( 1 ) HEARD Sri V. S. R. Anjaneyulu, the learned Counsel representing the 1st revision Petitioner and Sri P. R. Prasad, the learned Counsel representing the 1st respondent-landlord. ( 2 ) THE Counsel representing respective parties raised certain contentions relating to the merits and demerits of the grounds on which R. C. C. No. 1/87 on the file of the learned Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsiff, Repalle, had been filed. The principal question canvassed is in relation to the jurisdiction of the learned Rent Controller to entertain the eviction petition in view of g. O. Ms. No. 636, which specifies rent of Rs. 1,000/- for the purpose of maintaining eviction petition under the provisions of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960 (here-in-after, in short, referred to as the Act for the purpose of convenience ). ( 3 ) ADDANKI Venkateswara Rao @ Babu, arrayed as one of the respondents in the c. R. P. filed C. M. P. No. 14688 of 2003 to transpose him as 2nd petitioner and the same was allowed by order dated 21-12-2004. The original petitioner, who filed R. C. C. No. 1/87 on the file of Rent Controller, Repalle, died and his son was brought on record by order dated 16-2-93 in I. A. No. 878/92. The 1st respondent in the aforesaid R. C. C. is the 2nd revision petitioner and the 3rd respondent in the aforesaid R. C. C. is the 1st revision petitioner. Respondents 7 to 9 in the aforesaid R. C. C. No. 1/87 were added as per orders in i. A. No. 1699/90, dated 25-4-1991. ( 4 ) THE eviction petition was filed on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and also on the ground of sub-letting. The learned Rent Controller, on appreciation of evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 and R. Ws. 1 to 4 and Exs. A. 1 to A. 18 and b. 1 to B. 29, allowed the petition with costs directing respondents 1 to 4 and 7 to 9 to deliver vacant possession within three months and dismissed the petition as against R. 5 and R. 6. Aggrieved by the same, respondents 1 to 4 and 7 to 9 in the aforesaid R. C. C. , preferred R. C. A. No. 3/96 on the file of Principal Senior civil Judge-cum-Appellate Authority, Tenali, and the same was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, respondents 1 to 4 and 7 to 9 in the aforesaid R. C. C. , preferred R. C. A. No. 3/96 on the file of Principal Senior civil Judge-cum-Appellate Authority, Tenali, and the same was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, originally, the 3rd respondent in the R. C. C. and 3rd appellant in the R. C. A. preferred the present C. R. P. and subsequent thereto, the present 2nd revision petitioner -- 1st appellant in the R. C. A. and the 1st respondent in the R. C. C. also was transposed as 2nd petitioner, as aforesaid. ( 5 ) AS already referred to supra, the principal contention raised by the counsel representing the 1st revision petitioner is the question of jurisdiction, though incidentally the other questions also had been argued. The learned Counsel would contend that though the question of jurisdiction was not raised in the counter filed before the learned Rent Controller, this question was raised specifically before the Appellate Authority and the Appellate authority decided only this question leaving apart the other contentions touching the merits and demerits of the grounds of eviction. The learned counsel also contended that even on the pleading filed before the learned Rent controller, it is clear that the rate of daily rent is Rs. 39/- and if calculated this would exceed Rs. 1,000/- and hence in the light of the deposition of P. W. 1 and also the evidence available on record, the Courts below should have arrived at a conclusion not to entertain the present eviction petition. The learned counsel placed reliance on certain decisions. The learned Counsel also would maintain that inasmuch as some deposit is lying with the landlord, there is no question of committing any default, whatsoever, much less, wilful default. The learned Counsel also would explain that inasmuch as it is only a partnership business, there is no question of sub-letting. While elaborating the submissions, the Counsel would maintain that the affidavit filed by the Counsel to the effect that the other contentions were orally given-up may not be of any consequence in the light of what had been recorded by the Appellate Authority that these questions were also argued. The learned Counsel also made certain submissions relating to the concept of waiver and to substantiate his submissions reliance was placed on certain decisions. The learned Counsel also made certain submissions relating to the concept of waiver and to substantiate his submissions reliance was placed on certain decisions. ( 6 ) PER contra, Sri Prasad, the learned Counsel representing the landlord would contend that the plea is clear and specific and the daily rent is Rs. 20/- and the other additions need not be added and even otherwise, in the factual situation, the question of jurisdiction is not a pure question of law and in the absence of a plea and clear evidence on record and also in the absence of the agreement being marked, this contention need not be seriously considered. No plea relating to the jurisdiction had been taken in the counter. The learned counsel also made certain submissions relating to what is the meaning or the definition of the word or expression "rent". The learned Counsel