory and reasonable. This obligation to furnish service at a reasonable price is implied by law and is incurred by acceptance of the franchise and privilege to serve the public. Furthermore, there is authority to the effect that a public utility must give a consumer the benefit of the most favourable rate which he is entitled to receive.’ Sri Subba Rao, learned senior counsel, would strongly rely on this case to show that in terms of the said judgment, the respondent cannot be termed as public utility service. Furthermore, there is authority to the effect that a public utility must give a consumer the benefit of the most favourable rate which he is entitled to receive.’ Sri Subba Rao, learned senior counsel, would strongly rely on this case to show that in terms of the said judgment, the respondent cannot be termed as public utility service. According to him, it should be so essential in rendering public service in the matter of its duty in terms of the judgment and only then the Government can consider that service/industry as Public Utility Service. Learned counsel says that no public service as such is rendered by the respondent and manufacturing of cars is not so essential warranting a status of public utility. A careful reading of the said judgment would show that the Court was considering in that case certain contracts in the light of the policy and in the light of the price fixation in the said case. However, the Court made a reference to the ID Act and in particular to the public utility character. After noticing the ID Act, the Court ruled as under : ‘19. As far as we have been able to see, there is no statutory definition of public utility in the context of any Indian enactment that may be relevant for our present purpose. There is a definition of ‘public utility service’ in S. 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which, inter alia, covers ‘any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public’ and certain notified industries. It is arguable whether supply of natural gas is concluded in this definition for, though power connotes generally any form of energy available for doing work, it is normally related to such energy made available by mechanical or electrical means (vide, Webster Comprehensive, Vol. 2, p. 990). It is also a moot question whether that definition can be appropriate in the context with which we are concerned. In fact in the said judgment the Court has noticed that it is also a moot question whether that definition can be appropriate in the context with which we are concerned. Therefore that judgment cannot be pressed into service in terms of the argument of Sri Subba Rao. The said judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts and in terms of the finding in para 19. Therefore that judgment cannot be pressed into service in terms of the argument of Sri Subba Rao. The said judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts and in terms of the finding in para 19. The said judgment may not apply to the facts of this case. Respondents rely on a few judgments. (a) (1995) Supp (1) SCC 499 : ( AIR 1995 SC 470 ) the Court has considered public interest and has ruled after noticing the judgment of the Kamagar Union as under. (para 77 of AIR) : ‘Nor do we think that ‘public interest’ which is to be taken into account as an element against approval of amalgamation would include a mere future possibility of merger resulting in a situation where the interests of the consumer might be adversely affected. If, however, in future the working of the Company turns out to be against the interest of the consumers or the employees, suitable corrective steps may be taken by appropriate authorities in accordance with law. As has been said in the case of Fertilizer Corporation. Kamgar Union v. Union of India (SCR p. 77 : SCC pp. 588-89, para 47) : ( AIR 1981 SC 344 at p. 356, para 47) : ‘.....it is not a part of the judicial process to examine entrepreneurial activities to ferret out flaws. The Court is least equipped for such oversights. Now, indeed, it is the function of the Judges in our constitutional scheme.’ Now merely because the Scheme envisages allotment of 51% equity shares to Unilever, the scheme cannot be held to be against public interest. (b) (2001) 4 SCC 139 : ( AIR 2001 SC 724 ) the Supreme Court has ruled in para 21 (of SCC) : (para 17 of AIR) reading as under : ‘21 : So far as the fifth question is concerned, though it is no doubt true that the Court could be justified to some extent in examining the materials for finding out the true legislative intent engrafted in a statute, but the same would be done only when the statute itself is ambiguous or a particular meaning given to a particular provision of the statute would make the statute unworkable or the very purpose of enacting the statute would get frustrated. But by no stretch of imagination, would it be open for a Court to expand even the language used in the Preamble to extract the meaning of the statute or to find out the latent intention of the legislature in enacting the statute. As has been stated earlier, in the case in hand, the taking over of management statute of 1983 had been engrafted in the public interest as the legislature found that there is imperative need to take over the management of the companies until the process of nationalisation is finalised. This is apparent from the long title of the Act itself and the Preamble also indicates that to make the mills viable, it would be necessary for the public financial institutions to invest a very large sum of money, so that the mills will be rehabilitated and the