also would point out that the original tenant had not filed the C. R. P. and a sub-tenant cannot raise all these contentions since sub-tenant has no locus standi. Even otherwise, the transposed party-the 2nd revision petitioner and the Counsel representing the 2nd revision petitioner had not advanced any arguments. Hence, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the C. R. P. is liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) HEARD the Counsel and perused the material available on record. ( 8 ) THE questions which may have to be decided in the present C. R. P. are as hereunder:-1) Whether the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that the Rent controller has jurisdiction to entertain eviction petition be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the case? 2) Whether the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the appellate Authority suffer any legal infirmity so as to be disturbed in the present C. R. P. ? 3) If so, to what relief the parties are entitled to? ( 9 ) POINT Nos. 1 and 2:-"original landlord died and the present 1st respondent was brought on record in R. C. C. No. 1/87 on the file of Rent Controller, Repalle. It was averred by the landlord that he is the absolute owner of the Coffee Hotel sheds with Door No. 16/79 and 16/80 of Repalle. ( 9 ) POINT Nos. 1 and 2:-"original landlord died and the present 1st respondent was brought on record in R. C. C. No. 1/87 on the file of Rent Controller, Repalle. It was averred by the landlord that he is the absolute owner of the Coffee Hotel sheds with Door No. 16/79 and 16/80 of Repalle. It is also his case that respondents 1 and 2 -- Addanki Venkateswara Rao @ Babu -2nd revision petitioner herein by virtue of transposition and the 3rd respondent in the c. R. P. , and Tota Sriramakrishnaiah, had taken the petition schedule premises on lease with appurtenances in August, 1985 for running Coffee Hotel business under the name and style of Hotel Sridevi and it was also pleaded that the period of lease was for 11 months and 25 days from 15-8-1985 to 10-8-1986 and they should pay the rent @ Rs. 20/- per day and Rs. 4/- per day towards property tax. Thus, the total rent payable is Rs. 24/- per day. It was also pleaded that if they committed default of payment of rent, they have to vacate the premises and also to pay some interest. It was further pleaded that if they do not vacate the premises after the lease period, they have to pay rent at Rs. 30/- per day till they vacate the premises. It was also pleaded that in case of occupying some vacant place and constructing shed etc. , they have to pay additional rent of rs. 5/- per day and it was also pleaded that if they violate the conditions of lease, they should forfeit the earnest money of Rs. 5,000/ -. It was further pleaded that those parties, the original tenants, sold the hotel samans etc. , for running the hotel business and transferred the right to run the hotel business and goodwill. It was also specifically pleaded that the original tenants were running coffee hotel business under the name and style of Hotel sridevi for a period of about 2 to 3 months and they stopped payment of rent of rs. , for running the hotel business and transferred the right to run the hotel business and goodwill. It was also specifically pleaded that the original tenants were running coffee hotel business under the name and style of Hotel sridevi for a period of about 2 to 3 months and they stopped payment of rent of rs. 24/- per day from 26-10-1985 and committed wilful default in payment of rent and it was also pleaded that they sold away all the furniture and goodwill to the 1st revision petitioner Koneru Nageshwar Rao, shown as 3rd respondent in the r. C. C. and the details of the sub-letting had been pleaded at length. It was also further pleaded about the sending of notice on 18-6-1986 demanding them to vacate the premises and they had sent a reply with false allegations. " ( 10 ) 3rd respondent filed a counter denying the allegations and it was also pleaded that the Coffee Hotel under the name and style of Hotel Sridevi had been changed into a partnership business under the name and style Hotel Navayuga and the management was entrusted to the 1st revision petitioner herein. Specific stand was taken that the landlord was refusing to receive rents and they were always ready and willing to pay the rent. 6th respondent in R. C. C. had taken a stand that the Killi shop is in Municipal site and hence the landlord is not entitled to claim any rent. Respondents 7 to 9 in the R. C. C. , who were added, filed a counter denying the sub-letting and also taking a stand that it is a partnership business and after the death of the original landlord, when the legal representative was brought on record, an additional counter was filed taking a plea that he is not the only legal representative. ( 11 ) THE 1st respondent in the C. R. P.-the 2nd petitioner examined himself as p. W. 1 and another witness was examined as P. W. 2. Exs. A. 1 to A. 18 were marked. Likewise, R. Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. B. 1 to B. 29 were marked. The 2nd respondent was examined as RW. 1; the 3rd respondent was examined as RW. 2; R. 8 was examined as RW. 3; and R. 6 was examined as RW. 4. Exs. Exs. A. 1 to A. 18 were marked. Likewise, R. Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. B. 1 to B. 29 were marked. The 2nd respondent was examined as RW. 1; the 3rd respondent was examined as RW. 2; R. 8 was examined as RW. 3; and R. 6 was examined as RW. 4. Exs. A. 1 and A. 2 are the chits showing payment of rent; Ex. A. 3 is the office copy of the registered notice; Ex. A. 4 is the reply notice; Ex. A. 5 is yet another reply notice; Exs. A. 6, a. 7 and A. 8 are the Encroachment Tax Receipts issued by the Municipality; Ex. A. 9 is the plan of the site; Ex. A. 10 is the Will executed by the original owner; ex. A. 11 is the certified copy of the plaint in O. S. No. 199/89; Ex. A. 12 is the certified copy of the written statement in O. S. No. 199/89; Ex. A. 13 is the certified copy of the Decree in I. A. No. 1108/89 in O. S. No. 199/89; Ex. A. 14 is the invitation Act; Ex. A. 15 is the charge sheet in S. T. C. No. 170/91; Ex. A. 16 is the invitation card of Hotel Raghavendra; Ex. A. 17 is the invitation card of Hotel navayuga; and Ex. A. 18 is the certified copy of Caveat in O. P. No. 3/95. As against this documentary evidence, Ex. B. 1-is the partnership deed, dated 13-2-86; Exs. B. 2 to B. 8-Sales Tax assessment order; Ex. B. 9-Sales tax receipt; exs. B. 10 to B. 13-Municipal Licence receipts; Ex. B. 14-Prohibition Tax Receipt; exs. B. 15 to B. 17-Hotel Tax receipts; Ex. B. 18-Licence fee receipt for the year 1995-96; Ex. B. 19-Certificate for the year 1993-94; Exs. B. 20 to B. 28-Salary registers for the years 1986-87 to 1994-95; and Ex. B. 29-Letter, were marked. ( 12 ) THE learned Rent Controller framed the following points for consideration:-1) Whether the respondents 1 and 2 and respondent No. 3 sub-let the schedule premises to other respondents? 2) Whether the respondents committed wilful default in payment of rent? 3) Whether the 2nd petitioner alone become the landlord subsequent to the death of first petitioner, if not, the petition is maintainable or not?the learned Rent Controller appreciated the evidence available on record and ultimately ordered eviction. 2) Whether the respondents committed wilful default in payment of rent? 3) Whether the 2nd petitioner alone become the landlord subsequent to the death of first petitioner, if not, the petition is maintainable or not?the learned Rent Controller appreciated the evidence available on record and ultimately ordered eviction. As against the same, an appeal was preferred in r. C. A. No. 3/96 and the Appellate Authority, Tenali, also had confirmed the same. ( 13 ) ON a careful analysis of the findings recorded by the learned Rent controller and the Appellate Authority, it is clear that the plea of want of jurisdiction had not been pleaded before the learned Rent Controller but the said ground was raised as a ground of attack before the Appellate Authority. From the written arguments submitted by the parties, it appears that the principal ground of attack before the Appellate Authority was the question of jurisdiction. An affidavit was sworn to by the Advocate Sri Chunduru Rama mohana Rao of Tenali, who filed Vakalat on behalf of the contesting respondent- landlord in R. C. A. on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tenali. The learned Advocate is aged about 60 years and has been practicing as Advocate at tenali since 1959. He had sworn to an affidavit wherein at para 2 of the affidavit, it was specifically stated, "the said R. C. A. No. 3/96 was filed against the decree and judgment in RCC. No. 1/87 on the file of Principal Junior Civil judge, Repalle. R. C. C. No. 1/87 was allowed by the Court holding that the respondents-tenants committed willful default in payment of rents and that the respondents-tenants, sub-leased the premises without the consent of the petitioner-landlord. R. C. A. No. 3/96 was filed questioning the findings of the lower court. The appellant s advocate informed the court orally at the time of arguments that the appellants are giving-up their contention against the findings of the lower court and they will confine their arguments only with regard to applicability of provisions of the Rent Control Act, when the agreed rent is on daily basis. Both parties in the appeal got filed their written arguments confining to the jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court. The appellant s Advocate did not raise any objection regarding the findings of the lower court at the time of arguments. Both parties in the appeal got filed their written arguments confining to the jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court. The appellant s Advocate did not raise any objection regarding the findings of the lower court at the time of arguments. " strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in State of maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another wherein the Apex Court held, as hereunder-"public Policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of Judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. "judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation". (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v. Subramanian, AIR 1926 PC 136 ). We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still, fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhusudan v. Chandrabati, air 1917 PC 30 ). That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an Appellate Court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment. "in R. v. Mellor (1858) 7 Cox CC 454 Martin B was reported to have said :"we must consider the statement of the learned judge as absolute verity and we ought to take. His statement precisely as a record and act on it in the same manner as on a record of Court which of itself implies an absolute verity. "in King. Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose, (1924) 28 Cal WN 170 : (AIR 1924 Cal 257) (FB), Page, J. said. "these proceedings emphasise the importance of rigidly maintaining the rule that a statement by a learned Judge as to what took place during the course of a trial before him is final and decisive; it is not to be criticised or circumvented; much less is it to be exposed to animad version. "in Sarat Chandra v. Bibhabati Debi (1921) 34 Cal LJ 302 : (AIR 1921 Cal 584), Sir Asutosh Mookherjee explained what had to be done :"it is plain that in cases of this character where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, wherever practicable, is to apply to the judge, without delay and ask for rectification or review of the judgment". So the Judges record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge, himself, but nowhere else. On the strength of the aforesaid decision, submissions at length were made that what had been recorded by the learned Judge alone may have to be taken into consideration and not what had been stated in the affidavit sworn to by the counsel who represented the party before the Appellate Authority. On a careful analysis of the record available, it appears that the learned Counsel representing the appellants in the R. C. A. had not been particular about the factual findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller evidently in view of the fact that the learned Rent Controller had gone into all the aspects and recorded the factual findings relating to wilful default and sub-letting and hence, the Appellate Authority recorded certain findings on the principal question. In the light of the same, though the order impugned in the C. R. P. is not so happily worded the fact remains that on the strength of the written submissions made, the findings had been recorded and hence, this question, whether the Advocate had sworn to the correct affidavit or whether the contents of the affidavit would run contrary to the findings, if any, recorded by the learned Judge, would not arise for consideration and may not deserve serious consideration at the hands of this Court. The principal question which had been canvassed before the Revisional Court is the question of jurisdiction. Strong reliance was placed on DHIRENDRA NATH v. SUDHIR CHANDRA wherein it was held that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right but obviously an objection to jurisdiction cannot be waived for consent cannot give a Court jurisdiction where there is none and where such jurisdiction is not wanting a directory provision can be waived, but a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the public interest but in the interest of the party that waives it. Further reliance was placed on SMT. ISABELLA JOHNSON v. M. A. SUSAI (DEAD) BY LRS. , wherein it was held "a Court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. Further, it is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law. " Reliance was also placed on P. D. M. Reddy V. P. A. Rao wherein it was held "the essential element of waiver is that there must be a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. The voluntary choice is the essence of waiver. There should exist an opportunity for choice between the relinquishment and an enforcement of the right in question. It cannot be held that there has been a waiver of valuable rights where the circumstances show that what was done was involuntary. There can be no waiver of a non-existent right. Similarly, one cannot waive that which is not one s as a right at the time of waiver. It cannot be held that there has been a waiver of valuable rights where the circumstances show that what was done was involuntary. There can be no waiver of a non-existent right. Similarly, one cannot waive that which is not one s as a right at the time of waiver. Some mistake or misapprehension as to some facts which constitute the underlying assumption without which parties would not have made the contract may be sufficient to justify the court in saying that there was no consent. " Reliance was also placed on Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. Commissioner of income Tax, Mysore and another, a case arising under the Income tax Act, 1961, wherein it was held "in an order of affirmation, repetition of reasons elaborately may not be necessary. But even then the arguments advanced and the points urged have to be dealt with. Reasons for affirmation have to be indicated, though in appropriate cases they may be briefly stated. " ( 14 ) ON admitted facts, where a question of want of jurisdiction clearly emerges, the Court would be left with no other option except to hold that the court has no jurisdiction. But there may be cases where the evidence available on record may not be so clear or while deciding the question of jurisdiction several factual aspects may also have to be incidentally gone into. In the said context, a plea in this regard and also the necessary evidence to arrive at a conclusion on record may be essential. There cannot be any doubt or controversy that the question of jurisdiction can be definitely raised even before the appellate Court. As per the specific pleading the rent per day was Rs. 20/- with some addition. Whether this addition to be taken into consideration or not is yet another question. It is true that a plea had been taken that after the stipulated period, enhanced rent is payable. But the specific pleading is the period of default commenced even prior thereto and that is made the ground of wilful default. The other ground is sub-letting. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the ground taken in the counter in this regard also may have to be considered. But the specific pleading is the period of default commenced even prior thereto and that is made the ground of wilful default. The other ground is sub-letting. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the ground taken in the counter in this regard also may have to be considered. There is specific denial and specific stand and if the pleadings of both the parties are carefully scrutinized, the daily rent even if calculated would fall within the permissible limits of Rs. 1,000/- and hence, it cannot be said that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain eviction petition on the ground that for a subsequent period enhanced daily rent had been stipulated in the agreement. Apart from this aspect of the matter, whether the additions would constitute part and parcel of the rent would also be a question of fact. There is evidence of P. W. 1 available on record and RWs. 1 and 2 also deposed about this aspect. Reliance was placed on Bailuri Govinda Bhattu v. Tatavarty Sri Nagendra Ram Rao and others wherein it was held that g. O. Ms. No. 636 which speaks of only Rs. 1,000/- monthly rent payable at the end of every month does not apply to a building the rent of which is Rs. 33/- payable at the end of every day and the legal rights and obligations of the tenant and the landlord in relation to a daily rented building are vastly different from a monthly rented building and G. O. 636 should therefore be understood as dealing with only monthly rented buildings". In M/s. Heerachand Poonamchand v. M/s. Kanchan Cycle Trading Co. the learned Judge on the aspect of rent held, as hereunder:-The word rent is not defined in the Act. The word lease also is not defined in the Act. Therefore, it is but proper to look into the definition as provided under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, which reads as follows:-"a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. ""on a close reading of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is clear that the lese is a right to enjoy the property for consideration of the price of money or any service or any other thing of value to be rendered periodically and the consideration is called the rent. Therefore, from the definition of rent as contained in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is clear that the rent is the consideration which a tenant has agreed to pay to the landlord for the beneficial use of the demised premises. It is the intention of the parties in regard to the payment of consideration that matters. In the instant case, the intention of the parties is that the tenant agreed to pay a rent of Rs. 900/- and also a further sum of Rs. 300/- towards charges for amenities. The intention is that a total amount of Rs. 1200/- is payable for the letting out the suit premises to the tenant. Both the sums form an integral part of the contract between the parties. If the tenant refused to pay at the inception of the lease, the charges for amenities, the landlord would have agreed to let out the premises to the tenant. The rent that is agreed, as per the contention raised by the landlord himself inclusive of amenities is rs. 1200/ -. "in P. Rajaiah v. Veera Shaiva Vidyavardhak Sangh where an eviction petition was filed on the ground of wilful default, it was held "it makes no difference whether the tax is to be paid directly to the Municipal Authorities by the tenant as per the rental agreement or to the landlord. When once rental agreement clearly mentions that the property tax due to the demised building is to be paid by the tenant over and above the rent that was specified in the agreement and when once a default is committed by the tenant in payment of such tax even directly to the Municipality, it will amount to violation of terms of the agreement and wilful default in payment of such property tax. Where the tenant has agreed to pay the Municipal taxes as per the rental agreement, non- payment of tax would amount to non-payment of rent and thus it will form a ground for eviction. " Strong reliance was placed on State of Punjab v. British India Corpn. wherein while dealing with the provisions of Punjab Urban immovable property Tax Act, 1940 and Rules made there under, it was held that the word rent in its wider sense means any payment made for the use of land or buildings and thus includes the payment by a licencee in respect of the use and occupation of any land or building. " Reliance was also placed on certain dictionary meanings in relation to the word or expression rent. It was stated in Legal Glossary:- rent:- a return made by a tenant or occupant of land or corporeal hereditaments to the owner for the possession and use thereof; a pecuniary sum, agreed upon between a tenant and his landlord and paid at fixed intervals by the tenant to the landlord for the use of land or its appendages; a fixed periodical profit in money, provisions, chattels or