interest of the workmen, employed therein, would be protected. The preamble further indicates that the process of acquisition would take a longer time and to enable the Central Government to invest a large sum of money, it was necessary in the public interest to take over the management of the undertakings. Thus, the taking over of the management of the mills was in the public interest, the said public interest being to rehabilitate the mills by pumping in huge sums of public money to protect the interest of the workers in the mills. The High Court in the impugned judgment, however, gave a restricted meaning to the purpose of the Act by interpreting the expression ‘mismanagement’ used in the first Preamble to connote fraud and dishonestly, and in our considered opinion, the High Court was wholly unjustified in going behind the apparent legislative intention as already stated and in coming to a conclusion which cannot be sustained either on the materials on record or applying the rules of interpretation of a statute. The said conclusion of the High Court as to the spirit behind the statute, therefore, cannot be sustained. From these decisions what emerges is that public interest satisfaction is that of the Government and not that of the Court. That would not mean that the Court is helpless if the facts are staring with regard to public interest. But this is not one such case where public interest is lacking as argued by the petitioner. From these decisions what emerges is that public interest satisfaction is that of the Government and not that of the Court. That would not mean that the Court is helpless if the facts are staring with regard to public interest. But this is not one such case where public interest is lacking as argued by the petitioner. Let me see the facts of the case for the purpose of consideration of public interest. Admittedly petitioner is a joint venture and it has invested several crores of rupees in terms of the industrial policy. Hundreds of workmen are employed and they have been provided with better service conditions in terms of the pleadings. When the Government in the light of its policy has chosen to include automobile and auto components manufacturing industries in the light of public interest this Court has to be extremely slow in nullifying such a decision. Public interest is a term of very wide ambit and it cannot be scuttled or squeezed, thereby arresting the growth of industry in terms of the policy of the State. Material facts, material findings and the law on the subject would compel me to accept that these notifications are issued in public interest. At this stage, I must also notice the argument of ejusdem generis of the petitioner. Petitioner strongly relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1960 SC 1080 to say that the said principle would apply to the facts of this case. The Supreme Court in para 15 has ruled that as under : ‘When general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. But the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary.’ The word otherwise as used in S. 2(b) of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act (32 of 1955) in the context only means of maintenance’. It is most likely that a word of the widest amplitude was used to cover even acts of charity and bounty. It is most likely that a word of the widest amplitude was used to cover even acts of charity and bounty. The word is not confined merely to things analogous to right or custom.’ In 1955 SC 504 the Supreme Court has ruled in para 38 as under : ‘Interpretation of Statutes —Ejusdem generis —(Civil P.C. (1908), Pre.) The true scope of the rule of ejusdem generis is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified and not its everse, that specific words which precede are controlled by the general words which follow.’ The Supreme Court again in AIR 1989 SC 1019 has ruled as under (paras 7 & 8) : ‘The expression ejusdem generis —of the same kind or nature —signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a list or string or family of genus-describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words. The Principle underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not in- tended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured. The preceding words in the statutory provision which, under this particular rule of construction, control and limit the meaning of the subsequent words must represent a genus or a family which admits of a number of species or members. If there is only one species it cannot supply the idea of a genus.’ There can be no quarrel over this position. Law is well settled with regard to the principle of ejusdem generis. If there is only one species it cannot supply the idea of a genus.’ There can be no quarrel over this position. Law is well settled with regard to the principle of ejusdem generis. What cannot be forgotten is that the satisfaction in terms of Sec. 40 and in terms of Sec. 2(a) is essential for inclusion of any industry in public interest. The word any industry in terms of the given circumstances compel me to say that the principle of ejusdem generis is not available to the facts of this case. In fact, several industries have been included to the first schedule, by many State Governments, which in no way be analogous to the five categories of industry in terms of the principal definition. This would also show that colour and shade may not be the same shade as that of the five categories of establishments/industries in terms of the Act. Parties have also addressed arguments with regard to satisfaction with regard to the