services arising out of lands and tenements in payment for use. In Black s Law Dictionary it was stated:-Rent:- Consideration paid, usu. Periodically for the use or occupancy of property (esp. real property ). In Webster s Dictionary it was stated:-Rent:- 1. a stated return or payment for the temporary possession or use of a house, land, or other property, made, usually at fixed intervals, by the tenant or user to the owner 2. (Obs.) a) real estate or other property yielding an income b) income; revenue 3. Econ. a)income from the use of land b) a return or profit realized from a differential advantage in production, as the difference in yield between relatively good land and the poorest land under cultivation in similar conditions - vt. 1. a) to get temporary possession and use of (a house, land, etc.) by paying rent b) to get the temporary use of (a car, tool, furniture etc.) by paying a fee 2. to give temporary possession and use of in return for the payment of rent or a fee; lease or let (often with out) to be leased or let for rent or a fee 2. to lease or let a place or thing. to give temporary possession and use of in return for the payment of rent or a fee; lease or let (often with out) to be leased or let for rent or a fee 2. to lease or let a place or thing. ( 15 ) THE word or expression rent , no doubt, is not defined in the Act. It is no doubt true that the pleadings of the parties may have to be looked into for the purpose of deciding jurisdiction. In Sari Krishna General Stores v. B. Sai Anand Prasad the learned Judge at para 28 held :"the question is one of jurisdiction. It does not depend upon the interpretation process. Whether the rent Controller has jurisdiction or not shall have to be considered on a plain reading of the provisions of the Act and the pleading of the petitioner. " ( 16 ) IN the light of the findings recorded that the default was committed even prior to the subsequent stipulation in the agreement coming into force and also the ground of sub-letting had been specifically pleaded and proved, the said findings had not been seriously assailed and the question of jurisdiction alone principally had been argued by making even written submissions by the respective counsel and the learned Judge had gone into all the aspects and confirmed the order of eviction made by the learned Rent Controller. When the cause of action relating to a ground had arisen even prior to stipulation coming into operation in the agreement it cannot be said that on the strength of such a term, the daily rent to be computed at Rs. 39/- and hence the jurisdiction of the Rent controller is ousted by virtue of the rent exceeding Rs. 1,000/- by virtue of g. O. Ms. No. 636. Though this stand taken by the 1st revision petitioner on the face of it appears to be attractive, the same is without substance. It is true that agreement was not marked but however P. W. 1 deposed about these aspects. The learned Counsel representing the 1st revision petition however was unable to show on facts how the findings recorded relating to the other grounds cannot be sustained. The only contention is that the Appellate Authority left those grounds, evidently those were not adverted to in the light of the oral and written submissions made by the Counsel on record. The learned Counsel representing the 1st revision petition however was unable to show on facts how the findings recorded relating to the other grounds cannot be sustained. The only contention is that the Appellate Authority left those grounds, evidently those were not adverted to in the light of the oral and written submissions made by the Counsel on record. This approach of the appellate authority cannot be found fault in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, especially in the light of the specific pleading and also the evidence available on record. The learned Counsel for the 1st revision petitioner also placed reliance on K. Venkata Ramanaiah v. P. Rukminamma and sachivada Simhachalam and another v. Kalla Naidu and others. Inasmuch as clear and categorical findings had been recorded on appreciation of evidence and in the light of conduct of the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that they had not seriously persuaded the said grounds which may have to be deemed to have been waived though specifically the same had not recorded by the appellate Authority. The question of jurisdiction had been dealt with at length and findings had been recorded by the Appellate Authority. In the light of the peculiar facts of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the question of jurisdiction is being raised only with a view to drive the party to yet another forum for the purpose of gaining time and definitely this is not a bona fide plea or ground which is being urged by the tenant. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the original tenant had not preferred the C. R. P. , but however subsequently one of the original tenants had been transposed as the 2nd revision petitioner. Even if the conduct of the parties if carefully scrutinized, this Court is satisfied that the order of eviction made by both the courts below cannot be said to be either perverse or illegal, warranting interference at the hands of the revisional Court. ( 17 ) POINT No. 3:- Accordingly, the C. R. P. shall stand dismissed with costs granting a month s time to the revision petitioners to vacate the premises.