notification. Sri Subba Rao, learned Senior counsel would place before me famous case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918 . He would invite my attention to the observations made in paras 42, 44, 45 to say that the Court has the necessary power to satisfy itself with regard to the satisfaction in terms of statute. From the said judgment particularly in the light of finding in para 54, it is clear that this Court can go into the legality of a notification with regard to satisfaction. In para 54, the Court would say that many of the parameters of judicial review developed in the field of administrative law are not antithetical to the field of Constitutional law, and they can equally apply to the domain covered by the Constitutional law. That is also true of the doctrine of proportionality. Sri Ganesh, learned Senior Counsel also would not dispute this proposition. Let me also see as to whether the Government is satisfied in terms of the files made available to me. I have gone through the files made available to me and also the memorandum of facts filed on 5-10-2005. From the file it is seen that initially the Government has chosen to put up a note seeking for declaration of this industry as public utility service. Honble Minister for Labour has approved the same. I have gone through the files made available to me and also the memorandum of facts filed on 5-10-2005. From the file it is seen that initially the Government has chosen to put up a note seeking for declaration of this industry as public utility service. Honble Minister for Labour has approved the same. Thereafter a detailed note has been put up and in the light of the detailed note, the Honble Minister has again approved para 11 in the case on hand. In the note put up it is seen that the Government has chosen to provide the material with regard to declaration of the industry. A reading of these reasons would show that it cannot be said that there is no satisfaction at all by the Government. This Court cannot go into the microscopic satisfaction and if the Government in its wisdom has chosen to get satisfaction with regard to public utility that decision has to prevail and the Court cannot substitute its views in the matter of satisfaction. It is for the Government to take a decision, in the largest interest and in the light of the public policy. Therefore it cannot be said that there is no satisfaction at all in terms of the material made available to the Court. It may be that some facts may warrant different satisfaction but that cannot be a ground for this Court to set aside the satisfaction that has been arrived at by the Government. Therefore the non-satisfaction argument on the part of the Government in terms of the material does not appeal to me. From the above discussions what is clear to me is that the notification has been issued strictly in terms of the statute. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF 12. This Court also has to notice that in the light of changed industrial scenario all over the globe, the wheel of the industry has to keep on moving in the larger interest of the economy of the country. The capital and labour form two wheels of the chariot namely the industry. Workmen and the management have to work together in the larger interest of attaining the required economy in the larger interest of the State as a whole. Therefore the framers of the ID Act have chosen to place restriction on both the management and workmen in terms of Sec. 22, 23 and 24 of the Act. Workmen and the management have to work together in the larger interest of attaining the required economy in the larger interest of the State as a whole. Therefore the framers of the ID Act have chosen to place restriction on both the management and workmen in terms of Sec. 22, 23 and 24 of the Act. It is a reasonable restriction. Section 22 provides prohibition of strikes and lockout by public utility service. Restriction is placed on other employees in terms of Sec. 23. A special provision is created to arrest both strikes and lockouts in terms of Sec. 24. Therefore, if the Government in its wisdom has chosen to issue a notification with a view to arrest provocative acts on the part of both the employees and employees by way of strikes and lockouts, this Court has to be slow in interfering with the policy decision of the State. 13. This Court also has to notice that even the life of the notification is only for a period of six months. It is ultimately for the Government to either extend or not to extend taking note of an over all view of the matter. Therefore on this principle also, the Court must be slow in interfering with such notification. But of course that does not mean that this Court has to shut its eyes if in a given circumstance parties are able to show arbitrariness in issuing the notification. 14. This Court also notices from the averments in the writ petition that there seems to be some industrial problems in terms of pleadings of the petitioner. Petitioner has provided a detailed account of the same in the body of the petition. The same is countered by the management. This Court makes it clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion or view or has not given any finding with regard to those industrial problems if any in terms of the pleadings of the parties. This judgment is only with regard to the notification in terms of the pleadings. In conclusion, this Court finds no good grounds to interfere with the impugned notifications. 15. In the result, this petition is rejected. Impugned notifications are up held. No costs. 16. Petition dismissed.